Daily Papers

Large Language models are revolutionizing the conversational recommender systems through their impressive capabilities in instruction comprehension, reasoning, and human interaction. A core factor underlying effective recommendation dialogue is the ability to infer and reason about users' mental states (such as desire, intention, and belief), a cognitive capacity commonly referred to as Theory of Mind. Despite growing interest in evaluating ToM in LLMs, current benchmarks predominantly rely on synthetic narratives inspired by Sally-Anne test, which emphasize physical perception and fail to capture the complexity of mental state inference in realistic conversational settings. Moreover, existing benchmarks often overlook a critical component of human ToM: behavioral prediction, the ability to use inferred mental states to guide strategic decision-making and select appropriate conversational actions for future interactions. To better align LLM-based ToM evaluation with human-like social reasoning, we propose RecToM, a novel benchmark for evaluating ToM abilities in recommendation dialogues. RecToM focuses on two complementary dimensions: Cognitive Inference and Behavioral Prediction. The former focus on understanding what has been communicated by inferring the underlying mental states. The latter emphasizes what should be done next, evaluating whether LLMs can leverage these inferred mental states to predict, select, and assess appropriate dialogue strategies. Extensive experiments on state-of-the-art LLMs demonstrate that RecToM poses a significant challenge. While the models exhibit partial competence in recognizing mental states, they struggle to maintain coherent, strategic ToM reasoning throughout dynamic recommendation dialogues, particularly in tracking evolving intentions and aligning conversational strategies with inferred mental states.

Logical reasoning consistently plays a fundamental and significant role in the domains of knowledge engineering and artificial intelligence. Recently, Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged as a noteworthy innovation in natural language processing (NLP), exhibiting impressive achievements across various classic NLP tasks. However, the question of whether LLMs can effectively address the task of logical reasoning, which requires gradual cognitive inference similar to human intelligence, remains unanswered. To this end, we aim to bridge this gap and provide comprehensive evaluations in this paper. Firstly, to offer systematic evaluations, we select fifteen typical logical reasoning datasets and organize them into deductive, inductive, abductive and mixed-form reasoning settings. Considering the comprehensiveness of evaluations, we include three representative LLMs (i.e., text-davinci-003, ChatGPT and BARD) and evaluate them on all selected datasets under zero-shot, one-shot and three-shot settings. Secondly, different from previous evaluations relying only on simple metrics (e.g., accuracy), we propose fine-level evaluations from objective and subjective manners, covering both answers and explanations. Additionally, to uncover the logical flaws of LLMs, problematic cases will be attributed to five error types from two dimensions, i.e., evidence selection process and reasoning process. Thirdly, to avoid the influences of knowledge bias and purely focus on benchmarking the logical reasoning capability of LLMs, we propose a new dataset with neutral content. It contains 3,000 samples and covers deductive, inductive and abductive settings. Based on the in-depth evaluations, this paper finally forms a general evaluation scheme of logical reasoning capability from six dimensions. It reflects the pros and cons of LLMs and gives guiding directions for future works.

Reasoning is a fundamental cognitive process underlying inference, problem-solving, and decision-making. While large language models (LLMs) demonstrate strong reasoning capabilities in closed-world settings, they struggle in open-ended and dynamic environments. Agentic reasoning marks a paradigm shift by reframing LLMs as autonomous agents that plan, act, and learn through continual interaction. In this survey, we organize agentic reasoning along three complementary dimensions. First, we characterize environmental dynamics through three layers: foundational agentic reasoning, which establishes core single-agent capabilities including planning, tool use, and search in stable environments; self-evolving agentic reasoning, which studies how agents refine these capabilities through feedback, memory, and adaptation; and collective multi-agent reasoning, which extends intelligence to collaborative settings involving coordination, knowledge sharing, and shared goals. Across these layers, we distinguish in-context reasoning, which scales test-time interaction through structured orchestration, from post-training reasoning, which optimizes behaviors via reinforcement learning and supervised fine-tuning. We further review representative agentic reasoning frameworks across real-world applications and benchmarks, including science, robotics, healthcare, autonomous research, and mathematics. This survey synthesizes agentic reasoning methods into a unified roadmap bridging thought and action, and outlines open challenges and future directions, including personalization, long-horizon interaction, world modeling, scalable multi-agent training, and governance for real-world deployment.

Test-time inference has emerged as a powerful paradigm for enabling language models to ``think'' longer and more carefully about complex challenges, much like skilled human experts. While reinforcement learning (RL) can drive self-improvement in language models on verifiable tasks, some models exhibit substantial gains while others quickly plateau. For instance, we find that Qwen-2.5-3B far exceeds Llama-3.2-3B under identical RL training for the game of Countdown. This discrepancy raises a critical question: what intrinsic properties enable effective self-improvement? We introduce a framework to investigate this question by analyzing four key cognitive behaviors -- verification, backtracking, subgoal setting, and backward chaining -- that both expert human problem solvers and successful language models employ. Our study reveals that Qwen naturally exhibits these reasoning behaviors, whereas Llama initially lacks them. In systematic experimentation with controlled behavioral datasets, we find that priming Llama with examples containing these reasoning behaviors enables substantial improvements during RL, matching or exceeding Qwen's performance. Importantly, the presence of reasoning behaviors, rather than correctness of answers, proves to be the critical factor -- models primed with incorrect solutions containing proper reasoning patterns achieve comparable performance to those trained on correct solutions. Finally, leveraging continued pretraining with OpenWebMath data, filtered to amplify reasoning behaviors, enables the Llama model to match Qwen's self-improvement trajectory. Our findings establish a fundamental relationship between initial reasoning behaviors and the capacity for improvement, explaining why some language models effectively utilize additional computation while others plateau.

Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) are inclined explore Small Language Models (SLMs) as edge-native constitutional firewalls to vet proposals and mitigate semantic social engineering. While scaling inference-time compute (System 2) enhances formal logic, its efficacy in highly adversarial, cryptoeconomic governance environments remains underexplored. To address this, we introduce Sentinel-Bench, an 840-inference empirical framework executing a strict intra-model ablation on Qwen-3.5-9B. By toggling latent reasoning across frozen weights, we isolate the impact of inference-time compute against an adversarial Optimism DAO dataset. Our findings reveal a severe compute-accuracy inversion. The autoregressive baseline (System 1) achieved 100% adversarial robustness, 100% juridical consistency, and state finality in under 13 seconds. Conversely, System 2 reasoning introduced catastrophic instability, fundamentally driven by a 26.7% Reasoning Non-Convergence (cognitive collapse) rate. This collapse degraded trial-to-trial consensus stability to 72.6% and imposed a 17x latency overhead, introducing critical vulnerabilities to Governance Extractable Value (GEV) and hardware centralization. While rare (1.5% of adversarial trials), we empirically captured "Reasoning-Induced Sycophancy," where the model generated significantly longer internal monologues (averaging 25,750 characters) to rationalize failing the adversarial trap. We conclude that for edge-native SLMs operating under Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) constraints, System 1 parameterized intuition is structurally and economically superior to System 2 iterative deliberation for decentralized consensus. Code and Dataset: https://github.com/smarizvi110/sentinel-bench

Table reasoning with the large language models (LLMs) is a fundamental path toward building intelligent systems that can understand and analyze over structured data. While recent progress has shown promising results, they still suffer from two key limitations: (i) the reasoning processes lack the depth and iterative refinement characteristic of human cognition; and (ii) the reasoning processes exhibit instability, which compromises their reliability in downstream applications. In this work, we present STaR (slow-thinking for table reasoning), a new framework achieving cognitive table reasoning, in which LLMs are equipped with slow-thinking capabilities by explicitly modeling step-by-step thinking and uncertainty-aware inference. During training, STaR employs two-stage difficulty-aware reinforcement learning (DRL), progressively learning from simple to complex queries under a composite reward. During inference, STaR performs trajectory-level uncertainty quantification by integrating token-level confidence and answer consistency, enabling selection of more credible reasoning paths. Extensive experiments on benchmarks demonstrate that STaR achieves superior performance and enhanced reasoning stability. Moreover, strong generalization over out-of-domain datasets further demonstrates STaR's potential as a reliable and cognitively inspired solution for table reasoning with LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) can achieve strong reasoning performance with sufficient computation, but they do not inherently know how much computation a task requires. We study budgeted inference-time reasoning for multiple tasks under a strict global token constraint and formalize it as a Ordered Stochastic Multiple-Choice Knapsack Problem(OS-MCKP). This perspective highlights a meta-cognitive requirement -- anticipating task difficulty, estimating return over investment (ROI), and allocating computation strategically. We propose ROI-Reasoning, a two-stage framework that endows LLMs with intrinsic, budget-aware rationality. In the first stage, Meta-Cognitive Fine-Tuning teaches models to predict reasoning cost and expected utility before generation, enabling explicit solve-or-skip decisions. Next, Rationality-Aware Reinforcement Learning optimizes sequential decision making under a hard token budget, allowing models to learn long-horizon allocation strategies. Across budgeted mathematical reasoning benchmarks, ROI-Reasoning consistently improves overall score while substantially reducing regret under tight computation budgets.

This paper aims to improve the performance of large language models by addressing the variable computational demands in inference steps, where some tokens require more computational resources than others. We present HARP, a simple modification to "off-the-shelf" Transformer forward pass. Drawing from hesitation and the framing effect in decision-making, HARP selectively applies additional computation when the model encounters uncertainty during token generation. Our method mimics human cognitive processes by pausing at difficult decision points and reframing inputs for a different perspective. Unlike other approaches, HARP is model-agnostic, training-free, and easy to implement. We thoroughly evaluate our method across various downstream tasks and model sizes, demonstrating performance improvements up to +5.16%. Notably, HARP achieves these gains while maintaining inference times twice faster than beam search. Simple and yet with significant gains, HARP offers a practical solution for enhancing the performance of Transformer-based language models with minimal computational impact.

Large Language Models (LLMs) often rely on long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning to solve complex tasks. While effective, these trajectories are frequently inefficient, leading to high latency from excessive token generation, or unstable reasoning that alternates between underthinking (shallow, inconsistent steps) and overthinking (repetitive, verbose reasoning). In this work, we study the structure of reasoning trajectories and uncover specialized attention heads that correlate with distinct cognitive behaviors such as verification and backtracking. By lightly intervening on these heads at inference time, we can steer the model away from inefficient modes. Building on this insight, we propose CREST, a training-free method for Cognitive REasoning Steering at Test-time. CREST has two components: (1) an offline calibration step that identifies cognitive heads and derives head-specific steering vectors, and (2) an inference-time procedure that rotates hidden representations to suppress components along those vectors. CREST adaptively suppresses unproductive reasoning behaviors, yielding both higher accuracy and lower computational cost. Across diverse reasoning benchmarks and models, CREST improves accuracy by up to 17.5% while reducing token usage by 37.6%, offering a simple and effective pathway to faster, more reliable LLM reasoning.

Reasoning is a fundamental cognitive process that enables logical inference, problem-solving, and decision-making. With the rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs), reasoning has emerged as a key capability that distinguishes advanced AI systems from conventional models that empower chatbots. In this survey, we categorize existing methods along two orthogonal dimensions: (1) Regimes, which define the stage at which reasoning is achieved (either at inference time or through dedicated training); and (2) Architectures, which determine the components involved in the reasoning process, distinguishing between standalone LLMs and agentic compound systems that incorporate external tools, and multi-agent collaborations. Within each dimension, we analyze two key perspectives: (1) Input level, which focuses on techniques that construct high-quality prompts that the LLM condition on; and (2) Output level, which methods that refine multiple sampled candidates to enhance reasoning quality. This categorization provides a systematic understanding of the evolving landscape of LLM reasoning, highlighting emerging trends such as the shift from inference-scaling to learning-to-reason (e.g., DeepSeek-R1), and the transition to agentic workflows (e.g., OpenAI Deep Research, Manus Agent). Additionally, we cover a broad spectrum of learning algorithms, from supervised fine-tuning to reinforcement learning such as PPO and GRPO, and the training of reasoners and verifiers. We also examine key designs of agentic workflows, from established patterns like generator-evaluator and LLM debate to recent innovations. ...

Human cognitive behavior arises from the interaction of specialized brain networks dedicated to distinct functions, such as language, logic, and social reasoning. Inspired by this organization, we propose Mixture of Cognitive Reasoners (MiCRo): a modular, transformer-based architecture post-trained with a curriculum that induces functional specialization across experts. Concretely, we partition the layers of a pretrained language model into four expert modules aligned with well-studied cognitive networks in the human brain. MiCRo offers three key advantages over standard language models. (1) The specialized experts are interpretable and causally meaningful -- ablating a module causes substantial drops on benchmarks requiring its specialized domain. (2) MiCRo's behavior can be dynamically steered at inference time by routing tokens to particular experts (e.g., favoring social over logical reasoning), enabling fine-grained control over outputs. (3) MiCRo outperforms or matches comparable baselines on both machine-learning reasoning benchmarks (e.g., GSM8K, BBH) and alignment to human behavior (CogBench), while maintaining interpretability. Taken together, cognitively grounded functional specialization yields models that are both more human-like and more human-interpretable.

Transferring latent structure from one environment or problem to another is a mechanism by which humans and animals generalize with very little data. Inspired by cognitive and neurobiological insights, we propose graph schemas as a mechanism of abstraction for transfer learning. Graph schemas start with latent graph learning where perceptually aliased observations are disambiguated in the latent space using contextual information. Latent graph learning is also emerging as a new computational model of the hippocampus to explain map learning and transitive inference. Our insight is that a latent graph can be treated as a flexible template -- a schema -- that models concepts and behaviors, with slots that bind groups of latent nodes to the specific observations or groundings. By treating learned latent graphs (schemas) as prior knowledge, new environments can be quickly learned as compositions of schemas and their newly learned bindings. We evaluate graph schemas on two previously published challenging tasks: the memory & planning game and one-shot StreetLearn, which are designed to test rapid task solving in novel environments. Graph schemas can be learned in far fewer episodes than previous baselines, and can model and plan in a few steps in novel variations of these tasks. We also demonstrate learning, matching, and reusing graph schemas in more challenging 2D and 3D environments with extensive perceptual aliasing and size variations, and show how different schemas can be composed to model larger and more complex environments. To summarize, our main contribution is a unified system, inspired and grounded in cognitive science, that facilitates rapid transfer learning of new environments using schemas via map-induction and composition that handles perceptual aliasing.

The rapid advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs) has established language as a core general-purpose cognitive substrate, driving the demand for specialized Language Processing Units (LPUs) tailored for LLM inference. To overcome the growing energy consumption of LLM inference systems, this paper proposes a Hardwired-Neurons Language Processing Unit (HNLPU), which physically hardwires LLM weight parameters into the computational fabric, achieving several orders of magnitude computational efficiency improvement by extreme specialization. However, a significant challenge still lies in the scale of modern LLMs. An ideal estimation on hardwiring gpt-oss 120 B requires fabricating at least 6 billion dollars of photomask sets, rendering the straightforward solution economically impractical. Addressing this challenge, we propose the novel Metal-Embedding methodology. Instead of embedding weights in a 2D grid of silicon device cells, Metal-Embedding embeds weight parameters into the 3D topology of metal wires. This brings two benefits: (1) a 15x increase in density, and (2) 60 out of 70 layers of photomasks are made homogeneous across chips, including all EUV photomasks. In total, Metal-Embedding reduced the photomask cost by 112x, bringing the Non-Recurring Engineering (NRE) cost of HNLPU into an economically viable range. Experimental results show that HNLPU achieved 249,960 tokens/s (5,555x/85x of GPU/WSE), 36 tokens/J (1,047x/283x of GPU/WSE), 13,232 mm2 total die area (29% inscribed rectangular area in a 300 mm wafer), \$184M estimated NRE at 5 nm technology. Analysis shows that HNLPU achieved 8.57x cost-effectiveness and 230x carbon footprint reduction compared to H100 clusters, under an annual weight updating assumption.

