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"""SecureCodePairs v1.1.0 extension records (part 2): SCP-000087+.
Domains: fintech, FHIR/healthcare, Kubernetes, IoT.
Languages deepened: Python, Java, Go, TypeScript, C#, PHP, Kotlin, Swift, Rust.
"""
from typing import List, Dict
RECORDS_EXT2: List[Dict] = [
# ================================================================== FINTECH (Python/FastAPI) ==================================================================
{
"id": "SCP-000087",
"language": "Python",
"framework": "FastAPI",
"title": "Missing idempotency on payment endpoint",
"description": "A payment endpoint processes the same request twice if retried, double-charging.",
"owasp": "A04:2021 - Insecure Design",
"owasp_api": "API3:2023 - Broken Object Property Level Authorization",
"owasp_llm": "",
"cwe": "CWE-840",
"mitre_attack": "T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application",
"severity": "High",
"difficulty": "Intermediate",
"vulnerable_code": (
"@app.post('/pay')\n"
"def pay(req: PaymentReq):\n"
" # Vulnerable: no idempotency key check\n"
" charge_card(req.user, req.amount)\n"
" return {'ok': True}\n"
),
"secure_code": (
"@app.post('/pay')\n"
"def pay(req: PaymentReq, idem: str = Header(...)):\n"
" # Secure: dedupe by idempotency key\n"
" if redis.exists('idem:' + idem):\n"
" return {'ok': True, 'cached': True}\n"
" charge_card(req.user, req.amount)\n"
" redis.setex('idem:' + idem, 86400, '1')\n"
" return {'ok': True}\n"
),
"patch": (
"--- a/pay.py\n"
"+++ b/pay.py\n"
"@@ -1,5 +1,10 @@\n"
"-def pay(req: PaymentReq):\n"
"- charge_card(req.user, req.amount)\n"
"+def pay(req: PaymentReq, idem: str = Header(...)):\n"
"+ if redis.exists('idem:' + idem):\n"
" return {'ok': True, 'cached': True}\n"
"+ charge_card(req.user, req.amount)\n"
"+ redis.setex('idem:' + idem, 86400, '1')\n"
),
"root_cause": "No idempotency key, so client retries cause duplicate charges.",
"attack": "Network retry or replay of the request double-charges the customer.",
"impact": "Financial loss, customer trust damage.",
"fix": "Require and dedupe on an idempotency key per mutating request.",
"guideline": "Make payment endpoints idempotent via idempotency keys.",
"tags": ["business-logic", "fintech", "fastapi", "idempotency"],
"metadata": {"domain": "Banking", "input_source": "header", "auth_required": True},
},
{
"id": "SCP-000088",
"language": "Java",
"framework": "Spring Boot",
"title": "Rounding error in interest calculation",
"description": "A Spring service uses binary floating point for money, causing rounding drift.",
"owasp": "A04:2021 - Insecure Design",
"owasp_api": "",
"owasp_llm": "",
"cwe": "CWE-682",
"mitre_attack": "T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application",
"severity": "Medium",
"difficulty": "Intermediate",
"vulnerable_code": (
"public BigDecimal interest(double principal, double rate) {\n"
" // Vulnerable: double for currency\n"
" return BigDecimal.valueOf(principal * rate);\n"
"}\n"
),
"secure_code": (
"public BigDecimal interest(BigDecimal principal, BigDecimal rate) {\n"
" // Secure: BigDecimal throughout, explicit rounding\n"
" return principal.multiply(rate)\n"
" .setScale(2, RoundingMode.HALF_UP);\n"
"}\n"
),
"patch": (
"--- a/InterestService.java\n"
"+++ b/InterestService.java\n"
"@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@\n"
"- return BigDecimal.valueOf(principal * rate);\n"
"+ return principal.multiply(rate)\n"
"+ .setScale(2, RoundingMode.HALF_UP);\n"
),
