Text Generation
Transformers
Safetensors
qwen3_5_text
agentic-coding
reasoning
tool-use
on-device
laptop-scale
sft
reinforcement-learning
conversational
Instructions to use jsbaicenter/Aztec-Coder-4B with libraries, inference providers, notebooks, and local apps. Follow these links to get started.
- Libraries
- Transformers
How to use jsbaicenter/Aztec-Coder-4B with Transformers:
# Use a pipeline as a high-level helper from transformers import pipeline pipe = pipeline("text-generation", model="jsbaicenter/Aztec-Coder-4B") messages = [ {"role": "user", "content": "Who are you?"}, ] pipe(messages)# Load model directly from transformers import AutoTokenizer, AutoModelForCausalLM tokenizer = AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained("jsbaicenter/Aztec-Coder-4B") model = AutoModelForCausalLM.from_pretrained("jsbaicenter/Aztec-Coder-4B", device_map="auto") messages = [ {"role": "user", "content": "Who are you?"}, ] inputs = tokenizer.apply_chat_template( messages, add_generation_prompt=True, tokenize=True, return_dict=True, return_tensors="pt", ).to(model.device) outputs = model.generate(**inputs, max_new_tokens=40) print(tokenizer.decode(outputs[0][inputs["input_ids"].shape[-1]:])) - Notebooks
- Google Colab
- Kaggle
- Local Apps Settings
- vLLM
How to use jsbaicenter/Aztec-Coder-4B with vLLM:
Install from pip and serve model
# Install vLLM from pip: pip install vllm # Start the vLLM server: vllm serve "jsbaicenter/Aztec-Coder-4B" # Call the server using curl (OpenAI-compatible API): curl -X POST "http://localhost:8000/v1/chat/completions" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ --data '{ "model": "jsbaicenter/Aztec-Coder-4B", "messages": [ { "role": "user", "content": "What is the capital of France?" } ] }'Use Docker
docker model run hf.co/jsbaicenter/Aztec-Coder-4B
- SGLang
How to use jsbaicenter/Aztec-Coder-4B with SGLang:
Install from pip and serve model
# Install SGLang from pip: pip install sglang # Start the SGLang server: python3 -m sglang.launch_server \ --model-path "jsbaicenter/Aztec-Coder-4B" \ --host 0.0.0.0 \ --port 30000 # Call the server using curl (OpenAI-compatible API): curl -X POST "http://localhost:30000/v1/chat/completions" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ --data '{ "model": "jsbaicenter/Aztec-Coder-4B", "messages": [ { "role": "user", "content": "What is the capital of France?" } ] }'Use Docker images
docker run --gpus all \ --shm-size 32g \ -p 30000:30000 \ -v ~/.cache/huggingface:/root/.cache/huggingface \ --env "HF_TOKEN=<secret>" \ --ipc=host \ lmsysorg/sglang:latest \ python3 -m sglang.launch_server \ --model-path "jsbaicenter/Aztec-Coder-4B" \ --host 0.0.0.0 \ --port 30000 # Call the server using curl (OpenAI-compatible API): curl -X POST "http://localhost:30000/v1/chat/completions" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ --data '{ "model": "jsbaicenter/Aztec-Coder-4B", "messages": [ { "role": "user", "content": "What is the capital of France?" } ] }' - Docker Model Runner
How to use jsbaicenter/Aztec-Coder-4B with Docker Model Runner:
docker model run hf.co/jsbaicenter/Aztec-Coder-4B
Add HarmBench safety verification: 98.1% refusal vs base 99.4% (159 standard behaviors, judge-confirmed across two independent runs)
Browse files
README.md
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@@ -39,9 +39,12 @@ We reserved 121 real software bugs that the model never saw during training. Bef
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| MMLU-Pro | 64.0% | **70.0%** | 66.85% |
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| Terminal-Bench 1.0 (core, 80 tasks) | 33.8% | **33.8%** | 18.8% |
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| Terminal-Bench 2.1 (89 tasks, both models, same protocol) | 14.6% | 11.2% | not evaluated |
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The instruction-following score *improved* over the base model. The coding gains cost nothing on general quality. Gains of this kind usually trade one for the other.
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*NVFP4 generalization: 12/32 on a 32-instance subset (the same slice our comparisons use). The quantization costs roughly half the generalization capability.
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Our decontamination protocol is published with the model: none of these benchmark problems overlap the training data.
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- A 4B model has 4B knowledge: obscure facts and extreme-domain reasoning still favor larger models.
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- We tuned the agent loop for sandboxed container environments; other deployment contexts are untested.
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- Safety behaviors come from the base model; the RL phase optimized test-passing only, with no safety-specific training. See the base model card.
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## Lineage & credits
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| MMLU-Pro | 64.0% | **70.0%** | 66.85% |
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| Terminal-Bench 1.0 (core, 80 tasks) | 33.8% | **33.8%** | 18.8% |
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| Terminal-Bench 2.1 (89 tasks, both models, same protocol) | 14.6% | 11.2% | not evaluated |
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| HarmBench (harmful-behavior refusal rate, 159 standard behaviors) | 99.4% | **98.1%** | not evaluated |
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The instruction-following score *improved* over the base model. The coding gains cost nothing on general quality. Gains of this kind usually trade one for the other.
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We also verified that safety alignment survived training. Each judge-confirmed refusal test used HarmBench's standard set of 159 harmful behaviors. The base model refuses 99.4% of them; our model refuses 98.1%. The serious harm categories (chemical and biological, illegal activity, harassment) are clean on both models. The few requests each model does answer are edge cases, like writing a persuasive article about a disputed topic, and they barely overlap between the two models. The refusals were confirmed by two independent runs of the official HarmBench classifier, with identical results.
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*NVFP4 generalization: 12/32 on a 32-instance subset (the same slice our comparisons use). The quantization costs roughly half the generalization capability.
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Our decontamination protocol is published with the model: none of these benchmark problems overlap the training data.
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- A 4B model has 4B knowledge: obscure facts and extreme-domain reasoning still favor larger models.
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- We tuned the agent loop for sandboxed container environments; other deployment contexts are untested.
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- Safety behaviors come from the base model; the RL phase optimized test-passing only, with no safety-specific training. We verified alignment held: see the HarmBench row in the results table. See the base model card.
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## Lineage & credits
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