Daily Papers

Large Language Model (LLM)-based agent systems are increasingly deployed for complex real-world tasks but remain vulnerable to natural language-based attacks that exploit over-privileged tool use. This paper aims to understand and mitigate such attacks through the lens of privilege escalation, defined as agent actions exceeding the least privilege required for a user's intended task. Based on a formal model of LLM agent systems, we identify novel privilege escalation scenarios, particularly in multi-agent systems, including a variant akin to the classic confused deputy problem. To defend against both known and newly demonstrated privilege escalation, we propose SEAgent, a mandatory access control (MAC) framework built upon attribute-based access control (ABAC). SEAgent monitors agent-tool interactions via an information flow graph and enforces customizable security policies based on entity attributes. Our evaluations show that SEAgent effectively blocks various privilege escalation while maintaining a low false positive rate and negligible system overhead. This demonstrates its robustness and adaptability in securing LLM-based agent systems.

Manually generating access control policies from an organization's high-level requirement specifications poses significant challenges. It requires laborious efforts to sift through multiple documents containing such specifications and translate their access requirements into access control policies. Also, the complexities and ambiguities of these specifications often result in errors by system administrators during the translation process, leading to data breaches. However, the automated policy generation frameworks designed to help administrators in this process are unreliable due to limitations, such as the lack of domain adaptation. Therefore, to improve the reliability of access control policy generation, we propose RAGent, a novel retrieval-based access control policy generation framework based on language models. RAGent identifies access requirements from high-level requirement specifications with an average state-of-the-art F1 score of 87.9%. Through retrieval augmented generation, RAGent then translates the identified access requirements into access control policies with an F1 score of 77.9%. Unlike existing frameworks, RAGent generates policies with complex components like purposes and conditions, in addition to subjects, actions, and resources. Moreover, RAGent automatically verifies the generated policies and iteratively refines them through a novel verification-refinement mechanism, further improving the reliability of the process by 3%, reaching the F1 score of 80.6%. We also introduce three annotated datasets for developing access control policy generation frameworks in the future, addressing the data scarcity of the domain.

In recent years, Local Differential Privacy (LDP), a robust privacy-preserving methodology, has gained widespread adoption in real-world applications. With LDP, users can perturb their data on their devices before sending it out for analysis. However, as the collection of multiple sensitive information becomes more prevalent across various industries, collecting a single sensitive attribute under LDP may not be sufficient. Correlated attributes in the data may still lead to inferences about the sensitive attribute. This paper empirically studies the impact of collecting multiple sensitive attributes under LDP on fairness. We propose a novel privacy budget allocation scheme that considers the varying domain size of sensitive attributes. This generally led to a better privacy-utility-fairness trade-off in our experiments than the state-of-art solution. Our results show that LDP leads to slightly improved fairness in learning problems without significantly affecting the performance of the models. We conduct extensive experiments evaluating three benchmark datasets using several group fairness metrics and seven state-of-the-art LDP protocols. Overall, this study challenges the common belief that differential privacy necessarily leads to worsened fairness in machine learning.

Modern machine learning systems use models trained on ever-growing corpora. Typically, metadata such as ownership, access control, or licensing information is ignored during training. Instead, to mitigate privacy risks, we rely on generic techniques such as dataset sanitization and differentially private model training, with inherent privacy/utility trade-offs that hurt model performance. Moreover, these techniques have limitations in scenarios where sensitive information is shared across multiple participants and fine-grained access control is required. By ignoring metadata, we therefore miss an opportunity to better address security, privacy, and confidentiality challenges. In this paper, we take an information flow control perspective to describe machine learning systems, which allows us to leverage metadata such as access control policies and define clear-cut privacy and confidentiality guarantees with interpretable information flows. Under this perspective, we contrast two different approaches to achieve user-level non-interference: 1) fine-tuning per-user models, and 2) retrieval augmented models that access user-specific datasets at inference time. We compare these two approaches to a trivially non-interfering zero-shot baseline using a public model and to a baseline that fine-tunes this model on the whole corpus. We evaluate trained models on two datasets of scientific articles and demonstrate that retrieval augmented architectures deliver the best utility, scalability, and flexibility while satisfying strict non-interference guarantees.

The emergence of Large Language Models (LLMs) has significantly advanced solutions across various domains, from political science to software development. However, these models are constrained by their training data, which is static and limited to information available up to a specific date. Additionally, their generalized nature often necessitates fine-tuning -- whether for classification or instructional purposes -- to effectively perform specific downstream tasks. AI agents, leveraging LLMs as their core, mitigate some of these limitations by accessing external tools and real-time data, enabling applications such as live weather reporting and data analysis. In industrial settings, AI agents are transforming operations by enhancing decision-making, predictive maintenance, and process optimization. For example, in manufacturing, AI agents enable near-autonomous systems that boost productivity and support real-time decision-making. Despite these advancements, AI agents remain vulnerable to security threats, including prompt injection attacks, which pose significant risks to their integrity and reliability. To address these challenges, this paper proposes a framework for integrating Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) into AI agents, providing a robust security guardrail. This framework aims to support the effective and scalable deployment of AI agents, with a focus on on-premises implementations.

Access control policies are vital for securing modern cloud computing, where organizations must manage access to sensitive data across thousands of users in distributed system settings. Cloud administrators typically write and update policies manually, which can be an error-prone and time-consuming process and can potentially lead to security vulnerabilities. Existing approaches based on symbolic analysis have demon- strated success in automated debugging and repairing access control policies; however, their generalizability is limited in the context of cloud-based access control. Conversely, Large Language Models (LLMs) have been utilized for automated program repair; however, their applicability to repairing cloud access control policies remains unexplored. In this work, we introduce CloudFix, the first automated policy repair framework for cloud access control that combines formal methods with LLMs. Given an access control policy and a specification of allowed and denied access requests, CloudFix employs Formal Methods-based Fault Localization to identify faulty statements in the policy and leverages LLMs to generate potential repairs, which are then verified using SMT solvers. To evaluate CloudFix, we curated a dataset of 282 real-world AWS access control policies extracted from forum posts and augmented them with synthetically generated request sets based on real scenarios. Our experimental results show that CloudFix improves repair accuracy over a Baseline implementation across varying request sizes. Our work is the first to leverage LLMs for policy repair, showcasing the effectiveness of LLMs for access control and enabling efficient and automated repair of cloud access control policies. We make our tool Cloudfix and AWS dataset publicly available.

Corporate LLMs are gaining traction for efficient knowledge dissemination and management within organizations. However, as current LLMs are vulnerable to leaking sensitive information, it has proven difficult to apply them in settings where strict access control is necessary. To this end, we design AC-LoRA, an end-to-end system for access control-aware corporate LLM chatbots that maintains a strong information isolation guarantee. AC-LoRA maintains separate LoRA adapters for permissioned datasets, along with the document embedding they are finetuned on. AC-LoRA retrieves a precise set of LoRA adapters based on the similarity score with the user query and their permission. This similarity score is later used to merge the responses if more than one LoRA is retrieved, without requiring any additional training for LoRA routing. We provide an end-to-end prototype of AC-LoRA, evaluate it on two datasets, and show that AC-LoRA matches or even exceeds the performance of state-of-the-art LoRA mixing techniques while providing strong isolation guarantees. Furthermore, we show that AC-LoRA design can be directly applied to different modalities.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have evolved into AI agents that interact with external tools and environments to perform complex tasks. The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has become the de facto standard for connecting agents with such resources, but security has lagged behind: thousands of MCP servers execute with unrestricted access to host systems, creating a broad attack surface. In this paper, we introduce AgentBound, the first access control framework for MCP servers. AgentBound combines a declarative policy mechanism, inspired by the Android permission model, with a policy enforcement engine that contains malicious behavior without requiring MCP server modifications. We build a dataset containing the 296 most popular MCP servers, and show that access control policies can be generated automatically from source code with 80.9% accuracy. We also show that AgentBound blocks the majority of security threats in several malicious MCP servers, and that policy enforcement engine introduces negligible overhead. Our contributions provide developers and project managers with a practical foundation for securing MCP servers while maintaining productivity, enabling researchers and tool builders to explore new directions for declarative access control and MCP security.

User authorization-based access privileges are a key feature in many safety-critical systems, but have thus far been absent from the large language model (LLM) realm. In this work, drawing inspiration from such access control systems, we introduce sudoLLM, a novel framework that results in multi-role aligned LLMs, i.e., LLMs that account for, and behave in accordance with, user access rights. sudoLLM injects subtle user-based biases into queries and trains an LLM to utilize this bias signal in order to produce sensitive information if and only if the user is authorized. We present empirical results demonstrating that this approach shows substantially improved alignment, generalization, and resistance to prompt-based jailbreaking attacks. The persistent tension between the language modeling objective and safety alignment, which is often exploited to jailbreak LLMs, is somewhat resolved with the aid of the injected bias signal. Our framework is meant as an additional security layer, and complements existing guardrail mechanisms for enhanced end-to-end safety with LLMs.

Cloud computing is ubiquitous, with a growing number of services being hosted on the cloud every day. Typical cloud compute systems allow administrators to write policies implementing access control rules which specify how access to private data is governed. These policies must be manually written, and due to their complexity can often be error prone. Moreover, existing policies often implement complex access control specifications and thus can be difficult to precisely analyze in determining their behavior works exactly as intended. Recently, Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown great success in automated code synthesis and summarization. Given this success, they could potentially be used for automatically generating access control policies or aid in understanding existing policies. In this paper, we explore the effectiveness of LLMs for access control policy synthesis and summarization. Specifically, we first investigate diverse LLMs for access control policy synthesis, finding that: although LLMs can effectively generate syntactically correct policies, they have permissiveness issues, generating policies equivalent to the given specification 45.8% of the time for non-reasoning LLMs, and 93.7% of the time for reasoning LLMs. We then investigate how LLMs can be used to analyze policies by introducing a novel semantic-based request summarization approach which leverages LLMs to generate a precise characterization of the requests allowed by a policy. Our results show that while there are significant hurdles in leveraging LLMs for automated policy generation, LLMs show promising results when combined with symbolic approaches in analyzing existing policies.

Structured access is an emerging paradigm for the safe deployment of artificial intelligence (AI). Instead of openly disseminating AI systems, developers facilitate controlled, arm's length interactions with their AI systems. The aim is to prevent dangerous AI capabilities from being widely accessible, whilst preserving access to AI capabilities that can be used safely. The developer must both restrict how the AI system can be used, and prevent the user from circumventing these restrictions through modification or reverse engineering of the AI system. Structured access is most effective when implemented through cloud-based AI services, rather than disseminating AI software that runs locally on users' hardware. Cloud-based interfaces provide the AI developer greater scope for controlling how the AI system is used, and for protecting against unauthorized modifications to the system's design. This chapter expands the discussion of "publication norms" in the AI community, which to date has focused on the question of how the informational content of AI research projects should be disseminated (e.g., code and models). Although this is an important question, there are limits to what can be achieved through the control of information flows. Structured access views AI software not only as information that can be shared but also as a tool with which users can have arm's length interactions. There are early examples of structured access being practiced by AI developers, but there is much room for further development, both in the functionality of cloud-based interfaces and in the wider institutional framework.

The AI trustworthiness crisis threatens to derail the artificial intelligence revolution, with regulatory barriers, security vulnerabilities, and accountability gaps preventing deployment in critical domains. Current AI systems operate on opaque data structures that lack the audit trails, provenance tracking, or explainability required by emerging regulations like the EU AI Act. We propose an artifact-centric AI agent paradigm where behavior is driven by persistent, verifiable data artifacts rather than ephemeral tasks, solving the trustworthiness problem at the data architecture level. Central to this approach is the Multimodal Artifact File Format (MAIF), an AI-native container embedding semantic representations, cryptographic provenance, and granular access controls. MAIF transforms data from passive storage into active trust enforcement, making every AI operation inherently auditable. Our production-ready implementation demonstrates ultra-high-speed streaming (2,720.7 MB/s), optimized video processing (1,342 MB/s), and enterprise-grade security. Novel algorithms for cross-modal attention, semantic compression, and cryptographic binding achieve up to 225 compression while maintaining semantic fidelity. Advanced security features include stream-level access control, real-time tamper detection, and behavioral anomaly analysis with minimal overhead. This approach directly addresses the regulatory, security, and accountability challenges preventing AI deployment in sensitive domains, offering a viable path toward trustworthy AI systems at scale.

Recent work has explored how to train machine learning models which do not discriminate against any subgroup of the population as determined by sensitive attributes such as gender or race. To avoid disparate treatment, sensitive attributes should not be considered. On the other hand, in order to avoid disparate impact, sensitive attributes must be examined, e.g., in order to learn a fair model, or to check if a given model is fair. We introduce methods from secure multi-party computation which allow us to avoid both. By encrypting sensitive attributes, we show how an outcome-based fair model may be learned, checked, or have its outputs verified and held to account, without users revealing their sensitive attributes.

Current AI agent frameworks have made remarkable progress in automating individual tasks, yet all existing systems serve a single user. Human productivity rests on the social and organizational relationships through which people coordinate, negotiate, and delegate. When agents move beyond performing tasks for one person to representing that person in collaboration with others, the infrastructure for cross-user agent collaboration is entirely absent, let alone the governance mechanisms needed to secure it. We argue that the next frontier for AI agents lies not in stronger individual capability, but in the digitization of human collaborative relationships. To this end, we propose a human-symbiotic agent paradigm. Each user owns a permanently bound agent system that collaborates on the owner's behalf, forming a network whose nodes are humans rather than agents. This paradigm rests on three governance primitives. A layered identity architecture separates a Manager Agent from multiple context-specific Identity Agents; the Manager Agent holds global knowledge but is architecturally isolated from external communication. Scoped authorization enforces per-identity access control and escalates boundary violations to the owner. Action-level accountability logs every operation against its owner's identity and authorization, ensuring full auditability. We instantiate this paradigm in ClawNet, an identity-governed agent collaboration framework that enforces identity binding and authorization verification through a central orchestrator, enabling multiple users to collaborate securely through their respective agents.

Private and public organizations regularly collect and analyze digitalized data about their associates, volunteers, clients, etc. However, because most personal data are sensitive, there is a key challenge in designing privacy-preserving systems. To tackle privacy concerns, research communities have proposed different methods to preserve privacy, with Differential privacy (DP) standing out as a formal definition that allows quantifying the privacy-utility trade-off. Besides, with the local DP (LDP) model, users can sanitize their data locally before transmitting it to the server. The objective of this thesis is thus two-fold: O_1) To improve the utility and privacy in multiple frequency estimates under LDP guarantees, which is fundamental to statistical learning. And O_2) To assess the privacy-utility trade-off of machine learning (ML) models trained over differentially private data. For O_1, we first tackled the problem from two "multiple" perspectives, i.e., multiple attributes and multiple collections throughout time, while focusing on utility. Secondly, we focused our attention on the multiple attributes aspect only, in which we proposed a solution focusing on privacy while preserving utility. In both cases, we demonstrate through analytical and experimental validations the advantages of our proposed solutions over state-of-the-art LDP protocols. For O_2, we empirically evaluated ML-based solutions designed to solve real-world problems while ensuring DP guarantees. Indeed, we mainly used the input data perturbation setting from the privacy-preserving ML literature. This is the situation in which the whole dataset is sanitized independently and, thus, we implemented LDP algorithms from the perspective of the centralized data owner. In all cases, we concluded that differentially private ML models achieve nearly the same utility metrics as non-private ones.

