Daily Papers

Integer overflow accounts for one of the major source of bugs in software. Verification systems typically assume a well defined underlying semantics for various integer operations and do not explicitly check for integer overflow in programs. In this paper we present a specification mechanism for expressing integer overflow. We develop an automated procedure for integer overflow checking during program verification. We have implemented a prototype integer overflow checker and tested it on a benchmark consisting of already verified programs (over 14k LOC). We have found 43 bugs in these programs due to integer overflow.

Smart contract vulnerability detection remains a major challenge in blockchain security. Existing vulnerability detection methods face two main issues: (1) Existing datasets lack comprehensive coverage and high-quality explanations for preference learning. (2) Large language models (LLMs) often struggle with accurately interpreting specific concepts in smart contract security. Empirical analysis shows that even after continual pre-training (CPT) and supervised fine-tuning (SFT), LLMs may misinterpret the execution order of state changes, resulting in incorrect explanations despite making correct detection decisions. To address these challenges, we propose Smart-LLaMA-DPO based on LLaMA-3.1-8B. We construct a comprehensive dataset covering four major vulnerability types and machine-unauditable vulnerabilities, including precise labels, explanations, and locations for SFT, as well as high-quality and low-quality output pairs for Direct Preference Optimization (DPO). Second, we perform CPT using large-scale smart contract to enhance the LLM's understanding of specific security practices in smart contracts. Futhermore, we conduct SFT with our comprehensive dataset. Finally, we apply DPO, leveraging human feedback and a specially designed loss function that increases the probability of preferred explanations while reducing the likelihood of non-preferred outputs. We evaluate Smart-LLaMA-DPO on four major vulnerability types: reentrancy, timestamp dependence, integer overflow/underflow, and delegatecall, as well as machine-unauditable vulnerabilities. Our method significantly outperforms state-of-the-art baselines, with average improvements of 10.43% in F1 score and 7.87% in accuracy. Moreover, both LLM evaluation and human evaluation confirm that our method generates more correct, thorough, and clear explanations.

As blockchain technology and smart contracts become widely adopted, securing them throughout every stage of the transaction process is essential. The concern of improved security for smart contracts is to find and detect vulnerabilities using classical Machine Learning (ML) models and fine-tuned Large Language Models (LLM). The robustness of such work rests on a labeled smart contract dataset that includes annotated vulnerabilities on which several LLMs alongside various traditional machine learning algorithms such as DistilBERT model is trained and tested. We train and test machine learning algorithms to classify smart contract codes according to vulnerability types in order to compare model performance. Having fine-tuned the LLMs specifically for smart contract code classification should help in getting better results when detecting several types of well-known vulnerabilities, such as Reentrancy, Integer Overflow, Timestamp Dependency and Dangerous Delegatecall. From our initial experimental results, it can be seen that our fine-tuned LLM surpasses the accuracy of any other model by achieving an accuracy of over 90%, and this advances the existing vulnerability detection benchmarks. Such performance provides a great deal of evidence for LLMs ability to describe the subtle patterns in the code that traditional ML models could miss. Thus, we compared each of the ML and LLM models to give a good overview of each models strengths, from which we can choose the most effective one for real-world applications in smart contract security. Our research combines machine learning and large language models to provide a rich and interpretable framework for detecting different smart contract vulnerabilities, which lays a foundation for a more secure blockchain ecosystem.

The state-of-the-art (SOTA) for mixed precision training is dominated by variants of low precision floating point operations, and in particular, FP16 accumulating into FP32 Micikevicius et al. (2017). On the other hand, while a lot of research has also happened in the domain of low and mixed-precision Integer training, these works either present results for non-SOTA networks (for instance only AlexNet for ImageNet-1K), or relatively small datasets (like CIFAR-10). In this work, we train state-of-the-art visual understanding neural networks on the ImageNet-1K dataset, with Integer operations on General Purpose (GP) hardware. In particular, we focus on Integer Fused-Multiply-and-Accumulate (FMA) operations which take two pairs of INT16 operands and accumulate results into an INT32 output.We propose a shared exponent representation of tensors and develop a Dynamic Fixed Point (DFP) scheme suitable for common neural network operations. The nuances of developing an efficient integer convolution kernel is examined, including methods to handle overflow of the INT32 accumulator. We implement CNN training for ResNet-50, GoogLeNet-v1, VGG-16 and AlexNet; and these networks achieve or exceed SOTA accuracy within the same number of iterations as their FP32 counterparts without any change in hyper-parameters and with a 1.8X improvement in end-to-end training throughput. To the best of our knowledge these results represent the first INT16 training results on GP hardware for ImageNet-1K dataset using SOTA CNNs and achieve highest reported accuracy using half-precision