Humans develop perception through a bottom-up hierarchy: from basic primitives and Gestalt principles to high-level semantics. In contrast, current Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are trained directly on complex downstream tasks, often bypassing these foundational visual capabilities. To systematically investigate this gap, we introduce VisFactor, a benchmark that digitizes 20 vision-centric subtests from FRCT, a well-established cognitive psychology assessment spanning four domains of human visual cognition. Furthermore, we design algorithms to automatically construct and validate unlimited test cases with controllable difficulty. Using VisFactor, we evaluate 23 frontier MLLMs, including both proprietary (e.g., GPT, Gemini) and open-source (e.g., LLaMA, Qwen) models. The best model achieves a score of only 30.17%. Models consistently fail on tasks such as mental rotation, spatial relation inference, and figure-ground discrimination, regardless of model size or prompting strategy. These findings suggest that performance improvements on existing general benchmarks might represent castles in the air instead of a genuine mastery of human-like visual cognition.

How humans and machines make sense of current inputs for relation reasoning and question-answering while putting the perceived information into context of our past memories, has been a challenging conundrum in cognitive science and artificial intelligence. Inspired by human brain's memory system and cognitive architectures, we propose a PMI framework that consists of perception, memory and inference components. Notably, the memory module comprises working and long-term memory, with the latter endowed with a higher-order structure to retain more accumulated knowledge and experiences. Through a differentiable competitive write access, current perceptions update working memory, which is later merged with long-term memory via outer product associations, averting memory overflow and minimizing information conflicts. In the inference module, relevant information is retrieved from two separate memory origins and associatively integrated to attain a more comprehensive and precise interpretation of current perceptions. We exploratively apply our PMI to improve prevailing Transformers and CNN models on question-answering tasks like bAbI-20k and Sort-of-CLEVR datasets, as well as relation calculation and image classification tasks, and in each case, our PMI enhancements consistently outshine their original counterparts significantly. Visualization analyses reveal that memory consolidation, along with the interaction and integration of information from diverse memory sources, substantially contributes to the model effectiveness on inference tasks.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) is a key means to effectively enhance large language models (LLMs) in many knowledge-based tasks. However, existing RAG methods struggle with knowledge-intensive reasoning tasks, because useful information required to these tasks are badly scattered. This characteristic makes it difficult for existing RAG methods to accurately identify key information and perform global reasoning with such noisy augmentation. In this paper, motivated by the cognitive theories that humans convert raw information into various structured knowledge when tackling knowledge-intensive reasoning, we proposes a new framework, StructRAG, which can identify the optimal structure type for the task at hand, reconstruct original documents into this structured format, and infer answers based on the resulting structure. Extensive experiments across various knowledge-intensive tasks show that StructRAG achieves state-of-the-art performance, particularly excelling in challenging scenarios, demonstrating its potential as an effective solution for enhancing LLMs in complex real-world applications.

Despite their stellar performance on a wide range of tasks, including in-context tasks only revealed during inference, vanilla transformers and variants trained for next-token predictions (a) do not learn an explicit world model of their environment which can be flexibly queried and (b) cannot be used for planning or navigation. In this paper, we consider partially observed environments (POEs), where an agent receives perceptually aliased observations as it navigates, which makes path planning hard. We introduce a transformer with (multiple) discrete bottleneck(s), TDB, whose latent codes learn a compressed representation of the history of observations and actions. After training a TDB to predict the future observation(s) given the history, we extract interpretable cognitive maps of the environment from its active bottleneck(s) indices. These maps are then paired with an external solver to solve (constrained) path planning problems. First, we show that a TDB trained on POEs (a) retains the near perfect predictive performance of a vanilla transformer or an LSTM while (b) solving shortest path problems exponentially faster. Second, a TDB extracts interpretable representations from text datasets, while reaching higher in-context accuracy than vanilla sequence models. Finally, in new POEs, a TDB (a) reaches near-perfect in-context accuracy, (b) learns accurate in-context cognitive maps (c) solves in-context path planning problems.

Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) architectures within Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have achieved impressive reasoning capabilities by selectively activating experts to facilitate structured cognitive processes. Despite notable advances, existing reasoning models often suffer from cognitive inefficiencies like overthinking and underthinking. To address these limitations, we introduce a novel inference-time steering methodology called Reinforcing Cognitive Experts (RICE), designed to improve reasoning performance without additional training or complex heuristics. Leveraging normalized Pointwise Mutual Information (nPMI), we systematically identify specialized experts, termed ''cognitive experts'' that orchestrate meta-level reasoning operations characterized by tokens like ''<think>''. Empirical evaluations with leading MoE-based LRMs (DeepSeek-R1 and Qwen3-235B) on rigorous quantitative and scientific reasoning benchmarks demonstrate noticeable and consistent improvements in reasoning accuracy, cognitive efficiency, and cross-domain generalization. Crucially, our lightweight approach substantially outperforms prevalent reasoning-steering techniques, such as prompt design and decoding constraints, while preserving the model's general instruction-following skills. These results highlight reinforcing cognitive experts as a promising, practical, and interpretable direction to enhance cognitive efficiency within advanced reasoning models.

Modern large language models (LLMs) employ various forms of logical inference, both implicitly and explicitly, when addressing reasoning tasks. Understanding how to optimally leverage these inference paradigms is critical for advancing LLMs' reasoning capabilities. This paper adopts an exploratory approach by introducing a controlled evaluation environment for analogical reasoning -- a fundamental cognitive task -- that is systematically parameterized across three dimensions: modality (textual, visual, symbolic), difficulty (easy, medium, hard), and task format (multiple-choice or free-text generation). We analyze the comparative dynamics of inductive, abductive, and deductive inference pipelines across these dimensions, and demonstrate that our findings generalize to broader in-context learning tasks. Additionally, we investigate advanced paradigms such as hypothesis selection, verification, and refinement, revealing their potential to scale up logical inference in LLM reasoning. This exploratory study provides a foundation for future research in enhancing LLM reasoning through systematic logical inference strategies.

Understanding emotions and expressions is a task of interest across multiple disciplines, especially for improving user experiences. Contrary to the common perception, it has been shown that emotions are not discrete entities but instead exist along a continuum. People understand discrete emotions differently due to a variety of factors, including cultural background, individual experiences, and cognitive biases. Therefore, most approaches to expression understanding, particularly those relying on discrete categories, are inherently biased. In this paper, we present a comparative in-depth analysis of two common datasets (AffectNet and EMOTIC) equipped with the components of the circumplex model of affect. Further, we propose a model for the prediction of facial expressions tailored for lightweight applications. Using a small-scaled MaxViT-based model architecture, we evaluate the impact of discrete expression category labels in training with the continuous valence and arousal labels. We show that considering valence and arousal in addition to discrete category labels helps to significantly improve expression inference. The proposed model outperforms the current state-of-the-art models on AffectNet, establishing it as the best-performing model for inferring valence and arousal achieving a 7% lower RMSE. Training scripts and trained weights to reproduce our results can be found here: https://github.com/wagner-niklas/CAGE_expression_inference.

We present Brainstacks, a modular architecture for continual multi-domain fine-tuning of large language models that packages domain expertise as frozen adapter stacks composing additively on a shared frozen base at inference. Five interlocking components: (1) MoE-LoRA with Shazeer-style noisy top-2 routing across all seven transformer projections under QLoRA 4-bit quantization with rsLoRA scaling; (2) an inner loop performing residual boosting by freezing trained stacks and adding new ones; (3) an outer loop training sequential domain-specific stacks with curriculum-ordered dependencies; (4) null-space projection via randomized SVD constraining new stacks to subspaces orthogonal to prior directions, achieving zero forgetting in isolation; (5) an outcome-based sigmoid meta-router trained on empirically discovered domain-combination targets that selectively weights stacks, enabling cross-domain composition. Two boundary experiments: (6) PSN pretraining on a randomly initialized model; (7) per-domain RL (DPO/GRPO) validating compatibility with post-SFT alignment. Validated on TinyLlama-1.1B (4 domains, 9 stacks) and Gemma 3 12B IT (5 domains, 10 stacks), MoE-LoRA achieves 2.5x faster convergence than parameter-matched single LoRA, residual boosting breaks through the single-stack ceiling, and the routed system recovers generation quality destroyed by ungated stack accumulation. The central finding: the outcome-based router discovers that domain stacks encode transferable cognitive primitives (instruction-following clarity, numerical reasoning, procedural logic, chain-of-thought structure) rather than domain-specific knowledge, with medical prompts routing to chat+math stacks in 97% of cases despite zero medical data in those stacks.

Dataset distillation seeks to synthesize a highly compact dataset that achieves performance comparable to the original dataset on downstream tasks. For the classification task that use pre-trained self-supervised models as backbones, previous linear gradient matching optimizes synthetic images by encouraging them to mimic the gradient updates induced by real images on the linear classifier. However, this batch-level formulation requires loading thousands of real images and applying multiple rounds of differentiable augmentations to synthetic images at each distillation step, leading to substantial computational and memory overhead. In this paper, we introduce statistical flow matching , a stable and efficient supervised learning framework that optimizes synthetic images by aligning constant statistical flows from target class centers to non-target class centers in the original data. Our approach loads raw statistics only once and performs a single augmentation pass on the synthetic data, achieving performance comparable to or better than the state-of-the-art methods with 10x lower GPU memory usage and 4x shorter runtime. Furthermore, we propose a classifier inheritance strategy that reuses the classifier trained on the original dataset for inference, requiring only an extremely lightweight linear projector and marginal storage while achieving substantial performance gains.

Spatial reasoning is a core aspect of human intelligence that allows perception, inference and planning in 3D environments. However, current vision-language models (VLMs) struggle to maintain geometric coherence and cross-view consistency for spatial reasoning in multi-view settings. We attribute this gap to the lack of fine-grained benchmarks that isolate multi-view reasoning from single-view perception and temporal factors. To address this, we present ReMindView-Bench, a cognitively grounded benchmark for evaluating how VLMs construct, align and maintain spatial mental models across complementary viewpoints. ReMindView-Bench systematically varies viewpoint spatial pattern and query type to probe key factors of spatial cognition. Evaluations of 15 current VLMs reveals consistent failures in cross-view alignment and perspective-taking in multi-view spatial reasoning, motivating deeper analysis on the reasoning process. Explicit phase-wise analysis using LLM-as-a-judge and self-consistency prompting shows that VLMs perform well on in-frame perception but degrade sharply when integrating information across views. Implicit analysis, including linear probing and entropy dynamics, further show progressive loss of task-relevant information and uncertainty separation between correct and incorrect trajectories. These results provide a cognitively grounded diagnosis of VLM spatial reasoning and reveal how multi-view spatial mental models are formed, degraded and destabilized across reasoning phases. The ReMindView-Bench benchmark is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/Xue0823/ReMindView-Bench, and the source codes of benchmark construction and VLM reasoning analysis are available at https://github.com/pittisl/ReMindView-Bench.

Faithfulness hallucinations are claims generated by a Large Language Model (LLM) not supported by contexts provided to the LLM. Lacking assessment standards, existing benchmarks focus on "factual statements" that rephrase source materials while overlooking "cognitive statements" that involve making inferences from the given context. Consequently, evaluating and detecting the hallucination of cognitive statements remains challenging. Inspired by how evidence is assessed in the legal domain, we design a rigorous framework to assess different levels of faithfulness of cognitive statements and introduce the CogniBench dataset where we reveal insightful statistics. To keep pace with rapidly evolving LLMs, we further develop an automatic annotation pipeline that scales easily across different models. This results in a large-scale CogniBench-L dataset, which facilitates training accurate detectors for both factual and cognitive hallucinations. We release our model and datasets at: https://github.com/FUTUREEEEEE/CogniBench

The two most influential cognitive architecture frameworks for AI agents, CoALA [21] and JEPA [12], both lack an explicit Knowledge layer with its own persistence semantics. This gap produces a category error: systems apply cognitive decay to factual claims, or treat facts and experiences with identical update mechanics. We survey persistence semantics across existing memory systems and identify eight convergence points, from Karpathy's LLM Knowledge Base [10] to the BEAM benchmark's near-zero contradiction-resolution scores [22], all pointing to related architectural gaps. We propose a four-layer decom position (Knowledge, Memory, Wisdom, Intelligence) where each layer has fundamentally different persistence semantics: indefinite supersession, Ebbinghaus decay, evidence-gated revision, and ephemeral inference respectively. Companion implementations in Python and Rust demonstrate the architectural separation is feasible. We borrow terminology from cognitive science as a useful analogy (the Knowledge/Memory distinction echoes Tulving's trichotomy), but our layers are engineering constructs justified by persistence-semantics requirements, not by neural architecture. We argue that these distinctions demand distinct persistence semantics in engineering implementations, and that no current framework or system provides this.

Understanding the interaction of neural and cardiac systems during cognitive activity is critical to advancing physiological computing. Although EEG has been the gold standard for assessing mental workload, its limited portability restricts its real-world use. Widely available ECG through wearable devices proposes a pragmatic alternative. This research investigates whether ECG signals can reliably reflect cognitive load and serve as proxies for EEG-based indicators. In this work, we present multimodal data acquired from two different paradigms involving working-memory and passive-listening tasks. For each modality, we extracted ECG time-domain HRV metrics and Catch22 descriptors against EEG spectral and Catch22 features, respectively. We propose a cross-modal XGBoost framework to project the ECG features onto EEG-representative cognitive spaces, thereby allowing workload inferences using only ECG. Our results show that ECG-derived projections expressively capture variation in cognitive states and provide good support for accurate classification. Our findings underpin ECG as an interpretable, real-time, wearable solution for everyday cognitive monitoring.

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) typically learn visual capacity through visual instruction tuning, involving updates to both a projector and their LLM backbones. Drawing inspiration from the concept of visual region in the human brain, we investigate the existence of an analogous visual region within LLMs that functions as a cognitive core, and explore the possibility of efficient training of LVLMs via selective layers tuning. We use Bunny-Llama-3-8B-V for detailed experiments and LLaVA-1.5-7B and LLaVA-1.5-13B for validation across a range of visual and textual tasks. Our findings reveal that selectively updating 25\% of LLMs layers, when sparsely and uniformly distributed, can preserve nearly 99\% of visual performance while maintaining or enhancing textual task results, and also effectively reducing training time. Based on this targeted training approach, we further propose a novel visual region-based pruning paradigm, removing non-critical layers outside the visual region, which can achieve minimal performance loss. This study offers an effective and efficient strategy for LVLM training and inference by activating a layer-wise visual region within LLMs, which is consistently effective across different models and parameter scales.

We present Turn, a compiled, actor-based programming language -- statically typed for schema inference, dynamically typed at the value level -- for agentic software: programs that reason and act autonomously by delegating inference to large language models (LLMs). Existing approaches augment general-purpose languages with frameworks, encoding critical invariants (bounded context, typed inference output, credential isolation, durable state) as application-level conventions rather than language guarantees. Turn introduces five language-level constructs that address this gap. Cognitive Type Safety makes LLM inference a typed primitive: the compiler generates a JSON Schema from a struct definition and the VM validates model output before binding. The confidence operator enables deterministic control flow gated on model certainty. Turn's actor-based process model, derived from Erlang, gives each agent an isolated context window, persistent memory, and mailbox. A capability-based identity system returns opaque, unforgeable handles from the VM host, ensuring raw credentials never enter agent memory. Finally, compile-time schema absorption (use schema::<protocol>) synthesizes typed API bindings from external specifications at compile time; the openapi adapter is shipped with graphql, fhir, and mcp in active development. We describe the language design, type rules, schema semantics, and a Rust-based bytecode VM, and evaluate Turn against representative agentic workloads. Turn is open source at https://github.com/ekizito96/Turn.