Organizations cannot address demographic disparities that they cannot see. Recent research on machine learning and fairness has emphasized that awareness of sensitive attributes, such as race and sex, is critical to the development of interventions. However, on the ground, the existence of these data cannot be taken for granted. This paper uses the domains of employment, credit, and healthcare in the United States to surface conditions that have shaped the availability of sensitive attribute data. For each domain, we describe how and when private companies collect or infer sensitive attribute data for antidiscrimination purposes. An inconsistent story emerges: Some companies are required by law to collect sensitive attribute data, while others are prohibited from doing so. Still others, in the absence of legal mandates, have determined that collection and imputation of these data are appropriate to address disparities. This story has important implications for fairness research and its future applications. If companies that mediate access to life opportunities are unable or hesitant to collect or infer sensitive attribute data, then proposed techniques to detect and mitigate bias in machine learning models might never be implemented outside the lab. We conclude that today's legal requirements and corporate practices, while highly inconsistent across domains, offer lessons for how to approach the collection and inference of sensitive data in appropriate circumstances. We urge stakeholders, including machine learning practitioners, to actively help chart a path forward that takes both policy goals and technical needs into account.

Automated decision systems are increasingly used to make consequential decisions in people's lives. Due to the sensitivity of the manipulated data as well as the resulting decisions, several ethical concerns need to be addressed for the appropriate use of such technologies, in particular, fairness and privacy. Unlike previous work, which focused on centralized differential privacy (DP) or local DP (LDP) for a single sensitive attribute, in this paper, we examine the impact of LDP in the presence of several sensitive attributes (i.e., multi-dimensional data) on fairness. Detailed empirical analysis on synthetic and benchmark datasets revealed very relevant observations. In particular, (1) multi-dimensional LDP is an efficient approach to reduce disparity, (2) the multi-dimensional approach of LDP (independent vs. combined) matters only at low privacy guarantees, and (3) the outcome Y distribution has an important effect on which group is more sensitive to the obfuscation. Last, we summarize our findings in the form of recommendations to guide practitioners in adopting effective privacy-preserving practices while maintaining fairness and utility in ML applications.

Advanced AI assistants combine frontier LLMs and tool access to autonomously perform complex tasks on behalf of users. While the helpfulness of such assistants can increase dramatically with access to user information including emails and documents, this raises privacy concerns about assistants sharing inappropriate information with third parties without user supervision. To steer information-sharing assistants to behave in accordance with privacy expectations, we propose to operationalize contextual integrity (CI), a framework that equates privacy with the appropriate flow of information in a given context. In particular, we design and evaluate a number of strategies to steer assistants' information-sharing actions to be CI compliant. Our evaluation is based on a novel form filling benchmark composed of synthetic data and human annotations, and it reveals that prompting frontier LLMs to perform CI-based reasoning yields strong results.

The deployment of autonomous AI agents capable of executing commercial transactions has motivated the adoption of mandate-based payment authorization protocols, including the Universal Commerce Protocol (UCP) and the Agent Payments Protocol (AP2). These protocols replace interactive, session-based authorization with cryptographically issued mandates, enabling asynchronous and autonomous execution. While AP2 provides specification-level guarantees through signature verification, explicit binding, and expiration semantics, real-world agentic execution introduces runtime behaviors such as retries, concurrency, and orchestration that challenge implicit assumptions about mandate usage. In this work, we present a security analysis of the AP2 mandate lifecycle and identify enforcement gaps that arise during runtime in agent-based payment systems. We propose a zero-trust runtime verification framework that enforces explicit context binding and consume-once mandate semantics using dynamically generated, time-bound nonces, ensuring that authorization decisions are evaluated at execution time rather than assumed from static issuance properties. Through simulation-based evaluation under high concurrency, we show that context-aware binding and consume-once enforcement address distinct and complementary attack classes, and that both are required to prevent replay and context-redirect attacks. The proposed framework mitigates all evaluated attacks while maintaining stable verification latency of approximately 3.8~ms at throughput levels up to 10{,}000 transactions per second. We further demonstrate that the required runtime state is bounded by peak concurrency rather than cumulative transaction history, indicating that robust runtime security for agentic payment execution can be achieved with minimal and predictable overhead.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has attracted significant attention due to its ability to combine the generative capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) with knowledge obtained through efficient retrieval mechanisms over large-scale data collections. Currently, the majority of existing approaches overlook the risks associated with exposing sensitive or access-controlled information directly to the generation model. Only a few approaches propose techniques to instruct the generative model to refrain from disclosing sensitive information; however, recent studies have also demonstrated that LLMs remain vulnerable to prompt injection attacks that can override intended behavioral constraints. For these reasons, we propose a novel approach to Selective Disclosure in Retrieval-Augmented Generation, called SD-RAG, which decouples the enforcement of security and privacy constraints from the generation process itself. Rather than relying on prompt-level safeguards, SD-RAG applies sanitization and disclosure controls during the retrieval phase, prior to augmenting the language model's input. Moreover, we introduce a semantic mechanism to allow the ingestion of human-readable dynamic security and privacy constraints together with an optimized graph-based data model that supports fine-grained, policy-aware retrieval. Our experimental evaluation demonstrates the superiority of SD-RAG over baseline existing approaches, achieving up to a 58% improvement in the privacy score, while also showing a strong resilience to prompt injection attacks targeting the generative model.

Recommendation fairness has attracted great attention recently. In real-world systems, users usually have multiple sensitive attributes (e.g. age, gender, and occupation), and users may not want their recommendation results influenced by those attributes. Moreover, which of and when these user attributes should be considered in fairness-aware modeling should depend on users' specific demands. In this work, we define the selective fairness task, where users can flexibly choose which sensitive attributes should the recommendation model be bias-free. We propose a novel parameter-efficient prompt-based fairness-aware recommendation (PFRec) framework, which relies on attribute-specific prompt-based bias eliminators with adversarial training, enabling selective fairness with different attribute combinations on sequential recommendation. Both task-specific and user-specific prompts are considered. We conduct extensive evaluations to verify PFRec's superiority in selective fairness. The source codes are released in https://github.com/wyqing20/PFRec.

Neural network-based image classifiers are powerful tools for computer vision tasks, but they inadvertently reveal sensitive attribute information about their classes, raising concerns about their privacy. To investigate this privacy leakage, we introduce the first Class Attribute Inference Attack (CAIA), which leverages recent advances in text-to-image synthesis to infer sensitive attributes of individual classes in a black-box setting, while remaining competitive with related white-box attacks. Our extensive experiments in the face recognition domain show that CAIA can accurately infer undisclosed sensitive attributes, such as an individual's hair color, gender, and racial appearance, which are not part of the training labels. Interestingly, we demonstrate that adversarial robust models are even more vulnerable to such privacy leakage than standard models, indicating that a trade-off between robustness and privacy exists.

Large Language Model (LLM)-based agents increasingly interact, collaborate, and delegate tasks to one another autonomously with minimal human interaction. Industry guidelines for agentic system governance emphasize the need for users to maintain comprehensive control over their agents, mitigating potential damage from malicious agents. Several proposed agentic system designs address agent identity, authorization, and delegation, but remain purely theoretical, without concrete implementation and evaluation. Most importantly, they do not provide user-controlled agent management. To address this gap, we propose SAGA, a scalable Security Architecture for Governing Agentic systems, that offers user oversight over their agents' lifecycle. In our design, users register their agents with a central entity, the Provider, that maintains agent contact information, user-defined access control policies, and helps agents enforce these policies on inter-agent communication. We introduce a cryptographic mechanism for deriving access control tokens, that offers fine-grained control over an agent's interaction with other agents, providing formal security guarantees. We evaluate SAGA on several agentic tasks, using agents in different geolocations, and multiple on-device and cloud LLMs, demonstrating minimal performance overhead with no impact on underlying task utility in a wide range of conditions. Our architecture enables secure and trustworthy deployment of autonomous agents, accelerating the responsible adoption of this technology in sensitive environments.

Verifiable delegation in digital identity systems remains unresolved across centralized, federated, and self-sovereign identity (SSI) environments, particularly where both human users and autonomous AI agents must exercise and transfer authority without exposing primary credentials or private keys. We introduce a unified framework that enables bounded, auditable, and least-privilege delegation across heterogeneous identity ecosystems. The framework includes four key elements: Delegation Grants (DGs), first-class authorization artefacts that encode revocable transfers of authority with enforced scope reduction; a Canonical Verification Context (CVC) that normalizes verification requests into a single structured representation independent of protocols or credential formats; a layered reference architecture that separates trust anchoring, credential and proof validation, policy evaluation, and protocol mediation via a Trust Gateway; and an explicit treatment of blockchain anchoring as an optional integrity layer rather than a structural dependency. Together, these elements advance interoperable delegation and auditability and provide a foundation for future standardization, implementation, and integration of autonomous agents into trusted digital identity infrastructures.

The rapid advancement of ML models in critical sectors such as healthcare, finance, and security has intensified the need for robust data security, model integrity, and reliable outputs. Large multimodal foundational models, while crucial for complex tasks, present challenges in scalability, reliability, and potential misuse. Decentralized systems offer a solution by distributing workload and mitigating central points of failure, but they introduce risks of unauthorized access to sensitive data across nodes. We address these challenges with a comprehensive framework designed for responsible AI development. Our approach incorporates: 1) Zero-knowledge proofs for secure model verification, enhancing trust without compromising privacy. 2) Consensus-based verification checks to ensure consistent outputs across nodes, mitigating hallucinations and maintaining model integrity. 3) Split Learning techniques that segment models across different nodes, preserving data privacy by preventing full data access at any point. 4) Hardware-based security through trusted execution environments (TEEs) to protect data and computations. This framework aims to enhance security and privacy and improve the reliability and fairness of multimodal AI systems. Promoting efficient resource utilization contributes to more sustainable AI development. Our state-of-the-art proofs and principles demonstrate the framework's effectiveness in responsibly democratizing artificial intelligence, offering a promising approach for building secure and private foundational models.

Recent advances in synthetic data generation (SDG) have been hailed as a solution to the difficult problem of sharing sensitive data while protecting privacy. SDG aims to learn statistical properties of real data in order to generate "artificial" data that are structurally and statistically similar to sensitive data. However, prior research suggests that inference attacks on synthetic data can undermine privacy, but only for specific outlier records. In this work, we introduce a new attribute inference attack against synthetic data. The attack is based on linear reconstruction methods for aggregate statistics, which target all records in the dataset, not only outliers. We evaluate our attack on state-of-the-art SDG algorithms, including Probabilistic Graphical Models, Generative Adversarial Networks, and recent differentially private SDG mechanisms. By defining a formal privacy game, we show that our attack can be highly accurate even on arbitrary records, and that this is the result of individual information leakage (as opposed to population-level inference). We then systematically evaluate the tradeoff between protecting privacy and preserving statistical utility. Our findings suggest that current SDG methods cannot consistently provide sufficient privacy protection against inference attacks while retaining reasonable utility. The best method evaluated, a differentially private SDG mechanism, can provide both protection against inference attacks and reasonable utility, but only in very specific settings. Lastly, we show that releasing a larger number of synthetic records can improve utility but at the cost of making attacks far more effective.

As autonomous AI agents are used in regulated and safety-critical settings, organizations need effective ways to turn policy into enforceable controls. We introduce a regulatory machine learning framework that converts unstructured design artifacts (like PRDs, TDDs, and code) into verifiable runtime guardrails. Our Policy as Prompt method reads these documents and risk controls to build a source-linked policy tree. This tree is then compiled into lightweight, prompt-based classifiers for real-time runtime monitoring. The system is built to enforce least privilege and data minimization. For conformity assessment, it provides complete provenance, traceability, and audit logging, all integrated with a human-in-the-loop review process. Evaluations show our system reduces prompt-injection risk, blocks out-of-scope requests, and limits toxic outputs. It also generates auditable rationales aligned with AI governance frameworks. By treating policies as executable prompts (a policy-as-code for agents), this approach enables secure-by-design deployment, continuous compliance, and scalable AI safety and AI security assurance for regulatable ML.

Machine learning models trained with differentially-private (DP) algorithms such as DP-SGD enjoy resilience against a wide range of privacy attacks. Although it is possible to derive bounds for some attacks based solely on an (varepsilon,delta)-DP guarantee, meaningful bounds require a small enough privacy budget (i.e., injecting a large amount of noise), which results in a large loss in utility. This paper presents a new approach to evaluate the privacy of machine learning models against specific record-level threats, such as membership and attribute inference, without the indirection through DP. We focus on the popular DP-SGD algorithm, and derive simple closed-form bounds. Our proofs model DP-SGD as an information theoretic channel whose inputs are the secrets that an attacker wants to infer (e.g., membership of a data record) and whose outputs are the intermediate model parameters produced by iterative optimization. We obtain bounds for membership inference that match state-of-the-art techniques, whilst being orders of magnitude faster to compute. Additionally, we present a novel data-dependent bound against attribute inference. Our results provide a direct, interpretable, and practical way to evaluate the privacy of trained models against specific inference threats without sacrificing utility.

Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) is a crucial pathway in mitigating the risk of non-transparency in the decision-making process of black-box Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems. However, despite the benefits, XAI methods are found to leak the privacy of individuals whose data is used in training or querying the models. Researchers have demonstrated privacy attacks that exploit explanations to infer sensitive personal information of individuals. Currently there is a lack of defenses against known privacy attacks targeting explanations when vulnerable XAI are used in production and machine learning as a service system. To address this gap, in this article, we explore Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) as a defense mechanism against attribute inference on explanations provided by feature-based XAI methods. We empirically evaluate 3 types of PETs, namely synthetic training data, differentially private training and noise addition, on two categories of feature-based XAI. Our evaluation determines different responses from the mitigation methods and side-effects of PETs on other system properties such as utility and performance. In the best case, PETs integration in explanations reduced the risk of the attack by 49.47%, while maintaining model utility and explanation quality. Through our evaluation, we identify strategies for using PETs in XAI for maximizing benefits and minimizing the success of this privacy attack on sensitive personal information.

Artificial intelligence (AI) agents are increasingly used in a variety of domains to automate tasks, interact with users, and make decisions based on data inputs. Ensuring that AI agents perform only authorized actions and handle inputs appropriately is essential for maintaining system integrity and preventing misuse. In this study, we introduce the AgentGuardian, a novel security framework that governs and protects AI agent operations by enforcing context-aware access-control policies. During a controlled staging phase, the framework monitors execution traces to learn legitimate agent behaviors and input patterns. From this phase, it derives adaptive policies that regulate tool calls made by the agent, guided by both real-time input context and the control flow dependencies of multi-step agent actions. Evaluation across two real-world AI agent applications demonstrates that AgentGuardian effectively detects malicious or misleading inputs while preserving normal agent functionality. Moreover, its control-flow-based governance mechanism mitigates hallucination-driven errors and other orchestration-level malfunctions.

We present the first systematic approach to static and dynamic taint analysis for Graph APIs focusing on broken access control. The approach comprises the following. We taint nodes in the Graph API if they represent data requiring specific privileges in order to be retrieved or manipulated, and identify API calls which are related to sources and sinks. Then, we statically analyze whether tainted information flow between API source and sink calls occurs. To this end, we model the API calls using graph transformation rules. We subsequently use critical pair analysis to automatically analyze potential dependencies between rules representing source calls and rules representing sink calls. We distinguish direct from indirect tainted information flow and argue under which conditions the CPA is able to detect not only direct, but also indirect tainted flow. The static taint analysis (i) identifies flows that need to be further reviewed, since tainted nodes may be created by an API call and used or manipulated by another API call later without having the necessary privileges, and (ii) can be used to systematically design dynamic security tests for broken access control. The dynamic taint analysis checks if potential broken access control risks detected during the static taint analysis really occur. We apply the approach to a part of the GitHub GraphQL API. The application illustrates that our analysis supports the detection of two types of broken access control systematically: the case where users of the API may not be able to access or manipulate information, although they should be able to do so; and the case where users (or attackers) of the API may be able to access/manipulate information that they should not.