"root_cause": "Binary floating point cannot represent decimal currency exactly, introducing drift.",
"attack": "Repeated calculations accumulate cents of error, enabling arbitrage or loss.",
"impact": "Incorrect balances, financial discrepancy.",
"fix": "Use BigDecimal (or integer minor units) with explicit rounding for all money.",
"guideline": "Never use float/double for currency; use BigDecimal with scale.",
"tags": ["fintech", "spring", "java", "rounding"],
"metadata": {"domain": "Banking", "input_source": "server", "auth_required": False},
},
{
"id": "SCP-000089",
"language": "Go",
"framework": "Gin",
"title": "Missing signature verification on webhook",
"description": "A Gin webhook handler trusts the body without verifying the provider's HMAC signature.",
"owasp": "A08:2021 - Software and Data Integrity Failures",
"owasp_api": "API2:2023 - Broken Authentication",
"owasp_llm": "",
"cwe": "CWE-345",
"mitre_attack": "T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application",
"severity": "High",
"difficulty": "Intermediate",
"vulnerable_code": (
"func webhook(c *gin.Context) {\n"
" body, _ := c.GetRawData()\n"
" // Vulnerable: no signature check\n"
" processEvent(json.RawMessage(body))\n"
" c.Status(200)\n"
"}\n"
),
"secure_code": (
"func webhook(c *gin.Context) {\n"
" body, _ := c.GetRawData()\n"
" sig := c.GetHeader(\"X-Signature\")\n"
" // Secure: verify HMAC\n"
" mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, []byte(os.Getenv(\"WEBHOOK_SECRET\")))\n"
" mac.Write(body)\n"
" if !hmac.Equal([]byte(sig), []byte(hex.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil)))) {\n"
" c.Status(401); return\n"
" }\n"
" processEvent(json.RawMessage(body))\n"
" c.Status(200)\n"
"}\n"
),
"patch": (
"--- a/webhook.go\n"
"+++ b/webhook.go\n"
"@@ -2,5 +2,12 @@\n"
"- processEvent(json.RawMessage(body))\n"
"+ sig := c.GetHeader(\"X-Signature\")\n"
"+ mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, []byte(os.Getenv(\"WEBHOOK_SECRET\")))\n"
"+ mac.Write(body)\n"
"+ if !hmac.Equal([]byte(sig), []byte(hex.EncodeToString(mac.Sum(nil)))) {\n"
"+ c.Status(401); return\n"
"+ }\n"
"+ processEvent(json.RawMessage(body))\n"
),
"root_cause": "Webhook authenticity is not verified, so anyone can forge events.",
"attack": "Attacker posts fake 'payment succeeded' events to grant themselves credit.",
"impact": "Fraud, unauthorized state changes.",
"fix": "Verify the provider HMAC signature on every webhook before processing.",
"guideline": "Always verify webhook signatures (HMAC) before acting on events.",
"tags": ["fintech", "gin", "go", "webhook"],
"metadata": {"domain": "Banking", "input_source": "request_body", "auth_required": False},
},
{
"id": "SCP-000090",
"language": "TypeScript",
"framework": "NestJS",
"title": "Client-side amount manipulation in checkout",
"description": "A NestJS checkout trusts the price sent from the client instead of the server catalog.",
"owasp": "A04:2021 - Insecure Design",
"owasp_api": "API3:2023 - Broken Object Property Level Authorization",
"owasp_llm": "",
"cwe": "CWE-602",
"mitre_attack": "T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application",
"severity": "High",
"difficulty": "Intermediate",
"vulnerable_code": (
"@Post('checkout')\n"
"checkout(@Body() b: { itemId: string; price: number }) {\n"
" // Vulnerable: trusts client price\n"
" return this.billing.charge(b.price);\n"
"}\n"
),
"secure_code": (
"@Post('checkout')\n"
"async checkout(@Body() b: { itemId: string }) {\n"
" // Secure: look up authoritative price server-side\n"