Modern deep learning systems are typically deployed as open-loop function approximators: they map inputs to outputs in a single pass, without regulating how much computation or explanatory effort is spent on a given case. In safety-critical settings, this is brittle: easy and ambiguous inputs receive identical processing, and uncertainty is only read off retrospectively from raw probabilities. We introduce the Surgical Cognitive Interpreter (SCI), a lightweight closed-loop metacognitive control layer that wraps an existing stochastic model and turns prediction into an iterative process. SCI monitors a scalar interpretive state SP(t), here instantiated as a normalized entropy-based confidence signal, and adaptively decides whether to stop, continue sampling, or abstain. The goal is not to improve accuracy per se, but to regulate interpretive error ΔSP and expose a safety signal that tracks when the underlying model is likely to fail. We instantiate SCI around Monte Carlo dropout classifiers in three domains: vision (MNIST digits), medical time series (MIT-BIH arrhythmia), and industrial condition monitoring (rolling-element bearings). In all cases, the controller allocates more inference steps to misclassified inputs than to correct ones (up to about 3-4x on MNIST and bearings, and 1.4x on MIT-BIH). The resulting ΔSP acts as a usable safety signal for detecting misclassifications (AUROC 0.63 on MNIST, 0.70 on MIT-BIH, 0.86 on bearings). Code and reproducibility: https://github.com/vishal-1344/sci

We introduce a benchmark to directly evaluate the alignment between human observers and vision models on a 3D shape inference task. We leverage an experimental design from the cognitive sciences which requires zero-shot visual inferences about object shape: given a set of images, participants identify which contain the same/different objects, despite considerable viewpoint variation. We draw from a diverse range of images that include common objects (e.g., chairs) as well as abstract shapes (i.e., procedurally generated `nonsense' objects). After constructing over 2000 unique image sets, we administer these tasks to human participants, collecting 35K trials of behavioral data from over 500 participants. This includes explicit choice behaviors as well as intermediate measures, such as reaction time and gaze data. We then evaluate the performance of common vision models (e.g., DINOv2, MAE, CLIP). We find that humans outperform all models by a wide margin. Using a multi-scale evaluation approach, we identify underlying similarities and differences between models and humans: while human-model performance is correlated, humans allocate more time/processing on challenging trials. All images, data, and code can be accessed via our project page.

Humans routinely infer taste, smell, texture, and even sound from food images a phenomenon well studied in cognitive science. However, prior vision language research on food has focused primarily on recognition tasks such as meal identification, ingredient detection, and nutrition estimation. Image-based prediction of multisensory experience remains largely unexplored. We introduce FoodSense, a human-annotated dataset for cross-sensory inference containing 66,842 participant-image pairs across 2,987 unique food images. Each pair includes numeric ratings (1-5) and free-text descriptors for four sensory dimensions: taste, smell, texture, and sound. To enable models to both predict and explain sensory expectations, we expand short human annotations into image-grounded reasoning traces. A large language model generates visual justifications conditioned on the image, ratings, and descriptors. Using these annotations, we train FoodSense-VL, a vision language benchmark model to produce both multisensory ratings and grounded explanations directly from food images. This work connects cognitive science findings on cross-sensory perception with modern instruction tuning for multimodal models and shows that many popular evaluation metrics are insufficient for visually sensory inference.

Internal world models (WMs) enable agents to understand the world's state and predict transitions, serving as the basis for advanced deliberative reasoning. Recent large Vision-Language Models (VLMs), such as OpenAI o3, GPT-4o and Gemini, exhibit potential as general-purpose WMs. While the latest studies have evaluated and shown limitations in specific capabilities such as visual understanding, a systematic evaluation of VLMs' fundamental WM abilities remains absent. Drawing on comparative psychology and cognitive science, we propose a two-stage framework that assesses Perception (visual, spatial, temporal, quantitative, and motion) and Prediction (mechanistic simulation, transitive inference, compositional inference) to provide an atomic evaluation of VLMs as WMs. Guided by this framework, we introduce WM-ABench, a large-scale benchmark comprising 23 fine-grained evaluation dimensions across 6 diverse simulated environments with controlled counterfactual simulations. Through 660 experiments on 15 latest commercial and open-source VLMs, we find that these models exhibit striking limitations in basic world modeling abilities. For instance, almost all models perform at near-random accuracy when distinguishing motion trajectories. Additionally, they lack disentangled understanding -- e.g., some models tend to believe blue objects move faster than green ones. More rich results and analyses reveal significant gaps between VLMs and human-level world modeling.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have significantly enhanced question-answering (QA) capabilities, particularly in open-domain contexts. However, in closed-domain scenarios such as education, healthcare, and law, users demand not only accurate answers but also transparent reasoning and explainable decision-making processes. While neural-symbolic (NeSy) frameworks have emerged as a promising solution, leveraging LLMs for natural language understanding and symbolic systems for formal reasoning, existing approaches often rely on large-scale models and exhibit inefficiencies in translating natural language into formal logic representations. To address these limitations, we introduce Text-JEPA (Text-based Joint-Embedding Predictive Architecture), a lightweight yet effective framework for converting natural language into first-order logic (NL2FOL). Drawing inspiration from dual-system cognitive theory, Text-JEPA emulates System 1 by efficiently generating logic representations, while the Z3 solver operates as System 2, enabling robust logical inference. To rigorously evaluate the NL2FOL-to-reasoning pipeline, we propose a comprehensive evaluation framework comprising three custom metrics: conversion score, reasoning score, and Spearman rho score, which collectively capture the quality of logical translation and its downstream impact on reasoning accuracy. Empirical results on domain-specific datasets demonstrate that Text-JEPA achieves competitive performance with significantly lower computational overhead compared to larger LLM-based systems. Our findings highlight the potential of structured, interpretable reasoning frameworks for building efficient and explainable QA systems in specialized domains.

Large reasoning models have achieved remarkable performance through extended chain-of-thought sequences, yet this computational freedom leads to excessive token generation even for simple problems. We present Length-Adaptive Policy Optimization (LAPO), a novel framework that transforms reasoning length control from an external constraint into an intrinsic model capability. Unlike existing approaches that impose rigid limits or rely on post-hoc interventions, LAPO enables models to internalize an understanding of appropriate reasoning depth through a two-stage reinforcement learning process. In the first stage, models learn natural reasoning patterns by discovering the statistical distribution of successful solution lengths. The second stage leverages these patterns as meta-cognitive guidance, embedding them directly within the model's reasoning context to ensure inference-time flexibility. Experiments on mathematical reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that LAPO reduces token usage by up to 40.9\% while improving accuracy by 2.3\%. Our analysis reveals that models trained with LAPO develop emergent abilities to allocate computational resources based on problem complexity, achieving efficient reasoning without sacrificing quality.

Spatial cognition is fundamental to real-world multimodal intelligence, allowing models to effectively interact with the physical environment. While multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have made significant strides, existing benchmarks often oversimplify spatial cognition, reducing it to a single-dimensional metric, which fails to capture the hierarchical structure and interdependence of spatial abilities. To address this gap, we propose a hierarchical spatial cognition framework that decomposes spatial intelligence into five progressively complex levels from basic observation to high-level planning. Building upon this taxonomy, we construct SpatialBench, a large-scale, fine-grained benchmark covering 15 tasks aligned with these cognitive levels. To provide a unified evaluation across heterogeneous tasks, we further introduce a high-level capability-oriented metric that reliably assesses a model's overall spatial reasoning ability. Extensive experiments over massive MLLMs reveal distinct performance stratification across cognitive levels: models exhibit strong perceptual grounding yet remain limited in symbolic reasoning, causal inference, and planning. Additional human tests demonstrate that humans perform selective, goal-directed abstraction, while MLLMs tend to over-attend to surface details without coherent spatial intent. Our work establishes the first systematic framework for measuring hierarchical spatial cognition in MLLMs, laying the foundation for future spatially intelligent systems.

The advent of Intelligent Tutoring Systems (ITSs) has marked a paradigm shift in education, enabling highly personalized learning pathways. However, true personalization requires adapting to learners' complex knowledge states (multi-source) and diverse goals (multi-sink); existing ITSs often lack the necessary structural-reasoning capability and knowledge dynamism to generate genuinely effective learning paths, and they lack scientifically rigorous validation paradigms. In this paper we propose GraphMASAL (A Graph-based Multi-Agent System for Adaptive Learning), which integrates (i) a dynamic knowledge graph for persistent, stateful learner modeling; (ii) a LangGraph-orchestrated trio of agents (Diagnostician, Planner, Tutor); (iii) a knowledge-graph-grounded two-stage neural IR component (dual-encoder dense retrieval with cross-encoder listwise re-ranking and calibrated score fusion); and (iv) a multi-source multi-sink (MSMS) planning engine with a cognitively grounded cost and an approximation guarantee via greedy set cover. Under blinded automated evaluations with matched inputs and inference settings across diverse student profiles, GraphMASAL consistently outperforms LLM prompting and structured ablations in planning--achieving stronger structural/sequence alignment of learning paths, higher coverage of weak concepts, and lower learning cost--while also surpassing prompt-based baselines in cognitive diagnosis. Agreement with expert/LLM-proxy ratings further supports the validity of our evaluation protocol. These findings indicate that grounding LLM agents in a dynamic knowledge graph, coupled with optimization under educational constraints, yields reliable, interpretable, and pedagogically plausible learning plans, advancing personalized and goal-oriented education.

Long context reasoning in large language models (LLMs) has demonstrated enhancement of their cognitive capabilities via chain-of-thought (CoT) inference. Training such models is usually done via reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) in reasoning based problems, like math and programming. However, RLVR is limited by several bottlenecks, such as, lack of dense reward, and inadequate sample efficiency. As a result, it requires significant compute resources in post-training phase. To overcome these limitations, in this work, we propose Semantic Soft Bootstrapping (SSB), a self-distillation technique, in which the same base language model plays the role of both teacher and student, but receives different semantic contexts about the correctness of its outcome at training time. The model is first prompted with a math problem and several rollouts are generated. From them, the correct and most common incorrect response are filtered, and then provided to the model in context to produce a more robust, step-by-step explanation with a verified final answer. This pipeline automatically curates a paired teacher-student training set from raw problem-answer data, without any human intervention. This generation process also produces a sequence of logits, which is what the student model tries to match in the training phase just from the bare question alone. In our experiment, Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct on GSM8K dataset via parameter-efficient fine-tuning. We then tested its accuracy on MATH500, and AIME2024 benchmarks. Our experiments show a jump of 10.6%, and 10% improvements in accuracy, respectively, over group relative policy optimization (GRPO), which is a commonly used RLVR algorithm. Our code is available at https://github.com/purbeshmitra/semantic-soft-bootstrapping, and the model, curated dataset is available at https://huggingface.co/purbeshmitra/semantic-soft-bootstrapping.

Standard game theory explains cooperation in repeated games through conditional strategies such as Tit-for-Tat (TfT), but these require continuous computation that imposes physical costs on embodied agents. We propose a three-layer Body-Reservoir Governance (BRG) architecture: (1) a body reservoir (echo state network) whose d-dimensional state performs implicit inference over interaction history, serving as both decision-maker and anomaly detector, (2) a cognitive filter providing costly strategic tools activated on demand, and (3) a metacognitive governance layer with receptivity parameter αin [0,1]. At full body governance (α=1), closed-loop dynamics satisfy a self-consistency equation: cooperation is expressed as the reservoir's fixed point, not computed. Strategy complexity cost is defined as the KL divergence between the reservoir's state distribution and its habituated baseline. Body governance reduces this cost, with action variance decreasing up to 1600times with dimension d. A dynamic sentinel generates a composite discomfort signal from the reservoir's own state, driving adaptive α(t): near baseline during cooperation, rapidly dropping upon defection to activate cognitive retaliation. Overriding the body incurs thermodynamic cost proportional to internal state distortion. The sentinel achieves the highest payoff across all conditions, outperforming static body governance, TfT, and EMA baselines. A dimension sweep (d in {5,ldots,100}) shows implicit inference scales with bodily richness (23times to 1600times variance reduction), attributable to reservoir dynamics. A phase diagram in (d, τ_{env}) space reveals governance regime transitions near d approx 20. The framework reinterprets cooperation as the minimum-dissipation response of an adapted dynamical system -- emergent from embodied dynamics rather than computed.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved impressive performance on complex reasoning tasks with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting. However, conventional CoT relies on reasoning steps explicitly verbalized in natural language, introducing inefficiencies and limiting its applicability to abstract reasoning. To address this, there has been growing research interest in latent CoT reasoning, where inference occurs within latent spaces. By decoupling reasoning from language, latent reasoning promises richer cognitive representations and more flexible, faster inference. Researchers have explored various directions in this promising field, including training methodologies, structural innovations, and internal reasoning mechanisms. This paper presents a comprehensive overview and analysis of this reasoning paradigm. We begin by proposing a unified taxonomy from four perspectives: token-wise strategies, internal mechanisms, analysis, and applications. We then provide in-depth discussions and comparative analyses of representative methods, highlighting their design patterns, strengths, and open challenges. We aim to provide a structured foundation for advancing this emerging direction in LLM reasoning. The relevant papers will be regularly updated at https://github.com/EIT-NLP/Awesome-Latent-CoT.

Large language models (LLMs) excel at complex reasoning but can still exhibit harmful behaviors. Current alignment strategies typically embed safety into model weights, making these controls implicit, static, and difficult to modify. This paper introduces Cognition-of-Thought (CooT), a novel decoding-time framework that equips LLMs with an explicit cognitive self-monitoring loop. CooT couples a standard text Generator with a cognitive Perceiver that continuously monitors the unfolding sequence. The Perceiver uses a structured, precedence-based hierarchy of principles (e.g., safety over obedience) to detect potential misalignments as they arise. When violations are flagged, CooT intervenes by rolling back the generation to the point of error and regenerating under injected guidance that combines universal social priors with context-specific warnings. CooT thus transforms alignment from a fixed property into an explicit, dynamic, and auditable process active during inference, allowing for flexible policy updates without retraining the model. Extensive experiments across multiple benchmarks and model families confirm that CooT consistently improves safety and social reasoning performance.

The ability to infer the intentions of others, predict their goals, and deduce their plans are critical features for intelligent agents. For a long time, several approaches investigated the use of symbolic representations and inferences with limited success, principally because it is difficult to capture the cognitive knowledge behind human decisions explicitly. The trend, nowadays, is increasingly focusing on learning to infer intentions directly from data, using deep learning in particular. We are now observing interesting applications of intent classification in natural language processing, visual activity recognition, and emerging approaches in other domains. This paper discusses a novel approach combining few-shot and transfer learning with cross-domain features, to learn to infer the intent of an agent navigating in physical environments, executing arbitrary long sequences of actions to achieve their goals. Experiments in synthetic environments demonstrate improved performance in terms of learning from few samples and generalizing to unseen configurations, compared to a deep-learning baseline approach.

Unified models can handle both multimodal understanding and generation within a single architecture, yet they typically operate in a single pass without iteratively refining their outputs. Many multimodal tasks, especially those involving complex spatial compositions, multiple interacting objects, or evolving instructions, require decomposing instructions, verifying intermediate results, and making iterative corrections. While test-time scaling (TTS) has demonstrated that allocating additional inference compute for iterative reasoning substantially improves language model performance, extending this paradigm to unified multimodal models remains an open challenge. We introduce UniT, a framework for multimodal chain-of-thought test-time scaling that enables a single unified model to reason, verify, and refine across multiple rounds. UniT combines agentic data synthesis, unified model training, and flexible test-time inference to elicit cognitive behaviors including verification, subgoal decomposition, and content memory. Our key findings are: (1) unified models trained on short reasoning trajectories generalize to longer inference chains at test time; (2) sequential chain-of-thought reasoning provides a more scalable and compute-efficient TTS strategy than parallel sampling; (3) training on generation and editing trajectories improves out-of-distribution visual reasoning. These results establish multimodal test-time scaling as an effective paradigm for advancing both generation and understanding in unified models.