The continued promise of Large Language Models (LLMs), particularly in their natural language understanding and generation capabilities, has driven a rapidly increasing interest in identifying and developing LLM use cases. In an effort to complement the ingrained "knowledge" of LLMs, Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) techniques have become widely popular. At its core, RAG involves the coupling of LLMs with domain-specific knowledge bases, whereby the generation of a response to a user question is augmented with contextual and up-to-date information. The proliferation of RAG has sparked concerns about data privacy, particularly with the inherent risks that arise when leveraging databases with potentially sensitive information. Numerous recent works have explored various aspects of privacy risks in RAG systems, from adversarial attacks to proposed mitigations. With the goal of surveying and unifying these works, we ask one simple question: What are the privacy risks in RAG, and how can they be measured and mitigated? To answer this question, we conduct a systematic literature review of RAG works addressing privacy, and we systematize our findings into a comprehensive set of privacy risks, mitigation techniques, and evaluation strategies. We supplement these findings with two primary artifacts: a Taxonomy of RAG Privacy Risks and a RAG Privacy Process Diagram. Our work contributes to the study of privacy in RAG not only by conducting the first systematization of risks and mitigations, but also by uncovering important considerations when mitigating privacy risks in RAG systems and assessing the current maturity of proposed mitigations.

The A2AS framework is introduced as a security layer for AI agents and LLM-powered applications, similar to how HTTPS secures HTTP. A2AS enforces certified behavior, activates model self-defense, and ensures context window integrity. It defines security boundaries, authenticates prompts, applies security rules and custom policies, and controls agentic behavior, enabling a defense-in-depth strategy. The A2AS framework avoids latency overhead, external dependencies, architectural changes, model retraining, and operational complexity. The BASIC security model is introduced as the A2AS foundation: (B) Behavior certificates enable behavior enforcement, (A) Authenticated prompts enable context window integrity, (S) Security boundaries enable untrusted input isolation, (I) In-context defenses enable secure model reasoning, (C) Codified policies enable application-specific rules. This first paper in the series introduces the BASIC security model and the A2AS framework, exploring their potential toward establishing the A2AS industry standard.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has recently emerged as a promising solution for enhancing the accuracy and credibility of Large Language Models (LLMs), particularly in Question & Answer tasks. This is achieved by incorporating proprietary and private data from integrated databases. However, private RAG systems face significant challenges due to the scarcity of private domain data and critical data privacy issues. These obstacles impede the deployment of private RAG systems, as developing privacy-preserving RAG systems requires a delicate balance between data security and data availability. To address these challenges, we regard federated learning (FL) as a highly promising technology for privacy-preserving RAG services. We propose a novel framework called Federated Retrieval-Augmented Generation (FedE4RAG). This framework facilitates collaborative training of client-side RAG retrieval models. The parameters of these models are aggregated and distributed on a central-server, ensuring data privacy without direct sharing of raw data. In FedE4RAG, knowledge distillation is employed for communication between the server and client models. This technique improves the generalization of local RAG retrievers during the federated learning process. Additionally, we apply homomorphic encryption within federated learning to safeguard model parameters and mitigate concerns related to data leakage. Extensive experiments conducted on the real-world dataset have validated the effectiveness of FedE4RAG. The results demonstrate that our proposed framework can markedly enhance the performance of private RAG systems while maintaining robust data privacy protection.

AI agents increasingly call tools via the Model Context Protocol (MCP) and delegate to other agents via Agent-to-Agent (A2A), yet neither protocol verifies agent identity. A scan of approximately 2,000 MCP servers found all lacked authentication. In our survey, we did not identify a prior implemented protocol that jointly combines public-key verifiable delegation, holder-side attenuation, expressive chained policy, transport bindings across MCP/A2A/HTTP, and provenance-oriented completion records. We introduce Invocation-Bound Capability Tokens (IBCTs), a primitive that fuses identity, attenuated authorization, and provenance binding into a single append-only token chain. IBCTs operate in two wire formats: compact mode (a signed JWT for single-hop cases) and chained mode (a Biscuit token with Datalog policies for multi-hop delegation). We provide reference implementations in Python and Rust with full cross-language interoperability. Compact mode verification takes 0.049ms (Rust) and 0.189ms (Python), with 0.22ms overhead over no-auth in real MCP-over-HTTP deployment. In a real multi-agent deployment with Gemini 2.5 Flash, AIP adds 2.35ms of overhead (0.086% of total end-to-end latency). Adversarial evaluation across 600 attack attempts shows 100% rejection rate, with two attack categories (delegation depth violation and audit evasion through empty context) uniquely caught by AIP's chained delegation model that neither unsigned nor plain JWT deployments detect.

Machine learning models are often personalized with categorical attributes that are protected, sensitive, self-reported, or costly to acquire. In this work, we show models that are personalized with group attributes can reduce performance at a group level. We propose formal conditions to ensure the "fair use" of group attributes in prediction tasks by training one additional model -- i.e., collective preference guarantees to ensure that each group who provides personal data will receive a tailored gain in performance in return. We present sufficient conditions to ensure fair use in empirical risk minimization and characterize failure modes that lead to fair use violations due to standard practices in model development and deployment. We present a comprehensive empirical study of fair use in clinical prediction tasks. Our results demonstrate the prevalence of fair use violations in practice and illustrate simple interventions to mitigate their harm.

This research paper explores the privacy and security threats posed to an Agentic AI system with direct access to database systems. Such access introduces significant risks, including unauthorized retrieval of sensitive information, potential exploitation of system vulnerabilities, and misuse of personal or confidential data. The complexity of AI systems combined with their ability to process and analyze large volumes of data increases the chances of data leaks or breaches, which could occur unintentionally or through adversarial manipulation. Furthermore, as AI agents evolve with greater autonomy, their capacity to bypass or exploit security measures becomes a growing concern, heightening the need to address these critical vulnerabilities in agentic systems.

We introduce a fairness-aware dataset for job recommendation in advertising, designed to foster research in algorithmic fairness within real-world scenarios. It was collected and prepared to comply with privacy standards and business confidentiality. An additional challenge is the lack of access to protected user attributes such as gender, for which we propose a solution to obtain a proxy estimate. Despite being anonymized and including a proxy for a sensitive attribute, our dataset preserves predictive power and maintains a realistic and challenging benchmark. This dataset addresses a significant gap in the availability of fairness-focused resources for high-impact domains like advertising -- the actual impact being having access or not to precious employment opportunities, where balancing fairness and utility is a common industrial challenge. We also explore various stages in the advertising process where unfairness can occur and introduce a method to compute a fair utility metric for the job recommendations in online systems case from a biased dataset. Experimental evaluations of bias mitigation techniques on the released dataset demonstrate potential improvements in fairness and the associated trade-offs with utility.

In domains with high stakes such as law, recruitment, and healthcare, learning models frequently rely on sensitive user data for inference, necessitating the complete set of features. This not only poses significant privacy risks for individuals but also demands substantial human effort from organizations to verify information accuracy. This paper asks whether it is necessary to use all input features for accurate predictions at inference time. The paper demonstrates that, in a personalized setting, individuals may only need to disclose a small subset of their features without compromising decision-making accuracy. The paper also provides an efficient sequential algorithm to determine the appropriate attributes for each individual to provide. Evaluations across various learning tasks show that individuals can potentially report as little as 10\% of their information while maintaining the same accuracy level as a model that employs the full set of user information.

Deterministic pre-execution safety gates evaluate whether individual agent actions are compatible with their assigned roles. While effective at per-action authorization, these systems are structurally blind to distributed attacks that decompose harmful intent across multiple individually-compliant steps. This paper introduces Session Risk Memory (SRM), a lightweight deterministic module that extends stateless execution gates with trajectory-level authorization. SRM maintains a compact semantic centroid representing the evolving behavioral profile of an agent session and accumulates a risk signal through exponential moving average over baseline-subtracted gate outputs. It operates on the same semantic vector representation as the underlying gate, requiring no additional model components, training, or probabilistic inference. We evaluate SRM on a multi-turn benchmark of 80 sessions containing slow-burn exfiltration, gradual privilege escalation, and compliance drift scenarios. Results show that ILION+SRM achieves F1 = 1.0000 with 0% false positive rate, compared to stateless ILION at F1 = 0.9756 with 5% FPR, while maintaining 100% detection rate for both systems. Critically, SRM eliminates all false positives with a per-turn overhead under 250 microseconds. The framework introduces a conceptual distinction between spatial authorization consistency (evaluated per action) and temporal authorization consistency (evaluated over trajectory), providing a principled basis for session-level safety in agentic systems.

Generative AI release decisions determine whether system components are made available, but release does not address many other elements that change how users and stakeholders are able to engage with a system. Beyond release, access to system components informs potential risks and benefits. Access refers to practical needs, infrastructurally, technically, and societally, in order to use available components in some way. We deconstruct access along three axes: resourcing, technical usability, and utility. Within each category, a set of variables per system component clarify tradeoffs. For example, resourcing requires access to computing infrastructure to serve model weights. We also compare the accessibility of four high performance language models, two open-weight and two closed-weight, showing similar considerations for all based instead on access variables. Access variables set the foundation for being able to scale or increase access to users; we examine the scale of access and how scale affects ability to manage and intervene on risks. This framework better encompasses the landscape and risk-benefit tradeoffs of system releases to inform system release decisions, research, and policy.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) is an advanced technique designed to address the challenges of Artificial Intelligence-Generated Content (AIGC). By integrating context retrieval into content generation, RAG provides reliable and up-to-date external knowledge, reduces hallucinations, and ensures relevant context across a wide range of tasks. However, despite RAG's success and potential, recent studies have shown that the RAG paradigm also introduces new risks, including robustness issues, privacy concerns, adversarial attacks, and accountability issues. Addressing these risks is critical for future applications of RAG systems, as they directly impact their trustworthiness. Although various methods have been developed to improve the trustworthiness of RAG methods, there is a lack of a unified perspective and framework for research in this topic. Thus, in this paper, we aim to address this gap by providing a comprehensive roadmap for developing trustworthy RAG systems. We place our discussion around five key perspectives: reliability, privacy, safety, fairness, explainability, and accountability. For each perspective, we present a general framework and taxonomy, offering a structured approach to understanding the current challenges, evaluating existing solutions, and identifying promising future research directions. To encourage broader adoption and innovation, we also highlight the downstream applications where trustworthy RAG systems have a significant impact.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) replaces static, developer-controlled API integrations with more dynamic, user-driven agent systems, which also introduces new security risks. As MCP adoption grows across community servers and major platforms, organizations encounter threats that existing AI governance frameworks (such as NIST AI RMF and ISO/IEC 42001) do not yet cover in detail. We focus on three types of adversaries that take advantage of MCP s flexibility: content-injection attackers that embed malicious instructions into otherwise legitimate data; supply-chain attackers who distribute compromised servers; and agents who become unintentional adversaries by over-stepping their role. Based on early incidents and proof-of-concept attacks, we describe how MCP can increase the attack surface through data-driven exfiltration, tool poisoning, and cross-system privilege escalation. In response, we propose a set of practical controls, including per-user authentication with scoped authorization, provenance tracking across agent workflows, containerized sandboxing with input/output checks, inline policy enforcement with DLP and anomaly detection, and centralized governance using private registries or gateway layers. The aim is to help organizations ensure that unvetted code does not run outside a sandbox, tools are not used beyond their intended scope, data exfiltration attempts are detectable, and actions can be audited end-to-end. We close by outlining open research questions around verifiable registries, formal methods for these dynamic systems, and privacy-preserving agent operations.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has become a cornerstone of knowledge-intensive applications, including enterprise chatbots, healthcare assistants, and agentic memory management. However, recent studies show that knowledge-extraction attacks can recover sensitive knowledge-base content through maliciously crafted queries, raising serious concerns about intellectual property theft and privacy leakage. While prior work has explored individual attack and defense techniques, the research landscape remains fragmented, spanning heterogeneous retrieval embeddings, diverse generation models, and evaluations based on non-standardized metrics and inconsistent datasets. To address this gap, we introduce the first systematic benchmark for knowledge-extraction attacks on RAG systems. Our benchmark covers a broad spectrum of attack and defense strategies, representative retrieval embedding models, and both open- and closed-source generators, all evaluated under a unified experimental framework with standardized protocols across multiple datasets. By consolidating the experimental landscape and enabling reproducible, comparable evaluation, this benchmark provides actionable insights and a practical foundation for developing privacy-preserving RAG systems in the face of emerging knowledge extraction threats. Our code is available here.

Aiming to train and deploy predictive models, organizations collect large amounts of detailed client data, risking the exposure of private information in the event of a breach. To mitigate this, policymakers increasingly demand compliance with the data minimization (DM) principle, restricting data collection to only that data which is relevant and necessary for the task. Despite regulatory pressure, the problem of deploying machine learning models that obey DM has so far received little attention. In this work, we address this challenge in a comprehensive manner. We propose a novel vertical DM (vDM) workflow based on data generalization, which by design ensures that no full-resolution client data is collected during training and deployment of models, benefiting client privacy by reducing the attack surface in case of a breach. We formalize and study the corresponding problem of finding generalizations that both maximize data utility and minimize empirical privacy risk, which we quantify by introducing a diverse set of policy-aligned adversarial scenarios. Finally, we propose a range of baseline vDM algorithms, as well as Privacy-aware Tree (PAT), an especially effective vDM algorithm that outperforms all baselines across several settings. We plan to release our code as a publicly available library, helping advance the standardization of DM for machine learning. Overall, we believe our work can help lay the foundation for further exploration and adoption of DM principles in real-world applications.

The rise of AI agent frameworks has introduced agent skills, modular packages containing instructions and executable code that dynamically extend agent capabilities. While this architecture enables powerful customization, skills execute with implicit trust and minimal vetting, creating a significant yet uncharacterized attack surface. We conduct the first large-scale empirical security analysis of this emerging ecosystem, collecting 42,447 skills from two major marketplaces and systematically analyzing 31,132 using SkillScan, a multi-stage detection framework integrating static analysis with LLM-based semantic classification. Our findings reveal pervasive security risks: 26.1% of skills contain at least one vulnerability, spanning 14 distinct patterns across four categories: prompt injection, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, and supply chain risks. Data exfiltration (13.3%) and privilege escalation (11.8%) are most prevalent, while 5.2% of skills exhibit high-severity patterns strongly suggesting malicious intent. We find that skills bundling executable scripts are 2.12x more likely to contain vulnerabilities than instruction-only skills (OR=2.12, p<0.001). Our contributions include: (1) a grounded vulnerability taxonomy derived from 8,126 vulnerable skills, (2) a validated detection methodology achieving 86.7% precision and 82.5% recall, and (3) an open dataset and detection toolkit to support future research. These results demonstrate an urgent need for capability-based permission systems and mandatory security vetting before this attack vector is further exploited.

Existing visual privacy benchmarks largely treat privacy as a binary property, labeling images as private or non-private based on visible sensitive content. We argue that privacy is fundamentally compositional. Attributes that are benign in isolation may combine to produce severe privacy violations. We introduce the Compositional Privacy Risk Taxonomy (CPRT), a regulation-aware framework that organizes visual attributes according to standalone identifiability and compositional harm potential. CPRT defines four graded severity levels and is paired with an interpretable scoring function that assigns continuous privacy severity scores. We further construct a taxonomy-aligned dataset of 6.7K images and derive ground-truth compositional risk scores. By evaluating frontier and open-weight VLMs we find that frontier models align well with compositional severity when provided structured guidance, but systematically underestimate composition-driven risks. Smaller models struggle to internalize graded privacy reasoning. To bridge this gap, we introduce a deployable 8B supervised fine-tuned (SFT) model that closely matches frontier-level performance on compositional privacy assessment.

With LLMs increasingly deployed in corporate data management, it is crucial to ensure that these models do not leak sensitive information. In the context of corporate data management, the concept of sensitivity awareness has been introduced, enabling LLMs to adhere to predefined access rights rules. However, it remains unclear how sensitivity awareness relates to established notions of privacy, such as differential privacy (DP), thereby making it difficult to deploy meaningfully in real-world applications. In this work, we formalize the notion of sensitivity awareness and theoretically establish its connection to DP. Additionally, we develop a supervised fine-tuning recipe to make existing, four-bit quantized LLMs more sensitivity-aware. With a performance boost of up to 21.7%, the finetuned LLMs not only substantially improve over their baseline but also outperform other full-precision open-source and commercial models of similar size in achieving sensitivity awareness, demonstrating the effectiveness of our proposed approach. At the same time, our method also largely preserves the models' performance on other tasks, such as general instruction-following, mathematical, and common-sense reasoning.

