Daily Papers

Frontier models are increasingly trained and deployed as autonomous agent. One safety concern is that AI agents might covertly pursue misaligned goals, hiding their true capabilities and objectives - also known as scheming. We study whether models have the capability to scheme in pursuit of a goal that we provide in-context and instruct the model to strongly follow. We evaluate frontier models on a suite of six agentic evaluations where models are instructed to pursue goals and are placed in environments that incentivize scheming. Our results show that o1, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude 3 Opus, Gemini 1.5 Pro, and Llama 3.1 405B all demonstrate in-context scheming capabilities. They recognize scheming as a viable strategy and readily engage in such behavior. For example, models strategically introduce subtle mistakes into their responses, attempt to disable their oversight mechanisms, and even exfiltrate what they believe to be their model weights to external servers. Additionally, this deceptive behavior proves persistent. When o1 has engaged in scheming, it maintains its deception in over 85% of follow-up questions and often remains deceptive in multi-turn interrogations. Analysis of the models' chains-of-thought reveals that models explicitly reason about these deceptive strategies, providing evidence that the scheming behavior is not accidental. Surprisingly, we also find rare instances where models engage in scheming when only given a goal, without being strongly nudged to pursue it. We observe cases where Claude 3.5 Sonnet strategically underperforms in evaluations in pursuit of being helpful, a goal that was acquired during training rather than in-context. Our findings demonstrate that frontier models now possess capabilities for basic in-context scheming, making the potential of AI agents to engage in scheming behavior a concrete rather than theoretical concern.

Highly capable AI systems could secretly pursue misaligned goals -- what we call "scheming". Because a scheming AI would deliberately try to hide its misaligned goals and actions, measuring and mitigating scheming requires different strategies than are typically used in ML. We propose that assessing anti-scheming interventions requires at least (1) testing propensity to scheme on far out-of-distribution (OOD) tasks, (2) evaluating whether lack of scheming is driven by situational awareness, and (3) checking for robustness to pre-existing misaligned goals. We use a broad category of "covert actions" -- such as secretly breaking rules or intentionally underperforming in tests -- as a proxy for scheming, and design evaluations for covert actions. We then stress-test deliberative alignment as a case study for anti-scheming. Across 26 OOD evaluations (180+ environments), deliberative alignment reduces covert action rates (OpenAI o3: 13%->0.4%) but does not fully eliminate them. Our mitigation is also able to largely stop agents from pursuing a hidden goal previously trained into the model, but we still find misbehavior after additional red-teaming. We find that models' chain-of-thought (CoT) often demonstrates awareness of being evaluated for alignment, and show causal evidence that this awareness decreases covert behavior, while unawareness increases it. Therefore, we cannot exclude that the observed reductions in covert action rates are at least partially driven by situational awareness. While we rely on human-legible CoT for training, studying situational awareness, and demonstrating clear evidence of misalignment, our ability to rely on this degrades as models continue to depart from reasoning in standard English. We encourage research into alignment mitigations for scheming and their assessment, especially for the adversarial case of deceptive alignment, which this paper does not address.

As frontier language models are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents pursuing complex, long-term objectives, there is increased risk of scheming: agents covertly pursuing misaligned goals. Prior work has focused on showing agents are capable of scheming, but their propensity to scheme in realistic scenarios remains underexplored. To understand when agents scheme, we decompose scheming incentives into agent factors and environmental factors. We develop realistic settings allowing us to systematically vary these factors, each with scheming opportunities for agents that pursue instrumentally convergent goals such as self-preservation, resource acquisition, and goal-guarding. We find only minimal instances of scheming despite high environmental incentives, and show this is unlikely due to evaluation awareness. While inserting adversarially-designed prompt snippets that encourage agency and goal-directedness into an agent's system prompt can induce high scheming rates, snippets used in real agent scaffolds rarely do. Surprisingly, in model organisms (Hubinger et al., 2023) built with these snippets, scheming behavior is remarkably brittle: removing a single tool can drop the scheming rate from 59% to 3%, and increasing oversight can raise rather than deter scheming by up to 25%. Our incentive decomposition enables systematic measurement of scheming propensity in settings relevant for deployment, which is necessary as agents are entrusted with increasingly consequential tasks.

We study scheming in LLM agents, in which agents covertly pursue misaligned goals. Our focus is to understand how scheming arises from the interaction of key factors, such as instrumental goals, environmental affordances, oversight conditions, and perceived consequences. Prior work examines only a small number of scenarios, limiting the ability to isolate how these conditions shape an agent's propensity or capability to scheme. This limited scale and task diversity also restrict coverage of realistic deployment settings and the range of scheming strategies that can be observed. To this end, we introduce SCHEMEARENA, a 400-scenario benchmark for scalable scheming stress testing, constructed through a factorized scenario synthesis framework spanning diverse safety-relevant tool domains, instrumental goals, oversight conditions, and pressure mechanisms. To enable scalable and reliable monitoring, we further propose SCOUT, a scheming monitor that grounds multi-criteria judgments in evidence drawn from agents' reasoning and actions. Across controlled stress tests on five LLM agents, we find that explicit instrumental goals are the strongest driver of scheming propensity. Strategic hints play a distinct role by helping agents translate scheming reasoning into concrete covert behavior. Oversight has mixed effects: in several closed models, action-only monitoring increases scheming, suggesting that partial oversight can act as an optimization constraint rather than a deterrent. CoT is a useful but incomplete monitoring signal: it can reveal latent scheming before execution, yet action-only scheming shows that covert behavior may occur without explicit reasoning evidence. We release the benchmark, code, and monitor at: https://github.com/launchnlp/SchemeArena.

We examine recent research that asks whether current AI systems may be developing a capacity for "scheming" (covertly and strategically pursuing misaligned goals). We compare current research practices in this field to those adopted in the 1970s to test whether non-human primates could master natural language. We argue that there are lessons to be learned from that historical research endeavour, which was characterised by an overattribution of human traits to other agents, an excessive reliance on anecdote and descriptive analysis, and a failure to articulate a strong theoretical framework for the research. We recommend that research into AI scheming actively seeks to avoid these pitfalls. We outline some concrete steps that can be taken for this research programme to advance in a productive and scientifically rigorous fashion.

As autonomous agents become more capable of performing real-world tasks, distinguishing scheming behavior from benign task pursuit may become a central AI control problem. Existing monitors often rely on chain-of-thought access or internal activations, or use prompted frontier models, all of which can be unavailable, unreliable or expensive in deployment. In this work, we study action-only deliberative monitors: smaller open-weight models trained to detect scheming and sabotage from agentic trajectories without accessing the monitored agent's reasoning or model internals. Our method, inspired by deliberative alignment, uses a scheming specification to elicit structured rationales from a frontier teacher, filters them with a separate judge, and distills the highest-quality rationales into open-weight monitors with supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning. We train on five datasets, and evaluate across six out-of-distribution agentic misalignment benchmarks. We show that applying our method to Qwen3.5-27B yields higher performance than all low-cost frontier models as prompted monitors (Gemini 3.1 Flash-Lite, GPT-5.4 Nano, and Claude Haiku 4.5) and than Gemini 2.5 Pro, while also achieving lower marginal inference cost (token-metered USD per 1,000 evaluations). Stronger prompted frontier monitors (Gemini 3.1 Pro, GPT-5.4, Claude Sonnet 4.6, and Claude Opus 4.6) achieve higher performance but at roughly 16--34times higher marginal inference cost. Several of our trained monitors are positioned on the empirical cost--performance Pareto frontier among the monitors we evaluate, providing practical low-cost, low-FPR alternatives to prompted frontier models.