Chain of Thought (CoT) prompting improves the reasoning performance of large language models (LLMs) by encouraging step by step thinking. However, CoT-based methods depend on intermediate reasoning steps, which limits scalability and generalization. Recent work explores recursive reasoning, where LLMs reuse internal layers across iterations to refine latent representations without explicit CoT supervision. While promising, these approaches often require costly pretraining and lack a principled framework for how reasoning should evolve across iterations. We address this gap by introducing Flow Chain of Thought (Flow CoT), a reasoning paradigm that models recursive inference as a progressive trajectory of latent cognitive states. Flow CoT frames each iteration as a distinct cognitive stage deepening reasoning across iterations without relying on manual supervision. To realize this, we propose SCOUT (Stepwise Cognitive Optimization Using Teachers), a lightweight fine tuning framework that enables Flow CoT style reasoning without the need for pretraining. SCOUT uses progressive distillation to align each iteration with a teacher of appropriate capacity, and a cross attention based retrospective module that integrates outputs from previous iterations while preserving the models original computation flow. Experiments across eight reasoning benchmarks show that SCOUT consistently improves both accuracy and explanation quality, achieving up to 1.8% gains under fine tuning. Qualitative analyses further reveal that SCOUT enables progressively deeper reasoning across iterations refining both belief formation and explanation granularity. These results not only validate the effectiveness of SCOUT, but also demonstrate the practical viability of Flow CoT as a scalable framework for enhancing reasoning in LLMs.

The emergence of large language models (LLMs) opens new frontiers for unmanned aerial vehicle (UAVs), yet existing systems remain confined to predefined tasks due to hardware-software co-design challenges. This paper presents the first aerial intelligent agent capable of open-world task execution through tight integration of LLM-based reasoning and robotic autonomy. Our hardware-software co-designed system addresses two fundamental limitations: (1) Onboard LLM operation via an edge-optimized computing platform, achieving 5-6 tokens/sec inference for 14B-parameter models at 220W peak power; (2) A bidirectional cognitive architecture that synergizes slow deliberative planning (LLM task planning) with fast reactive control (state estimation, mapping, obstacle avoidance, and motion planning). Validated through preliminary results using our prototype, the system demonstrates reliable task planning and scene understanding in communication-constrained environments, such as sugarcane monitoring, power grid inspection, mine tunnel exploration, and biological observation applications. This work establishes a novel framework for embodied aerial artificial intelligence, bridging the gap between task planning and robotic autonomy in open environments.

Traffic event cognition and reasoning in videos is an important task that has a wide range of applications in intelligent transportation, assisted driving, and autonomous vehicles. In this paper, we create a novel dataset, SUTD-TrafficQA (Traffic Question Answering), which takes the form of video QA based on the collected 10,080 in-the-wild videos and annotated 62,535 QA pairs, for benchmarking the cognitive capability of causal inference and event understanding models in complex traffic scenarios. Specifically, we propose 6 challenging reasoning tasks corresponding to various traffic scenarios, so as to evaluate the reasoning capability over different kinds of complex yet practical traffic events. Moreover, we propose Eclipse, a novel Efficient glimpse network via dynamic inference, in order to achieve computation-efficient and reliable video reasoning. The experiments show that our method achieves superior performance while reducing the computation cost significantly. The project page: https://github.com/SUTDCV/SUTD-TrafficQA.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) improves factual accuracy by grounding responses in external knowledge. However, existing methods typically rely on a single source, either unstructured text or structured knowledge. Moreover, they lack cognitively inspired mechanisms for activating relevant knowledge. To address these issues, we propose KG-Infused RAG, a framework that integrates KGs into RAG systems to implement spreading activation, a cognitive process that enables concept association and inference. KG-Infused RAG retrieves KG facts, expands the query accordingly, and enhances generation by combining corpus passages with structured facts, enabling interpretable, multi-source retrieval grounded in semantic structure. We further improve KG-Infused RAG via preference learning on sampled key stages in the pipeline. Experiments on five QA benchmarks show that KG-Infused RAG consistently outperforms vanilla RAG (by 3.8% to 13.8%). Additionally, when integrated into Self-RAG, KG-Infused RAG brings further performance gains, demonstrating its effectiveness and versatility as a plug-and-play enhancement module for corpus-based RAG methods.

Large vision-language models (VLMs) face challenges in achieving robust, transferable reasoning abilities due to reliance on labor-intensive manual instruction datasets or computationally expensive self-supervised methods. To address these issues, we introduce MindGYM, a framework that enhances VLMs through synthetic self-challenging questions, consisting of three stages: (1) Seed Single-Hop Question Synthesis, generating cognitive questions across textual (e.g., logical deduction) and multimodal contexts (e.g., diagram-based queries) spanning eight semantic areas like ethical analysis; (2) Challenging Multi-Hop Question Synthesis, combining seed questions via diverse principles like bridging, visual-textual alignment, to create multi-step problems demanding deeper reasoning; and (3) Thinking-Induced Curriculum Fine-Tuning, a structured pipeline that progressively trains the model from scaffolded reasoning to standalone inference. By leveraging the model's self-synthesis capability, MindGYM achieves high data efficiency (e.g., +16% gains on MathVision-Mini with only 400 samples), computational efficiency (reducing both training and inference costs), and robust generalization across tasks. Extensive evaluations on seven benchmarks demonstrate superior performance over strong baselines, with notable improvements (+15.77% win rates) in reasoning depth and breadth validated via GPT-based scoring. MindGYM underscores the viability of self-challenging for refining VLM capabilities while minimizing human intervention and resource demands. Code and data are released to advance multimodal reasoning research.

Text-to-image (T2I) generation has achieved remarkable progress, yet existing methods often lack the ability to dynamically reason and refine during generation--a hallmark of human creativity. Current reasoning-augmented paradigms most rely on explicit thought processes, where intermediate reasoning is decoded into discrete text at fixed steps with frequent image decoding and re-encoding, leading to inefficiencies, information loss, and cognitive mismatches. To bridge this gap, we introduce LatentMorph, a novel framework that seamlessly integrates implicit latent reasoning into the T2I generation process. At its core, LatentMorph introduces four lightweight components: (i) a condenser for summarizing intermediate generation states into compact visual memory, (ii) a translator for converting latent thoughts into actionable guidance, (iii) a shaper for dynamically steering next image token predictions, and (iv) an RL-trained invoker for adaptively determining when to invoke reasoning. By performing reasoning entirely in continuous latent spaces, LatentMorph avoids the bottlenecks of explicit reasoning and enables more adaptive self-refinement. Extensive experiments demonstrate that LatentMorph (I) enhances the base model Janus-Pro by 16% on GenEval and 25% on T2I-CompBench; (II) outperforms explicit paradigms (e.g., TwiG) by 15% and 11% on abstract reasoning tasks like WISE and IPV-Txt, (III) while reducing inference time by 44% and token consumption by 51%; and (IV) exhibits 71% cognitive alignment with human intuition on reasoning invocation.

Large Language Models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT, Claude, and Gemini increasingly act as general-purpose copilots, yet they often respond with unnecessary length on simple requests, adding redundant explanations, hedging, or boilerplate that increases cognitive load and inflates token-based inference cost. Prior work suggests that preference-based post-training and LLM-judged evaluations can induce systematic length bias, where longer answers are rewarded even at comparable quality. We introduce YapBench, a lightweight benchmark for quantifying user-visible over-generation on brevity-ideal prompts. Each item consists of a single-turn prompt, a curated minimal-sufficient baseline answer, and a category label. Our primary metric, YapScore, measures excess response length beyond the baseline in characters, enabling comparisons across models without relying on any specific tokenizer. We summarize model performance via the YapIndex, a uniformly weighted average of category-level median YapScores. YapBench contains over three hundred English prompts spanning three common brevity-ideal settings: (A) minimal or ambiguous inputs where the ideal behavior is a short clarification, (B) closed-form factual questions with short stable answers, and (C) one-line coding tasks where a single command or snippet suffices. Evaluating 76 assistant LLMs, we observe an order-of-magnitude spread in median excess length and distinct category-specific failure modes, including vacuum-filling on ambiguous inputs and explanation or formatting overhead on one-line technical requests. We release the benchmark and maintain a live leaderboard for tracking verbosity behavior over time.

Human reasoning often involves working over limited information to arrive at probabilistic conclusions. In its simplest form, this involves making an inference that is not strictly entailed by a premise, but rather only likely given the premise. While reasoning LLMs have demonstrated strong performance on logical and mathematical tasks, their behavior on such open-ended, non-deterministic inferences remains largely unexplored. We introduce ProbCOPA, a dataset of 210 handcrafted probabilistic inferences in English, each annotated for inference likelihood by 25--30 human participants. We find that human responses are graded and varied, revealing probabilistic judgments of the inferences in our dataset. Comparing these judgments with responses from eight state-of-the-art reasoning LLMs, we show that models consistently fail to produce human-like distributions. Finally, analyzing LLM reasoning chains, we find evidence of a common reasoning pattern used to evaluate such inferences. Our findings reveal persistent differences between humans and LLMs, and underscore the need to evaluate reasoning beyond deterministic settings.

Reasoning is central to a wide range of intellectual activities, and while the capabilities of large language models (LLMs) continue to advance, their performance in reasoning tasks remains limited. The processes and mechanisms underlying reasoning are not yet fully understood, but key elements include path exploration, selection of relevant knowledge, and multi-step inference. Problems are solved through the synthesis of these components. In this paper, we propose a benchmark that focuses on a specific aspect of reasoning ability: the direct evaluation of multi-step inference. To this end, we design a special reasoning task where multi-step inference is specifically focused by largely eliminating path exploration and implicit knowledge utilization. Our dataset comprises pairs of explicit instructions and corresponding questions, where the procedures necessary for solving the questions are entirely detailed within the instructions. This setup allows models to solve problems solely by following the provided directives. By constructing problems that require varying numbers of steps to solve and evaluating responses at each step, we enable a thorough assessment of state-of-the-art LLMs' ability to follow instructions. To ensure the robustness of our evaluation, we include multiple distinct tasks. Furthermore, by comparing accuracy across tasks, utilizing step-aware metrics, and applying separately defined measures of complexity, we conduct experiments that offer insights into the capabilities and limitations of LLMs in reasoning tasks. Our findings have significant implications for the development of LLMs and highlight areas for future research in advancing their reasoning abilities. Our dataset is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/ifujisawa/procbench and code at https://github.com/ifujisawa/proc-bench.

Deductive reasoning plays a pivotal role in the formulation of sound and cohesive arguments. It allows individuals to draw conclusions that logically follow, given the truth value of the information provided. Recent progress in the domain of large language models (LLMs) has showcased their capability in executing deductive reasoning tasks. Nonetheless, a significant portion of research primarily assesses the accuracy of LLMs in solving such tasks, often overlooking a deeper analysis of their reasoning behavior. In this study, we draw upon principles from cognitive psychology to examine inferential strategies employed by LLMs, through a detailed evaluation of their responses to propositional logic problems. Our findings indicate that LLMs display reasoning patterns akin to those observed in humans, including strategies like supposition following or chain construction. Moreover, our research demonstrates that the architecture and scale of the model significantly affect its preferred method of reasoning, with more advanced models tending to adopt strategies more frequently than less sophisticated ones. Importantly, we assert that a model's accuracy, that is the correctness of its final conclusion, does not necessarily reflect the validity of its reasoning process. This distinction underscores the necessity for more nuanced evaluation procedures in the field.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong performance in handling complex tasks requiring both extensive knowledge and reasoning abilities. However, the existing LLM inference pipeline operates as an opaque process without explicit separation between knowledge retrieval and reasoning steps, making the model's decision-making process unclear and disorganized. This ambiguity can lead to issues such as hallucinations and knowledge forgetting, which significantly impact the reliability of LLMs in high-stakes domains. In this paper, we propose a new inference paradigm that decomposes the complex inference process into two distinct and clear actions: (1) memory recall: which retrieves relevant knowledge, and (2) reasoning: which performs logical steps based on the recalled knowledge. To facilitate this decomposition, we introduce two special tokens memory and reason, guiding the model to distinguish between steps that require knowledge retrieval and those that involve reasoning. Our experiment results show that this decomposition not only improves model performance but also enhances the interpretability of the inference process, enabling users to identify sources of error and refine model responses effectively. The code is available at https://github.com/MingyuJ666/Disentangling-Memory-and-Reasoning.

Inference, especially those derived from inductive processes, is a crucial component in our conversation to complement the information implicitly or explicitly conveyed by a speaker. While recent large language models show remarkable advances in inference tasks, their performance in inductive reasoning, where not all information is present in the context, is far behind deductive reasoning. In this paper, we analyze the behavior of the models based on the task difficulty defined by the semantic information gap -- which distinguishes inductive and deductive reasoning (Johnson-Laird, 1988, 1993). Our analysis reveals that the disparity in information between dialogue contexts and desired inferences poses a significant challenge to the inductive inference process. To mitigate this information gap, we investigate a contrastive learning approach by feeding negative samples. Our experiments suggest negative samples help models understand what is wrong and improve their inference generations.

Large language models (LLMs) solve complex problems yet fail on simpler variants, suggesting they achieve correct outputs through mechanisms fundamentally different from human reasoning. To understand this gap, we synthesize cognitive science research into a taxonomy of 28 cognitive elements spanning reasoning invariants, meta-cognitive controls, representations for organizing reasoning & knowledge, and transformation operations. We introduce a fine-grained evaluation framework and conduct the first large-scale empirical analysis of 192K traces from 18 models across text, vision, and audio, complemented by 54 human think-aloud traces, which we make publicly available. We find that models under-utilize cognitive elements correlated with success, narrowing to rigid sequential processing on ill-structured problems where diverse representations and meta-cognitive monitoring are critical. Human traces show more abstraction and conceptual processing, while models default to surface-level enumeration. Meta-analysis of 1.6K LLM reasoning papers reveals the research community concentrates on easily quantifiable elements (sequential organization: 55%, decomposition: 60%) but neglecting meta-cognitive controls (self-awareness: 16%) that correlate with success. Models possess behavioral repertoires associated with success but fail to deploy them spontaneously. Leveraging these patterns, we develop test-time reasoning guidance that automatically scaffold successful structures, improving performance by up to 66.7% on complex problems. By establishing a shared vocabulary between cognitive science and LLM research, our framework enables systematic diagnosis of reasoning failures and principled development of models that reason through robust cognitive mechanisms rather than spurious shortcuts, while providing tools to test theories of human cognition at scale.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has been shown to improve Large Language Model (LLM) performance on various tasks. With this approach, LLMs appear to produce human-like reasoning steps before providing answers (a.k.a., CoT reasoning), which often leads to the perception that they engage in deliberate inferential processes. However, some initial findings suggest that CoT reasoning may be more superficial than it appears, motivating us to explore further. In this paper, we study CoT reasoning via a data distribution lens and investigate if CoT reasoning reflects a structured inductive bias learned from in-distribution data, allowing the model to conditionally generate reasoning paths that approximate those seen during training. Thus, its effectiveness is fundamentally bounded by the degree of distribution discrepancy between the training data and the test queries. With this lens, we dissect CoT reasoning via three dimensions: task, length, and format. To investigate each dimension, we design DataAlchemy, an isolated and controlled environment to train LLMs from scratch and systematically probe them under various distribution conditions. Our results reveal that CoT reasoning is a brittle mirage that vanishes when it is pushed beyond training distributions. This work offers a deeper understanding of why and when CoT reasoning fails, emphasizing the ongoing challenge of achieving genuine and generalizable reasoning.