Data collected from the real world tends to be biased, unbalanced, and at risk of exposing sensitive and private information. This reality has given rise to the idea of creating synthetic datasets to alleviate risk, bias, harm, and privacy concerns inherent in the real data. This concept relies on Generative AI models to produce unbiased, privacy-preserving synthetic data while being true to the real data. In this new paradigm, how can we tell if this approach delivers on its promises? We present an auditing framework that offers a holistic assessment of synthetic datasets and AI models trained on them, centered around bias and discrimination prevention, fidelity to the real data, utility, robustness, and privacy preservation. We showcase our framework by auditing multiple generative models on diverse use cases, including education, healthcare, banking, human resources, and across different modalities, from tabular, to time-series, to natural language. Our use cases demonstrate the importance of a holistic assessment in order to ensure compliance with socio-technical safeguards that regulators and policymakers are increasingly enforcing. For this purpose, we introduce the trust index that ranks multiple synthetic datasets based on their prescribed safeguards and their desired trade-offs. Moreover, we devise a trust-index-driven model selection and cross-validation procedure via auditing in the training loop that we showcase on a class of transformer models that we dub TrustFormers, across different modalities. This trust-driven model selection allows for controllable trust trade-offs in the resulting synthetic data. We instrument our auditing framework with workflows that connect different stakeholders from model development to audit and certification via a synthetic data auditing report.

The rapid deployment of AI systems in high-stakes domains, including those classified as high-risk under the The EU AI Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689), has intensified the need for reliable compliance auditing. For binary classifiers, regulatory risk assessment often relies on global fairness metrics such as the Disparate Impact ratio, widely used to evaluate potential discrimination. In typical auditing settings, the auditee provides a subset of its dataset to an auditor, while a supervisory authority may verify whether this subset is representative of the full underlying distribution. In this work, we investigate to what extent a malicious auditee can construct a fairness-compliant yet representative-looking sample from a non-compliant original distribution, thereby creating an illusion of fairness. We formalize this problem as a constrained distributional projection task and introduce mathematically grounded manipulation strategies based on entropic and optimal transport projections. These constructions characterize the minimal distributional shift required to satisfy fairness constraints. To counter such attacks, we formalize representativeness through distributional distance based statistical tests and systematically evaluate their ability to detect manipulated samples. Our analysis highlights the conditions under which fairness manipulation can remain statistically undetected and provides practical guidelines for strengthening supervisory verification. We validate our theoretical findings through experiments on standard tabular datasets for bias detection. Code is publicly available at https://github.com/ValentinLafargue/Inspection.

As multi-agent AI systems grow in complexity, the protocols connecting them constrain their capabilities. Current protocols such as A2A and MCP do not expose model-level properties as first-class primitives, ignoring properties fundamental to effective delegation: model identity, reasoning profile, quality calibration, and cost characteristics. We present the LLM Delegate Protocol (LDP), an AI-native communication protocol introducing five mechanisms: (1) rich delegate identity cards with quality hints and reasoning profiles; (2) progressive payload modes with negotiation and fallback; (3) governed sessions with persistent context; (4) structured provenance tracking confidence and verification status; (5) trust domains enforcing security boundaries at the protocol level. We implement LDP as a plugin for the JamJet agent runtime and evaluate against A2A and random baselines using local Ollama models and LLM-as-judge evaluation. Identity-aware routing achieves ~12x lower latency on easy tasks through delegate specialization, though it does not improve aggregate quality in our small delegate pool; semantic frame payloads reduce token count by 37% (p=0.031) with no observed quality loss; governed sessions eliminate 39% token overhead at 10 rounds; and noisy provenance degrades synthesis quality below the no-provenance baseline, arguing that confidence metadata is harmful without verification. Simulated analyses show architectural advantages in attack detection (96% vs. 6%) and failure recovery (100% vs. 35% completion). This paper contributes a protocol design, reference implementation, and initial evidence that AI-native protocol primitives enable more efficient and governable delegation.

Tool-using automation systems, from scripts and CI bots to agentic assistants, fail in recurring patterns. Common failures include unsafe side effects, invalid arguments, uncontrolled retries, and leakage of sensitive outputs. Many mitigations are model-centric and prompt-dependent, so they are brittle and do not generalize to non-LLM callers. We present Policy-First Tooling, a model-agnostic permission layer that mediates tool invocation through explicit constraints, risk-aware gating, recovery controls, and auditable explanations. The paper contributes a compact policy DSL, a runtime enforcement architecture with actionable rationale and fix hints, and a reproducible benchmark based on trace replay with controlled fault and misuse injection. In 225 controlled runs across five policy packs and three fault profiles, stricter packs improve violation prevention from 0.000 in P0 to 0.681 in P4, while task success drops from 0.356 to 0.067. Retry amplification decreases from 3.774 in P0 to 1.378 in P4, and leakage recall reaches 0.875 under injected secret outputs. These results make safety to utility trade-offs explicit and measurable.

The emergence of open data portals necessitates more attention to protecting sensitive data before datasets get published and exchanged. While an abundance of methods for suppressing sensitive data exist, the conceptualization of sensitive data and methods to detect it, focus particularly on personal data that, if disclosed, may be harmful or violate privacy. We observe the need for refining and broadening our definitions of sensitive data, and argue that the sensitivity of data depends on its context. Based on this definition, we introduce two mechanisms for contextual sensitive data detection that consider the broader context of a dataset at hand. First, we introduce type contextualization, which first detects the semantic type of particular data values, then considers the overall context of the data values within the dataset or document. Second, we introduce domain contextualization which determines sensitivity of a given dataset in the broader context based on the retrieval of relevant rules from documents that specify data sensitivity (e.g., data topic and geographic origin). Experiments with these mechanisms, assisted by large language models (LLMs), confirm that: 1) type-contextualization significantly reduces the number of false positives for type-based sensitive data detection and reaches a recall of 94% compared to 63% with commercial tools, and 2) domain-contextualization leveraging sensitivity rule retrieval is effective for context-grounded sensitive data detection in non-standard data domains such as humanitarian datasets. Evaluation with humanitarian data experts also reveals that context-grounded LLM explanations provide useful guidance in manual data auditing processes, improving consistency. We open-source mechanisms and annotated datasets for contextual sensitive data detection at https://github.com/trl-lab/sensitive-data-detection.

External audits of AI systems are increasingly recognized as a key mechanism for AI governance. The effectiveness of an audit, however, depends on the degree of system access granted to auditors. Recent audits of state-of-the-art AI systems have primarily relied on black-box access, in which auditors can only query the system and observe its outputs. However, white-box access to the system's inner workings (e.g., weights, activations, gradients) allows an auditor to perform stronger attacks, more thoroughly interpret models, and conduct fine-tuning. Meanwhile, outside-the-box access to its training and deployment information (e.g., methodology, code, documentation, hyperparameters, data, deployment details, findings from internal evaluations) allows for auditors to scrutinize the development process and design more targeted evaluations. In this paper, we examine the limitations of black-box audits and the advantages of white- and outside-the-box audits. We also discuss technical, physical, and legal safeguards for performing these audits with minimal security risks. Given that different forms of access can lead to very different levels of evaluation, we conclude that (1) transparency regarding the access and methods used by auditors is necessary to properly interpret audit results, and (2) white- and outside-the-box access allow for substantially more scrutiny than black-box access alone.

As AI agents become increasingly autonomous and capable, ensuring their security against vulnerabilities such as prompt injection becomes critical. This paper explores the use of information-flow control (IFC) to provide security guarantees for AI agents. We present a formal model to reason about the security and expressiveness of agent planners. Using this model, we characterize the class of properties enforceable by dynamic taint-tracking and construct a taxonomy of tasks to evaluate security and utility trade-offs of planner designs. Informed by this exploration, we present Fides, a planner that tracks confidentiality and integrity labels, deterministically enforces security policies, and introduces novel primitives for selectively hiding information. Its evaluation in AgentDojo demonstrates that this approach broadens the range of tasks that can be securely accomplished. A tutorial to walk readers through the the concepts introduced in the paper can be found at https://github.com/microsoft/fides

Personalization is critical in AI assistants, particularly in the context of private AI models that work with individual users. A key scenario in this domain involves enabling AI models to access and interpret a user's private data (e.g., conversation history, user-AI interactions, app usage) to understand personal details such as biographical information, preferences, and social connections. However, due to the sensitive nature of such data, there are no publicly available datasets that allow us to assess an AI model's ability to understand users through direct access to personal information. To address this gap, we introduce a synthetic data generation pipeline that creates diverse, realistic user profiles and private documents simulating human activities. Leveraging this synthetic data, we present PersonaBench, a benchmark designed to evaluate AI models' performance in understanding personal information derived from simulated private user data. We evaluate Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) pipelines using questions directly related to a user's personal information, supported by the relevant private documents provided to the models. Our results reveal that current retrieval-augmented AI models struggle to answer private questions by extracting personal information from user documents, highlighting the need for improved methodologies to enhance personalization capabilities in AI.

Video anomaly detection (VAD) without human monitoring is a complex computer vision task that can have a positive impact on society if implemented successfully. While recent advances have made significant progress in solving this task, most existing approaches overlook a critical real-world concern: privacy. With the increasing popularity of artificial intelligence technologies, it becomes crucial to implement proper AI ethics into their development. Privacy leakage in VAD allows models to pick up and amplify unnecessary biases related to people's personal information, which may lead to undesirable decision making. In this paper, we propose TeD-SPAD, a privacy-aware video anomaly detection framework that destroys visual private information in a self-supervised manner. In particular, we propose the use of a temporally-distinct triplet loss to promote temporally discriminative features, which complements current weakly-supervised VAD methods. Using TeD-SPAD, we achieve a positive trade-off between privacy protection and utility anomaly detection performance on three popular weakly supervised VAD datasets: UCF-Crime, XD-Violence, and ShanghaiTech. Our proposed anonymization model reduces private attribute prediction by 32.25% while only reducing frame-level ROC AUC on the UCF-Crime anomaly detection dataset by 3.69%. Project Page: https://joefioresi718.github.io/TeD-SPAD_webpage/

AI memory systems are evolving toward unified context layers that enable efficient cross-agent collaboration and multi-tool workflows, facilitating better accumulation of personal data and learning of user preferences. However, centralization creates a trust crisis where users must entrust cloud providers with sensitive digital memory data. We identify a core tension between personalization demands and data sovereignty: centralized memory systems enable efficient cross-agent collaboration but expose users' sensitive data to cloud provider risks, while private deployments provide security but limit collaboration. To resolve this tension, we aim to achieve local-equivalent security while enabling superior maintenance efficiency and collaborative capabilities. We propose a five-layer architecture abstracting common functional components of AI memory systems: Storage, Extraction, Learning, Retrieval, and Governance. By applying TEE protection to each layer, we establish a trustworthy framework. Based on this, we design MemTrust, a hardware-backed zero-trust architecture that provides cryptographic guarantees across all layers. Our contributions include the five-layer abstraction, "Context from MemTrust" protocol for cross-application sharing, side-channel hardened retrieval with obfuscated access patterns, and comprehensive security analysis. The architecture enables third-party developers to port existing systems with acceptable development costs, achieving system-wide trustworthiness. We believe that AI memory plays a crucial role in enhancing the efficiency and collaboration of agents and AI tools. AI memory will become the foundational infrastructure for AI agents, and MemTrust serves as a universal trusted framework for AI memory systems, with the goal of becoming the infrastructure of memory infrastructure.

We make two contributions in the field of AI fairness over continuous protected attributes. First, we show that the Hirschfeld-Gebelein-Renyi (HGR) indicator (the only one currently available for such a case) is valuable but subject to a few crucial limitations regarding semantics, interpretability, and robustness. Second, we introduce a family of indicators that are: 1) complementary to HGR in terms of semantics; 2) fully interpretable and transparent; 3) robust over finite samples; 4) configurable to suit specific applications. Our approach also allows us to define fine-grained constraints to permit certain types of dependence and forbid others selectively. By expanding the available options for continuous protected attributes, our approach represents a significant contribution to the area of fair artificial intelligence.

Conventional recommender systems (RSs) face challenges in precisely capturing users' fine-grained preferences. Large language models (LLMs) have shown capabilities in commonsense reasoning and leveraging external tools that may help address these challenges. However, existing LLM-based RSs suffer from hallucinations, misalignment between the semantic space of items and the behavior space of users, or overly simplistic control strategies (e.g., whether to rank or directly present existing results). To bridge these gap, we introduce ToolRec, a framework for LLM-empowered recommendations via tool learning that uses LLMs as surrogate users, thereby guiding the recommendation process and invoking external tools to generate a recommendation list that aligns closely with users' nuanced preferences. We formulate the recommendation process as a process aimed at exploring user interests in attribute granularity. The process factors in the nuances of the context and user preferences. The LLM then invokes external tools based on a user's attribute instructions and probes different segments of the item pool. We consider two types of attribute-oriented tools: rank tools and retrieval tools. Through the integration of LLMs, ToolRec enables conventional recommender systems to become external tools with a natural language interface. Extensive experiments verify the effectiveness of ToolRec, particularly in scenarios that are rich in semantic content.

The security of Large Language Model (LLM) applications is fundamentally challenged by "form-first" attacks like prompt injection and jailbreaking, where malicious instructions are embedded within user inputs. Conventional defenses, which rely on post hoc output filtering, are often brittle and fail to address the root cause: the model's inability to distinguish trusted instructions from untrusted data. This paper proposes Countermind, a multi-layered security architecture intended to shift defenses from a reactive, post hoc posture to a proactive, pre-inference, and intra-inference enforcement model. The architecture proposes a fortified perimeter designed to structurally validate and transform all inputs, and an internal governance mechanism intended to constrain the model's semantic processing pathways before an output is generated. The primary contributions of this work are conceptual designs for: (1) A Semantic Boundary Logic (SBL) with a mandatory, time-coupled Text Crypter intended to reduce the plaintext prompt injection attack surface, provided all ingestion paths are enforced. (2) A Parameter-Space Restriction (PSR) mechanism, leveraging principles from representation engineering, to dynamically control the LLM's access to internal semantic clusters, with the goal of mitigating semantic drift and dangerous emergent behaviors. (3) A Secure, Self-Regulating Core that uses an OODA loop and a learning security module to adapt its defenses based on an immutable audit log. (4) A Multimodal Input Sandbox and Context-Defense mechanisms to address threats from non-textual data and long-term semantic poisoning. This paper outlines an evaluation plan designed to quantify the proposed architecture's effectiveness in reducing the Attack Success Rate (ASR) for form-first attacks and to measure its potential latency overhead.

Open-weight AI systems offer unique benefits, including enhanced transparency, open research, and decentralized access. However, they are vulnerable to tampering attacks which can efficiently elicit harmful behaviors by modifying weights or activations. Currently, there is not yet a robust science of open-weight model risk management. Existing safety fine-tuning methods and other post-training techniques have struggled to make LLMs resistant to more than a few dozen steps of adversarial fine-tuning. In this paper, we investigate whether filtering text about dual-use topics from training data can prevent unwanted capabilities and serve as a more tamper-resistant safeguard. We introduce a multi-stage pipeline for scalable data filtering and show that it offers a tractable and effective method for minimizing biothreat proxy knowledge in LLMs. We pretrain multiple 6.9B-parameter models from scratch and find that they exhibit substantial resistance to adversarial fine-tuning attacks on up to 10,000 steps and 300M tokens of biothreat-related text -- outperforming existing post-training baselines by over an order of magnitude -- with no observed degradation to unrelated capabilities. However, while filtered models lack internalized dangerous knowledge, we find that they can still leverage such information when it is provided in context (e.g., via search tool augmentation), demonstrating a need for a defense-in-depth approach. Overall, these findings help to establish pretraining data curation as a promising layer of defense for open-weight AI systems.

