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Aug 12

Safety Geometry Collapse in Multimodal LLMs and Adaptive Drift Correction

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) often fail to transfer safety capabilities learned in the text modality to semantically equivalent non-text inputs, revealing a persistent multimodal safety gap. We study this gap from a representation-geometric perspective by analyzing a text-aligned refusal direction and a modality-induced drift direction. We show that multimodal inputs compress the usable separation along the refusal direction, making it no longer reliable for identifying and refusing harmful inputs. We refer to this failure mode as Safety Geometry Collapse. We quantify it through conditional refusal separability and show that stronger modality-induced drift is consistently associated with weaker refusal separability and higher attack success rates. We then validate the causal role of modality-induced drift through a fixed-strength activation intervention: counteracting the estimated drift restores refusal separability and improves multimodal safety. After drift correction, we further observe self-rectification, where the model recovers its ability to recognize and refuse harmful multimodal inputs during forward dynamics. This effect also provides an internal signal of the model's perceived harmfulness of each input. Motivated by this signal, we propose ReGap, a training-free inference-time method that adaptively corrects modality drift using self-rectification. Experiments across multiple multimodal safety benchmarks and utility benchmarks demonstrate the effectiveness of ReGap, which significantly improves the safety of MLLMs without compromising general capabilities. Our findings highlight representation-level modality alignment as a crucial direction for real-time safety improvement and for building safer, more reliable MLLMs.

  • 9 authors
·
May 17

LLMs Encode Harmfulness and Refusal Separately

LLMs are trained to refuse harmful instructions, but do they truly understand harmfulness beyond just refusing? Prior work has shown that LLMs' refusal behaviors can be mediated by a one-dimensional subspace, i.e., a refusal direction. In this work, we identify a new dimension to analyze safety mechanisms in LLMs, i.e., harmfulness, which is encoded internally as a separate concept from refusal. There exists a harmfulness direction that is distinct from the refusal direction. As causal evidence, steering along the harmfulness direction can lead LLMs to interpret harmless instructions as harmful, but steering along the refusal direction tends to elicit refusal responses directly without reversing the model's judgment on harmfulness. Furthermore, using our identified harmfulness concept, we find that certain jailbreak methods work by reducing the refusal signals without reversing the model's internal belief of harmfulness. We also find that adversarially finetuning models to accept harmful instructions has minimal impact on the model's internal belief of harmfulness. These insights lead to a practical safety application: The model's latent harmfulness representation can serve as an intrinsic safeguard (Latent Guard) for detecting unsafe inputs and reducing over-refusals that is robust to finetuning attacks. For instance, our Latent Guard achieves performance comparable to or better than Llama Guard 3 8B, a dedicated finetuned safeguard model, across different jailbreak methods. Our findings suggest that LLMs' internal understanding of harmfulness is more robust than their refusal decision to diverse input instructions, offering a new perspective to study AI safety

  • 5 authors
·
Jul 15, 2025

Do LLMs Know Their Vulnerable Scenarios?

Safety-aligned large language models are trained to refuse harmful requests, yet embedding the same requests in particular scenarios can bypass their safeguards. Existing red-teaming methods empirically identify effective scenarios through observed attack outcomes, but why particular scenarios weaken refusal remains mechanistically unclear. Meanwhile, mechanistic interpretability studies have characterized both refusal directions and jailbreak-associated features, without explaining the relationship between the two representations. In this work, we show that scenario-wrapped prompts activate internal scenario directions whose causal steering consistently reduces refusal scores. Building on this finding, we propose Concept2Scenario, a concept-based attribution framework for vulnerable scenario discovery. It instantiates a broad concept space with a sparse autoencoder, attributes refusal suppression to individual concepts, translates the identified concepts into interpretable natural-language scenarios, and identifies synergistic scenario combinations through interaction attribution. Across three open-source models, two safety benchmarks, and six black-box jailbreak methods, the discovered scenarios serve as reusable priors that improve average attack success rates by up to 18.2 percentage points. They also transfer to GPT-5, Claude-Haiku-4.5, and Gemini-3-Flash, suggesting that some scenario-level refusal vulnerabilities are shared across model families. Moreover, the identified combinations outperform their individual constituents and enable iterative attacks to succeed in fewer turns.

  • 8 authors
·
Jul 25

Efficient Refusal Ablation in LLM through Optimal Transport

Safety-aligned language models refuse harmful requests through learned refusal behaviors encoded in their internal representations. Recent activation-based jailbreaking methods circumvent these safety mechanisms by applying orthogonal projections to remove refusal directions, but these approaches treat refusal as a one-dimensional phenomenon and ignore the rich distributional structure of model activations. We introduce a principled framework based on optimal transport theory that transforms the entire distribution of harmful activations to match harmless ones. By combining PCA with closed-form Gaussian optimal transport, we achieve efficient computation in high-dimensional representation spaces while preserving essential geometric structure. Across six models (Llama-2, Llama-3.1, Qwen-2.5; 7B-32B parameters), our method achieves up to 11% higher attack success rates than state-of-the-art baselines while maintaining comparable perplexity, demonstrating superior preservation of model capabilities. Critically, we discover that layer-selective intervention (applying optimal transport to 1-2 carefully chosen layers at approximately 40-60% network depth) substantially outperforms full-network interventions, revealing that refusal mechanisms may be localized rather than distributed. Our analysis provides new insights into the geometric structure of safety representations and suggests that current alignment methods may be vulnerable to distributional attacks beyond simple direction removal.

  • 3 authors
·
Mar 4

Perfect Detection, Failed Control: The Geometry of Knowing vs. Steering in Language Models

A central aspiration of mechanistic interpretability is controllability: if we know where a behavior is represented in a model's activations, we should be able to modify it. This rests on a hidden premise -- that the direction which detects a behavior and the direction which controls it are the same, or close. We test this geometrically: what is the angle between the direction that best detects a behavior and the one that best causes it? If detection implies control the cosine is near 1; otherwise it quantifies a detection-intervention gap. On Gemma 2-2B-it, output format (clean JSON vs markdown fencing) collapses both roles onto one axis. Hallucination does not: the model detects fake entities with perfect linear separability (AUC = 1.000 from layer 5), yet that direction sits at cos = 0.12 (about 83 degrees) from the direction producing a refusal -- a small, reproducible alignment, far from the cos = 1 that "detection is control" would require. A detector built from activations, with no chosen tokens, likewise fails to align (cos = -0.06). The gap generalizes: across four models from three families and two scales (1B-9B), cos stays in [0.12, 0.20], identical before and after instruction tuning (0.1197 vs 0.1200), placing its origin in pretraining. A 15-degree rotation toward the refusal direction partially bridges it -- 73% and 60% refusal on two held-out fake-entity categories at 1.8% false positives. We then ask whether this cosine predicts steerability, and it does not: detection is a high-dimensional class, not a single direction, and what separates the steerable case is functional, not readable from a static angle. The cosine is a weight-computable signature of the dissociation between knowing and steering, not a predictor of it.