" const item = await this.catalog.get(b.itemId);\n"
" return this.billing.charge(item.price);\n"
"}\n"
),
"patch": (
"--- a/checkout.controller.ts\n"
"+++ b/checkout.controller.ts\n"
"@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@\n"
"-checkout(@Body() b: { itemId: string; price: number }) {\n"
"- return this.billing.charge(b.price);\n"
"+async checkout(@Body() b: { itemId: string }) {\n"
"+ const item = await this.catalog.get(b.itemId);\n"
"+ return this.billing.charge(item.price);\n"
),
"root_cause": "Price is taken from the client, so an attacker can set it to 0.01.",
"attack": "Intercept the request and change price to 0.01 to buy at a discount.",
"impact": "Revenue loss, fraud.",
"fix": "Never trust client-supplied prices; derive totals server-side from the catalog.",
"guideline": "Compute prices server-side from authoritative sources.",
"tags": ["fintech", "nestjs", "typescript", "price-tampering"],
"metadata": {"domain": "E-commerce", "input_source": "request_body", "auth_required": True},
},
{
"id": "SCP-000091",
"language": "Python",
"framework": "Django",
"title": "Reusable token (no expiry) for password reset",
"description": "A Django reset token never expires and is stored in plaintext, enabling reuse.",
"owasp": "A07:2021 - Identification and Authentication Failures",
"owasp_api": "API2:2023 - Broken Authentication",
"owasp_llm": "",
"cwe": "CWE-640",
"mitre_attack": "T1600 - Weaken Encryption",
"severity": "High",
"difficulty": "Intermediate",
"vulnerable_code": (
"def issue_reset(user):\n"
" token = secrets.token_urlsafe(16)\n"
" # Vulnerable: no expiry, plaintext store\n"
" Cache.set('reset:' + user.id, token)\n"
" return token\n"
),
"secure_code": (
"def issue_reset(user):\n"
" token = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)\n"
" # Secure: hash + short TTL\n"
" Cache.set('reset:' + user.id, sha256(token), 900)\n"
" return token\n"
),
"patch": (
"--- a/auth.py\n"
"+++ b/auth.py\n"
"@@ -2,5 +2,6 @@\n"
"- token = secrets.token_urlsafe(16)\n"
"- Cache.set('reset:' + user.id, token)\n"
"+ token = secrets.token_urlsafe(32)\n"
"+ Cache.set('reset:' + user.id, sha256(token), 900)\n"
),
"root_cause": "Reset tokens lack expiry and are stored reversibly, allowing indefinite reuse.",
"attack": "Attacker who sees the token once can reset the password indefinitely.",
"impact": "Persistent account takeover.",
"fix": "Set short TTLs and store only token hashes; invalidate after use.",
"guideline": "Reset tokens must expire and be single-use; store hashes only.",
"tags": ["fintech", "django", "python", "auth"],
"metadata": {"domain": "Authentication systems", "input_source": "server", "auth_required": False},
},
{
"id": "SCP-000092",
"language": "C#",
"framework": "ASP.NET Core",
"title": "Insecure direct object reference on bank account",
"description": "An ASP.NET Core controller returns an account by id without verifying ownership.",
"owasp": "A01:2021 - Broken Access Control",
"owasp_api": "API1:2023 - Broken Object Level Authorization",
"owasp_llm": "",
"cwe": "CWE-639",
"mitre_attack": "T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application",
"severity": "Critical",
"difficulty": "Beginner",
"vulnerable_code": (
"[HttpGet(\"accounts/{id}\")]\n"
"public Account Get(string id) => _repo.GetAccount(id); // Vulnerable: no owner check\n"
),
"secure_code": (
"[HttpGet(\"accounts/{id}\")]\n"
"public IActionResult Get(string id, [FromClaims] string userId)\n"
"{\n"
" var acc = _repo.GetAccount(id);\n"
