add honest findings (taker+maker closed) + Dr-Strange grid map
Browse files- FINDINGS.md +109 -0
FINDINGS.md
ADDED
|
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 1 |
+
# Polymarket up/down crypto markets — what actually has edge (honest findings)
|
| 2 |
+
|
| 3 |
+
*Companion to the `polymarket-updown-microstructure` dataset. 2026-06-25.*
|
| 4 |
+
|
| 5 |
+
This is a negative-results report, written to the standard that matters on an
|
| 6 |
+
efficient venue: **every edge claim is graded against the price you could actually
|
| 7 |
+
transact at**, not win-rate. On a market where the ask already encodes P(win),
|
| 8 |
+
a high win-rate is not edge — `edge_real = realized_WR − avg_price_paid` is.
|
| 9 |
+
|
| 10 |
+
## TL;DR
|
| 11 |
+
|
| 12 |
+
Across an exhaustive search of taker signals, a full physics-regional sweep of the
|
| 13 |
+
maker side, an active cancel-race simulation, and replication against two independent
|
| 14 |
+
external corpora, **no signal-based strategy clears the realizable bar** — taker or
|
| 15 |
+
maker, passive or active. The informed flow leads the settlement oracle, so even a
|
| 16 |
+
*perfect, zero-latency* oracle-based maker cancel does not help. What edge exists on
|
| 17 |
+
this venue belongs to actors racing inside the inter-trade gap on non-public signals;
|
| 18 |
+
it is not reachable from price/oracle data, at any latency we measured.
|
| 19 |
+
|
| 20 |
+
## 1. Method
|
| 21 |
+
|
| 22 |
+
- **edge_real** = `(won ? 1 : 0) − price_paid`, per fill, bootstrap-CI'd.
|
| 23 |
+
- **Realizable (fillable) lens**: a backtest "fill" counts only if a *real* trade
|
| 24 |
+
print corroborates it (tape) or the quote survives our measured latency
|
| 25 |
+
(persistence). Paper-fills at the displayed quote overstate edge ~10× via
|
| 26 |
+
fill self-selection (you fill the losers, get rejected on the winners).
|
| 27 |
+
- **Ground-truth resolution** from the settlement oracle, never from spot capture.
|
| 28 |
+
- Calibration anchor: a strategy with a known live `edge_real ≈ −0.004` reproduces
|
| 29 |
+
to that value under the lens before any verdict is trusted.
|
| 30 |
+
|
| 31 |
+
## 2. Taker side — closed
|
| 32 |
+
|
| 33 |
+
An exhaustive grid (5,161 configurations: entry-timing × price-band × move ×
|
| 34 |
+
fade/decisive, across BTC/ETH/SOL/XRP, 5m/15m) graded on the realizable lens, then
|
| 35 |
+
an adversarial verification stage (pooled-CI + persistence-agreement + date-holdout
|
| 36 |
+
OOS):
|
| 37 |
+
|
| 38 |
+
- The overfit cells evaporate under pooling (a family at +0.12 on n≈50 per cell is
|
| 39 |
+
**−0.017** pooled to n=1752).
|
| 40 |
+
- Most apparent survivors die on persistence-vs-tape disagreement (tape says +,
|
| 41 |
+
the resting book says −: the fills are phantom/adverse).
|
| 42 |
+
- Exactly one configuration survived the full gauntlet, and it was carried entirely
|
| 43 |
+
by a single coin at n=63 — a pocket, not an edge — and fires ~1×/day (economically
|
| 44 |
+
negligible even if real).
|
| 45 |
+
|
| 46 |
+
Live confirmation: every directional taker we shipped died live (momentum, entropy,
|
| 47 |
+
velrider, flip), each time because the backtest measured `corr(signal, observed
|
| 48 |
+
price)` while live fills self-select into the losing side.