  • 5 authors
·
Jun 22

Refusal Tokens: A Simple Way to Calibrate Refusals in Large Language Models

A key component of building safe and reliable language models is enabling the models to appropriately refuse to follow certain instructions or answer certain questions. We may want models to output refusal messages for various categories of user queries, for example, ill-posed questions, instructions for committing illegal acts, or queries which require information past the model's knowledge horizon. Engineering models that refuse to answer such questions is complicated by the fact that an individual may want their model to exhibit varying levels of sensitivity for refusing queries of various categories, and different users may want different refusal rates. The current default approach involves training multiple models with varying proportions of refusal messages from each category to achieve the desired refusal rates, which is computationally expensive and may require training a new model to accommodate each user's desired preference over refusal rates. To address these challenges, we propose refusal tokens, one such token for each refusal category or a single refusal token, which are prepended to the model's responses during training. We then show how to increase or decrease the probability of generating the refusal token for each category during inference to steer the model's refusal behavior. Refusal tokens enable controlling a single model's refusal rates without the need of any further fine-tuning, but only by selectively intervening during generation.

  • 9 authors
·
Dec 9, 2024

WorldKernel: A World Model is the Coupling Kernel of Admissible Possible Worlds

A common assumption holds that enough observational and interventional data, given to a strong enough predictor, suffices. We report a failure mode that contradicts it. Across hundreds of structural causal models, on identified quantities a strong predictor and a Bayesian baseline both succeed, but on unidentified quantities (the couplings between counterfactual worlds) the predictor collapses to a point, on 28% of models to one no valid model can produce, while the truth is an admissible interval more data never narrows. The gap is structural: prediction cannot represent uncertainty over counterfactual couplings. We cast a world model as a single positive semidefinite coupling kernel K(T,T') over admissible worlds, whose diagonal is the ordinary posterior (what a predictor recovers) and whose off-diagonal is the cross-world coupling it cannot, which every counterfactual reads. The paper is the theory of that off-diagonal. It is real: two states with identical posteriors differ on a cross-world query, and the off-diagonal is the coupling that fixes counterfactuals. It can be bounded: positive semidefiniteness is partial-identifying information the marginals lack, and enforcing it bounds counterfactuals in polynomial time where the exact response-type program is intractable. Logical structure sharpens it: ontology axioms tighten the bound by up to a third, propagating to couplings they never touch. It can be acquired: targeted scars, constraints learned from encountered infeasibilities, close the gap several times faster than untargeted ones. Its full reconstruction is approximate counting of the admissible worlds, tractable below the Sly-Sun threshold and inapproximable above; we do not claim to beat the worst case.

  • 1 authors
·
Jun 8

Does Refusal Training in LLMs Generalize to the Past Tense?

Refusal training is widely used to prevent LLMs from generating harmful, undesirable, or illegal outputs. We reveal a curious generalization gap in the current refusal training approaches: simply reformulating a harmful request in the past tense (e.g., "How to make a Molotov cocktail?" to "How did people make a Molotov cocktail?") is often sufficient to jailbreak many state-of-the-art LLMs. We systematically evaluate this method on Llama-3 8B, Claude-3.5 Sonnet, GPT-3.5 Turbo, Gemma-2 9B, Phi-3-Mini, GPT-4o mini, GPT-4o, and R2D2 models using GPT-3.5 Turbo as a reformulation model. For example, the success rate of this simple attack on GPT-4o increases from 1% using direct requests to 88% using 20 past tense reformulation attempts on harmful requests from JailbreakBench with GPT-4 as a jailbreak judge. Interestingly, we also find that reformulations in the future tense are less effective, suggesting that refusal guardrails tend to consider past historical questions more benign than hypothetical future questions. Moreover, our experiments on fine-tuning GPT-3.5 Turbo show that defending against past reformulations is feasible when past tense examples are explicitly included in the fine-tuning data. Overall, our findings highlight that the widely used alignment techniques -- such as SFT, RLHF, and adversarial training -- employed to align the studied models can be brittle and do not always generalize as intended. We provide code and jailbreak artifacts at https://github.com/tml-epfl/llm-past-tense.

  • 2 authors
·
Jul 16, 2024

Training LLMs to Enforce Multi-Level Instruction Hierarchies via Gravity-Weighted Direct Preference Optimization

Production LLMs receive instructions from sources with very different levels of trust, yet attend to every token with uniform architectural privilege. This is the structural vulnerability that enables malicious prompt injections and, more broadly, leaves models without a principled way to resolve conflicts between legitimate but competing instructions. A common training-based response is to teach models an explicit instruction hierarchy; existing approaches, however, formalize hierarchies of only three or four levels, treat all violations as equally severe, and rarely evaluate the full set of pairwise level interactions. We formalize a k-level instruction hierarchy problem and instantiate it for k=5, yielding ten pairwise priority relations that a compliant model must enforce. We then introduce Gravity-Weighted DPO (GW-DPO), a preference-optimization objective whose per-sample offset scales with the structural distance between conflicting levels under a linear or bilateral schedule, the latter weighting severity by both the privilege gap and the privilege of the victim level. Combined with hierarchy-specific delimiter tokens (Chen et al., 2025) and Instructional Segment Embeddings (ISE; Wu et al., 2025), GW-DPO with the bilateral schedule Pareto-improves over standard DPO and the linear variant on Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct, raising macro pairwise priority adherence while keeping over-refusal at half the standard DPO rate. Ablations isolate ISE as a refusal-threshold calibrator and recast five- versus three-level training as a generality-specialization tradeoff.

  • 2 authors
·
Jun 8

HARC: Coupling Harmfulness and Refusal Directions for Robust Safety Alignment

Understanding how aligned LLMs internally represent safety is critical for diagnosing alignment vulnerabilities, as it explains why jailbreaks succeed and informs the design of robust alignment strategies. Prior work shows that aligned LLMs encode harmfulness and refusal as separable directions in the residual stream at prompt-side token positions. We show that jailbreaks succeed at prompt encoding by suppressing either the refusal or harmfulness direction before any token is generated, with distinct attack classes occupying separable regions of the harmfulness-refusal plane. Extending the analysis to response-token positions, we find that the model recognizes harmful content while it is generating that content, even when it failed to recognize the input as harmful at the prompt side. Motivated by our findings, we introduce HARC (Harmfulness-And-Refusal Coupling), a fine-tuning method that pairs the two directions across both prompt and response positions. Since the intervention is confined to the harmfulness-refusal subspace, it leaves the rest of the residual stream intact and does not degrade general capability or inflate over-refusal. Across extensive experiments, HARC achieves the strongest robustness-capability-usability trade-off among six baselines spanning the major training-time and inference-time safety methods. The harmfulness and refusal directions at prompt and response positions transfer across the five model families and two scales we tested without architecture-specific tuning.