" if (acc == null || acc.OwnerId != userId) return NotFound();\n"
" return Ok(acc);\n"
"}\n"
),
"patch": (
"--- a/AccountsController.cs\n"
"+++ b/AccountsController.cs\n"
"@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@\n"
"-public Account Get(string id) => _repo.GetAccount(id);\n"
"+public IActionResult Get(string id, [FromClaims] string userId) {\n"
"+ var acc = _repo.GetAccount(id);\n"
"+ if (acc == null || acc.OwnerId != userId) return NotFound();\n"
"+ return Ok(acc); }\n"
),
"root_cause": "Account lookup is keyed only by id, not by the authenticated owner.",
"attack": "User enumerates account ids to read other customers' balances.",
"impact": "Disclosure of financial data (PII).",
"fix": "Scope lookups to the authenticated principal.",
"guideline": "Enforce object-level authorization on financial records.",
"tags": ["fintech", "aspnet", "csharp", "idor"],
"metadata": {"domain": "Banking", "input_source": "path_param", "auth_required": True},
},
# ================================================================== FHIR / HEALTHCARE ==================================================================
{
"id": "SCP-000093",
"language": "Java",
"framework": "Spring Boot",
"title": "FHIR resource IDOR across tenants",
"description": "A Spring FHIR server returns a Patient resource by id without tenant scoping.",
"owasp": "A01:2021 - Broken Access Control",
"owasp_api": "API1:2023 - Broken Object Level Authorization",
"owasp_llm": "",
"cwe": "CWE-639",
"mitre_attack": "T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application",
"severity": "Critical",
"difficulty": "Intermediate",
"vulnerable_code": (
"@GetMapping(\"/fhir/Patient/{id}\")\n"
"public Patient read(@PathVariable String id) {\n"
" // Vulnerable: no tenant filter\n"
" return fhirDao.read(Patient.class, id);\n"
"}\n"
),
"secure_code": (
"@GetMapping(\"/fhir/Patient/{id}\")\n"
"public Patient read(@PathVariable String id, @TenantId String tenant) {\n"
" // Secure: scope by tenant\n"
" Patient p = fhirDao.read(Patient.class, id);\n"
" if (!p.getTenant().equals(tenant)) throw new NotFoundException();\n"
" return p;\n"
"}\n"
),
"patch": (
"--- a/FhirController.java\n"
"+++ b/FhirController.java\n"
"@@ -2,4 +2,7 @@\n"
"- return fhirDao.read(Patient.class, id);\n"
"+ Patient p = fhirDao.read(Patient.class, id);\n"
"+ if (!p.getTenant().equals(tenant)) throw new NotFoundException();\n"
"+ return p;\n"
),
"root_cause": "FHIR reads are not scoped by tenant, so one clinic reads another's patients.",
"attack": "Intercept and change Patient id to scrape PHI across tenants.",
"impact": "HIPAA violation, mass PHI disclosure.",
"fix": "Apply tenant scoping on every FHIR read/write.",
"guideline": "Tenant-isolate all PHI resources; verify on every access.",
"tags": ["fhir", "spring", "java", "healthcare"],
"metadata": {"domain": "Healthcare", "input_source": "path_param", "auth_required": True},
},
{
"id": "SCP-000094",
"language": "Python",
"framework": "FastAPI",
"title": "Unvalidated FHIR Observation value",
"description": "A FastAPI endpoint stores a FHIR Observation value without validating type/range, enabling injection.",
"owasp": "A03:2021 - Injection",
"owasp_api": "",
"owasp_llm": "",
"cwe": "CWE-20",
"mitre_attack": "T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application",
"severity": "Medium",
"difficulty": "Intermediate",
"vulnerable_code": (
"@app.post('/fhir/Observation')\n"
"def obs(o: dict):\n"
" # Vulnerable: stores arbitrary value\n"