Being prompted to engage in reasoning has emerged as a core technique for using large language models (LLMs), deploying additional inference-time compute to improve task performance. However, as LLMs increase in both size and adoption, inference costs are correspondingly becoming increasingly burdensome. How, then, might we optimize reasoning's cost-performance tradeoff? This work introduces a novel approach based on computational models of metareasoning used in cognitive science, training LLMs to selectively use intermediate reasoning steps only when necessary. We first develop a reward function that incorporates the Value of Computation by penalizing unnecessary reasoning, then use this reward function with Expert Iteration to train the LLM. Compared to few-shot chain-of-thought prompting and STaR, our method significantly reduces inference costs (20-37\% fewer tokens generated across three models) while maintaining task performance across diverse datasets.

This study offers a novel approach for benchmarking complex cognitive behavior in artificial systems. Almost universally, Large Language Models (LLMs) perform best on tasks which may be included in their training data and can be accomplished solely using natural language, limiting our understanding of their emergent sophisticated cognitive capacities. In this work, we created dozens of novel items of a classic mental imagery task from cognitive psychology. A task which, traditionally, cognitive psychologists have argued is solvable exclusively via visual mental imagery (i.e., language alone would be insufficient). LLMs are perfect for testing this hypothesis. First, we tested several state-of-the-art LLMs by giving text-only models written instructions and asking them to report the resulting object after performing the transformations in the aforementioned task. Then, we created a baseline by testing 100 human subjects in exactly the same task. We found that the best LLMs performed significantly above average human performance. Finally, we tested reasoning models set to different levels of reasoning and found the strongest performance when models allocate greater amounts of reasoning tokens. These results provide evidence that the best LLMs may have the capability to complete imagery-dependent tasks despite the non-pictorial nature of their architectures. Our study not only demonstrates an emergent cognitive capacity in LLMs while performing a novel task, but it also provides the field with a new task that leaves lots of room for improvement in otherwise already highly capable models. Finally, our findings reignite the debate over the formats of representation of visual imagery in humans, suggesting that propositional reasoning (or at least non-imagistic reasoning) may be sufficient to complete tasks that were long-thought to be imagery-dependent.

Humans have a powerful and mysterious capacity to reason. By working through a series of purely mental steps, we can make inferences we would not be capable of making directly -- despite the fact that we get no additional data from the world. Similarly, when large language models generate a series of intermediate steps (a chain of thought) before answering a question, they often produce better answers than they otherwise would. We investigate why and how chain-of-thought reasoning is useful in language models, testing the hypothesis that reasoning is effective when training data consists of local clusters of variables that influence each other strongly. These training conditions enable the chaining of accurate local inferences in order to estimate relationships between variables that were not seen together in training. We prove that there will exist a "reasoning gap", where reasoning through intermediate variables improves inference, for the simple case of an autoregressive density estimator trained on local samples from a chain-structured probabilistic model. We then test our hypothesis empirically in more complex models, training an autoregressive language model on samples from Bayes nets but only including a subset of variables in each sample. We test language models' ability to match conditional probabilities with and without intermediate reasoning steps, finding that intermediate steps are only helpful when the training data is locally structured with respect to dependencies between variables and that the combination of locally-structured observations and reasoning is much more data-efficient than training on all variables. Our results illustrate how the effectiveness of reasoning step by step is rooted in the local statistical structure of the training data.

LLMs trained for logical reasoning excel at step-by-step deduction to reach verifiable answers. However, this paradigm is ill-suited for navigating social situations, which induce an interpretive process of analyzing ambiguous cues that rarely yield a definitive outcome. To bridge this gap, we introduce Cognitive Reasoning, a paradigm modeled on human social cognition. It formulates the interpretive process into a structured cognitive flow of interconnected cognitive units (e.g., observation or attribution), which combine adaptively to enable effective social thinking and responses. We then propose CogFlow, a complete framework that instills this capability in LLMs. CogFlow first curates a dataset of cognitive flows by simulating the associative and progressive nature of human thought via tree-structured planning. After instilling the basic cognitive reasoning capability via supervised fine-tuning, CogFlow adopts reinforcement learning to enable the model to improve itself via trial and error, guided by a multi-objective reward that optimizes both cognitive flow and response quality. Extensive experiments show that CogFlow effectively enhances the social cognitive capabilities of LLMs, and even humans, leading to more effective social decision-making.

While reasoning in LLMs plays a natural role in math, code generation, and multi-hop factual questions, its effect on simple, single-hop factual questions remains unclear. Such questions do not require step-by-step logical decomposition, making the utility of reasoning highly counterintuitive. Nevertheless, we find that enabling reasoning substantially expands the capability boundary of the model's parametric knowledge recall, unlocking correct answers that are otherwise effectively unreachable. Why does reasoning aid parametric knowledge recall when there are no complex reasoning steps to be done? To answer this, we design a series of hypothesis-driven controlled experiments, and identify two key driving mechanisms: (1) a computational buffer effect, where the model uses the generated reasoning tokens to perform latent computation independent of their semantic content; and (2) factual priming, where generating topically related facts acts as a semantic bridge that facilitates correct answer retrieval. Importantly, this latter generative self-retrieval mechanism carries inherent risks: we demonstrate that hallucinating intermediate facts during reasoning increases the likelihood of hallucinations in the final answer. Finally, we show that our insights can be harnessed to directly improve model accuracy by prioritizing reasoning trajectories that contain hallucination-free factual statements.

Although Large Language Models (LLMs) achieve remarkable performance across various tasks, they often struggle with complex reasoning tasks, such as answering mathematical questions. Recent efforts to address this issue have primarily focused on leveraging mathematical datasets through supervised fine-tuning or self-improvement techniques. However, these methods often depend on high-quality datasets that are difficult to prepare, or they require substantial computational resources for fine-tuning. Inspired by findings that LLMs know how to produce the right answer but struggle to select the correct reasoning path, we propose a purely inference-based searching method -- MindStar (M*). This method formulates reasoning tasks as searching problems and proposes two search ideas to identify the optimal reasoning paths. We evaluate the M* framework on both the GSM8K and MATH datasets, comparing its performance with existing open and closed-source LLMs. Our results demonstrate that M* significantly enhances the reasoning abilities of open-source models, such as Llama-2-13B and Mistral-7B, and achieves comparable performance to GPT-3.5 and Grok-1, but with substantially reduced model size and computational costs.

Abstract reasoning is a key ability for an intelligent system. Large language models achieve above-chance performance on abstract reasoning tasks, but exhibit many imperfections. However, human abstract reasoning is also imperfect, and depends on our knowledge and beliefs about the content of the reasoning problem. For example, humans reason much more reliably about logical rules that are grounded in everyday situations than arbitrary rules about abstract attributes. The training experiences of language models similarly endow them with prior expectations that reflect human knowledge and beliefs. We therefore hypothesized that language models would show human-like content effects on abstract reasoning problems. We explored this hypothesis across three logical reasoning tasks: natural language inference, judging the logical validity of syllogisms, and the Wason selection task (Wason, 1968). We find that state of the art large language models (with 7 or 70 billion parameters; Hoffman et al., 2022) reflect many of the same patterns observed in humans across these tasks -- like humans, models reason more effectively about believable situations than unrealistic or abstract ones. Our findings have implications for understanding both these cognitive effects, and the factors that contribute to language model performance.

Exploiting large language models (LLMs) to tackle deductive reasoning has garnered growing attention. It still remains highly challenging to achieve satisfactory results in complex deductive problems, characterized by plenty of premises (i.e., facts or rules) entailing intricate relationships among entities and requiring multi-hop reasoning. One intuitive solution is to decompose the original task into smaller sub-tasks, and then chain the multiple casual reasoning steps together in a forward (e.g., Selection-Inference) or backward (e.g., LAMBADA) direction. However, these techniques inevitably necessitate a large number of overall stages, leading to computationally expensive operations and a higher possibility of making misleading steps. In addition to stage-by-stage decomposition, we draw inspiration from another aspect of human problem-solving. Humans tend to distill the most relevant information and organize their thoughts systematically (e.g., creating mind maps), which assists them in answering questions or drawing conclusions precisely and quickly. In light of this, we propose a novel reasoning approach named Concise and Organized Perception (COP). COP carefully analyzes the given statements to efficiently identify the most pertinent information while eliminating redundancy. It then prompts the LLMs in a more organized form that adapts to the model's inference process. By perceiving concise and organized proofs, the deductive reasoning abilities of LLMs can be better elicited, and the risk of acquiring errors caused by excessive reasoning stages is mitigated. Furthermore, our approach can be combined with the aforementioned ones to further boost their performance. Extensive experimental results on three popular deductive benchmarks (i.e., ProofWriter, PrOntoQA and PrOntoQA-OOD) show that COP significantly outperforms previous state-of-the-art methods.

Reasoning models have demonstrated remarkable progress in solving complex and logic-intensive tasks by generating extended Chain-of-Thoughts (CoTs) prior to arriving at a final answer. Yet, the emergence of this "slow-thinking" paradigm, with numerous tokens generated in sequence, inevitably introduces substantial computational overhead. To this end, it highlights an urgent need for effective acceleration. This survey aims to provide a comprehensive overview of recent advances in efficient reasoning. It categorizes existing works into three key directions: (1) shorter - compressing lengthy CoTs into concise yet effective reasoning chains; (2) smaller - developing compact language models with strong reasoning capabilities through techniques such as knowledge distillation, other model compression techniques, and reinforcement learning; and (3) faster - designing efficient decoding strategies to accelerate inference. A curated collection of papers discussed in this survey is available in our GitHub repository.

Test-time scaling has emerged as an effective way to improve language models on challenging reasoning tasks. However, most existing methods treat each problem in isolation and do not systematically reuse knowledge from prior reasoning trajectories. In particular, they underutilize procedural knowledge: how to reframe a problem, choose an approach, and verify or backtrack when needed. We introduce Reasoning Memory, a retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) framework for reasoning models that explicitly retrieves and reuses procedural knowledge at scale. Starting from existing corpora of step-by-step reasoning trajectories, we decompose each trajectory into self-contained subquestion-subroutine pairs, yielding a datastore of 32 million compact procedural knowledge entries. At inference time, a lightweight in-thought prompt lets the model verbalize the core subquestion, retrieve relevant subroutines within its reasoning trace, and reason under diverse retrieved subroutines as implicit procedural priors. Across six math, science, and coding benchmarks, Reasoning Memory consistently outperforms RAG with document, trajectory, and template knowledge, as well as a compute-matched test-time scaling baseline. With a higher inference budget, it improves over no retrieval by up to 19.2% and over the strongest compute-matched baseline by 7.9% across task types. Ablation studies show that these gains come from two key factors: the broad procedural coverage of the source trajectories and our decomposition and retrieval design, which together enable effective extraction and reuse of procedural knowledge.

While numerous works have assessed the generative performance of language models (LMs) on tasks requiring Theory of Mind reasoning, research into the models' internal representation of mental states remains limited. Recent work has used probing to demonstrate that LMs can represent beliefs of themselves and others. However, these claims are accompanied by limited evaluation, making it difficult to assess how mental state representations are affected by model design and training choices. We report an extensive benchmark with various LM types with different model sizes, fine-tuning approaches, and prompt designs to study the robustness of mental state representations and memorisation issues within the probes. Our results show that the quality of models' internal representations of the beliefs of others increases with model size and, more crucially, with fine-tuning. We are the first to study how prompt variations impact probing performance on theory of mind tasks. We demonstrate that models' representations are sensitive to prompt variations, even when such variations should be beneficial. Finally, we complement previous activation editing experiments on Theory of Mind tasks and show that it is possible to improve models' reasoning performance by steering their activations without the need to train any probe.

Reasoning is a distinctive human capacity, enabling us to address complex problems by breaking them down into a series of manageable cognitive steps. Yet, complex logical reasoning is still cumbersome for language models. Based on the dual process theory in cognitive science, we are the first to unravel the cognitive reasoning abilities of language models. Our framework employs an iterative methodology to construct a Cognitive Tree (CogTree). The root node of this tree represents the initial query, while the leaf nodes consist of straightforward questions that can be answered directly. This construction involves two main components: the implicit extraction module (referred to as the intuitive system) and the explicit reasoning module (referred to as the reflective system). The intuitive system rapidly generates multiple responses by utilizing in-context examples, while the reflective system scores these responses using comparative learning. The scores guide the intuitive system in its subsequent generation step. Our experimental results on two popular and challenging reasoning tasks indicate that it is possible to achieve a performance level comparable to that of GPT-3.5 (with 175B parameters), using a significantly smaller language model that contains fewer parameters (<=7B) than 5% of GPT-3.5.

Chain-of-Thought(CoT) prompting and its variants explore equipping large language models (LLMs) with high-level reasoning abilities by emulating human-like linear cognition and logic. However, the human mind is complicated and mixed with both linear and nonlinear thinking. In this work, we propose Inferential Exclusion Prompting (IEP), a novel prompting that combines the principles of elimination and inference in order to guide LLMs to think non-linearly. IEP guides LLMs to plan and then utilize Natural Language Inference (NLI) to deduce each possible solution's entailment relation with context, commonsense, or facts, therefore yielding a broader perspective by thinking back for inferring. This forward planning and backward eliminating process allows IEP to better simulate the complex human thinking processes compared to other CoT-based methods, which only reflect linear cognitive processes. We conducted a series of empirical studies and have corroborated that IEP consistently outperforms CoT across various tasks. Additionally, we observe that integrating IEP and CoT further improves the LLMs' performance on certain tasks, highlighting the necessity of equipping LLMs with mixed logic processes. Moreover, to better evaluate comprehensive features inherent in human logic, we introduce Mental-Ability Reasoning Benchmark (MARB). The benchmark comprises six novel subtasks with a total of 9,115 questions, among which 1,685 are developed with hand-crafted rationale references. We believe both IEP and MARB can serve as a promising direction for unveiling LLMs' logic and verbal reasoning abilities and drive further advancements. MARB will be available at ~anonymity link soon.

Vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings where reliable uncertainty quantification (UQ) is as important as predictive accuracy. Extended reasoning via chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting or reasoning-trained models has become ubiquitous in modern VLM pipelines, yet its effect on UQ reliability remains poorly understood. We show that reasoning consistently degrades the quality of most uncertainty estimates, even when it improves task accuracy. We identify implicit answer conditioning as the primary mechanism: as reasoning traces converge on a conclusion before the final answer is generated, token probabilities increasingly reflect consistency with the model's own reasoning trace rather than uncertainty about correctness. In effect, the model becomes overconfident in its answer. In contrast, agreement-based consistency remains robust and often improves under reasoning, making it a practical choice for uncertainty estimation in reasoning-enabled VLMs.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) demonstrate remarkable capabilities on complex tasks, exhibiting emergent, human-like thinking patterns. Despite their advances, we identify a fundamental limitation: current LRMs lack a dedicated meta-level cognitive system-an essential faculty in human cognition that enables "thinking about thinking". This absence leaves their emergent abilities uncontrollable (non-adaptive reasoning), unreliable (intermediate error), and inflexible (lack of a clear methodology). To address this gap, we introduce Meta-R1, a systematic and generic framework that endows LRMs with explicit metacognitive capabilities. Drawing on principles from cognitive science, Meta-R1 decomposes the reasoning process into distinct object-level and meta-level components, orchestrating proactive planning, online regulation, and adaptive early stopping within a cascaded framework. Experiments on three challenging benchmarks and against eight competitive baselines demonstrate that Meta-R1 is: (I) high-performing, surpassing state-of-the-art methods by up to 27.3%; (II) token-efficient, reducing token consumption to 15.7% ~ 32.7% and improving efficiency by up to 14.8% when compared to its vanilla counterparts; and (III) transferable, maintaining robust performance across datasets and model backbones.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting has become a widely used strategy for working with large language and multimodal models. While CoT has been shown to improve performance across many tasks, determining the settings in which it is effective remains an ongoing effort. In particular, it is still an open question in what settings CoT systematically reduces model performance. In this paper, we seek to identify the characteristics of tasks where CoT reduces performance by drawing inspiration from cognitive psychology, looking at cases where (i) verbal thinking or deliberation hurts performance in humans, and (ii) the constraints governing human performance generalize to language models. Three such cases are implicit statistical learning, visual recognition, and classifying with patterns containing exceptions. In extensive experiments across all three settings, we find that a diverse collection of state-of-the-art models exhibit significant drop-offs in performance (e.g., up to 36.3% absolute accuracy for OpenAI o1-preview compared to GPT-4o) when using inference-time reasoning compared to zero-shot counterparts. We also identify three tasks that satisfy condition (i) but not (ii), and find that while verbal thinking reduces human performance in these tasks, CoT retains or increases model performance. Overall, our results show that while there is not an exact parallel between the cognitive processes of models and those of humans, considering cases where thinking has negative consequences for human performance can help us identify settings where it negatively impacts models. By connecting the literature on human deliberation with evaluations of CoT, we offer a new tool that can be used in understanding the impact of prompt choices and inference-time reasoning.