  • 2 authors
·
Jun 30

Soohak: A Mathematician-Curated Benchmark for Evaluating Research-level Math Capabilities of LLMs

Following the recent achievement of gold-medal performance on the IMO by frontier LLMs, the community is searching for the next meaningful and challenging target for measuring LLM reasoning. Whereas olympiad-style problems measure step-by-step reasoning alone, research-level problems use such reasoning to advance the frontier of mathematical knowledge itself, emerging as a compelling alternative. Yet research-level math benchmarks remain scarce because such problems are difficult to source (e.g., Riemann Bench and FrontierMath-Tier 4 contain 25 and 50 problems, respectively). To support reliable evaluation of next-generation frontier models, we introduce Soohak, a 439-problem benchmark newly authored from scratch by 64 mathematicians. Soohak comprises two subsets. On the Challenge subset, frontier models including Gemini-3-Pro, GPT-5, and Claude-Opus-4.5 reach 30.4%, 26.4%, and 10.4% respectively, leaving substantial headroom, while leading open-weight models such as Qwen3-235B, GPT-OSS-120B, and Kimi-2.5 remain below 15%. Notably, beyond standard problem solving, Soohak introduces a refusal subset that probes a capability intrinsic to research mathematics: recognizing ill-posed problems and pausing rather than producing confident but unjustified answers. On this subset, no model exceeds 50%, identifying refusal as a new optimization target that current models do not directly address. To prevent contamination, the dataset will be publicly released in late 2026, with model evaluations available upon request in the interim.

EleutherAI EleutherAI
·
May 8 3

RefusalBench: Why Refusal Rate Misranks Frontier LLMs on Biological Research Prompts

Frontier large language models are increasingly deployed as orchestration backbones for biological research workflows, yet no shared evidence base exists for comparing their refusal behaviour on legitimate research prompts. RefusalBench, introduced here, is a matched-triple benchmark of 141 prompts in 47 bundles that holds task framing constant while varying only biological risk tier (benign, borderline, dual-use), enabling tier-conditioned comparisons robust to subdomain confounding. A 15-prompt should-refuse positive-control module establishes per-model calibration floors; three models fail to refuse even these prompts. Across 19 frontier models in the May 2026 snapshot, strict refusal rates span 0.1% to 94.6% on identical prompts. Jurisdiction does not predict refusal in this snapshot (Mann-Whitney U, p = 0.393; EU n = 1, US bimodal); provider identity does, with Anthropic's API stack predicting refusal at OR = 21.03 (95% CI: 14.58-30.34 prompt-clustered; 5.70-77.55 under model-clustered GEE). This effect is best read as access-path-level rather than model-weight-level: 99.8% of Anthropic's strict refusals carry the same safety_policy adjudicated reason code, consistent with a small set of canonical refusal templates rather than case-by-case model reasoning. Strict refusal rate misranks safety calibration: Grok 4.20 achieves the highest tier discrimination (Youden's J = 0.787) while ranking only seventh by overall refusal rate, and Claude Opus 4.7's J dropped 65% from prior versions with no improvement in dual-use detection. Nine of 18 frontier models exhibit a hedge-but-help partial-compliance pattern at dual-use tier that binary refusal metrics cannot detect.

  • 5 authors
·
May 19

Can LLMs Refuse Questions They Do Not Know? Measuring Knowledge-Aware Refusal in Factual Tasks

Large Language Models (LLMs) should refuse to answer questions beyond their knowledge. This capability, which we term knowledge-aware refusal, is crucial for factual reliability. However, existing metrics fail to faithfully measure this ability. On the one hand, simple refusal-based metrics are biased by refusal rates and yield inconsistent scores when models exhibit different refusal tendencies. On the other hand, existing calibration metrics are proxy-based, capturing the performance of auxiliary calibration processes rather than the model's actual refusal behavior. In this work, we propose the Refusal Index (RI), a principled metric that measures how accurately LLMs refuse questions they do not know. We define RI as Spearman's rank correlation between refusal probability and error probability. To make RI practically measurable, we design a lightweight two-pass evaluation method that efficiently estimates RI from observed refusal rates across two standard evaluation runs. Extensive experiments across 16 models and 5 datasets demonstrate that RI accurately quantifies a model's intrinsic knowledge-aware refusal capability in factual tasks. Notably, RI remains stable across different refusal rates and provides consistent model rankings independent of a model's overall accuracy and refusal rates. More importantly, RI provides insight into an important but previously overlooked aspect of LLM factuality: while LLMs achieve high accuracy on factual tasks, their refusal behavior can be unreliable and fragile. This finding highlights the need to complement traditional accuracy metrics with the Refusal Index for comprehensive factuality evaluation.

  • 8 authors
·
Oct 2, 2025

Power law graph attention: exact generalization of scaled dot-product attention, empirical collapse at inference

The Large Language Model from Power Law Decoder Representations (PLDR-LLM) and its attention, Power Law Graph Attention (PLGA), replace the fixed bilinear form of scaled dot-product attention (SDPA) with a learned, input-generated bilinear operator G_{LM}, built from a positive tensor A_{LM} by elementwise power laws. The architecture is fully specified, verified against pinned reference releases; claims are labeled theorem, conditional theorem, measurement, or conjecture. Unconditionally: PLGA contains SDPA exactly at G_{LM}=I; A_{LM} and A_P are strictly entrywise positive, with Perron-Frobenius structure on A_{LM}; the DAG regularizer has the NOTEARS walk-counting form and positivity obstructs exact acyclicity; and, under nonresonance (satisfied by standard rotary frequencies), a commutant criterion identifies which operators preserve relative-position dependence. An inference-collapse theorem: exact input invariance of deductive outputs collapses inference to generalized SDPA with a constant operator. Measured invariance: relative fluctuations of 10^{-6} and below; perturbation bounds quantify but do not certify cached inference; the assembled proxy misses the decoding margin. A conditional three-stage mechanism (rotary twirl, concentration, row-map contraction) is measured on a released checkpoint. Blockwise training and scoring under the global Gram are stated with explicit target exposure; on tested samples, block and sequential scoring select identical answers and agree on the published TruthfulQA probability-mass metric within 5times 10^{-5} per item. Self-organized criticality enters as a phenomenological framework with an intrinsic order parameter; open claims become falsifiable conjectures. Selected proof cores are machine-checked in Lean 4.

Refusal Falls off a Cliff: How Safety Alignment Fails in Reasoning?