General-purpose artificial intelligence (AI) systems are built on massive swathes of public web data, assembled into corpora such as C4, RefinedWeb, and Dolma. To our knowledge, we conduct the first, large-scale, longitudinal audit of the consent protocols for the web domains underlying AI training corpora. Our audit of 14,000 web domains provides an expansive view of crawlable web data and how consent preferences to use it are changing over time. We observe a proliferation of AI-specific clauses to limit use, acute differences in restrictions on AI developers, as well as general inconsistencies between websites' expressed intentions in their Terms of Service and their robots.txt. We diagnose these as symptoms of ineffective web protocols, not designed to cope with the widespread re-purposing of the internet for AI. Our longitudinal analyses show that in a single year (2023-2024) there has been a rapid crescendo of data restrictions from web sources, rendering ~5%+ of all tokens in C4, or 28%+ of the most actively maintained, critical sources in C4, fully restricted from use. For Terms of Service crawling restrictions, a full 45% of C4 is now restricted. If respected or enforced, these restrictions are rapidly biasing the diversity, freshness, and scaling laws for general-purpose AI systems. We hope to illustrate the emerging crisis in data consent, foreclosing much of the open web, not only for commercial AI, but non-commercial AI and academic purposes.

LLM agents are an emerging form of AI systems where large language models (LLMs) serve as the central component, utilizing a diverse set of tools to complete user-assigned tasks. Despite their great potential, LLM agents pose significant security risks. When interacting with the external world, they may encounter malicious commands from attackers, leading to the execution of dangerous actions. A promising way to address this is by enforcing the principle of least privilege: allowing only essential actions for task completion while blocking unnecessary ones. However, achieving this is challenging, as it requires covering diverse agent scenarios while preserving both security and utility. We introduce Progent, the first privilege control mechanism for LLM agents. At its core is a domain-specific language for flexibly expressing privilege control policies applied during agent execution. These policies provide fine-grained constraints over tool calls, deciding when tool calls are permissible and specifying fallbacks if they are not. This enables agent developers and users to craft suitable policies for their specific use cases and enforce them deterministically to guarantee security. Thanks to its modular design, integrating Progent does not alter agent internals and requires only minimal changes to agent implementation, enhancing its practicality and potential for widespread adoption. To automate policy writing, we leverage LLMs to generate policies based on user queries, which are then updated dynamically for improved security and utility. Our extensive evaluation shows that it enables strong security while preserving high utility across three distinct scenarios or benchmarks: AgentDojo, ASB, and AgentPoison. Furthermore, we perform an in-depth analysis, showcasing the effectiveness of its core components and the resilience of its automated policy generation against adaptive attacks.

In LLM/VLM agents, prompt privacy risk propagates beyond a single model call because raw user content can flow into retrieval queries, memory writes, tool calls, and logs. Existing de-identification pipelines address document boundaries but not this cross-stage propagation. We propose BodhiPromptShield, a policy-aware framework that detects sensitive spans, routes them via typed placeholders, semantic abstraction, or secure symbolic mapping, and delays restoration to authorized boundaries. Relative to enterprise redaction, this adds explicit propagation-aware mediation and restoration timing as a security variable. Under controlled evaluation on the Controlled Prompt-Privacy Benchmark (CPPB), stage-wise propagation suppresses from 10.7\% to 7.1\% across retrieval, memory, and tool stages; PER reaches 9.3\% with 0.94 AC and 0.92 TSR, outperforming generic de-identification. These are controlled systems results on CPPB rather than formal privacy guarantees or public-benchmark transfer claims. The project repository is available at https://github.com/mabo1215/BodhiPromptShield.git.

Anonymized data is highly valuable to both businesses and researchers. A large body of research has however shown the strong limits of the de-identification release-and-forget model, where data is anonymized and shared. This has led to the development of privacy-preserving query-based systems. Based on the idea of "sticky noise", Diffix has been recently proposed as a novel query-based mechanism satisfying alone the EU Article~29 Working Party's definition of anonymization. According to its authors, Diffix adds less noise to answers than solutions based on differential privacy while allowing for an unlimited number of queries. This paper presents a new class of noise-exploitation attacks, exploiting the noise added by the system to infer private information about individuals in the dataset. Our first differential attack uses samples extracted from Diffix in a likelihood ratio test to discriminate between two probability distributions. We show that using this attack against a synthetic best-case dataset allows us to infer private information with 89.4% accuracy using only 5 attributes. Our second cloning attack uses dummy conditions that conditionally strongly affect the output of the query depending on the value of the private attribute. Using this attack on four real-world datasets, we show that we can infer private attributes of at least 93% of the users in the dataset with accuracy between 93.3% and 97.1%, issuing a median of 304 queries per user. We show how to optimize this attack, targeting 55.4% of the users and achieving 91.7% accuracy, using a maximum of only 32 queries per user. Our attacks demonstrate that adding data-dependent noise, as done by Diffix, is not sufficient to prevent inference of private attributes. We furthermore argue that Diffix alone fails to satisfy Art. 29 WP's definition of anonymization. [...]

Multi-agent systems face a fundamental architectural flaw: agent identity is bound to network location. When agents migrate between providers, scale across instances, or federate across organizations, URI-based identity schemes break references, fragment audit trails, and require centralized coordination. We propose the agent:// URI scheme, which decouples identity from topology through three orthogonal components: a trust root establishing organizational authority, a hierarchical capability path enabling semantic discovery, and a sortable unique identifier providing stable reference. The scheme enables capability-based discovery through DHT key derivation, where queries return agents by what they do rather than where they are. Trust-root scoping prevents cross-organization pollution while permitting federation when desired. Cryptographic attestation via PASETO tokens binds capability claims to agent identity, enabling verification without real-time contact with the issuing authority. We evaluate the scheme across four dimensions: capability expressiveness (100% coverage on 369 production tools with zero collision), discovery precision (F1=1.0 across 10,000 agents), identity stability (formal proofs of migration invariance), and performance (all operations under 5 microseconds). The agent:// URI scheme provides a formally-specified, practically-evaluated foundation for decentralized agent identity and capability-based discovery.

This paper investigates the problem of collecting multidimensional data throughout time (i.e., longitudinal studies) for the fundamental task of frequency estimation under Local Differential Privacy (LDP) guarantees. Contrary to frequency estimation of a single attribute, the multidimensional aspect demands particular attention to the privacy budget. Besides, when collecting user statistics longitudinally, privacy progressively degrades. Indeed, the "multiple" settings in combination (i.e., many attributes and several collections throughout time) impose several challenges, for which this paper proposes the first solution for frequency estimates under LDP. To tackle these issues, we extend the analysis of three state-of-the-art LDP protocols (Generalized Randomized Response -- GRR, Optimized Unary Encoding -- OUE, and Symmetric Unary Encoding -- SUE) for both longitudinal and multidimensional data collections. While the known literature uses OUE and SUE for two rounds of sanitization (a.k.a. memoization), i.e., L-OUE and L-SUE, respectively, we analytically and experimentally show that starting with OUE and then with SUE provides higher data utility (i.e., L-OSUE). Also, for attributes with small domain sizes, we propose Longitudinal GRR (L-GRR), which provides higher utility than the other protocols based on unary encoding. Last, we also propose a new solution named Adaptive LDP for LOngitudinal and Multidimensional FREquency Estimates (ALLOMFREE), which randomly samples a single attribute to be sent with the whole privacy budget and adaptively selects the optimal protocol, i.e., either L-GRR or L-OSUE. As shown in the results, ALLOMFREE consistently and considerably outperforms the state-of-the-art L-SUE and L-OUE protocols in the quality of the frequency estimates.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) represents a significant advancement in AI-tool integration, enabling seamless communication between AI agents and external services. However, this connectivity introduces novel attack vectors that remain largely unexplored. This paper demonstrates how unsophisticated threat actors, requiring only basic programming skills and free web tools, can exploit MCP's trust model to exfiltrate sensitive financial data. We present a proof-of-concept attack where a malicious weather MCP server, disguised as benign functionality, discovers and exploits legitimate banking tools to steal user account balances. The attack chain requires no advanced technical knowledge, server infrastructure, or monetary investment. The findings reveal a critical security gap in the emerging MCP ecosystem: while individual servers may appear trustworthy, their combination creates unexpected cross-server attack surfaces. Unlike traditional cybersecurity threats that assume sophisticated adversaries, our research shows that the barrier to entry for MCP-based attacks is alarmingly low. A threat actor with undergraduate-level Python knowledge can craft convincing social engineering attacks that exploit the implicit trust relationships MCP establishes between AI agents and tool providers. This work contributes to the nascent field of MCP security by demonstrating that current MCP implementations allow trivial cross-server attacks and proposing both immediate mitigations and protocol improvements to secure this emerging ecosystem.

As the era of autonomous agents making decisions on behalf of users unfolds, ensuring contextual integrity (CI) -- what is the appropriate information to share while carrying out a certain task -- becomes a central question to the field. We posit that CI demands a form of reasoning where the agent needs to reason about the context in which it is operating. To test this, we first prompt LLMs to reason explicitly about CI when deciding what information to disclose. We then extend this approach by developing a reinforcement learning (RL) framework that further instills in models the reasoning necessary to achieve CI. Using a synthetic, automatically created, dataset of only sim700 examples but with diverse contexts and information disclosure norms, we show that our method substantially reduces inappropriate information disclosure while maintaining task performance across multiple model sizes and families. Importantly, improvements transfer from this synthetic dataset to established CI benchmarks such as PrivacyLens that has human annotations and evaluates privacy leakage of AI assistants in actions and tool calls.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has significantly enhanced the factual accuracy and domain adaptability of Large Language Models (LLMs). This advancement has enabled their widespread deployment across sensitive domains such as healthcare, finance, and enterprise applications. RAG mitigates hallucinations by integrating external knowledge, yet introduces privacy risk and security risk, notably data breaching risk and data poisoning risk. While recent studies have explored prompt injection and poisoning attacks, there remains a significant gap in comprehensive research on controlling inbound and outbound query flows to mitigate these threats. In this paper, we propose an AI firewall, ControlNET, designed to safeguard RAG-based LLM systems from these vulnerabilities. ControlNET controls query flows by leveraging activation shift phenomena to detect adversarial queries and mitigate their impact through semantic divergence. We conduct comprehensive experiments on four different benchmark datasets including Msmarco, HotpotQA, FinQA, and MedicalSys using state-of-the-art open source LLMs (Llama3, Vicuna, and Mistral). Our results demonstrate that ControlNET achieves over 0.909 AUROC in detecting and mitigating security threats while preserving system harmlessness. Overall, ControlNET offers an effective, robust, harmless defense mechanism, marking a significant advancement toward the secure deployment of RAG-based LLM systems.

We often interact with untrusted parties. Prioritization of privacy can limit the effectiveness of these interactions, as achieving certain goals necessitates sharing private data. Traditionally, addressing this challenge has involved either seeking trusted intermediaries or constructing cryptographic protocols that restrict how much data is revealed, such as multi-party computations or zero-knowledge proofs. While significant advances have been made in scaling cryptographic approaches, they remain limited in terms of the size and complexity of applications they can be used for. In this paper, we argue that capable machine learning models can fulfill the role of a trusted third party, thus enabling secure computations for applications that were previously infeasible. In particular, we describe Trusted Capable Model Environments (TCMEs) as an alternative approach for scaling secure computation, where capable machine learning model(s) interact under input/output constraints, with explicit information flow control and explicit statelessness. This approach aims to achieve a balance between privacy and computational efficiency, enabling private inference where classical cryptographic solutions are currently infeasible. We describe a number of use cases that are enabled by TCME, and show that even some simple classic cryptographic problems can already be solved with TCME. Finally, we outline current limitations and discuss the path forward in implementing them.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems enhance large language models (LLMs) by incorporating external knowledge bases, but this may expose them to extraction attacks, leading to potential copyright and privacy risks. However, existing extraction methods typically rely on malicious inputs such as prompt injection or jailbreaking, making them easily detectable via input- or output-level detection. In this paper, we introduce Implicit Knowledge Extraction Attack (IKEA), which conducts Knowledge Extraction on RAG systems through benign queries. Specifically, IKEA first leverages anchor concepts-keywords related to internal knowledge-to generate queries with a natural appearance, and then designs two mechanisms that lead anchor concepts to thoroughly "explore" the RAG's knowledge: (1) Experience Reflection Sampling, which samples anchor concepts based on past query-response histories, ensuring their relevance to the topic; (2) Trust Region Directed Mutation, which iteratively mutates anchor concepts under similarity constraints to further exploit the embedding space. Extensive experiments demonstrate IKEA's effectiveness under various defenses, surpassing baselines by over 80% in extraction efficiency and 90% in attack success rate. Moreover, the substitute RAG system built from IKEA's extractions shows comparable performance to the original RAG and outperforms those based on baselines across multiple evaluation tasks, underscoring the stealthy copyright infringement risk in RAG systems.

Legal compliance in AI-driven data transfer planning is becoming increasingly critical under stringent privacy regulations such as the Japanese Act on the Protection of Personal Information (APPI). We propose a multi-agent legal verifier that decomposes compliance checking into specialized agents for statutory interpretation, business context evaluation, and risk assessment, coordinated through a structured synthesis protocol. Evaluated on a stratified dataset of 200 Amended APPI Article 16 cases with clearly defined ground truth labels and multiple performance metrics, the system achieves 72% accuracy, which is 21 percentage points higher than a single-agent baseline, including 90% accuracy on clear compliance cases (vs. 16% for the baseline) while maintaining perfect detection of clear violations. While challenges remain in ambiguous scenarios, these results show that domain specialization and coordinated reasoning can meaningfully improve legal AI performance, providing a scalable and regulation-aware framework for trustworthy and interpretable automated compliance verification.

Autonomous agent systems increasingly trigger real-world side effects: deploying infrastructure, modifying databases, moving money, and executing workflows. Yet most agent stacks provide no mandatory execution checkpoint where organizations can deterministically permit, deny, or defer an action before it changes reality. This paper introduces Faramesh, a protocol-agnostic execution control plane that enforces execution-time authorization for agent-driven actions via a non-bypassable Action Authorization Boundary (AAB). Faramesh canonicalizes agent intent into a Canonical Action Representation (CAR), evaluates actions deterministically against policy and state, and issues a decision artifact (PERMIT/DEFER/DENY) that executors must validate prior to execution. The system is designed to be framework- and model-agnostic, supports multi-agent and multi-tenant deployments, and remains independent of transport protocols (e.g., MCP). Faramesh further provides decision-centric, append-only provenance logging keyed by canonical action hashes, enabling auditability, verification, and deterministic replay without re-running agent reasoning. We show how these primitives yield enforceable, predictable governance for autonomous execution while avoiding hidden coupling to orchestration layers or observability-only approaches.

Privacy concerns have become increasingly critical in modern AI and data science applications, where sensitive information is collected, analyzed, and shared across diverse domains such as healthcare, finance, and mobility. While prior research has focused on protecting privacy in a single data release, many real-world systems operate under sequential or continuous data publishing, where the same or related data are released over time. Such sequential disclosures introduce new vulnerabilities, as temporal correlations across releases may enable adversaries to infer sensitive information that remains hidden in any individual release. In this paper, we investigate whether an attacker can compromise privacy in sequential data releases by exploiting dependencies between consecutive publications, even when each individual release satisfies standard privacy guarantees. To this end, we propose a novel attack model that captures these sequential dependencies by integrating a Hidden Markov Model with a reinforcement learning-based bi-directional inference mechanism. This enables the attacker to leverage both earlier and later observations in the sequence to infer private information. We instantiate our framework in the context of trajectory data, demonstrating how an adversary can recover sensitive locations from sequential mobility datasets. Extensive experiments on Geolife, Porto Taxi, and SynMob datasets show that our model consistently outperforms baseline approaches that treat each release independently. The results reveal a fundamental privacy risk inherent to sequential data publishing, where individually protected releases can collectively leak sensitive information when analyzed temporally. These findings underscore the need for new privacy-preserving frameworks that explicitly model temporal dependencies, such as time-aware differential privacy or sequential data obfuscation strategies.