" db.observations.insert_one(o)\n"
" return {'ok': True}\n"
),
"secure_code": (
"@app.post('/fhir/Observation')\n"
"def obs(o: ObservationModel):\n"
" # Secure: pydantic validation of code/value/unit\n"
" if not (0 <= o.valueQuantity.value <= 1000):\n"
" raise HTTPException(422, 'out of range')\n"
" db.observations.insert_one(o.dict())\n"
" return {'ok': True}\n"
),
"patch": (
"--- a/fhir_obs.py\n"
"+++ b/fhir_obs.py\n"
"@@ -1,5 +1,8 @@\n"
"-def obs(o: dict):\n"
"- db.observations.insert_one(o)\n"
"+def obs(o: ObservationModel):\n"
"+ if not (0 <= o.valueQuantity.value <= 1000):\n"
"+ raise HTTPException(422, 'out of range')\n"
"+ db.observations.insert_one(o.dict())\n"
),
"root_cause": "Observation payload is stored without schema/range validation, allowing malformed or hostile data.",
"attack": "Post an Observation with a script payload later rendered in a clinician dashboard (stored XSS).",
"impact": "Data integrity loss, stored XSS in viewers.",
"fix": "Validate FHIR resources against the profile (type, range, required fields).",
"guideline": "Validate all FHIR resources server-side before persistence.",
"tags": ["fhir", "fastapi", "python", "input-validation"],
"metadata": {"domain": "Healthcare", "input_source": "request_body", "auth_required": True},
},
{
"id": "SCP-000095",
"language": "C#",
"framework": "ASP.NET Core",
"title": "Missing audit log on PHI access",
"description": "An ASP.NET Core healthcare API reads PHI without writing an audit trail.",
"owasp": "A09:2021 - Security Logging and Monitoring Failures",
"owasp_api": "",
"owasp_llm": "",
"cwe": "CWE-778",
"mitre_attack": "T1562.001 - Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools",
"severity": "Medium",
"difficulty": "Beginner",
"vulnerable_code": (
"[HttpGet(\"records/{id}\")]\n"
"public Record Get(int id) {\n"
" // Vulnerable: no audit log\n"
" return _repo.Get(id);\n"
"}\n"
),
"secure_code": (
"[HttpGet(\"records/{id}\")]\n"
"public Record Get(int id, ClaimsPrincipal user)\n"
"{\n"
" var r = _repo.Get(id);\n"
" _audit.Log(new PhiAccess { User = user.Identity.Name, RecordId = id, At = DateTime.UtcNow });\n"
" return r;\n"
"}\n"
),
"patch": (
"--- a/RecordsController.cs\n"
"+++ b/RecordsController.cs\n"
"@@ -1,4 +1,7 @@\n"
"- return _repo.Get(id);\n"
"+ var r = _repo.Get(id);\n"
"+ _audit.Log(new PhiAccess { User = user.Identity.Name, RecordId = id, At = DateTime.UtcNow });\n"
"+ return r;\n"
),
"root_cause": "PHI access is not audited, failing compliance and incident response needs.",
"attack": "An insider scrapes records with no trace, evading detection.",
"impact": "Undetected PHI abuse; compliance failure (HIPAA).",
"fix": "Emit immutable audit logs for every PHI read/write.",
"guideline": "Audit all PHI access with user, record, and timestamp.",
"tags": ["fhir", "aspnet", "csharp", "audit"],
"metadata": {"domain": "Healthcare", "input_source": "path_param", "auth_required": True},
},
{
"id": "SCP-000096",
"language": "JavaScript",
"framework": "Express",
"title": "HL7v2 injection in message builder",
"description": "An Express service builds HL7v2 messages by concatenating patient fields without escaping separators.",
"owasp": "A03:2021 - Injection",
"owasp_api": "",
"owasp_llm": "",
"cwe": "CWE-93",
"mitre_attack": "T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application",
"severity": "Medium",
"difficulty": "Advanced",
"vulnerable_code": (
"function hl7(patient) {\n"
" // Vulnerable: unescaped field with pipe/newline\n"
" return `PID|1|${patient.name}|${patient.dob}`;\n"