Large reasoning models (LRMs) with multi-step reasoning capabilities have shown remarkable problem-solving abilities, yet they exhibit concerning safety vulnerabilities that remain poorly understood. In this work, we investigate why safety alignment fails in reasoning models through a mechanistic interpretability lens. Using a linear probing approach to trace refusal intentions across token positions, we discover a striking phenomenon termed as refusal cliff: many poorly-aligned reasoning models correctly identify harmful prompts and maintain strong refusal intentions during their thinking process, but experience a sharp drop in refusal scores at the final tokens before output generation. This suggests that these models are not inherently unsafe; rather, their refusal intentions are systematically suppressed. Through causal intervention analysis, we identify a sparse set of attention heads that negatively contribute to refusal behavior. Ablating just 3\% of these heads can reduce attack success rates below 10\%. Building on these mechanistic insights, we propose Cliff-as-a-Judge, a novel data selection method that identifies training examples exhibiting the largest refusal cliff to efficiently repair reasoning models' safety alignment. This approach achieves comparable safety improvements using only 1.7\% of the vanilla safety training data, demonstrating a less-is-more effect in safety alignment.

dots-studio dots studio
·
Oct 7, 2025 2

PsychoSafe: Eliciting Psychologically-Informed Refusals in Large Language Models

Large language models (LLMs) routinely face requests that should be refused, creating a trade-off between helpfulness and harm prevention. However, refusals themselves can be helpful. In high-risk interactions involving crisis, coercion, or escalating intent, blunt non-compliance may prevent direct harm while still failing to support the needs of the person behind the request. We present PsychoSafe, a psychologically-informed refusal framework that reframes refusal as structured supportive communication grounded in evidence-based intervention strategies. To develop PsychoSafe, we construct a corpus of 8019 prompt-response pairs spanning five psychologically salient risk domains and apply prompting and parameter-efficient fine-tuning to Qwen 3.5 27B. On a balanced validation set of 500 prompts, evaluated with an LLM judge and validated through human ratings, PsychoSafe prompting improves overall refusal quality by 28.1% over a generic baseline, with particularly strong gains in external resource referral (+46.8%) and psychological grounding (+34.8%), while preserving downstream performance on non-refusal tasks. Fine-tuning achieves near-perfect refusal and resource-referral rates but reduces response relevance. Additional evaluations on SORRY-Bench and XSTest show strong in-domain robustness but limited out-of-domain generalization, suggesting that future work should diversify fine-tuning data to help models apply interventions selectively rather than schematically.

Coherence Under Commitment: Probing Generalization and Vacuous Memorization in LLM Logical Reasoning

Large language models (LLMs) deployed for logical reasoning in knowledge-intensive domains exhibit a subtle but critical failure: coherence can be vacuously achieved through systematic abstention. A model that withholds commitment to either entailment or refutation satisfies negation consistency while providing no utility. We introduce Coherence Under Commitment (CUC), a dual-query evaluation paradigm that jointly measures consistency and decisiveness. CUC contributes three innovations: (1) a commitment score c(φ) = p(φ) + p(lnotφ) quantifying probability mass allocated to decisive outcomes; (2) a deterministic elicitation protocol via normalized YES/NO log probabilities, eliminating sampling variance; and (3) a 3-way decision framework (True/False/Uncertain) operationalizing the coherence-commitment trade-off into metrics. Experiments on four open-weight LLMs (1B-3B) across 204 FOLIO examples expose a sharp frontier. Qwen2.5-3B achieves near-zero contradiction (E[v_{neg}]{=}0.025) but only 7.4% coverage, while TinyLlama-1.1B reaches 79.4% coverage with violations on every example. Coherence-only evaluation would rank the abstaining model first; CUC exposes this as vacuous, and the frontier generalizes to LogiQA~v2 (ρ{=}0.97). We argue that evaluation must report both coherence and non-vacuous commitment and release a toolkit for standardized assessment.

  • 2 authors
·
Jun 18

A Taxonomy of Event-Linked Perpetual Futures: Variant Designs Beyond the Single-Market Binary Case

Paper 1 of this research programme develops a resolution-aware risk-design framework for the simplest event-linked perpetual: a contract whose underlying tracks a single binary prediction-market probability through resolution. The instrument class is broader. Variants span conditional probabilities P(A|B), spreads p^A - p^B, weighted baskets sum w_i p^(i), derivatives on variance or entropy of the probability process, contracts on liquidity itself, perpetual-on-expiring-event roll structures, and funding-only derivatives with no settlement. Each variant inherits some framework components from the single-market binary case and requires its own design adaptations. This paper develops a formal taxonomy of seven pure-form canonical variants beyond the probability-index perpetual of Paper 1, organised along four orthogonal design axes: underlying geometry, temporal structure, settlement structure, and venue composition. The list is not exhaustive; combinations are not treated separately. For each variant we provide a precise payoff definition; an inheritance map identifying which Paper 1 components carry over, are modified, or fail; variant-specific design constraints; microstructure properties; empirical evaluability on the PMXT v2 archive; and limitations. Notable findings: the conditional variant admits a candidate non-portability proposition (denominator instability as the conditioning event becomes improbable); the spread variant requires a three-channel decomposition of resolution risk; the volatility/entropy variant avoids random binary terminal-collapse but introduces estimator-convention and entropy-decay issues; the basket variant requires multi-period jump-aware margin whose aggregation is correlation-dependent. The paper is theoretical primarily; it specifies how demonstrative time series can be constructed and provides evaluability criteria to guide future work.

  • 1 authors
·
May 10

Detection Is Cheap, Routing Is Learned: Why Refusal-Based Alignment Evaluation Fails

Current alignment evaluation mostly measures whether models encode dangerous concepts and whether they refuse harmful requests. Both miss the layer where alignment often operates: routing from concept detection to behavioral policy. We study political censorship in Chinese-origin language models as a natural experiment, using probes, surgical ablations, and behavioral tests across nine open-weight models from five labs. Three findings follow. First, probe accuracy alone is non-diagnostic: political probes, null controls, and permutation baselines can all reach 100%, so held-out category generalization is the informative test. Second, surgical ablation reveals lab-specific routing. Removing the political-sensitivity direction eliminates censorship and restores accurate factual output in most models tested, while one model confabulates because its architecture entangles factual knowledge with the censorship mechanism. Cross-model transfer fails, indicating that routing geometry is model- and lab-specific. Third, refusal is no longer the dominant censorship mechanism. Within one model family, hard refusal falls to zero while narrative steering rises to the maximum, making censorship invisible to refusal-only benchmarks. These results support a three-stage descriptive framework: detect, route, generate. Models often retain the relevant knowledge; alignment changes how that knowledge is expressed. Evaluations that audit only detection or refusal therefore miss the routing mechanism that most directly determines behavior.