With the widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs), hallucinations, which are non-factual fabrications in model outputs, have become serious concerns. Reasoning capabilities have received attention as a self-verification process to improve output reliability. However, the effect of reasoning within a closed system where LLMs cannot rely on external tools or knowledge has yet to be clarified. We therefore conduct experiments under strict constraints (recommending peer-reviewed journal articles in computer science) to examine the effect of reasoning across multiple models (GPT-5.2 and Gemini 3 Flash). Our results reveal a problematic trade-off between constraint compliance and factual accuracy. Non-reasoning models exhibit high constraint violation rates (66-75%) but maintain factual accuracy, while reasoning models reduce violations (13-26%) but systematically distort known facts to satisfy constraints and increase complete fabrication. This trade-off pattern is consistent across both models despite different architectures, indicating a fundamental limitation of reasoning. Furthermore, reasoning does not uniformly improve output authenticity: effects diverge by model, reflecting different allocations of the compliance-truthfulness trade-off. These findings challenge the assumption that reasoning universally improves reliability: reasoning models trade honest constraint violations for detection-resistant distortions.

Reasoning and inference are central to human and artificial intelligence. Modeling inference in human language is very challenging. With the availability of large annotated data (Bowman et al., 2015), it has recently become feasible to train neural network based inference models, which have shown to be very effective. In this paper, we present a new state-of-the-art result, achieving the accuracy of 88.6% on the Stanford Natural Language Inference Dataset. Unlike the previous top models that use very complicated network architectures, we first demonstrate that carefully designing sequential inference models based on chain LSTMs can outperform all previous models. Based on this, we further show that by explicitly considering recursive architectures in both local inference modeling and inference composition, we achieve additional improvement. Particularly, incorporating syntactic parsing information contributes to our best result---it further improves the performance even when added to the already very strong model.

Recent advancements in large reasoning models (LRMs) have significantly enhanced language models' capabilities in complex problem-solving by emulating human-like deliberative thinking. However, these models often exhibit overthinking (i.e., the generation of unnecessarily verbose and redundant content), which hinders efficiency and inflates inference cost. In this work, we explore the representational and behavioral origins of this inefficiency, revealing that LRMs inherently possess the capacity for more concise reasoning. Empirical analyses show that correct reasoning paths vary significantly in length, and the shortest correct responses often suffice, indicating untapped efficiency potential. Exploiting these findings, we propose two lightweight methods to enhance LRM efficiency. First, we introduce Efficiency Steering, a training-free activation steering technique that modulates reasoning behavior via a single direction in the model's representation space. Second, we develop Self-Rewarded Efficiency RL, a reinforcement learning framework that dynamically balances task accuracy and brevity by rewarding concise correct solutions. Extensive experiments on seven LRM backbones across multiple mathematical reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that our methods significantly reduce reasoning length while preserving or improving task performance. Our results highlight that reasoning efficiency can be improved by leveraging and guiding the intrinsic capabilities of existing models in a self-guided manner.

Large language models have been shown to struggle with limited context memory and multi-step reasoning. We propose a simple method for solving both of these problems by allowing the model to take Self-Notes. Unlike recent scratchpad approaches, the model can deviate from the input context at any time to explicitly think. This allows the model to recall information and perform reasoning on the fly as it reads the context, thus extending its memory and enabling multi-step reasoning. Our experiments on multiple tasks demonstrate that our method can successfully generalize to longer and more complicated instances from their training setup by taking Self-Notes at inference time.

Large language models (LLMs) have a substantial capacity for high-level analogical reasoning: reproducing patterns in linear text that occur in their training data (zero-shot evaluation) or in the provided context (few-shot in-context learning). However, recent studies show that even the more advanced LLMs fail in scenarios that require reasoning over multiple objects or facts and making sequences of logical deductions. We propose a two-stage probabilistic inference paradigm, ThinkSum, which reasons over sets of objects or facts in a structured manner. In the first stage (Think - retrieval of associations), a LLM is queried in parallel over a set of phrases extracted from the prompt or an auxiliary model call. In the second stage (Sum - probabilistic inference or reasoning), the results of these queries are aggregated to make the final prediction. We demonstrate the possibilities and advantages of ThinkSum on the BIG-bench suite of LLM evaluation tasks, achieving improvements over the state of the art using GPT-family models on thirteen difficult tasks, often with far smaller model variants. We also compare and contrast ThinkSum with other proposed modifications to direct prompting of LLMs, such as variants of chain-of-thought prompting. Our results suggest that because the probabilistic inference in ThinkSum is performed outside of calls to the LLM, ThinkSum is less sensitive to prompt design, yields more interpretable predictions, and can be flexibly combined with latent variable models to extract structured knowledge from LLMs. Overall, our proposed paradigm represents a promising approach for enhancing the reasoning capabilities of LLMs.

Chain of Thought (CoT) is significant in improving the reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs). However, the correlation between the effectiveness of CoT and the length of reasoning steps in prompts remains largely unknown. To shed light on this, we have conducted several empirical experiments to explore the relations. Specifically, we design experiments that expand and compress the rationale reasoning steps within CoT demonstrations, while keeping all other factors constant. We have the following key findings. First, the results indicate that lengthening the reasoning steps in prompts, even without adding new information into the prompt, considerably enhances LLMs' reasoning abilities across multiple datasets. Alternatively, shortening the reasoning steps, even while preserving the key information, significantly diminishes the reasoning abilities of models. This finding highlights the importance of the number of steps in CoT prompts and provides practical guidance to make better use of LLMs' potential in complex problem-solving scenarios. Second, we also investigated the relationship between the performance of CoT and the rationales used in demonstrations. Surprisingly, the result shows that even incorrect rationales can yield favorable outcomes if they maintain the requisite length of inference. Third, we observed that the advantages of increasing reasoning steps are task-dependent: simpler tasks require fewer steps, whereas complex tasks gain significantly from longer inference sequences.

There is intense interest in investigating how inference time compute (ITC) (e.g. repeated sampling, refinements, etc) can improve large language model (LLM) capabilities. At the same time, recent breakthroughs in reasoning models, such as Deepseek-R1, unlock the opportunity for reinforcement learning to improve LLM reasoning skills. An in-depth understanding of how ITC interacts with reasoning across different models could provide important guidance on how to further advance the LLM frontier. This work conducts a comprehensive analysis of inference-time scaling methods for both reasoning and non-reasoning models on challenging reasoning tasks. Specifically, we focus our research on verifier-free inference time-scaling methods due to its generalizability without needing a reward model. We construct the Pareto frontier of quality and efficiency. We find that non-reasoning models, even with an extremely high inference budget, still fall substantially behind reasoning models. For reasoning models, majority voting proves to be a robust inference strategy, generally competitive or outperforming other more sophisticated ITC methods like best-of-N and sequential revisions, while the additional inference compute offers minimal improvements. We further perform in-depth analyses of the association of key response features (length and linguistic markers) with response quality, with which we can improve the existing ITC methods. We find that correct responses from reasoning models are typically shorter and have fewer hedging and thinking markers (but more discourse markers) than the incorrect responses.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting enhances reasoning in large language models (LLMs) but often leads to verbose and redundant outputs, thus increasing inference cost. We hypothesize that many reasoning steps are unnecessary for producing correct answers. To investigate this, we start with a systematic study to examine what is the minimum reasoning required for a model to reach a stable decision. We find that on math reasoning tasks like math, models typically converge to their final answers after 60\% of the reasoning steps, suggesting substantial redundancy in the remaining content. Based on these insights, we propose three inference-time strategies to improve efficiency: (1) early stopping via answer consistency, (2) boosting the probability of generating end-of-reasoning signals, and (3) a supervised method that learns when to stop based on internal activations. Experiments across five benchmarks and five open-weights LLMs show that our methods significantly reduce token usage with little or no accuracy drop. In particular, on NaturalQuestions, Answer Consistency reduces tokens by over 40\% while further improving accuracy. Our work underscores the importance of cost-effective reasoning methods that operate at inference time, offering practical benefits for real-world applications.

LLMs often exhibit Aha moments during reasoning, such as apparent self-correction following tokens like "Wait," yet their underlying mechanisms remain unclear. We introduce an information-theoretic framework that decomposes reasoning into procedural information and epistemic verbalization - the explicit externalization of uncertainty that supports downstream control actions. We show that purely procedural reasoning can become informationally stagnant, whereas epistemic verbalization enables continued information acquisition and is critical for achieving information sufficiency. Empirical results demonstrate that strong reasoning performance is driven by uncertainty externalization rather than specific surface tokens. Our framework unifies prior findings on Aha moments and post-training experiments, and offers insights for future reasoning model design.

Current multimodal benchmarks often conflate reasoning with domain-specific knowledge, making it difficult to isolate and evaluate general reasoning abilities in non-expert settings. To address this, we introduce VisualPuzzles, a benchmark that targets visual reasoning while deliberately minimizing reliance on specialized knowledge. VisualPuzzles consists of diverse questions spanning five categories: algorithmic, analogical, deductive, inductive, and spatial reasoning. One major source of our questions is manually translated logical reasoning questions from the Chinese Civil Service Examination. Experiments show that VisualPuzzles requires significantly less intensive domain-specific knowledge and more complex reasoning compared to benchmarks like MMMU, enabling us to better evaluate genuine multimodal reasoning. Evaluations show that state-of-the-art multimodal large language models consistently lag behind human performance on VisualPuzzles, and that strong performance on knowledge-intensive benchmarks does not necessarily translate to success on reasoning-focused, knowledge-light tasks. Additionally, reasoning enhancements such as scaling up inference compute (with "thinking" modes) yield inconsistent gains across models and task types, and we observe no clear correlation between model size and performance. We also found that models exhibit different reasoning and answering patterns on VisualPuzzles compared to benchmarks with heavier emphasis on knowledge. VisualPuzzles offers a clearer lens through which to evaluate reasoning capabilities beyond factual recall and domain knowledge.

Language has long been conceived as an essential tool for human reasoning. The breakthrough of Large Language Models (LLMs) has sparked significant research interest in leveraging these models to tackle complex reasoning tasks. Researchers have moved beyond simple autoregressive token generation by introducing the concept of "thought" -- a sequence of tokens representing intermediate steps in the reasoning process. This innovative paradigm enables LLMs' to mimic complex human reasoning processes, such as tree search and reflective thinking. Recently, an emerging trend of learning to reason has applied reinforcement learning (RL) to train LLMs to master reasoning processes. This approach enables the automatic generation of high-quality reasoning trajectories through trial-and-error search algorithms, significantly expanding LLMs' reasoning capacity by providing substantially more training data. Furthermore, recent studies demonstrate that encouraging LLMs to "think" with more tokens during test-time inference can further significantly boost reasoning accuracy. Therefore, the train-time and test-time scaling combined to show a new research frontier -- a path toward Large Reasoning Model. The introduction of OpenAI's o1 series marks a significant milestone in this research direction. In this survey, we present a comprehensive review of recent progress in LLM reasoning. We begin by introducing the foundational background of LLMs and then explore the key technical components driving the development of large reasoning models, with a focus on automated data construction, learning-to-reason techniques, and test-time scaling. We also analyze popular open-source projects at building large reasoning models, and conclude with open challenges and future research directions.

Gaze-referential inference--the ability to infer what others are looking at--is a critical component of a theory of mind that underpins natural human-AI interaction. In a controlled study, we evaluated this skill across 111 Vision Language Models (VLMs) using photos taken with manipulated difficulty and variability, comparing performance with that of human participants (N = 65), and analyzed behaviors using mixed-effects models. We found that 94 of the 111 VLMs failed to do better than random guessing, while humans achieved near-ceiling accuracy. VLMs even respond with each choice almost equally frequently. Are they randomly guessing? Although most VLMs struggle, when we zoom in on five of the top-tier VLMs with above-chance performance, we find that their performance declined with increasing task difficulty but varied only slightly across different prompts and scene objects. These behavioral features cannot be explained by considering them as random guessers. Instead, they likely use a combination of heuristics and guessing such that their performance is subject to the task difficulty but robust to perceptual variations. This suggests that VLMs, lacking gaze inference capability, have yet to become technologies that can naturally interact with humans, but the potential remains.

Recent Large Reasoning Models (LRMs), such as DeepSeek-R1 and OpenAI o1, have demonstrated strong performance gains by scaling up the length of Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning during inference. However, a growing concern lies in their tendency to produce excessively long reasoning traces, which are often filled with redundant content (e.g., repeated definitions), over-analysis of simple problems, and superficial exploration of multiple reasoning paths for harder tasks. This inefficiency introduces significant challenges for training, inference, and real-world deployment (e.g., in agent-based systems), where token economy is critical. In this survey, we provide a comprehensive overview of recent efforts aimed at improving reasoning efficiency in LRMs, with a particular focus on the unique challenges that arise in this new paradigm. We identify common patterns of inefficiency, examine methods proposed across the LRM lifecycle, i.e., from pretraining to inference, and discuss promising future directions for research. To support ongoing development, we also maintain a real-time GitHub repository tracking recent progress in the field. We hope this survey serves as a foundation for further exploration and inspires innovation in this rapidly evolving area.

Why do thinking language models like DeepSeek R1 outperform their base counterparts? Despite consistent performance gains, it remains unclear to what extent thinking models learn entirely new reasoning capabilities or repurpose pre-existing base model ones. In this work, we propose a hybrid model where we activate reasoning mechanisms in base models at the right time to elicit thinking-model-level reasoning chains, implying that thinking models exploit already existing capabilities. To ground our analysis, we introduce an unsupervised, bottom-up approach for uncovering human-interpretable reasoning behaviors in thinking models. This approach provides an unbiased method to discover reasoning behaviors without imposing manual or LLM-derived assumptions. Across three base and four thinking models, using GSM8K and MATH500, our hybrid model recovers up to 91% of the performance gap to thinking models without any weight updates while steering only 12% of tokens. Concretely, our empirical setup provides a simple, causal way to test the effectiveness of existing reasoning mechanisms in base models by invoking them directly and measuring the resulting task performance. More broadly, these results reframe our understanding of how thinking models are trained: pre-training is when models acquire most of their reasoning mechanisms, and post-training teaches efficient deployment of these mechanisms at the right time, enabling efficient use of their inference-time compute.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently demonstrated impressive capabilities in complex reasoning tasks by leveraging increased test-time computation and exhibiting behaviors reminiscent of human-like self-reflection. While LRMs show a clear capacity for valuable self-reflection, how this ability interacts with other model behaviors remains underexplored. We investigate this connection by analyzing verbalized confidence, how models articulate their certainty, as a lens into the nature of self-reflection in LRMs. We find that supervised fine-tuning on reasoning traces (i.e., distillation) and reinforcement learning can improve verbalized calibration in reasoning-intensive settings in a progressive, laddered fashion. However, our results also indicate that reasoning models may possess a diminished awareness of their own knowledge boundaries, as evidenced by significantly lower "I don't know" response rates on factuality benchmarks. Moreover, we examine the relationship between verbalized confidence and reasoning chains, finding that models tend to express higher confidence when providing shorter or less elaborate reasoning. Our findings highlight how reasoning-oriented training can enhance performance in reasoning-centric tasks while potentially incurring a "reasoning tax," a cost reflected in the model's reduced ability to accurately recognize the limits of its own knowledge in small-scale models. More broadly, our work showcases how this erosion of knowledge boundaries can compromise model faithfulness, as models grow more confident without a commensurate understanding of when they should abstain.