We investigate a failure mode of large language models (LLMs) in which plain-text prompts elicit excessive outputs, a phenomenon we term Overflow. Unlike jailbreaks or prompt injection, Overflow arises under ordinary interaction settings and can lead to elevated serving cost, latency, and cross-user performance degradation, particularly when scaled across many requests. Beyond usability, the stakes are economic and environmental: unnecessary tokens increase per-request cost and energy consumption, compounding into substantial operational spend and carbon footprint at scale. Moreover, Overflow represents a practical vector for compute amplification and service degradation in shared environments. We introduce BenchOverflow, a model-agnostic benchmark of nine plain-text prompting strategies that amplify output volume without adversarial suffixes or policy circumvention. Using a standardized protocol with a fixed budget of 5000 new tokens, we evaluate nine open- and closed-source models and observe pronounced rightward shifts and heavy tails in length distributions. Cap-saturation rates (CSR@1k/3k/5k) and empirical cumulative distribution functions (ECDFs) quantify tail risk; within-prompt variance and cross-model correlations show that Overflow is broadly reproducible yet heterogeneous across families and attack vectors. A lightweight mitigation-a fixed conciseness reminder-attenuates right tails and lowers CSR for all strategies across the majority of models. Our findings position length control as a measurable reliability, cost, and sustainability concern rather than a stylistic quirk. By enabling standardized comparison of length-control robustness across models, BenchOverflow provides a practical basis for selecting deployments that minimize resource waste and operating expense, and for evaluating defenses that curb compute amplification without eroding task performance.

LLM-agent budget overruns are a documented production failure class: a single retry loop can spend thousands of dollars before an operator notices, and the in-process integrity properties that would prevent it (no aliasing, no double-spend, no use-after-delegation of a cost-bearing value) are enforced, if at all, by ad-hoc wrappers rather than by the type system. Our central contribution is empirical: a catalog of 63 confirmed production incidents from 21 orchestration frameworks (2023-2026), each backed by a quoted GitHub issue and, where reported, a dollar loss, organized into an eight-cluster failure taxonomy (inter-rater Cohen's kappa = 0.837, N = 113), plus 47 supplementary structural entries. As one mitigation evaluated against this taxonomy, we build token-budgets, an 1,180-line Rust crate (no unsafe) that operationalizes affine ownership so that cloning, double-spending, or using a budget after delegating it are compile errors rather than runtime hazards an operator must remember to avoid. The dollar cap is runtime arithmetic under an estimator assumption; the affine layer makes that arithmetic non-bypassable. On single-agent workloads a 4-line Python counter matches the crate at 0/30 overshoot, so the distinguishing value is non-bypassability under operator error in multi-agent delegation: the delegation-fanout race documented in 11 incidents is rejected by the borrow checker at compile time, while the same pattern under asyncio overshoots 30/30 and three disciplined alternatives overshoot 0/30. Across five runtimes, three providers, and a temperature-stratified live-API test (N = 160), the approach reports zero cap violations and zero false refusals, at operational parity with concurrent work. Static over-reservation is 4-6x (2.11x adaptive). Binary-level cap-soundness on the running binary is left open.

We define R_l^*(n) as the number of overpartitions of n in which non-overlined parts are not divisible by l. In a recent work, Nath, Saikia, and the second author established several families of congruences for R_l^*(n), with particular focus on the cases l=6 and l=8. In the concluding remarks of their paper, they conjectured that R_6^*(n) satisfies an infinite family of congruences modulo 128. In this paper, we confirm their conjectures using elementary methods. Additionally, we provide elementary proofs of two congruences for R_6^*(n) previously proven via the machinery of modular forms by Alanazi, Munagi, and Saikia.