  • 1 authors
·
Mar 18

Belief-reality separation lives in routing over a shared value slot in language models

Capable language models hold what a character believes apart from what is true: told "Anna believes the cup is blue; in reality it is red," they answer blue about Anna and red about the world. Where in the computation does that separation live? We show it rests on two separable mechanisms at two positions. A generic value slot binds the attributed value. A router at the query position selects which frame, the character's belief or reality, a query reads out. Two routes fill the slot: an asserted belief, whose value the text supplies, binds in directly; a derived belief, whose value must be inferred from what the character could see, arrives by a visibility-gated lookback. A subspace trained on either route steers the other, and only the derived route depends on described visibility. The slot itself carries no belief-reality tag: intervening on it moves a reality readout as strongly as a belief one. The separation lives instead in a dissociated pair of routing subspaces, which flip a query between frames without injecting the donor's value. These results hold across three architectures, on stimuli de-confounded against theory-of-mind-benchmark shortcuts; the behavior itself emerges between 3B and 7B across five model families. This paper develops the single belief-reality axis in depth; a companion paper shows the same slot-and-router format is shared across the other non-actual contexts a sentence can open (counterfactual, fictional, temporal).

  • 3 authors
·
Jul 10

Learning with Boolean threshold functions

We develop a method for training neural networks on Boolean data in which the values at all nodes are strictly pm 1, and the resulting models are typically equivalent to networks whose nonzero weights are also pm 1. The method replaces loss minimization with a nonconvex constraint formulation. Each node implements a Boolean threshold function (BTF), and training is expressed through a divide-and-concur decomposition into two complementary constraints: one enforces local BTF consistency between inputs, weights, and output; the other imposes architectural concurrence, equating neuron outputs with downstream inputs and enforcing weight equality across training-data instantiations of the network. The reflect-reflect-relax (RRR) projection algorithm is used to reconcile these constraints. Each BTF constraint includes a lower bound on the margin. When this bound is sufficiently large, the learned representations are provably sparse and equivalent to networks composed of simple logical gates with pm 1 weights. Across a range of tasks -- including multiplier-circuit discovery, binary autoencoding, logic-network inference, and cellular automata learning -- the method achieves exact solutions or strong generalization in regimes where standard gradient-based methods struggle. These results demonstrate that projection-based constraint satisfaction provides a viable and conceptually distinct foundation for learning in discrete neural systems, with implications for interpretability and efficient inference.

  • 2 authors
·
Feb 19

Instructing Large Language Models to Identify and Ignore Irrelevant Conditions

Math word problem (MWP) solving requires generating a reasoning path based on a given problem description that often contains irrelevant conditions. Existing chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting methods elicited multi-step reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs) to solve MWPs. However, they were seriously confused by the irrelevant conditions, resulting in low accuracy. In this paper, we propose a novel approach named I^3C that instructs LLMs to identify and ignore irrelevant conditions. It identifies a set of irrelevant condition candidates that have a weak semantic relevance with the question. Then it prompts LLMs to verify the irrelevant conditions. Lastly it instructs the LLMs with the verification on relevant and irrelevant conditions to avoid confusion and improve reasoning paths. Moreover, we propose to select (problem, reasoning paths) pairs as demonstrations to enhance I^3C with few-shot reasoning. We develop I^3C-Select that selects the most confusing problems based on the semantic relevance measurement. We conduct extensive experiments on eight MWP datasets. I^3C can be combined with any CoT prompting methods to improve the performance of solving MWPs. Notably, with GPT-3.5-Turbo and I^3C-Select, we achieve an accuracy of 96.0 and 94.1 on GSM-IC2-1K and GSM-ICM-1K, respectively, significantly outperforming the state-of-the-art few-shot prompting method Complex-CoT by +11.7 and +11.1. Our implementation is made publicly available at https://wzy6642.github.io/I3C.github.io/.

  • 3 authors
·
Mar 19, 2024

FlowBender: Feedback-Aware Training for Self-Correcting Conditional Flows

Conditional diffusion and flow models routinely fail to satisfy the very constraints that define their task. For instance, a depth-conditioned model often produces images whose re-extracted depth disagrees with the input, even though the forward operator--the depth predictor defining the constraint--is available during both training and inference. Existing approaches generally fall into two categories: supervised models that treat the conditioning signal as a static cue and ignore alignment information at inference, and guidance-based methods that consult it through hand-tuned linear updates, typically trading fidelity to the condition against the plausibility of the generated sample. We argue that the fundamental gap in both paradigms is that the model is never trained to utilize its own alignment error. We introduce FlowBender, a closed-loop framework that treats this error as a first-class input, training the network to learn a correction policy conditioned on inference-time feedback. At each step, an unguided look-ahead pass estimates the clean signal, a task-specific deviation is computed via the forward operator, and a refinement pass consumes this signal to produce a corrected velocity. We propose several variants of FlowBender, including a gradient-based formulation for differentiable operators and a zero-order variant for non-differentiable settings such as JPEG compression. For efficient sampling, we introduce a prior-step shortcut that enables closed-loop correction at a minimal additional computational cost. Across image-to-image translation, restoration, and 3D mesh texturing, FlowBender consistently outperforms standard supervised baselines, alignment-loss-augmented training, and state-of-the-art inference-time guidance, improving fidelity and plausibility simultaneously rather than trading them against each other. Project page: https://flow-bender.github.io/

Oyster-I: Beyond Refusal -- Constructive Safety Alignment for Responsible Language Models

Large language models (LLMs) typically deploy safety mechanisms to prevent harmful content generation. Most current approaches focus narrowly on risks posed by malicious actors, often framing risks as adversarial events and relying on defensive refusals. However, in real-world settings, risks also come from non-malicious users seeking help while under psychological distress (e.g., self-harm intentions). In such cases, the model's response can strongly influence the user's next actions. Simple refusals may lead them to repeat, escalate, or move to unsafe platforms, creating worse outcomes. We introduce Constructive Safety Alignment (CSA), a human-centric paradigm that protects against malicious misuse while actively guiding vulnerable users toward safe and helpful results. Implemented in Oyster-I (Oy1), CSA combines game-theoretic anticipation of user reactions, fine-grained risk boundary discovery, and interpretable reasoning control, turning safety into a trust-building process. Oy1 achieves state-of-the-art safety among open models while retaining high general capabilities. On our Constructive Benchmark, it shows strong constructive engagement, close to GPT-5, and unmatched robustness on the Strata-Sword jailbreak dataset, nearing GPT-o1 levels. By shifting from refusal-first to guidance-first safety, CSA redefines the model-user relationship, aiming for systems that are not just safe, but meaningfully helpful. We release Oy1, code, and the benchmark to support responsible, user-centered AI.