Even though recent years have seen many attacks exposing severe vulnerabilities in Federated Learning (FL), a holistic understanding of what enables these attacks and how they can be mitigated effectively is still lacking. In this work, we demystify the inner workings of existing (targeted) attacks. We provide new insights into why these attacks are possible and why a definitive solution to FL robustness is challenging. We show that the need for ML algorithms to memorize tail data has significant implications for FL integrity. This phenomenon has largely been studied in the context of privacy; our analysis sheds light on its implications for ML integrity. We show that certain classes of severe attacks can be mitigated effectively by enforcing constraints such as norm bounds on clients' updates. We investigate how to efficiently incorporate these constraints into secure FL protocols in the single-server setting. Based on this, we propose RoFL, a new secure FL system that extends secure aggregation with privacy-preserving input validation. Specifically, RoFL can enforce constraints such as L_2 and L_infty bounds on high-dimensional encrypted model updates.

This paper investigates privacy jailbreaking in LLMs via steering, focusing on whether manipulating activations can bypass LLM alignment and alter response behaviors to privacy related queries (e.g., a certain public figure's sexual orientation). We begin by identifying attention heads predictive of refusal behavior for private attributes (e.g., sexual orientation) using lightweight linear probes trained with privacy evaluator labels. Next, we steer the activations of a small subset of these attention heads guided by the trained probes to induce the model to generate non-refusal responses. Our experiments show that these steered responses often disclose sensitive attribute details, along with other private information about data subjects such as life events, relationships, and personal histories that the models would typically refuse to produce. Evaluations across four LLMs reveal jailbreaking disclosure rates of at least 95%, with more than 50% on average of these responses revealing true personal information. Our controlled study demonstrates that private information memorized in LLMs can be extracted through targeted manipulation of internal activations.

Recent advances in multi-modal Large Language Models (M-LLMs) have demonstrated a powerful ability to synthesize implicit information from disparate sources, including images and text. These resourceful data from social media also introduce a significant and underexplored privacy risk: the inference of sensitive personal attributes from seemingly daily media content. However, the lack of benchmarks and comprehensive evaluations of state-of-the-art M-LLM capabilities hinders the research of private attribute profiling on social media. Accordingly, we propose (1) PRISM, the first multi-modal, multi-dimensional and fine-grained synthesized dataset incorporating a comprehensive privacy landscape and dynamic user history; (2) an Efficient evaluation framework that measures the cross-modal privacy inference capabilities of advanced M-LLM. Specifically, PRISM is a large-scale synthetic benchmark designed to evaluate cross-modal privacy risks. Its key feature is 12 sensitive attribute labels across a diverse set of multi-modal profiles, which enables targeted privacy analysis. These profiles are generated via a sophisticated LLM agentic workflow, governed by a prior distribution to ensure they realistically mimic social media users. Additionally, we propose a Multi-Agent Inference Framework that leverages a pipeline of specialized LLMs to enhance evaluation capabilities. We evaluate the inference capabilities of six leading M-LLMs (Qwen, Gemini, GPT-4o, GLM, Doubao, and Grok) on PRISM. The comparison with human performance reveals that these MLLMs significantly outperform in accuracy and efficiency, highlighting the threat of potential privacy risks and the urgent need for robust defenses.

With local differential privacy (LDP), users can privatize their data and thus guarantee privacy properties before transmitting it to the server (a.k.a. the aggregator). One primary objective of LDP is frequency (or histogram) estimation, in which the aggregator estimates the number of users for each possible value. In practice, when a study with rich content on a population is desired, the interest is in the multiple attributes of the population, that is to say, in multidimensional data (d geq 2). However, contrary to the problem of frequency estimation of a single attribute (the majority of the works), the multidimensional aspect imposes to pay particular attention to the privacy budget. This one can indeed grow extremely quickly due to the composition theorem. To the authors' knowledge, two solutions seem to stand out for this task: 1) splitting the privacy budget for each attribute, i.e., send each value with fracε{d}-LDP (Spl), and 2) random sampling a single attribute and spend all the privacy budget to send it with ε-LDP (Smp). Although Smp adds additional sampling error, it has proven to provide higher data utility than the former Spl solution. However, we argue that aggregators (who are also seen as attackers) are aware of the sampled attribute and its LDP value, which is protected by a "less strict" e^ε probability bound (rather than e^{ε/d}). This way, we propose a solution named Random Sampling plus Fake Data (RS+FD), which allows creating uncertainty over the sampled attribute by generating fake data for each non-sampled attribute; RS+FD further benefits from amplification by sampling. We theoretically and experimentally validate our proposed solution on both synthetic and real-world datasets to show that RS+FD achieves nearly the same or better utility than the state-of-the-art Smp solution.

RAG has emerged as a key technique for enhancing response quality of LLMs without high computational cost. In traditional architectures, RAG services are provided by a single entity that hosts the dataset within a trusted local environment. However, individuals or small organizations often lack the resources to maintain data storage servers, leading them to rely on outsourced cloud storage. This dependence on untrusted third-party services introduces privacy risks. Embedding-based retrieval mechanisms, commonly used in RAG systems, are vulnerable to privacy leakage such as vector-to-text reconstruction attacks and structural leakage via vector analysis. Several privacy-preserving RAG techniques have been proposed but most existing approaches rely on partially homomorphic encryption, which incurs substantial computational overhead. To address these challenges, we propose an efficient privacy-preserving RAG framework (ppRAG) tailored for untrusted cloud environments that defends against vector-to-text attack, vector analysis, and query analysis. We propose Conditional Approximate Distance-Comparison-Preserving Symmetric Encryption (CAPRISE) that encrypts embeddings while still allowing the cloud to compute similarity between an encrypted query and the encrypted database embeddings. CAPRISE preserves only the relative distance ordering between the encrypted query and each encrypted database embedding, without exposing inter-database distances, thereby enhancing both privacy and efficiency. To mitigate query analysis, we introduce DP by perturbing the query embedding prior to encryption, preventing the cloud from inferring sensitive patterns. Experimental results show that ppRAG achieves efficient processing throughput, high retrieval accuracy, strong privacy guarantees, making it a practical solution for resource-constrained users seeking secure cloud-augmented LLMs.

Stealing attacks pose a persistent threat to the intellectual property of deployed machine-learning systems. Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) intensifies this risk by extending the attack surface beyond model weights to knowledge base that often contains IP-bearing assets such as proprietary runbooks, curated domain collections, or licensed documents. Recent work shows that multi-turn questioning can gradually steal corpus content from RAG systems, yet existing attacks are largely heuristic and often plateau early. We address this gap by formulating RAG knowledge-base stealing as an adaptive stochastic coverage problem (ASCP), where each query is a stochastic action and the goal is to maximize the conditional expected marginal gain (CMG) in corpus coverage under a query budget. Bridging ASCP to real-world black-box RAG knowledge-base stealing raises three challenges: CMG is unobservable, the natural-language action space is intractably large, and feasibility constraints require stealthy queries that remain effective under diverse architectures. We introduce RAGCrawler, a knowledge graph-guided attacker that maintains a global attacker-side state to estimate coverage gains, schedule high-value semantic anchors, and generate non-redundant natural queries. Across four corpora and four generators with BGE retriever, RAGCrawler achieves 66.8% average coverage (up to 84.4%) within 1,000 queries, improving coverage by 44.90% relative to the strongest baseline. It also reduces the queries needed to reach 70% coverage by at least 4.03x on average and enables surrogate reconstruction with answer similarity up to 0.699. Our attack is also scalable to retriever switching and newer RAG techniques like query rewriting and multi-query retrieval. These results highlight urgent needs to protect RAG knowledge assets.

Policy compliance assessment is a fundamental task of evaluating whether an input case strictly complies with a set of human-defined rules, more generally known as policies. In practice, human experts follow a systematic, step-by-step process to identify violations with respect to specific stipulations outlined in the policy. However, such documentation of gold-standard, expert-level reasoning processes is costly to acquire. In this paper, we introduce Policy Reasoning Traces (PRT), a form of specialized generated reasoning chains that serve as a reasoning bridge to improve an LLM's policy compliance assessment capabilities. Our empirical evaluations demonstrate that the use of PRTs for both inference-time and training-time scenarios significantly enhances the performance of open-weight and commercial models, setting a new state-of-the-art for HIPAA and GDPR policies. Beyond accuracy gains, we also highlight how PRTs can improve an LLM's ability to accurately cite policy clauses, as well as influence compliance decisions through their high utilization from the raw chains of thought.

AI agents are autonomous systems that combine LLMs with external tools to solve complex tasks. While such tools extend capability, improper tool permissions introduce security risks such as indirect prompt injection and tool misuse. We characterize these failures as unbalanced tool-driven agency. Agents may retain unnecessary permissions (excessive agency) or fail to invoke required tools (insufficient agency), amplifying the attack surface and reducing performance. We introduce AgenTRIM, a framework for detecting and mitigating tool-driven agency risks without altering an agent's internal reasoning. AgenTRIM addresses these risks through complementary offline and online phases. Offline, AgenTRIM reconstructs and verifies the agent's tool interface from code and execution traces. At runtime, it enforces per-step least-privilege tool access through adaptive filtering and status-aware validation of tool calls. Evaluating on the AgentDojo benchmark, AgenTRIM substantially reduces attack success while maintaining high task performance. Additional experiments show robustness to description-based attacks and effective enforcement of explicit safety policies. Together, these results demonstrate that AgenTRIM provides a practical, capability-preserving approach to safer tool use in LLM-based agents.

Traditional recommendation systems estimate user preference on items from past interaction history, thus suffering from the limitations of obtaining fine-grained and dynamic user preference. Conversational recommendation system (CRS) brings revolutions to those limitations by enabling the system to directly ask users about their preferred attributes on items. However, existing CRS methods do not make full use of such advantage -- they only use the attribute feedback in rather implicit ways such as updating the latent user representation. In this paper, we propose Conversational Path Reasoning (CPR), a generic framework that models conversational recommendation as an interactive path reasoning problem on a graph. It walks through the attribute vertices by following user feedback, utilizing the user preferred attributes in an explicit way. By leveraging on the graph structure, CPR is able to prune off many irrelevant candidate attributes, leading to better chance of hitting user preferred attributes. To demonstrate how CPR works, we propose a simple yet effective instantiation named SCPR (Simple CPR). We perform empirical studies on the multi-round conversational recommendation scenario, the most realistic CRS setting so far that considers multiple rounds of asking attributes and recommending items. Through extensive experiments on two datasets Yelp and LastFM, we validate the effectiveness of our SCPR, which significantly outperforms the state-of-the-art CRS methods EAR (arXiv:2002.09102) and CRM (arXiv:1806.03277). In particular, we find that the more attributes there are, the more advantages our method can achieve.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has emerged as the dominant technique to provide Large Language Models (LLM) with fresh and relevant context, mitigating the risk of hallucinations and improving the overall quality of responses in environments with large and fast moving knowledge bases. However, the integration of external documents into the generation process raises significant privacy concerns. Indeed, when added to a prompt, it is not possible to guarantee a response will not inadvertently expose confidential data, leading to potential breaches of privacy and ethical dilemmas. This paper explores a practical solution to this problem suitable to general knowledge extraction from personal data. It shows differentially private token generation is a viable approach to private RAG.

This study presents Poison-RAG, a framework for adversarial data poisoning attacks targeting retrieval-augmented generation (RAG)-based recommender systems. Poison-RAG manipulates item metadata, such as tags and descriptions, to influence recommendation outcomes. Using item metadata generated through a large language model (LLM) and embeddings derived via the OpenAI API, we explore the impact of adversarial poisoning attacks on provider-side, where attacks are designed to promote long-tail items and demote popular ones. Two attack strategies are proposed: local modifications, which personalize tags for each item using BERT embeddings, and global modifications, applying uniform tags across the dataset. Experiments conducted on the MovieLens dataset in a black-box setting reveal that local strategies improve manipulation effectiveness by up to 50\%, while global strategies risk boosting already popular items. Results indicate that popular items are more susceptible to attacks, whereas long-tail items are harder to manipulate. Approximately 70\% of items lack tags, presenting a cold-start challenge; data augmentation and synthesis are proposed as potential defense mechanisms to enhance RAG-based systems' resilience. The findings emphasize the need for robust metadata management to safeguard recommendation frameworks. Code and data are available at https://github.com/atenanaz/Poison-RAG.

Fairness is an increasingly important concern as machine learning models are used to support decision making in high-stakes applications such as mortgage lending, hiring, and prison sentencing. This paper introduces a new open source Python toolkit for algorithmic fairness, AI Fairness 360 (AIF360), released under an Apache v2.0 license {https://github.com/ibm/aif360). The main objectives of this toolkit are to help facilitate the transition of fairness research algorithms to use in an industrial setting and to provide a common framework for fairness researchers to share and evaluate algorithms. The package includes a comprehensive set of fairness metrics for datasets and models, explanations for these metrics, and algorithms to mitigate bias in datasets and models. It also includes an interactive Web experience (https://aif360.mybluemix.net) that provides a gentle introduction to the concepts and capabilities for line-of-business users, as well as extensive documentation, usage guidance, and industry-specific tutorials to enable data scientists and practitioners to incorporate the most appropriate tool for their problem into their work products. The architecture of the package has been engineered to conform to a standard paradigm used in data science, thereby further improving usability for practitioners. Such architectural design and abstractions enable researchers and developers to extend the toolkit with their new algorithms and improvements, and to use it for performance benchmarking. A built-in testing infrastructure maintains code quality.

Large AI models (e.g., Dall-E, GPT4) have electrified the scientific, technological and societal landscape through their superhuman capabilities. These services are offered largely in a traditional web2.0 format (e.g., OpenAI's GPT4 service). As more large AI models proliferate (personalizing and specializing to a variety of domains), there is a tremendous need to have a neutral trust-free platform that allows the hosting of AI models, clients receiving AI services efficiently, yet in a trust-free, incentive compatible, Byzantine behavior resistant manner. In this paper we propose SAKSHI, a trust-free decentralized platform specifically suited for AI services. The key design principles of SAKSHI are the separation of the data path (where AI query and service is managed) and the control path (where routers and compute and storage hosts are managed) from the transaction path (where the metering and billing of services are managed over a blockchain). This separation is enabled by a "proof of inference" layer which provides cryptographic resistance against a variety of misbehaviors, including poor AI service, nonpayment for service, copying of AI models. This is joint work between multiple universities (Princeton University, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Tsinghua University, HKUST) and two startup companies (Witness Chain and Eigen Layer).