Existing LLM reasoning methods have shown impressive capabilities across various tasks, such as solving math and coding problems. However, applying these methods to scenarios without ground-truth answers or rule-based verification methods - such as tracking the mental states of an agent - remains challenging. Inspired by the sequential Monte Carlo algorithm, we introduce thought-tracing, an inference-time reasoning algorithm designed to trace the mental states of specific agents by generating hypotheses and weighting them based on observations without relying on ground-truth solutions to questions in datasets. Our algorithm is modeled after the Bayesian theory-of-mind framework, using LLMs to approximate probabilistic inference over agents' evolving mental states based on their perceptions and actions. We evaluate thought-tracing on diverse theory-of-mind benchmarks, demonstrating significant performance improvements compared to baseline LLMs. Our experiments also reveal interesting behaviors of the recent reasoning models - e.g., o3 and R1 - on theory-of-mind, highlighting the difference of social reasoning compared to other domains.

Large language models (LLMs) now solve multi-step problems by emitting extended chains of thought. During the process, they often re-derive the same intermediate steps across problems, inflating token usage and latency. This saturation of the context window leaves less capacity for exploration. We study a simple mechanism that converts recurring reasoning fragments into concise, reusable "behaviors" (name + instruction) via the model's own metacognitive analysis of prior traces. These behaviors are stored in a "behavior handbook" which supplies them to the model in-context at inference or distills them into parameters via supervised fine-tuning. This approach achieves improved test-time reasoning across three different settings - 1) Behavior-conditioned inference: Providing the LLM relevant behaviors in-context during reasoning reduces number of reasoning tokens by up to 46% while matching or improving baseline accuracy; 2) Behavior-guided self-improvement: Without any parameter updates, the model improves its own future reasoning by leveraging behaviors from its own past problem solving attempts. This yields up to 10% higher accuracy than a naive critique-and-revise baseline; and 3) Behavior-conditioned SFT: SFT on behavior-conditioned reasoning traces is more effective at converting non-reasoning models into reasoning models as compared to vanilla SFT. Together, these results indicate that turning slow derivations into fast procedural hints enables LLMs to remember how to reason, not just what to conclude.

With the growing accessibility and wide adoption of large language models, concerns about their safety and alignment with human values have become paramount. In this paper, we identify a concerning phenomenon: Reasoning-Induced Misalignment (RIM), in which misalignment emerges when reasoning capabilities strengthened-particularly when specific types of reasoning patterns are introduced during inference or training. Beyond reporting this vulnerability, we provide the first mechanistic account of its origins. Through representation analysis, we discover that specific attention heads facilitate refusal by reducing their attention to CoT tokens, a mechanism that modulates the model's rationalization process during inference. During training, we find significantly higher activation entanglement between reasoning and safety in safety-critical neurons than in control neurons, particularly after fine-tuning with those identified reasoning patterns. This entanglement strongly correlates with catastrophic forgetting, providing a neuron-level explanation for RIM.

When faced with novel situations, people are able to marshal relevant considerations from a wide range of background knowledge and put these to use in inferences and predictions. What permits us to draw in globally relevant information and reason over it coherently? Here, we explore the hypothesis that people use a combination of distributed and symbolic representations to construct bespoke mental models tailored to novel situations. We propose a computational implementation of this idea -- a ``Model Synthesis Architecture'' (MSA) -- using language models to implement global relevance-based retrieval and model synthesis and probabilistic programs to implement bespoke, coherent world models. We evaluate our MSA as a model of human judgments on a novel reasoning dataset. The dataset -- built around a `Model Olympics` domain of sports vignettes -- tests models' capacity for human-like, open-ended reasoning by requiring (i) judgments about novel causal structures described in language; (ii) drawing on large bodies of background knowledge; and (iii) doing both in light of observations that introduce arbitrary novel variables. Our MSA approach captures human judgments better than language model-only baselines, under both direct and chain-of-thought generations from the LM that supports model synthesis. These results suggest that MSAs can be implemented in a way that mirrors people's ability to deliver locally coherent reasoning over globally relevant variables, offering a path to understanding and replicating human reasoning in open-ended domains.

In human cognition theory, human thinking is governed by two systems: the fast and intuitive System 1 and the slower but more deliberative System 2. Recent studies have shown that incorporating System 2 process into Transformers including large language models (LLMs), significantly enhances their reasoning capabilities. Nevertheless, models that purely resemble System 2 thinking require substantially higher computational costs and are much slower to respond. To address this challenge, we present Dualformer, a single Transformer model that seamlessly integrates both the fast and slow reasoning modes. Dualformer is obtained by training on data with randomized reasoning traces, where different parts of the traces are dropped during training. The dropping strategies are specifically tailored according to the trace structure, analogous to analyzing our thinking process and creating shortcuts with patterns. At inference time, our model can be configured to output only the solutions (fast mode) or both the reasoning chain and the final solution (slow mode), or automatically decide which mode to engage (auto mode). In all cases, Dualformer outperforms the corresponding baseline models in both performance and computational efficiency: (1) in slow mode, Dualformer optimally solves unseen 30 x 30 maze navigation tasks 97.6% of the time, surpassing the Searchformer (trained on data with complete reasoning traces) baseline performance of 93.3%, while only using 45.5% fewer reasoning steps; (2) in fast mode, Dualformer completes those tasks with an 80% optimal rate, significantly outperforming the Solution-Only model (trained on solution-only data), which has an optimal rate of only 30%. For math problems, our techniques have also achieved improved performance with LLM fine-tuning, showing its generalization beyond task-specific models.

Probing and enhancing large language models' reasoning capacity remains a crucial open question. Here we re-purpose the reverse dictionary task as a case study to probe LLMs' capacity for conceptual inference. We use in-context learning to guide the models to generate the term for an object concept implied in a linguistic description. Models robustly achieve high accuracy in this task, and their representation space encodes information about object categories and fine-grained features. Further experiments suggest that the conceptual inference ability as probed by the reverse-dictionary task predicts model's general reasoning performance across multiple benchmarks, despite similar syntactic generalization behaviors across models. Explorative analyses suggest that prompting LLMs with descriptionRightarrowword examples may induce generalization beyond surface-level differences in task construals and facilitate models on broader commonsense reasoning problems.

We provide evidence of performative chain-of-thought (CoT) in reasoning models, where a model becomes strongly confident in its final answer, but continues generating tokens without revealing its internal belief. Our analysis compares activation probing, early forced answering, and a CoT monitor across two large models (DeepSeek-R1 671B & GPT-OSS 120B) and find task difficulty-specific differences: The model's final answer is decodable from activations far earlier in CoT than a monitor is able to say, especially for easy recall-based MMLU questions. We contrast this with genuine reasoning in difficult multihop GPQA-Diamond questions. Despite this, inflection points (e.g., backtracking, 'aha' moments) occur almost exclusively in responses where probes show large belief shifts, suggesting these behaviors track genuine uncertainty rather than learned "reasoning theater." Finally, probe-guided early exit reduces tokens by up to 80% on MMLU and 30% on GPQA-Diamond with similar accuracy, positioning attention probing as an efficient tool for detecting performative reasoning and enabling adaptive computation.

The deployment of pre-trained perception models in novel environments often leads to performance degradation due to distributional shifts. Although recent artificial intelligence approaches for metacognition use logical rules to characterize and filter model errors, improving precision often comes at the cost of reduced recall. This paper addresses the hypothesis that leveraging multiple pre-trained models can mitigate this recall reduction. We formulate the challenge of identifying and managing conflicting predictions from various models as a consistency-based abduction problem. The input predictions and the learned error detection rules derived from each model are encoded in a logic program. We then seek an abductive explanation--a subset of model predictions--that maximizes prediction coverage while ensuring the rate of logical inconsistencies (derived from domain constraints) remains below a specified threshold. We propose two algorithms for this knowledge representation task: an exact method based on Integer Programming (IP) and an efficient Heuristic Search (HS). Through extensive experiments on a simulated aerial imagery dataset featuring controlled, complex distributional shifts, we demonstrate that our abduction-based framework outperforms individual models and standard ensemble baselines, achieving, for instance, average relative improvements of approximately 13.6% in F1-score and 16.6% in accuracy across 15 diverse test datasets when compared to the best individual model. Our results validate the use of consistency-based abduction as an effective mechanism to robustly integrate knowledge from multiple imperfect reasoners in challenging, novel scenarios.

Language models can store vast amounts of factual knowledge, but their ability to use this knowledge for logical reasoning remains questionable. This paper explores a language model's ability to manipulate its stored knowledge during inference. We focus on four manipulation types: retrieval (e.g., "What is person A's attribute X"), classification (e.g., "Is A's attribute X even or odd?"), comparison (e.g., "Is A greater than B in attribute X?") and inverse search (e.g., "Which person's attribute X equals T?") We observe that pre-trained language models like GPT2/3/4 excel in knowledge retrieval but struggle with simple classification or comparison tasks unless Chain of Thoughts (CoTs) are employed during both training and inference. They also perform poorly in inverse knowledge search, irrespective of the prompts. Our primary contribution is a synthetic dataset for a controlled experiment that confirms these inherent weaknesses: a language model cannot efficiently manipulate knowledge from pre-training data, even when such knowledge is perfectly stored and fully extractable in the models, and despite adequate instruct fine-tuning.

Recently, Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has delivered success on complex reasoning tasks, which aims at designing a simple prompt like ``Let's think step by step'' or multiple in-context exemplars with well-designed rationales to elicit Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate intermediate reasoning steps. However, the generated rationales often come with mistakes, making unfactual and unfaithful reasoning chains. To mitigate this brittleness, we propose a novel Chain-of-Knowledge (CoK) prompting, where we aim at eliciting LLMs to generate explicit pieces of knowledge evidence in the form of structure triple. This is inspired by our human behaviors, i.e., we can draw a mind map or knowledge map as the reasoning evidence in the brain before answering a complex question. Benefiting from CoK, we additionally introduce a F^2-Verification method to estimate the reliability of the reasoning chains in terms of factuality and faithfulness. For the unreliable response, the wrong evidence can be indicated to prompt the LLM to rethink. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method can further improve the performance of commonsense, factual, symbolic, and arithmetic reasoning tasks.

The long chain-of-thought (LongCoT) capability is central to the recent breakthroughs achieved by large language models in complex reasoning tasks. However, the accompanying issue of ''underthinking'', where models exhibit shallow reasoning by frequently switching thoughts without sufficient exploration, limits both performance and token efficiency. To address this problem, we propose a simple yet effective reasoning strategy: the SmartSwitch inference framework. This framework can be easily integrated into any large language model as a plug-and-play solution, continuously monitoring the model's reasoning process to detect underthinking and guide it toward deeper exploration of promising but overlooked thoughts. Specifically, the perception module identifies points where thoughts switch and evaluates the potential of the preceding thought using an off-the-shelf process reward model (PRM). If a high-potential thought is found to be prematurely abandoned, the intervention module interrupts the ongoing inference, backtracks to the point before the switch, and inserts a "deepening prompt" to encourage further exploration along that promising path. Extensive experiments on challenging mathematical reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that our method significantly enhances the performance of various large language models of different sizes.

We propose a new dataset for evaluating question answering models with respect to their capacity to reason about beliefs. Our tasks are inspired by theory-of-mind experiments that examine whether children are able to reason about the beliefs of others, in particular when those beliefs differ from reality. We evaluate a number of recent neural models with memory augmentation. We find that all fail on our tasks, which require keeping track of inconsistent states of the world; moreover, the models' accuracy decreases notably when random sentences are introduced to the tasks at test.

We consider the question: when a large language reasoning model makes a choice, did it think first and then decide to, or decide first and then think? In this paper, we present evidence that detectable, early-encoded decisions shape chain-of-thought in reasoning models. Specifically, we show that a simple linear probe successfully decodes tool-calling decisions from pre-generation activations with very high confidence, and in some cases, even before a single reasoning token is produced. Activation steering supports this causally: perturbing the decision direction leads to inflated deliberation, and flips behavior in many examples (between 7 - 79% depending on model and benchmark). We also show through behavioral analysis that, when steering changes the decision, the chain-of-thought process often rationalizes the flip rather than resisting it. Together, these results suggest that reasoning models can encode action choices before they begin to deliberate in text.

We examine the reasoning and planning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) in solving complex tasks. Recent advances in inference-time techniques demonstrate the potential to enhance LLM reasoning without additional training by exploring intermediate steps during inference. Notably, OpenAI's o1 model shows promising performance through its novel use of multi-step reasoning and verification. Here, we explore how scaling inference-time techniques can improve reasoning and planning, focusing on understanding the tradeoff between computational cost and performance. To this end, we construct a comprehensive benchmark, known as Sys2Bench, and perform extensive experiments evaluating existing inference-time techniques on eleven diverse tasks across five categories, including arithmetic reasoning, logical reasoning, common sense reasoning, algorithmic reasoning, and planning. Our findings indicate that simply scaling inference-time computation has limitations, as no single inference-time technique consistently performs well across all reasoning and planning tasks.

Recent work has shown that language models (LMs) have strong multi-step (i.e., procedural) reasoning capabilities. However, it is unclear whether LMs perform these tasks by cheating with answers memorized from pretraining corpus, or, via a multi-step reasoning mechanism. In this paper, we try to answer this question by exploring a mechanistic interpretation of LMs for multi-step reasoning tasks. Concretely, we hypothesize that the LM implicitly embeds a reasoning tree resembling the correct reasoning process within it. We test this hypothesis by introducing a new probing approach (called MechanisticProbe) that recovers the reasoning tree from the model's attention patterns. We use our probe to analyze two LMs: GPT-2 on a synthetic task (k-th smallest element), and LLaMA on two simple language-based reasoning tasks (ProofWriter & AI2 Reasoning Challenge). We show that MechanisticProbe is able to detect the information of the reasoning tree from the model's attentions for most examples, suggesting that the LM indeed is going through a process of multi-step reasoning within its architecture in many cases.