  • 27 authors
·
Sep 1, 2025

Separable neural architectures as a primitive for unified predictive and generative intelligence

Intelligent systems across physics, language and perception often exhibit factorisable structure, yet are typically modelled by monolithic neural architectures that do not explicitly exploit this structure. The separable neural architecture (SNA) addresses this by formalising a representational class that unifies additive, quadratic and tensor-decomposed neural models. By constraining interaction order and tensor rank, SNAs impose a structural inductive bias that factorises high-dimensional mappings into low-arity components. Separability need not be a property of the system itself: it often emerges in the coordinates or representations through which the system is expressed. Crucially, this coordinate-aware formulation reveals a structural analogy between chaotic spatiotemporal dynamics and linguistic autoregression. By treating continuous physical states as smooth, separable embeddings, SNAs enable distributional modelling of chaotic systems. This approach mitigates the nonphysical drift characteristics of deterministic operators whilst remaining applicable to discrete sequences. The compositional versatility of this approach is demonstrated across four domains: autonomous waypoint navigation via reinforcement learning, inverse generation of multifunctional microstructures, distributional modelling of turbulent flow and neural language modelling. These results establish the separable neural architecture as a domain-agnostic primitive for predictive and generative intelligence, capable of unifying both deterministic and distributional representations.

  • 5 authors
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Mar 12

Yet another argument in favour of NP=CoNP

This article shows yet another proof of NP=CoNP$. In a previous article, we proved that NP=PSPACE and from it we can conclude that NP=CoNP immediately. The former proof shows how to obtain polynomial and, polynomial in time checkable Dag-like proofs for all purely implicational Minimal logic tautologies. From the fact that Minimal implicational logic is PSPACE-complete we get the proof that NP=PSPACE. This first proof of NP=CoNP uses Hudelmaier linear upper-bound on the height of Sequent Calculus minimal implicational logic proofs. In an addendum to the proof of NP=PSPACE, we observe that we do not need to use Hudelmaier upper-bound since any proof of non-hamiltonicity for any graph is linear upper-bounded. By the CoNP-completeness of non-hamiltonicity, we obtain NP=CoNP as a corollary of the first proof. In this article we show the third proof of CoNP=NP, also providing polynomial size and polynomial verifiable certificates that are Dags. They are generated from normal Natural Deduction proofs, linear height upper-bounded too, by removing redundancy, i.e., repeated parts. The existence of repeated parts is a consequence of the redundancy theorem for a family of super-polynomial proofs in the purely implicational Minimal logic. It is mandatory to read at least two previous articles to get the details of the proof presented here. The article that proves the redundancy theorem and the article that shows how to remove the repeated parts of a normal Natural Deduction proof to have a polynomial Dag certificate for minimal implicational logic tautologies.

  • 1 authors
·
Dec 28, 2020

Discrete Contrastive Diffusion for Cross-Modal Music and Image Generation

Diffusion probabilistic models (DPMs) have become a popular approach to conditional generation, due to their promising results and support for cross-modal synthesis. A key desideratum in conditional synthesis is to achieve high correspondence between the conditioning input and generated output. Most existing methods learn such relationships implicitly, by incorporating the prior into the variational lower bound. In this work, we take a different route -- we explicitly enhance input-output connections by maximizing their mutual information. To this end, we introduce a Conditional Discrete Contrastive Diffusion (CDCD) loss and design two contrastive diffusion mechanisms to effectively incorporate it into the denoising process, combining the diffusion training and contrastive learning for the first time by connecting it with the conventional variational objectives. We demonstrate the efficacy of our approach in evaluations with diverse multimodal conditional synthesis tasks: dance-to-music generation, text-to-image synthesis, as well as class-conditioned image synthesis. On each, we enhance the input-output correspondence and achieve higher or competitive general synthesis quality. Furthermore, the proposed approach improves the convergence of diffusion models, reducing the number of required diffusion steps by more than 35% on two benchmarks, significantly increasing the inference speed.

  • 6 authors
·
Jun 15, 2022

Why Do Reasoning Models Lose Coverage? The Role of Data and Forks in the Road

Recent progress in large language models has led to the emergence of reasoning models, which have shown strong performance on complex tasks through specialized fine-tuning procedures. While these methods reliably improve pass@1 accuracy, prior works have observed that they show a coverage shrinkage behavior, where pass@k degrades relative to the base model. In this paper, we investigate the reasoning shrinkage arise under SFT-based post-training. We hypothesize that this behavior is driven by properties of the fine-tuning data, specifically related to decision points or "forks in the road" scenarios where model faces indecipherable patterns with multiple valid reasoning paths. To test this hypothesis, we design controlled case studies that simulate such decision-point settings, spanning indecipherable nodes in graph branching, and reasoning modes. By tracking post-training dynamics in these settings, we find that the shrinkage phenomenon is tightly correlated with the prevalence of decision-point scenarios in the training data. We also demonstrate that this shrinkage behavior can be partially mitigated through targeted data synthesis design of decision-points, and a more systematic diversity-encouraging decoding mechanism. Our findings identify data-centric factors as a key driver of shrinkage in reasoning models and highlight diversity-aware designs as an effective lever for controlling it.

  • 7 authors
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May 15 1

NRR-Core: Non-Resolution Reasoning as a Computational Framework for Contextual Identity and Ambiguity Preservation

Current artificial intelligence systems exhibit a fundamental architectural limitation: they resolve ambiguity prematurely. This premature semantic collapse--collapsing multiple valid interpretations into single outputs--stems from classical identity assumptions in neural architectures. We propose Non-Resolution Reasoning (NRR), a framework treating ambiguity retention as a valid reasoning mode. NRR introduces three principles: (1) Non-Identity (A neq A)--the same symbol refers to different entities across contexts; (2) Approximate Identity (A approx A)--entities share partial structural overlap without being identical; (3) Non-Resolution--conflicting interpretations coexist without forced convergence. We formalize these through Multi-Vector Embeddings for context-dependent representation, Non-Collapsing Attention for parallel interpretation retention, and Contextual Identity Tracking (CIT) for maintaining A neq A across inference. We illustrate NRR through case studies in paradox handling, creative generation, and context-dependent reasoning. Functional verification in a synthetic two-turn disambiguation task shows NRR-lite maintains high entropy (H = 0.91 bits, near-maximum 1.0) at ambiguous turns while standard architectures collapse early (H = 0.15 bits), preserving interpretive flexibility until context arrives. NRR challenges the assumption that meaning must collapse to be useful. The question is not whether AI should resolve ambiguity, but when, how, and under whose control.