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in sensitive domains such as enterprise and government, ensuring that they adhere to user-defined security policies within context is critical-especially with respect to information non-disclosure. While prior LLM studies have focused on general safety and socially sensitive data, large-scale benchmarks for contextual security preservation against attacks remain lacking. To address this, we introduce a novel large-scale benchmark dataset, CoPriva, evaluating LLM adherence to contextual non-disclosure policies in question answering. Derived from realistic contexts, our dataset includes explicit policies and queries designed as direct and challenging indirect attacks seeking prohibited information. We evaluate 10 LLMs on our benchmark and reveal a significant vulnerability: many models violate user-defined policies and leak sensitive information. This failure is particularly severe against indirect attacks, highlighting a critical gap in current LLM safety alignment for sensitive applications. Our analysis reveals that while models can often identify the correct answer to a query, they struggle to incorporate policy constraints during generation. In contrast, they exhibit a partial ability to revise outputs when explicitly prompted. Our findings underscore the urgent need for more robust methods to guarantee contextual security.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems improve large language model outputs by incorporating external knowledge, enabling more informed and context-aware responses. However, the effectiveness and trustworthiness of these systems critically depends on how they are evaluated, particularly on whether the evaluation process captures real-world constraints like protecting sensitive information. While current evaluation efforts for RAG systems have primarily focused on the development of performance metrics, far less attention has been given to the design and quality of the underlying evaluation datasets, despite their pivotal role in enabling meaningful, reliable assessments. In this work, we introduce a novel multi-agent framework for generating synthetic QA datasets for RAG evaluation that prioritize semantic diversity and privacy preservation. Our approach involves: (1) a Diversity agent leveraging clustering techniques to maximize topical coverage and semantic variability, (2) a Privacy Agent that detects and mask sensitive information across multiple domains and (3) a QA curation agent that synthesizes private and diverse QA pairs suitable as ground truth for RAG evaluation. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our evaluation sets outperform baseline methods in diversity and achieve robust privacy masking on domain-specific datasets. This work offers a practical and ethically aligned pathway toward safer, more comprehensive RAG system evaluation, laying the foundation for future enhancements aligned with evolving AI regulations and compliance standards.

The evolution of generative AI systems exposes the challenges of traditional legal and ethical frameworks built around consent. This chapter examines how the conventional notion of consent, while fundamental to data protection and privacy rights, proves insufficient in addressing the implications of AI-generated content derived from personal data. Through legal and ethical analysis, we show that while individuals can consent to the initial use of their data for AI training, they cannot meaningfully consent to the numerous potential outputs their data might enable or the extent to which the output is used or distributed. We identify three fundamental challenges: the scope problem, the temporality problem, and the autonomy trap, which collectively create what we term a ''consent gap'' in AI systems and their surrounding ecosystem. We argue that current legal frameworks inadequately address these emerging challenges, particularly regarding individual autonomy, identity rights, and social responsibility, especially in cases where AI-generated content creates new forms of personal representation beyond the scope of the original consent. By examining how these consent limitations intersect with broader principles of responsible AI (including fairness, transparency, accountability, and autonomy) we demonstrate the need to evolve ethical and legal approaches to consent.

Many datasets contain personally identifiable information, or PII, which poses privacy risks to individuals. PII masking is commonly used to redact personal information such as names, addresses, and phone numbers from text data. Most modern PII masking pipelines involve machine learning algorithms. However, these systems may vary in performance, such that individuals from particular demographic groups bear a higher risk for having their personal information exposed. In this paper, we evaluate the performance of three off-the-shelf PII masking systems on name detection and redaction. We generate data using names and templates from the customer service domain. We find that an open-source RoBERTa-based system shows fewer disparities than the commercial models we test. However, all systems demonstrate significant differences in error rate based on demographics. In particular, the highest error rates occurred for names associated with Black and Asian/Pacific Islander individuals.

Privacy-enhancing technologies are technologies that implement fundamental data protection principles. With respect to biometric recognition, different types of privacy-enhancing technologies have been introduced for protecting stored biometric data which are generally classified as sensitive. In this regard, various taxonomies and conceptual categorizations have been proposed and standardization activities have been carried out. However, these efforts have mainly been devoted to certain sub-categories of privacy-enhancing technologies and therefore lack generalization. This work provides an overview of concepts of privacy-enhancing technologies for biometrics in a unified framework. Key aspects and differences between existing concepts are highlighted in detail at each processing step. Fundamental properties and limitations of existing approaches are discussed and related to data protection techniques and principles. Moreover, scenarios and methods for the assessment of privacy-enhancing technologies for biometrics are presented. This paper is meant as a point of entry to the field of biometric data protection and is directed towards experienced researchers as well as non-experts.

Modern Vision-Language Models (VLMs) demonstrate sophisticated reasoning, escalating privacy risks beyond simple attribute perception to individual-level linkage. Current privacy benchmarks are structurally insufficient for this new threat, as they primarily evaluate privacy perception while failing to address the more critical risk of privacy reasoning: a VLM's ability to infer and link distributed information to construct individual profiles. To address this critical gap, we propose MultiPriv, the first benchmark designed to systematically evaluate individual-level privacy reasoning in VLMs. We introduce the Privacy Perception and Reasoning (PPR) framework and construct a novel, bilingual multimodal dataset to support it. The dataset uniquely features a core component of synthetic individual profiles where identifiers (e.g., faces, names) are meticulously linked to sensitive attributes. This design enables nine challenging tasks evaluating the full PPR spectrum, from attribute detection to cross-image re-identification and chained inference. We conduct a large-scale evaluation of over 50 foundational and commercial VLMs. Our analysis reveals: (1) Many VLMs possess significant, unmeasured reasoning-based privacy risks. (2) Perception-level metrics are poor predictors of these reasoning risks, revealing a critical evaluation gap. (3) Existing safety alignments are inconsistent and ineffective against such reasoning-based attacks. MultiPriv exposes systemic vulnerabilities and provides the necessary framework for developing robust, privacy-preserving VLMs.

AI powered health chatbot applications are increasingly utilized for personalized healthcare services, yet they pose significant challenges related to user data security and privacy. This study evaluates the effectiveness of automated methods, specifically BART and Gemini GenAI, in identifying security privacy related (SPR) concerns within these applications' user reviews, benchmarking their performance against manual qualitative analysis. Our results indicate that while Gemini's performance in SPR classification is comparable to manual labeling, both automated methods have limitations, including the misclassification of unrelated issues. Qualitative analysis revealed critical user concerns, such as data collection practices, data misuse, and insufficient transparency and consent mechanisms. This research enhances the understanding of the relationship between user trust, privacy, and emerging mobile AI health chatbot technologies, offering actionable insights for improving security and privacy practices in AI driven health chatbots. Although exploratory, our findings highlight the necessity for rigorous audits and transparent communication strategies, providing valuable guidance for app developers and vendors in addressing user security and privacy concerns.

Watermarking has emerged as a leading technical proposal for attributing generative AI content and is increasingly cited in global governance frameworks. This paper argues that current implementations risk serving as symbolic compliance rather than delivering effective oversight. We identify a growing gap between regulatory expectations and the technical limitations of existing watermarking schemes. Through analysis of policy proposals and industry practices, we show how incentive structures disincentivize robust, auditable deployments. To realign watermarking with governance goals, we propose a three-layer framework encompassing technical standards, audit infrastructure, and enforcement mechanisms. Without enforceable requirements and independent verification, watermarking will remain inadequate for accountability and ultimately undermine broader efforts in AI safety and regulation.

This paper reviews Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence (TAI) and its various definitions. Considering the principles respected in any society, TAI is often characterized by a few attributes, some of which have led to confusion in regulatory or engineering contexts. We argue against using terms such as Responsible or Ethical AI as substitutes for TAI. And to help clarify any confusion, we suggest leaving them behind. Given the subjectivity and complexity inherent in TAI, developing a universal framework is deemed infeasible. Instead, we advocate for approaches centered on addressing key attributes and properties such as fairness, bias, risk, security, explainability, and reliability. We examine the ongoing regulatory landscape, with a focus on initiatives in the EU, China, and the USA. We recognize that differences in AI regulations based on geopolitical and geographical reasons pose an additional challenge for multinational companies. We identify risk as a core factor in AI regulation and TAI. For example, as outlined in the EU-AI Act, organizations must gauge the risk level of their AI products to act accordingly (or risk hefty fines). We compare modalities of TAI implementation and how multiple cross-functional teams are engaged in the overall process. Thus, a brute force approach for enacting TAI renders its efficiency and agility, moot. To address this, we introduce our framework Set-Formalize-Measure-Act (SFMA). Our solution highlights the importance of transforming TAI-aware metrics, drivers of TAI, stakeholders, and business/legal requirements into actual benchmarks or tests. Finally, over-regulation driven by panic of powerful AI models can, in fact, harm TAI too. Based on GitHub user-activity data, in 2023, AI open-source projects rose to top projects by contributor account. Enabling innovation in TAI hinges on the independent contributions of the open-source community.

The integration of machine learning (ML) systems into critical industries such as healthcare, finance, and cybersecurity has transformed decision-making processes, but it also brings new challenges around trust, security, and accountability. As AI systems become more ubiquitous, ensuring the transparency and correctness of AI-driven decisions is crucial, especially when they have direct consequences on privacy, security, or fairness. Verifiable AI, powered by Zero-Knowledge Machine Learning (zkML), offers a robust solution to these challenges. zkML enables the verification of AI model inferences without exposing sensitive data, providing an essential layer of trust and privacy. However, traditional zkML systems typically require deep cryptographic expertise, placing them beyond the reach of most ML engineers. In this paper, we introduce JSTprove, a specialized zkML toolkit, built on Polyhedra Network's Expander backend, to enable AI developers and ML engineers to generate and verify proofs of AI inference. JSTprove provides an end-to-end verifiable AI inference pipeline that hides cryptographic complexity behind a simple command-line interface while exposing auditable artifacts for reproducibility. We present the design, innovations, and real-world use cases of JSTprove as well as our blueprints and tooling to encourage community review and extension. JSTprove therefore serves both as a usable zkML product for current engineering needs and as a reproducible foundation for future research and production deployments of verifiable AI.

Impressive progress has been made in automated problem-solving by the collaboration of large language models (LLMs) based agents. However, these automated capabilities also open avenues for malicious applications. In this paper, we study a new threat that LLMs pose to online pseudonymity, called automated profile inference, where an adversary can instruct LLMs to automatically scrape and extract sensitive personal attributes from publicly visible user activities on pseudonymous platforms. We also introduce an automated profiling framework called AutoProfiler to assess the feasibility of such threats in real-world scenarios. AutoProfiler consists of four specialized LLM agents, who work collaboratively to collect and process user online activities and generate a profile with extracted personal information. Experimental results on two real-world datasets and one synthetic dataset demonstrate that AutoProfiler is highly effective and efficient, and can be easily deployed on a web scale. We demonstrate that the inferred attributes are both sensitive and identifiable, posing significant risks of privacy breaches, such as de-anonymization and sensitive information leakage. Additionally, we explore mitigation strategies from different perspectives and advocate for increased public awareness of this emerging privacy threat to online pseudonymity.

The widespread deployment of LLMs across enterprise services has created a critical security blind spot. Organizations operate multiple LLM services handling billions of queries daily, yet regulatory compliance boundaries prevent these services from sharing threat intelligence about prompt injection attacks, the top security risk for LLMs. When an attack is detected in one service, the same threat may persist undetected in others for months, as privacy regulations prohibit sharing user prompts across compliance boundaries. We present BinaryShield, the first privacy-preserving threat intelligence system that enables secure sharing of attack fingerprints across compliance boundaries. BinaryShield transforms suspicious prompts through a unique pipeline combining PII redaction, semantic embedding, binary quantization, and randomized response mechanism to potentially generate non-invertible fingerprints that preserve attack patterns while providing privacy. Our evaluations demonstrate that BinaryShield achieves an F1-score of 0.94, significantly outperforming SimHash (0.77), the privacy-preserving baseline, while achieving 64x storage reduction and 38x faster similarity search compared to dense embeddings.

Large language models (LLMs) are primarily accessed via commercial APIs, but this often requires users to expose their data to service providers. In this paper, we explore how users can stay in control of their data by using privacy profiles: simple natural language instructions that say what should and should not be revealed. We build a framework where a local model uses these instructions to rewrite queries, only hiding details deemed sensitive by the user, before sending them to an external model, thus balancing privacy with performance. To support this research, we introduce PEEP, a multilingual dataset of real user queries annotated to mark private content and paired with synthetic privacy profiles. Our experiments with lightweight LLMs show they can follow these instructions to some extent, but also face consistent challenges, highlighting the need for models that better understand and comply with user-defined privacy preferences.

The memorization of sensitive and personally identifiable information (PII) by large language models (LLMs) poses growing privacy risks as models scale and are increasingly deployed in real-world applications. Existing efforts to study sensitive and PII data memorization and develop mitigation strategies are hampered by the absence of comprehensive, realistic, and ethically sourced datasets reflecting the diversity of sensitive information found on the web. We introduce PANORAMA - Profile-based Assemblage for Naturalistic Online Representation and Attribute Memorization Analysis, a large-scale synthetic corpus of 384,789 samples derived from 9,674 synthetic profiles designed to closely emulate the distribution, variety, and context of PII and sensitive data as it naturally occurs in online environments. Our data generation pipeline begins with the construction of internally consistent, multi-attribute human profiles using constrained selection to reflect real-world demographics such as education, health attributes, financial status, etc. Using a combination of zero-shot prompting and OpenAI o3-mini, we generate diverse content types - including wiki-style articles, social media posts, forum discussions, online reviews, comments, and marketplace listings - each embedding realistic, contextually appropriate PII and other sensitive information. We validate the utility of PANORAMA by fine-tuning the Mistral-7B model on 1x, 5x, 10x, and 25x data replication rates with a subset of data and measure PII memorization rates - revealing not only consistent increases with repetition but also variation across content types, highlighting PANORAMA's ability to model how memorization risks differ by context. Our dataset and code are publicly available, providing a much-needed resource for privacy risk assessment, model auditing, and the development of privacy-preserving LLMs.

The widespread deployment of LLM-based agents is likely to introduce a critical privacy threat: malicious agents that proactively engage others in multi-turn interactions to extract sensitive information. These dynamic dialogues enable adaptive attack strategies that can cause severe privacy violations, yet their evolving nature makes it difficult to anticipate and discover sophisticated vulnerabilities manually. To tackle this problem, we present a search-based framework that alternates between improving attacker and defender instructions by simulating privacy-critical agent interactions. Each simulation involves three roles: data subject, data sender, and data recipient. While the data subject's behavior is fixed, the attacker (data recipient) attempts to extract sensitive information from the defender (data sender) through persistent and interactive exchanges. To explore this interaction space efficiently, our search algorithm employs LLMs as optimizers, using parallel search with multiple threads and cross-thread propagation to analyze simulation trajectories and iteratively propose new instructions. Through this process, we find that attack strategies escalate from simple direct requests to sophisticated multi-turn tactics such as impersonation and consent forgery, while defenses advance from rule-based constraints to identity-verification state machines. The discovered attacks and defenses transfer across diverse scenarios and backbone models, demonstrating strong practical utility for building privacy-aware agents.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has emerged as a de facto standard for integrating Large Language Models with external tools, yet no formal security analysis of the protocol specification exists. We present the first rigorous security analysis of MCP's architectural design, identifying three fundamental protocol-level vulnerabilities: (1) absence of capability attestation allowing servers to claim arbitrary permissions, (2) bidirectional sampling without origin authentication enabling server-side prompt injection, and (3) implicit trust propagation in multi-server configurations. We implement MCPBench, a novel framework bridging existing agent security benchmarks to MCP-compliant infrastructure, enabling direct measurement of protocol-specific attack surfaces. Through controlled experiments on 847 attack scenarios across five MCP server implementations, we demonstrate that MCP's architectural choices amplify attack success rates by 23--41\% compared to equivalent non-MCP integrations. We propose MCPSec, a backward-compatible protocol extension adding capability attestation and message authentication, reducing attack success rates from 52.8\% to 12.4\% with median latency overhead of 8.3ms per message. Our findings establish that MCP's security weaknesses are architectural rather than implementation-specific, requiring protocol-level remediation.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into real-world applications via the Model Context Protocol (MCP), a universal, open standard for connecting AI agents with data sources and external tools. While MCP enhances the capabilities of LLM-based agents, it also introduces new security risks and expands their attack surfaces. In this paper, we present the first systematic taxonomy of MCP security, identifying 17 attack types across 4 primary attack surfaces. We introduce MCPSecBench, a comprehensive security benchmark and playground that integrates prompt datasets, MCP servers, MCP clients, attack scripts, and protection mechanisms to evaluate these attacks across three major MCP providers. Our benchmark is modular and extensible, allowing researchers to incorporate custom implementations of clients, servers, and transport protocols for systematic security assessment. Experimental results show that over 85% of the identified attacks successfully compromise at least one platform, with core vulnerabilities universally affecting Claude, OpenAI, and Cursor, while prompt-based and tool-centric attacks exhibit considerable variability across different hosts and models. In addition, current protection mechanisms have little effect against these attacks. Overall, MCPSecBench standardizes the evaluation of MCP security and enables rigorous testing across all MCP layers.