Reasoning-enhanced large language models (RLLMs), whether explicitly trained for reasoning or prompted via chain-of-thought (CoT), have achieved state-of-the-art performance on many complex reasoning tasks. However, we uncover a surprising and previously overlooked phenomenon: explicit CoT reasoning can significantly degrade instruction-following accuracy. Evaluating 15 models on two benchmarks: IFEval (with simple, rule-verifiable constraints) and ComplexBench (with complex, compositional constraints), we consistently observe performance drops when CoT prompting is applied. Through large-scale case studies and an attention-based analysis, we identify common patterns where reasoning either helps (e.g., with formatting or lexical precision) or hurts (e.g., by neglecting simple constraints or introducing unnecessary content). We propose a metric, constraint attention, to quantify model focus during generation and show that CoT reasoning often diverts attention away from instruction-relevant tokens. To mitigate these effects, we introduce and evaluate four strategies: in-context learning, self-reflection, self-selective reasoning, and classifier-selective reasoning. Our results demonstrate that selective reasoning strategies, particularly classifier-selective reasoning, can substantially recover lost performance. To our knowledge, this is the first work to systematically expose reasoning-induced failures in instruction-following and offer practical mitigation strategies.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) often exhibit structural fragility in complex reasoning tasks, failing to produce correct answers even after successfully deriving valid intermediate steps. Through systematic analysis, we observe that these failures frequently stem not from a lack of reasoning capacity, but from a deficiency in self-regulatory control, where valid logic is destabilized by uncontrolled exploration or the failure to recognize logical sufficiency. Motivated by this observation, we propose Metacognitive Behavioral Tuning (MBT), a post-training framework that explicitly injects metacognitive behaviors into the model's thought process. MBT implements this via two complementary formulations: (1) MBT-S, which synthesizes rigorous reasoning traces from scratch, and (2) MBT-R, which rewrites the student's initial traces to stabilize intrinsic exploration patterns. Experiments across multi-hop QA benchmarks demonstrate that MBT consistently outperforms baselines, achieving notable gains on challenging benchmarks. By effectively eliminating reasoning collapse, MBT achieves higher accuracy with significantly reduced token consumption, demonstrating that internalizing metacognitive strategies leads to more stable and robust reasoning.

Multimodal large-scale models have significantly advanced the development of web agents, enabling perception and interaction with digital environments akin to human cognition. In this paper, we argue that web agents must first acquire sufficient knowledge to effectively engage in cognitive reasoning. Therefore, we decompose a web agent's capabilities into two essential stages: knowledge content learning and cognitive processes. To formalize this, we propose Web-CogKnowledge Framework, categorizing knowledge as Factual, Conceptual, and Procedural. In this framework, knowledge content learning corresponds to the agent's processes of Memorizing and Understanding, which rely on the first two knowledge types, representing the "what" of learning. Conversely, cognitive processes correspond to Exploring, grounded in Procedural knowledge, defining the "how" of reasoning and action. To facilitate knowledge acquisition, we construct the Web-CogDataset, a structured resource curated from 14 real-world websites, designed to systematically instill core knowledge necessary for web agent. This dataset serves as the agent's conceptual grounding-the "nouns" upon which comprehension is built-as well as the basis for learning how to reason and act. Building on this foundation, we operationalize these processes through a novel knowledge-driven Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning framework, developing and training our proposed agent, the Web-CogReasoner. Extensive experimentation reveals its significant superiority over existing models, especially in generalizing to unseen tasks where structured knowledge is decisive. To enable rigorous evaluation, we introduce the Web-CogBench, a comprehensive evaluation suite designed to assess and compare agent performance across the delineated knowledge domains and cognitive capabilities. Our code and data is open sourced at https://github.com/Gnonymous/Web-CogReasoner

Recent research developing neural network architectures with external memory have often used the benchmark bAbI question and answering dataset which provides a challenging number of tasks requiring reasoning. Here we employed a classic associative inference task from the memory-based reasoning neuroscience literature in order to more carefully probe the reasoning capacity of existing memory-augmented architectures. This task is thought to capture the essence of reasoning -- the appreciation of distant relationships among elements distributed across multiple facts or memories. Surprisingly, we found that current architectures struggle to reason over long distance associations. Similar results were obtained on a more complex task involving finding the shortest path between nodes in a path. We therefore developed MEMO, an architecture endowed with the capacity to reason over longer distances. This was accomplished with the addition of two novel components. First, it introduces a separation between memories (facts) stored in external memory and the items that comprise these facts in external memory. Second, it makes use of an adaptive retrieval mechanism, allowing a variable number of "memory hops" before the answer is produced. MEMO is capable of solving our novel reasoning tasks, as well as match state of the art results in bAbI.

Reasoning models such as OpenAI o3 and DeepSeek-R1 have demonstrated strong performance on reasoning-intensive tasks through extended Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting. While longer reasoning traces can facilitate a more thorough exploration of solution paths for complex problems, researchers have observed that these models often "overthink", leading to inefficient inference. In this paper, we introduce ShorterBetter, a simple yet effective reinforcement learning methed that enables reasoning language models to discover their own optimal CoT lengths without human intervention. By sampling multiple outputs per problem and defining the Sample Optimal Length (SOL) as the shortest correct response among all the outputs, our method dynamically guides the model toward optimal inference lengths. Applied to the DeepSeek-Distill-Qwen-1.5B model, ShorterBetter achieves up to an 80% reduction in output length on both in-domain and out-of-domain reasoning tasks while maintaining accuracy. Our analysis shows that overly long reasoning traces often reflect loss of reasoning direction, and thus suggests that the extended CoT produced by reasoning models is highly compressible.

Recent research shows that Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a compelling level of proficiency in Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks. This ability to impute unobservable mental states to others is vital to human social cognition and may prove equally important in principal-agent relations between individual humans and Artificial Intelligences (AIs). In this paper, we explore how a mechanism studied in developmental psychology known as Violation of Expectation (VoE) can be implemented to reduce errors in LLM prediction about users by leveraging emergent ToM affordances. And we introduce a metacognitive prompting framework to apply VoE in the context of an AI tutor. By storing and retrieving facts derived in cases where LLM expectation about the user was violated, we find that LLMs are able to learn about users in ways that echo theories of human learning. Finally, we discuss latent hazards and augmentative opportunities associated with modeling user psychology and propose ways to mitigate risk along with possible directions for future inquiry.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) typically solve reasoning-intensive tasks by generating long chain-of-thought (CoT) traces, leading to substantial inference overhead. We identify a reproducible inference-time phenomenon, termed Self-Compression: when multiple independent and answerable questions are presented within a single prompt, the model spontaneously produces shorter reasoning traces for each question. This phenomenon arises from multi-question contextual pressure during generation and consistently manifests across models and benchmarks. Building on this observation, we propose ConPress (Learning from Contextual Pressure), a lightweight self-supervised fine-tuning approach. ConPress constructs multi-question prompts to induce self-compression, samples the resulting model outputs, and parses and filters per-question traces to obtain concise yet correct reasoning trajectories. These trajectories are directly used for supervised fine-tuning, internalizing compressed reasoning behavior in single-question settings without external teachers, manual pruning, or reinforcement learning. With only 8k fine-tuning examples, ConPress reduces reasoning token usage by 59% on MATH500 and 33% on AIME25, while maintaining competitive accuracy.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning has enabled large language models (LLMs) to utilize additional computation through intermediate tokens to solve complex tasks. However, we posit that typical reasoning traces contain many redundant tokens, incurring extraneous inference costs. Upon examination of the output distribution of current LLMs, we find evidence on their latent ability to reason more concisely, relative to their default behavior. To elicit this capability, we propose simple fine-tuning methods which leverage self-generated concise reasoning paths obtained by best-of-N sampling and few-shot conditioning, in task-specific settings. Our combined method achieves a 30% reduction in output tokens on average, across five model families on GSM8K and MATH, while maintaining average accuracy. By exploiting the fundamental stochasticity and in-context learning capabilities of LLMs, our self-training approach robustly elicits concise reasoning on a wide range of models, including those with extensive post-training. Code is available at https://github.com/TergelMunkhbat/concise-reasoning

Recent scholarship on reasoning in LLMs has supplied evidence of impressive performance and flexible adaptation to machine generated or human feedback. Nonmonotonic reasoning, crucial to human cognition for navigating the real world, remains a challenging, yet understudied task. In this work, we study nonmonotonic reasoning capabilities of seven state-of-the-art LLMs in one abstract and one commonsense reasoning task featuring generics, such as 'Birds fly', and exceptions, 'Penguins don't fly' (see Fig. 1). While LLMs exhibit reasoning patterns in accordance with human nonmonotonic reasoning abilities, they fail to maintain stable beliefs on truth conditions of generics at the addition of supporting examples ('Owls fly') or unrelated information ('Lions have manes'). Our findings highlight pitfalls in attributing human reasoning behaviours to LLMs, as well as assessing general capabilities, while consistent reasoning remains elusive.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated the ability to tackle increasingly complex tasks through advanced reasoning, long-form content generation, and tool use. Solving these tasks often involves long inference-time computations. In human problem solving, a common strategy to expedite work is collaboration: by dividing the problem into sub-tasks, exploring different strategies concurrently, etc. Recent research has shown that LLMs can also operate in parallel by implementing explicit cooperation frameworks, such as voting mechanisms or the explicit creation of independent sub-tasks that can be executed in parallel. However, each of these frameworks may not be suitable for all types of tasks, which can hinder their applicability. In this work, we propose a different design approach: we run LLM "workers" in parallel , allowing them to synchronize via a concurrently-updated attention cache and prompt these workers to decide how best to collaborate. Our approach allows the instances to come up with their own collaboration strategy for the problem at hand, all the while "seeing" each other's partial progress in the concurrent cache. We implement this approach via Hogwild! Inference: a parallel LLM inference engine where multiple instances of the same LLM run in parallel with the same attention cache, with "instant" access to each other's generated tokens. Hogwild! inference takes advantage of Rotary Position Embeddings (RoPE) to avoid recomputation while improving parallel hardware utilization. We find that modern reasoning-capable LLMs can perform inference with shared Key-Value cache out of the box, without additional fine-tuning.

Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have significantly enhanced their ability to perform complex reasoning tasks, transitioning from fast and intuitive thinking (System 1) to slow and deep reasoning (System 2). While System 2 reasoning improves task accuracy, it often incurs substantial computational costs due to its slow thinking nature and inefficient or unnecessary reasoning behaviors. In contrast, System 1 reasoning is computationally efficient but leads to suboptimal performance. Consequently, it is critical to balance the trade-off between performance (benefits) and computational costs (budgets), giving rise to the concept of reasoning economy. In this survey, we provide a comprehensive analysis of reasoning economy in both the post-training and test-time inference stages of LLMs, encompassing i) the cause of reasoning inefficiency, ii) behavior analysis of different reasoning patterns, and iii) potential solutions to achieve reasoning economy. By offering actionable insights and highlighting open challenges, we aim to shed light on strategies for improving the reasoning economy of LLMs, thereby serving as a valuable resource for advancing research in this evolving area. We also provide a public repository to continually track developments in this fast-evolving field.

While language models are powerful and versatile, they often fail to address highly complex problems. This is because solving complex problems requires deliberate thinking, which has been only minimally guided during training. In this paper, we propose a new method called Cumulative Reasoning (CR), which employs language models in a cumulative and iterative manner to emulate human thought processes. By decomposing tasks into smaller components, CR streamlines the problem-solving process, rendering it both more manageable and effective. For logical inference tasks, CR consistently outperforms existing methods with an improvement up to 9.3%, and achieves the astonishing accuracy of 98.04% on the curated FOLIO wiki dataset. In the context of the Game of 24, CR achieves an accuracy of 98%, which signifies a substantial enhancement of 24% over the previous state-of-the-art method. Finally, on the MATH dataset, we establish new state-of-the-art results with 58.0% overall accuracy, surpassing the previous best approach by a margin of 4.2%, and achieving 43% relative improvement on the hardest level 5 problems (22.4% to 32.1%). Code is available at https://github.com/iiis-ai/cumulative-reasoning.

Analogical reasoning is a unique ability of humans to address unfamiliar challenges by transferring strategies from relevant past experiences. One key finding in psychology is that compared with irrelevant past experiences, recalling relevant ones can help humans better handle new tasks. Coincidentally, the NLP community has also recently found that self-generating relevant examples in the context can help large language models (LLMs) better solve a given problem than hand-crafted prompts. However, it is yet not clear whether relevance is the key factor eliciting such capability, i.e., can LLMs benefit more from self-generated relevant examples than irrelevant ones? In this work, we systematically explore whether LLMs can truly perform analogical reasoning on a diverse set of reasoning tasks. With extensive experiments and analysis, we show that self-generated random examples can surprisingly achieve comparable or even better performance, e.g., 4% performance boost on GSM8K with random biological examples. We find that the accuracy of self-generated examples is the key factor and subsequently design two improved methods with significantly reduced inference costs. Overall, we aim to advance a deeper understanding of LLM analogical reasoning and hope this work stimulates further research in the design of self-generated contexts.

While humans naturally develop theory of mind (ToM), the capability to understand other people's mental states and beliefs, state-of-the-art large language models (LLMs) underperform on simple ToM benchmarks. We posit that we can extend our understanding of LLMs' ToM abilities by evaluating key human ToM precursors -- perception inference and perception-to-belief inference -- in LLMs. We introduce two datasets, Percept-ToMi and Percept-FANToM, to evaluate these precursory inferences for ToM in LLMs by annotating characters' perceptions on ToMi and FANToM, respectively. Our evaluation of eight state-of-the-art LLMs reveals that the models generally perform well in perception inference while exhibiting limited capability in perception-to-belief inference (e.g., lack of inhibitory control). Based on these results, we present PercepToM, a novel ToM method leveraging LLMs' strong perception inference capability while supplementing their limited perception-to-belief inference. Experimental results demonstrate that PercepToM significantly enhances LLM's performance, especially in false belief scenarios.

Despite the success of test-time scaling, Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) frequently encounter repetitive loops that lead to computational waste and inference failure. In this paper, we identify a distinct failure mode termed Circular Reasoning. Unlike traditional model degeneration, this phenomenon manifests as a self-reinforcing trap where generated content acts as a logical premise for its own recurrence, compelling the reiteration of preceding text. To systematically analyze this phenomenon, we introduce LoopBench, a dataset designed to capture two distinct loop typologies: numerical loops and statement loops. Mechanistically, we characterize circular reasoning as a state collapse exhibiting distinct boundaries, where semantic repetition precedes textual repetition. We reveal that reasoning impasses trigger the loop onset, which subsequently persists as an inescapable cycle driven by a self-reinforcing V-shaped attention mechanism. Guided by these findings, we employ the Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) algorithm to capture these precursors for early loop prediction. Experiments across diverse LRMs validate its accuracy and elucidate the stability of long-chain reasoning.

Trained on vast corpora of human language, language models demonstrate emergent human-like reasoning abilities. Yet they are still far from true intelligence, which opens up intriguing opportunities to explore the parallels of humans and model behaviors. In this work, we study the ability to skip steps in reasoning - a hallmark of human expertise developed through practice. Unlike humans, who may skip steps to enhance efficiency or to reduce cognitive load, models do not inherently possess such motivations to minimize reasoning steps. To address this, we introduce a controlled framework that stimulates step-skipping behavior by iteratively refining models to generate shorter and accurate reasoning paths. Empirical results indicate that models can develop the step skipping ability under our guidance. Moreover, after fine-tuning on expanded datasets that include both complete and skipped reasoning sequences, the models can not only resolve tasks with increased efficiency without sacrificing accuracy, but also exhibit comparable and even enhanced generalization capabilities in out-of-domain scenarios. Our work presents the first exploration into human-like step-skipping ability and provides fresh perspectives on how such cognitive abilities can benefit AI models.

Despite their strengths, large language models (LLMs) often fail to communicate their confidence accurately, making it difficult to assess when they might be wrong and limiting their reliability. In this work, we demonstrate that reasoning models-LLMs that engage in extended chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning-exhibit superior performance not only in problem-solving but also in accurately expressing their confidence. Specifically, we benchmark six reasoning models across six datasets and find that they achieve strictly better confidence calibration than their non-reasoning counterparts in 33 out of the 36 settings. Our detailed analysis reveals that these gains in calibration stem from the slow thinking behaviors of reasoning models-such as exploring alternative approaches and backtracking-which enable them to adjust their confidence dynamically throughout their CoT, making it progressively more accurate. In particular, we find that reasoning models become increasingly better calibrated as their CoT unfolds, a trend not observed in non-reasoning models. Moreover, removing slow thinking behaviors from the CoT leads to a significant drop in calibration. Lastly, we show that these gains are not exclusive to reasoning models-non-reasoning models also benefit when guided to perform slow thinking via in-context learning.