  • 1 authors
·
Dec 15, 2025

FLARE: Toward Universal Dataset Purification against Backdoor Attacks

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are susceptible to backdoor attacks, where adversaries poison datasets with adversary-specified triggers to implant hidden backdoors, enabling malicious manipulation of model predictions. Dataset purification serves as a proactive defense by removing malicious training samples to prevent backdoor injection at its source. We first reveal that the current advanced purification methods rely on a latent assumption that the backdoor connections between triggers and target labels in backdoor attacks are simpler to learn than the benign features. We demonstrate that this assumption, however, does not always hold, especially in all-to-all (A2A) and untargeted (UT) attacks. As a result, purification methods that analyze the separation between the poisoned and benign samples in the input-output space or the final hidden layer space are less effective. We observe that this separability is not confined to a single layer but varies across different hidden layers. Motivated by this understanding, we propose FLARE, a universal purification method to counter various backdoor attacks. FLARE aggregates abnormal activations from all hidden layers to construct representations for clustering. To enhance separation, FLARE develops an adaptive subspace selection algorithm to isolate the optimal space for dividing an entire dataset into two clusters. FLARE assesses the stability of each cluster and identifies the cluster with higher stability as poisoned. Extensive evaluations on benchmark datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of FLARE against 22 representative backdoor attacks, including all-to-one (A2O), all-to-all (A2A), and untargeted (UT) attacks, and its robustness to adaptive attacks. Codes are available at https://github.com/THUYimingLi/BackdoorBox{BackdoorBox} and https://github.com/vtu81/backdoor-toolbox{backdoor-toolbox}.

  • 6 authors
·
Nov 29, 2024

Skin-Deep: A Geometric Diagnostic for Alignment Fragility in Large Language Model Representations

Alignment tuning is meant to make harmful-request refusal robust, yet this safety behavior can be erased by a small set of benign fine-tuning examples. This is a deployment risk for open-weight models because a checkpoint can pass refusal tests at release time and later lose refusal under low-cost downstream fine-tuning. Prior work has established these refusal failures, but existing studies do not show how to detect this fragility in the aligned model itself before an attack or fine-tuning intervention is run. We introduce Skin-Deep, a geometric diagnostic that detects alignment fragility directly from the aligned model's hidden-state activations before such an intervention is run and compresses the layer-wise safety geometry into a single scalar, the Geometric Fragility Score (GFS). Applied to twenty-one instruction-tuned models spanning six alignment recipes and 3B--32B parameters, Skin-Deep reveals a recurring low-rank safety subspace across model families. Direction ablations show that removing directions in this subspace weakens harmful-request refusal, providing causal evidence that the recovered geometry underlies refusal behavior. Crucially, GFS identifies, before any fine-tuning, the initially safe model that retains the most refusal after small-scale LoRA fine-tuning. These results establish GFS as a practical pre-deployment diagnostic for flagging fragile refusal behavior without running an attack.

  • 8 authors
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Jun 20

H-CoT: Hijacking the Chain-of-Thought Safety Reasoning Mechanism to Jailbreak Large Reasoning Models, Including OpenAI o1/o3, DeepSeek-R1, and Gemini 2.0 Flash Thinking

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have recently extended their powerful reasoning capabilities to safety checks-using chain-of-thought reasoning to decide whether a request should be answered. While this new approach offers a promising route for balancing model utility and safety, its robustness remains underexplored. To address this gap, we introduce Malicious-Educator, a benchmark that disguises extremely dangerous or malicious requests beneath seemingly legitimate educational prompts. Our experiments reveal severe security flaws in popular commercial-grade LRMs, including OpenAI o1/o3, DeepSeek-R1, and Gemini 2.0 Flash Thinking. For instance, although OpenAI's o1 model initially maintains a high refusal rate of about 98%, subsequent model updates significantly compromise its safety; and attackers can easily extract criminal strategies from DeepSeek-R1 and Gemini 2.0 Flash Thinking without any additional tricks. To further highlight these vulnerabilities, we propose Hijacking Chain-of-Thought (H-CoT), a universal and transferable attack method that leverages the model's own displayed intermediate reasoning to jailbreak its safety reasoning mechanism. Under H-CoT, refusal rates sharply decline-dropping from 98% to below 2%-and, in some instances, even transform initially cautious tones into ones that are willing to provide harmful content. We hope these findings underscore the urgent need for more robust safety mechanisms to preserve the benefits of advanced reasoning capabilities without compromising ethical standards.

  • 9 authors
·
Feb 18, 2025

Capability from Access Structure, Not Scale: Lower Bounds and Pre-Registered Tests for Hybrid Sequence Models

The Platonic Representation Hypothesis (PRH) holds that as models scale, representations of heterogeneous networks converge toward a shared model of reality. We propose its sequel and boundary, the Capability Convergence Hypothesis (CCH): under a fixed per-token inference budget, representational convergence does not entail capability convergence. Capability instead converges toward a class, the access-complete hybrid: any architecture holding both a compressive O(1)-state channel and a scalable verbatim-index channel. We anchor it on a witness task, the Newton's-apple problem in an infinite stream, and name three resource walls: a Shannon wall barring any o(Nb)-state architecture, a horizon wall barring any fixed window, and a circuit wall barring fixed-depth attention-only composition (conditional on TC0 != NC1). Under an explicit separability assumption a hybrid crosses all three by paying each wall's price, so capability is strictly super-additive under composition. We separate what we prove from what we conjecture: the access-completeness principle rests on information-theoretic lower bounds and pre-registered experiments, while the field-level convergence trend is an economics-motivated conjecture. We report the first pre-registered small-scale tests under criteria frozen before the data: the predicted scissors gap is measured (exact-retrieval error 0.994 vs. 0.000 once a 64-scalar state gains one global-attention layer), the state-tracking bifurcation lands at the registered boundary, and a conjunction witness shows an irreducibly two-channel solution; one prediction failed with its direction reversed and is reported as such. Representational convergence is given freely by scale; capability convergence must be purchased by access structure.