We present a hardware-oriented description of GoldenFloat (GF), a static-split floating-point family generated by a single closed rule, and three concrete artefacts: (i) an open multi-width RTL generator covering GF4-GF256 with a continuous-integration differential sweep against a correctly-rounded reference; (ii) an integer-backed Lucas-exact accumulator path verified at 500-digit precision for n = 1, ..., 256; and (iii) a GF16 FPGA codec passing a 35-of-35 testbench at 323 MHz on Artix-7 (Xilinx XC7A35T). For each total width N >= 4, the exponent width is e = round((N-1)/phi^2) with fraction f = N-1-e and phi = (1+sqrt(5))/2. The rule reproduces the realised exponent widths of nine formats (9/9) and extends consistently to GF128, GF512, GF1024. The rule is positioned alongside posit, takum, OCP-MX, and the IEEE P3109 multi-width float draft. We make no per-rung accuracy or superiority claim against any of them. The breadth/toolchain-coherence framing is recorded as an open conjecture with a pre-registered falsification path. A falsification ledger (FL-002) records open questions and the experiments that would settle them. An RTL-correctness erratum dated 2026-05-31 is reported; the fabricated TTSKY26b dies carry the defective multiplier portfolio, and the corrected generator is the regeneration baseline.

An open-source C++ framework for discovering fast matrix multiplication schemes using the flip graph approach is presented. The framework supports multiple coefficient rings -- binary (Z_2), modular ternary (Z_3) and integer ternary (Z_T = {-1,0,1}) -- and implements both fixed-dimension and meta-dimensional search operators. Using efficient bit-level encoding of coefficient vectors and OpenMP parallelism, the tools enable large-scale exploration on commodity hardware. The study covers 680 schemes ranging from (2 times 2 times 2) to (16 times 16 times 16), with 276 schemes now in Z_T coefficients and 117 in integer coefficients. With this framework, the multiplicative complexity (rank) is improved for 79 matrix multiplication schemes. Notably, a new 4 times 4 times 10 scheme requiring only 115 multiplications is discovered, achieving ωapprox 2.80478 and beating Strassen's exponent for this specific size. Additionally, 93 schemes are rediscovered in ternary coefficients that were previously known only over rationals or integers, and 68 schemes in integer coefficients that previously required fractions. All tools and discovered schemes are made publicly available to enable reproducible research.

Consider the following process: Take any four-digit number which has at least two distinct digits. Then, rearrange the digits of the original number in ascending and descending order, take these two numbers, and find the difference between the two. Finally, repeat this routine using the difference as the new four-digit number. In 1949, D. R. Kaprekar became the first to discover that this process, known as the Kaprekar Routine, would always yield 6174 within 7 iterations. Since this number remains unchanged after an application of the Kaprekar Routine, it became known as Kaprekar's Constant. Previous works have shown that the only base 10 Kaprekar's Constants are 495 and 6174, the 3-digit and 4-digit case. However, little attention has been given to other bases or determining which digit cases and which bases have a Kaprekar's Constant. This paper analyzes the behavior of the Kaprekar Routine in the 3-digit case, deriving an expression for all 3-digit Kaprekar Constants. In addition, the author developed a series of C++ programs to analyze the paths integers followed to their respective Kaprekar's Constant. Surprisingly, it was determined from this program that the most commonly required number of iterations required to reach Kaprekar's Constant for 3-digit integers was consistently 3, regardless of base. When loaded as a matrix, the iteration requirement data demonstrates a precise recurring relationship reminiscent of Pascal's Triangle.

The large number of parameters of some prominent language models, such as BERT, makes their fine-tuning on downstream tasks computationally intensive and energy hungry. Previously researchers were focused on lower bit-width integer data types for the forward propagation of language models to save memory and computation. As for the backward propagation, however, only 16-bit floating-point data type has been used for the fine-tuning of BERT. In this work, we use integer arithmetic for both forward and back propagation in the fine-tuning of BERT. We study the effects of varying the integer bit-width on the model's metric performance. Our integer fine-tuning uses integer arithmetic to perform forward propagation and gradient computation of linear, layer-norm, and embedding layers of BERT. We fine-tune BERT using our integer training method on SQuAD v1.1 and SQuAD v2., and GLUE benchmark. We demonstrate that metric performance of fine-tuning 16-bit integer BERT matches both 16-bit and 32-bit floating-point baselines. Furthermore, using the faster and more memory efficient 8-bit integer data type, integer fine-tuning of BERT loses an average of 3.1 points compared to the FP32 baseline.