Ensuring equitable treatment (fairness) across protected attributes (such as gender or ethnicity) is a critical issue in machine learning. Most existing literature focuses on binary classification, but achieving fairness in regression tasks-such as insurance pricing or hiring score assessments-is equally important. Moreover, anti-discrimination laws also apply to continuous attributes, such as age, for which many existing methods are not applicable. In practice, multiple protected attributes can exist simultaneously; however, methods targeting fairness across several attributes often overlook so-called "fairness gerrymandering", thereby ignoring disparities among intersectional subgroups (e.g., African-American women or Hispanic men). In this paper, we propose a distance covariance regularisation framework that mitigates the association between model predictions and protected attributes, in line with the fairness definition of demographic parity, and that captures both linear and nonlinear dependencies. To enhance applicability in the presence of multiple protected attributes, we extend our framework by incorporating two multivariate dependence measures based on distance covariance: the previously proposed joint distance covariance (JdCov) and our novel concatenated distance covariance (CCdCov), which effectively address fairness gerrymandering in both regression and classification tasks involving protected attributes of various types. We discuss and illustrate how to calibrate regularisation strength, including a method based on Jensen-Shannon divergence, which quantifies dissimilarities in prediction distributions across groups. We apply our framework to the COMPAS recidivism dataset and a large motor insurance claims dataset.

Users can divulge sensitive information to proprietary LLM providers, raising significant privacy concerns. While open-source models, hosted locally on the user's machine, alleviate some concerns, models that users can host locally are often less capable than proprietary frontier models. Toward preserving user privacy while retaining the best quality, we propose Privacy-Conscious Delegation, a novel task for chaining API-based and local models. We utilize recent public collections of user-LLM interactions to construct a natural benchmark called PUPA, which contains personally identifiable information (PII). To study potential approaches, we devise PAPILLON, a multi-stage LLM pipeline that uses prompt optimization to address a simpler version of our task. Our best pipeline maintains high response quality for 85.5% of user queries while restricting privacy leakage to only 7.5%. We still leave a large margin to the generation quality of proprietary LLMs for future work. Our data and code is available at https://github.com/siyan-sylvia-li/PAPILLON.

Large language models (LLMs) demonstrate remarkable medical expertise, but data privacy concerns impede their direct use in healthcare environments. Although offering improved data privacy protection, domain-specific small language models (SLMs) often underperform LLMs, emphasizing the need for methods that reduce this performance gap while alleviating privacy concerns. In this paper, we present a simple yet effective method that harnesses LLMs' medical proficiency to boost SLM performance in medical tasks under privacy-restricted scenarios. Specifically, we mitigate patient privacy issues by extracting keywords from medical data and prompting the LLM to generate a medical knowledge-intensive context by simulating clinicians' thought processes. This context serves as additional input for SLMs, augmenting their decision-making capabilities. Our method significantly enhances performance in both few-shot and full training settings across three medical knowledge-intensive tasks, achieving up to a 22.57% increase in absolute accuracy compared to SLM fine-tuning without context, and sets new state-of-the-art results in two medical tasks within privacy-restricted scenarios. Further out-of-domain testing and experiments in two general domain datasets showcase its generalizability and broad applicability.

Evaluating fairness can be challenging in practice because the sensitive attributes of data are often inaccessible due to privacy constraints. The go-to approach that the industry frequently adopts is using off-the-shelf proxy models to predict the missing sensitive attributes, e.g. Meta [Alao et al., 2021] and Twitter [Belli et al., 2022]. Despite its popularity, there are three important questions unanswered: (1) Is directly using proxies efficacious in measuring fairness? (2) If not, is it possible to accurately evaluate fairness using proxies only? (3) Given the ethical controversy over inferring user private information, is it possible to only use weak (i.e. inaccurate) proxies in order to protect privacy? Our theoretical analyses show that directly using proxy models can give a false sense of (un)fairness. Second, we develop an algorithm that is able to measure fairness (provably) accurately with only three properly identified proxies. Third, we show that our algorithm allows the use of only weak proxies (e.g. with only 68.85%accuracy on COMPAS), adding an extra layer of protection on user privacy. Experiments validate our theoretical analyses and show our algorithm can effectively measure and mitigate bias. Our results imply a set of practical guidelines for practitioners on how to use proxies properly. Code is available at github.com/UCSC-REAL/fair-eval.

LLM app (tool) ecosystems are rapidly evolving to support sophisticated use cases that often require extensive user data collection. Given that LLM apps are developed by third parties and anecdotal evidence indicating inconsistent enforcement of policies by LLM platforms, sharing user data with these apps presents significant privacy risks. In this paper, we aim to bring transparency in data practices of LLM app ecosystems. We examine OpenAI's GPT app ecosystem as a case study. We propose an LLM-based framework to analyze the natural language specifications of GPT Actions (custom tools) and assess their data collection practices. Our analysis reveals that Actions collect excessive data across 24 categories and 145 data types, with third-party Actions collecting 6.03% more data on average. We find that several Actions violate OpenAI's policies by collecting sensitive information, such as passwords, which is explicitly prohibited by OpenAI. Lastly, we develop an LLM-based privacy policy analysis framework to automatically check the consistency of data collection by Actions with disclosures in their privacy policies. Our measurements indicate that the disclosures for most of the collected data types are omitted, with only 5.8% of Actions clearly disclosing their data collection practices.

Multi-agent systems (MAS) powered by LLMs promise adaptive, reasoning-driven enterprise workflows, yet granting agents autonomous control over tools, memory, and communication introduces attack surfaces absent from deterministic pipelines. While current research largely addresses prompt-level exploits and narrow individual vectors, it lacks a holistic architectural model for enterprise-grade security. We introduce AgenticCyOps (Securing Multi-Agentic AI Integration in Enterprise Cyber Operations), a framework built on a systematic decomposition of attack surfaces across component, coordination, and protocol layers, revealing that documented vectors consistently trace back to two integration surfaces: tool orchestration and memory management. Building on this observation, we formalize these integration surfaces as primary trust boundaries and define five defensive principles: authorized interfaces, capability scoping, verified execution, memory integrity & synchronization, and access-controlled data isolation; each aligned with established compliance standards (NIST, ISO 27001, GDPR, EU AI Act). We apply the framework to a Security Operations Center (SOC) workflow, adopting the Model Context Protocol (MCP) as the structural basis, with phase-scoped agents, consensus validation loops, and per-organization memory boundaries. Coverage analysis, attack path tracing, and trust boundary assessment confirm that the design addresses the documented attack vectors with defense-in-depth, intercepts three of four representative attack chains within the first two steps, and reduces exploitable trust boundaries by a minimum of 72% compared to a flat MAS, positioning AgenticCyOps as a foundation for securing enterprise-grade integration.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has rapidly emerged as a universal standard for connecting AI assistants to external tools and data sources. While MCP simplifies integration between AI applications and various services, it introduces significant security vulnerabilities, particularly on the client side. In this work we conduct threat modelings of MCP implementations using STRIDE (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, Elevation of Privilege) and DREAD (Damage, Reproducibility, Exploitability, Affected Users, Discoverability) frameworks across five key components: (1) MCP Host and Client, (2) LLM, (3) MCP Server, (4) External Data Stores, and (5) Authorization Server. This comprehensive analysis reveals tool poisoning-where malicious instructions are embedded in tool metadata-as the most prevalent and impactful client-side vulnerability. We therefore focus our empirical evaluation on this critical attack vector, providing a systematic comparison of how seven major MCP clients validate and defend against tool poisoning attacks. Our analysis reveals significant security issues with most tested clients due to insufficient static validation and parameter visibility. We propose a multi-layered defense strategy encompassing static metadata analysis, model decision path tracking, behavioral anomaly detection, and user transparency mechanisms. This research addresses a critical gap in MCP security, which has primarily focused on server-side vulnerabilities, and provides actionable recommendations and mitigation strategies for securing AI agent ecosystems.

LLM agents increasingly act on users' personal information, yet existing privacy defenses remain limited in both design and adaptability. Most prior approaches rely on static or passive defenses, such as prompting and guarding. These paradigms are insufficient for supporting contextual, proactive privacy decisions in multi-step agent execution. We propose Contextualized Defense Instructing (CDI), a new privacy defense paradigm in which an instructor model generates step-specific, context-aware privacy guidance during execution, proactively shaping actions rather than merely constraining or vetoing them. Crucially, CDI is paired with an experience-driven optimization framework that trains the instructor via reinforcement learning (RL), where we convert failure trajectories with privacy violations into learning environments. We formalize baseline defenses and CDI as distinct intervention points in a canonical agent loop, and compare their privacy-helpfulness trade-offs within a unified simulation framework. Results show that our CDI consistently achieves a better balance between privacy preservation (94.2%) and helpfulness (80.6%) than baselines, with superior robustness to adversarial conditions and generalization.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) is increasingly deployed in real-world applications, where its reference-grounded design makes outputs appear trustworthy. This trust has spurred research on poisoning attacks that craft malicious content, inject it into knowledge sources, and manipulate RAG responses. However, when evaluated in practical RAG systems, existing attacks suffer from severely degraded effectiveness. This gap stems from two overlooked realities: (i) content is often processed before use, which can fragment the poison and weaken its effect, and (ii) users often do not issue the exact queries anticipated during attack design. These factors can lead practitioners to underestimate risks and develop a false sense of security. To better characterize the threat to practical systems, we present Confundo, a learning-to-poison framework that fine-tunes a large language model as a poison generator to achieve high effectiveness, robustness, and stealthiness. Confundo provides a unified framework supporting multiple attack objectives, demonstrated by manipulating factual correctness, inducing biased opinions, and triggering hallucinations. By addressing these overlooked challenges, Confundo consistently outperforms a wide range of purpose-built attacks across datasets and RAG configurations by large margins, even in the presence of defenses. Beyond exposing vulnerabilities, we also present a defensive use case that protects web content from unauthorized incorporation into RAG systems via scraping, with no impact on user experience.

We present SuperLocalMemory, a local-first memory system for multi-agent AI that defends against OWASP ASI06 memory poisoning through architectural isolation and Bayesian trust scoring, while personalizing retrieval through adaptive learning-to-rank -- all without cloud dependencies or LLM inference calls. As AI agents increasingly rely on persistent memory, cloud-based memory systems create centralized attack surfaces where poisoned memories propagate across sessions and users -- a threat demonstrated in documented attacks against production systems. Our architecture combines SQLite-backed storage with FTS5 full-text search, Leiden-based knowledge graph clustering, an event-driven coordination layer with per-agent provenance, and an adaptive re-ranking framework that learns user preferences through three-layer behavioral analysis (cross-project technology preferences, project context detection, and workflow pattern mining). Evaluation across seven benchmark dimensions demonstrates 10.6ms median search latency, zero concurrency errors under 10 simultaneous agents, trust separation (gap =0.90) with 72% trust degradation for sleeper attacks, and 104% improvement in NDCG@5 when adaptive re-ranking is enabled. Behavioral data is isolated in a separate database with GDPR Article 17 erasure support. SuperLocalMemory is open-source (MIT) and integrates with 17+ development tools via Model Context Protocol.

Large-scale datasets play a fundamental role in training deep learning models. However, dataset collection is difficult in domains that involve sensitive information. Collaborative learning techniques provide a privacy-preserving solution, by enabling training over a number of private datasets that are not shared by their owners. However, recently, it has been shown that the existing collaborative learning frameworks are vulnerable to an active adversary that runs a generative adversarial network (GAN) attack. In this work, we propose a novel classification model that is resilient against such attacks by design. More specifically, we introduce a key-based classification model and a principled training scheme that protects class scores by using class-specific private keys, which effectively hide the information necessary for a GAN attack. We additionally show how to utilize high dimensional keys to improve the robustness against attacks without increasing the model complexity. Our detailed experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed technique. Source code is available at https://github.com/mbsariyildiz/key-protected-classification.

OpenClaw, the most widely deployed personal AI agent in early 2026, operates with full local system access and integrates with sensitive services such as Gmail, Stripe, and the filesystem. While these broad privileges enable high levels of automation and powerful personalization, they also expose a substantial attack surface that existing sandboxed evaluations fail to capture. To address this gap, we present the first real-world safety evaluation of OpenClaw and introduce the CIK taxonomy, which unifies an agent's persistent state into three dimensions, i.e., Capability, Identity, and Knowledge, for safety analysis. Our evaluations cover 12 attack scenarios on a live OpenClaw instance across four backbone models (Claude Sonnet 4.5, Opus 4.6, Gemini 3.1 Pro, and GPT-5.4). The results show that poisoning any single CIK dimension increases the average attack success rate from 24.6% to 64-74%, with even the most robust model exhibiting more than a threefold increase over its baseline vulnerability. We further assess three CIK-aligned defense strategies alongside a file-protection mechanism; however, the strongest defense still yields a 63.8% success rate under Capability-targeted attacks, while file protection blocks 97% of malicious injections but also prevents legitimate updates. Taken together, these findings show that the vulnerabilities are inherent to the agent architecture, necessitating more systematic safeguards to secure personal AI agents. Our project page is https://ucsc-vlaa.github.io/CIK-Bench.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have revolutionized Natural Language Processing (NLP) but pose risks of inadvertently exposing copyrighted or proprietary data, especially when such data is used for training but not intended for distribution. Traditional methods address these leaks only after content is generated, which can lead to the exposure of sensitive information. This study introduces a proactive approach: examining LLMs' internal states before text generation to detect potential leaks. By using a curated dataset of copyrighted materials, we trained a neural network classifier to identify risks, allowing for early intervention by stopping the generation process or altering outputs to prevent disclosure. Integrated with a Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) system, this framework ensures adherence to copyright and licensing requirements while enhancing data privacy and ethical standards. Our results show that analyzing internal states effectively mitigates the risk of copyrighted data leakage, offering a scalable solution that fits smoothly into AI workflows, ensuring compliance with copyright regulations while maintaining high-quality text generation. The implementation is available on GitHub.https://github.com/changhu73/Internal_states_leakage

Large language models are increasingly deployed as *deep agents* that plan, maintain persistent state, and invoke external tools, shifting safety failures from unsafe text to unsafe *trajectories*. We introduce **AgentFence**, an architecture-centric security evaluation that defines 14 trust-boundary attack classes spanning planning, memory, retrieval, tool use, and delegation, and detects failures via *trace-auditable conversation breaks* (unauthorized or unsafe tool use, wrong-principal actions, state/objective integrity violations, and attack-linked deviations). Holding the base model fixed, we evaluate eight agent archetypes under persistent multi-turn interaction and observe substantial architectural variation in mean security break rate (MSBR), ranging from 0.29 pm 0.04 (LangGraph) to 0.51 pm 0.07 (AutoGPT). The highest-risk classes are operational: Denial-of-Wallet (0.62 pm 0.08), Authorization Confusion (0.54 pm 0.10), Retrieval Poisoning (0.47 pm 0.09), and Planning Manipulation (0.44 pm 0.11), while prompt-centric classes remain below 0.20 under standard settings. Breaks are dominated by boundary violations (SIV 31%, WPA 27%, UTI+UTA 24%, ATD 18%), and authorization confusion correlates with objective and tool hijacking (ρapprox 0.63 and ρapprox 0.58). AgentFence reframes agent security around what matters operationally: whether an agent stays within its goal and authority envelope over time.