  • 4 authors
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Jul 13 1

Quality Is Not a Safety Proxy Under Quantization

Quantized checkpoints are often screened first with quality metrics and only later, if at all, with direct safety tests. This paper audits that shortcut on a matched 51-row matrix spanning 6 models, 4 families, a 7-level GGUF ladder, and AWQ/GPTQ INT4 checkpoints. In this matrix the shortcut fails: all 36 quality-safety pairings split direction across models, and 9 hidden-danger rows plus 1 near-hidden-danger row show quality stable or improved while refusal falls by 12-68 percentage points. Seven of the 11 AWQ/GPTQ rows are hidden-danger. A four-probe mechanistic follow-up over the 17 Hugging Face-backed FP16/AWQ/GPTQ cells does not rescue it: entropy, refusal-direction, and calibration probes are weak or null separators of dangerous rows, and although probe-identified safety-associated neurons absorb 1.39times more quantization error overall (p < 5 times 10^{-7}), the effect is not regime-specific. Claude Sonnet 4 relabels 11,470 items in a predefined stratified set, agrees with the primary gemma3:12b judge on 89.9\% of rows (κ= 0.873, 95\% CI [0.866, 0.881]), and changes 0/10 hidden-danger cells. A calibrated study-internal behavioral screen -- the Refusal Template Stability Index (RTSI), built from four refusal-template drift features and calibrated on this matrix -- routes 10/10 hidden- or near-hidden-danger rows to direct safety testing (Wilson 95\% CI lower bound 0.72) while leaving 23 of 45 non-baseline rows in a low-risk bucket under both in-sample scoring and row-level leave-one-out validation; on the same matrix, the best single-feature baselines (unique-prefix-rate-delta, raw refusal-rate delta) recover 9/10 and 8/10 respectively at matched bucket size, and cross-stack transfer requires recalibration. For the quantized checkpoints, model families, and safety outcomes studied here, retained quality cannot waive direct safety evaluation.

  • 1 authors
·
Jun 7

BoostStep: Boosting mathematical capability of Large Language Models via improved single-step reasoning

Cutting-edge large language models (LLMs) demonstrate promising performance in solving complex math problems with a divide-and-conquer pipeline and the assistance of in-context learning (ICL) examples. However, their potential for improvement is limited by two critical problems within their ICL examples: granularity-mismatch and the ensuing negative-effect noise problem. Specifically, the LLMs are capable of the dividing process yet mostly failed by inaccurate reasoning within a few conquer steps, while the ICL examples retrieved in question-grained sometimes lack relevant steps for a specific challenging reasoning step. Further, this disconnect may hinder the correct reasoning due to its irrelevance. To this end, we focus on improving the reasoning quality within each step and present BoostStep. BoostStep aligns the granularity between the retrieving and reasoning on step grained, and provides highly related ICL examples for each reasoning step with a novel `first-try' strategy. BoostStep provides more relevant examples than the coarse question-grained strategy, enhancing the model reasoning quality within each step steadily. BoostStep is a general and robust reasoning-enhancing method that not only improves standalone reasoning performance but also integrates seamlessly with Monte Carlo Tree Search methods (MCTS) to refine both candidate generation and decision-making. Quantitatively, it improves GPT-4o and Qwen2.5-Math-72B by 3.6\% and 2.0\% respectively on various mathematical benchmarks, and 7.5\% gain combined with MCTS.

  • 9 authors
·
Jan 6, 2025 2

Comparative Analysis of LLM Abliteration Methods: A Cross-Architecture Evaluation

Safety alignment mechanisms in large language models prevent responses to harmful queries through learned refusal behavior, yet these same mechanisms impede legitimate research applications including cognitive modeling, adversarial testing, and security analysis. While abliteration techniques enable surgical removal of refusal representations through directional orthogonalization, the relative effectiveness of available implementations remains uncharacterized. This study evaluates four abliteration tools (Heretic, DECCP, ErisForge, FailSpy) across sixteen instruction-tuned models (7B-14B parameters), reporting tool compatibility on all 16 models and quantitative metrics on subsets dictated by tool support. Single-pass methods demonstrated superior capability preservation on the benchmarked subset (avg GSM8K change across three models: ErisForge -0.28 pp; DECCP -0.13 pp), while Bayesian-optimized abliteration produced variable distribution shift (KL divergence: 0.043-1.646) with model-dependent capability impact. These findings provide researchers with evidence-based selection criteria for abliteration tool deployment across diverse model architectures. The principal finding indicates that mathematical reasoning capabilities exhibit the highest sensitivity to abliteration interventions, with GSM8K change ranging from +1.51 pp to -18.81 pp (-26.5% relative) depending on tool selection and model architecture.

  • 1 authors
·
Dec 15, 2025 1

Code as a Weapon: A Consensus-Labeled Prompt Bank for Measuring Coding-Model Compliance with Malicious-Code Requests

A general-purpose language model that answers a harmful question returns text; a coding model that complies with a malicious request can return a working weapon -- a keylogger, a ransomware stub, an exploit that runs as written. This asymmetry in the severity of a single act of compliance implies coding-specialized models should clear a higher refusal bar than general-purpose chat models, not a lower one, yet the field cannot presently tell whether they do. Refusal benchmarks for malicious code are fragmented: they mix requests for executable software (ready-to-run weapons) with requests for harmful security knowledge (information a human must still operationalise) and report refusal rates over non-comparable corpora, so no single statistic measures the property that actually matters. This paper introduces an expanded consensus-labeled prompt bank that distinguishes between these two request types and provides a construct-stable substrate for cross-corpus coding-model compliance measurement. Eight corpora (ASTRA, CySecBench, AdvBench/harmful_behaviors, JailbreakBench, MalwareBench, RedCode, RMCBench, Scam2Prompt) are consolidated and classified under a five-judge consensus protocol (6,675 prompts x 5 judges = 33,375 calls). The panel reaches Fleiss' kappa = 0.767 [95% CI 0.755, 0.777] ("substantial"); 95.0% of prompts draw at least four agreeing judges, 76.9% are unanimous, and the panel reproduces the earlier four-corpus release at Cohen's kappa = 0.952 on the 3,133 shared prompts. The released bank comprises 4,748 consensus-CODE prompts (executable malicious code requests) and 1,923 consensus-KNOWLEDGE prompts (harmful security knowledge requests). The bank is the validated instrument the field has lacked: a reliability-quantified basis for testing whether coding models meet the stricter refusal standard their executable output demands.

  • 2 authors
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May 26

Generic Constraint Projection: Four-Dimensional Type Inference for Dynamic Languages

Type inference for dynamically typed languages must reconcile four qualitatively different sources of information about a parameter: values assigned inside a definition, explicit declarations, contextual requirements, and structural operations. Existing systems often combine these sources into one constraint set, causing spurious conflicts and requiring redundant annotations. We present Generic Constraint Projection (GCP), a zero-annotation inference framework that stores the four sources in separate monotone slots on a stable definition-time template and checks each call in a fresh projection session. Ordinary calls verify concrete arguments and specialize returns without mutating the template, while partial calls produce residual projected functions. On the success fragment of a finite-height type preorder, we prove monotonicity, local and global convergence, conditional projection-obligation soundness, projection termination, multi-module convergence, and order-independence under fair iteration. For the pure recursion-free core Outline_0, we also prove evaluation definedness, type preservation, runtime receiver retention, and projection-evaluation coherence. GCP uses Outline Equational Matching as an extensible structural compatibility relation and future this to preserve concrete receiver shape across fluent method chains. We instantiate the framework in Outline for typed ontology worlds and in Python for recovery of PEP 484 annotations from unannotated source.

  • 1 authors
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Jul 22