|
| 49 |
+
|
| 50 |
+
## 3. Maker side — no physics region
|
| 51 |
+
|
| 52 |
+
The passive (post-and-rest) maker, simulated against the **real trade tape** (same
|
| 53 |
+
adverse selection a live maker eats), across 17 physics regions
|
| 54 |
+
(favorite/underdog × distance-to-strike in bps × realized-σ × seconds-to-close):
|
| 55 |
+
|
| 56 |
+
| region (favorite) | bid | P(win \| fill) | gap | edge_real |
|
| 57 |
+
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
| 58 |
+
| dist <20bp, ≤60s | 0.957 | 85.4% | −10pp | −0.089 |
|
| 59 |
+
| dist <10bp, ≤60s | 0.904 | 70.8% | −20pp | −0.179 |
|
| 60 |
+
| dist <5bp, ≤60s | 0.704 | 44.2% | −26pp | −0.227 |
|
| 61 |
+
|
| 62 |
+
**Zero of 17 regions are positive.** A resting bid always fills ~10–20pp *below* its
|
| 63 |
+
true win probability — you are filled precisely when price is moving against you.
|
| 64 |
+
The rebate (hundredths of a cent) cannot close a 10–20pp gap. This holds near and
|
| 65 |
+
far from strike, early and late.
|
| 66 |
+
|
| 67 |
+
## 4. The cancel race — also closed
|
| 68 |
+
|
| 69 |
+
The passive maker is adversely selected everywhere, so the active maker's hope is to
|
| 70 |
+
**cancel an about-to-be-adverse quote before the informed taker hits it**. We simulated
|
| 71 |
+
exactly that on the microsecond book-delta firehose: post the favorite bid, fire a
|
| 72 |
+
cancel when the oracle-fair drops below the bid, and let the cancel land `L` ms later.
|
| 73 |
+
Sweeping `L` from 0 (perfect) to ∞ (never cancel):
|
| 74 |
+
|
| 75 |
+
| cancel latency | edge_real | $ROI |
|
| 76 |
+
|---|---|---|
|
| 77 |
+
| 0 ms (perfect) | −0.1898 | −42.4% |
|
| 78 |
+
| 190 ms (ours) | −0.1897 | −42.3% |
|
| 79 |
+
| ∞ (never cancel) | −0.1894 | −42.3% |
|
| 80 |
+
|
| 81 |
+
**The cancel does nothing — not even at 0 ms.** This is *not* a "we lose the latency
|
| 82 |
+
race" result; it is sharper. The cancel *signal* fires too late: the informed taker
|
| 83 |
+
hits the bid **before** the data-streams oracle reflects the move. The adverse flow
|
| 84 |
+
leads the oracle, so no oracle-based cancel can help at any latency. The only
|
| 85 |
+
untested variant is a flow-based cancel (detect the informed taker mid-arrival and
|
| 86 |
+
pull within the inter-trade gap) — which is the same sub-latency race a live attempt
|
| 87 |
+
already lost. **Maker is closed: passive (no region) and active (cancel useless).**
|
| 88 |
+
|
| 89 |
+
## 5. External replication (independent corpora)
|
| 90 |
+
|
| 91 |
+
- **Academic** ("Who Wins and Who Loses in Prediction Markets", 588M trades):
|
| 92 |
+
~70% of users lose; winners **provide liquidity with limit orders**, losers
|
| 93 |
+
**take liquidity with market orders**; only ~12% of top winners beat a coin-flip
|
| 94 |
+
benchmark and ~60% of "lucky winners" become losers out-of-sample.
|
| 95 |
+
- **Other people's bots** (a public arena of 4.77M paper trades, gamma-resolved):
|
| 96 |
+
taker `edge_real −0.031` / ROI −6.0%; maker `−0.136` / ROI −8.9%. Even the maker
|
| 97 |
+
families with positive `edge_real` still lose on realized ROI once fees and early
|
| 98 |
+
exits are counted.
|
| 99 |
+
|
| 100 |
+
Both land where our own data does: the taker space is closed; the maker space only
|
| 101 |
+
opens on execution speed.
|
| 102 |
+
|
| 103 |
+
## 6. Takeaway for anyone using this dataset
|
| 104 |
+
|
| 105 |
+
Grade against the transactable price. If you find a +edge in a backtest here, before
|
| 106 |
+
believing it: (1) pool across coins to kill multiple-comparison luck, (2) require
|
| 107 |
+
the persistence lens to agree with the tape lens, (3) hold out by date, (4) check it
|
| 108 |
+
isn't a once-a-day pocket. We did, on everything, and the honest answer is that the
|
| 109 |
+
signal is already in the price.
|