"}\n"
),
"secure_code": (
"function esc(s) { return String(s).replace(/[\\r\\n|]/g, ''); }\n"
"function hl7(patient) {\n"
" // Secure: strip HL7 field/segment separators\n"
" return `PID|1|${esc(patient.name)}|${esc(patient.dob)}`;\n"
"}\n"
),
"patch": (
"--- a/hl7.js\n"
"+++ b/hl7.js\n"
"@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@\n"
"+function esc(s) { return String(s).replace(/[\\r\\n|]/g, ''); }\n"
" function hl7(patient) {\n"
"- return `PID|1|${patient.name}|${patient.dob}`;\n"
"+ return `PID|1|${esc(patient.name)}|${esc(patient.dob)}`;\n"
),
"root_cause": "Patient fields containing HL7 separators corrupt the message or inject segments.",
"attack": "name=EVN|1|admin sets a fake segment altering downstream routing.",
"impact": "Message corruption, false data, misrouting.",
"fix": "Escape HL7 separators and validate field contents.",
"guideline": "Escape/encode structured-message separators before concatenation.",
"tags": ["healthcare", "hl7", "express", "injection"],
"metadata": {"domain": "Healthcare", "input_source": "request_body", "auth_required": False},
},
# ================================================================== KUBERNETES ==================================================================
{
"id": "SCP-000097",
"language": "YAML",
"framework": "Kubernetes",
"title": "Container running as root with privileged",
"description": "A Kubernetes Pod manifest runs as root with privileged: true, enabling host escape.",
"owasp": "A05:2021 - Security Misconfiguration",
"owasp_api": "",
"owasp_llm": "",
"cwe": "CWE-250",
"mitre_attack": "T1611 - Escape to Host",
"severity": "Critical",
"difficulty": "Beginner",
"vulnerable_code": (
"apiVersion: v1\n"
"kind: Pod\n"
"spec:\n"
" containers:\n"
" - name: app\n"
" image: app:1.0\n"
" securityContext:\n"
" privileged: true # Vulnerable\n"
" runAsUser: 0 # Vulnerable: root\n"
),
"secure_code": (
"apiVersion: v1\n"
"kind: Pod\n"
"spec:\n"
" securityContext:\n"
" runAsNonRoot: true\n"
" runAsUser: 1000\n"
" seccompProfile:\n"
" type: RuntimeDefault\n"
" containers:\n"
" - name: app\n"
" image: app:1.0\n"
" securityContext:\n"
" allowPrivilegeEscalation: false\n"
" readOnlyRootFilesystem: true\n"
" capabilities:\n"
" drop: [\"ALL\"]\n"
),
"patch": (
"--- a/pod.yaml\n"
"+++ b/pod.yaml\n"
"@@ -3,7 +3,14 @@\n"
"- securityContext:\n"
"- privileged: true\n"
"- runAsUser: 0\n"
"+ securityContext:\n"
"+ runAsNonRoot: true\n"
"+ runAsUser: 1000\n"
"+ seccompProfile:\n"
"+ type: RuntimeDefault\n"
"+ securityContext:\n"
"+ allowPrivilegeEscalation: false\n"
"+ readOnlyRootFilesystem: true\n"
"+ capabilities: { drop: [\"ALL\"] }\n"
),
"root_cause": "Privileged root containers can escape to the node via the kernel.",
"attack": "A compromised container mounts /host and reads node secrets or pivots.",
"impact": "Full node/cluster compromise.",
"fix": "Run as non-root, drop capabilities, disable privilege escalation, use seccomp.",
"guideline": "Apply Pod Security Standards; never run privileged/root in prod.",
"tags": ["kubernetes", "privilege", "yaml", "container"],
"metadata": {"domain": "Microservices", "input_source": "manifest", "auth_required": False},
},
{
"id": "SCP-000098",
"language": "YAML",
"framework": "Kubernetes",
"title": "Missing NetworkPolicy allows lateral movement",
"description": "A namespace has no NetworkPolicy, so any pod can reach any other pod (including the DB).",
"owasp": "A05:2021 - Security Misconfiguration",
"owasp_api": "",
"owasp_llm": "",
"cwe": "CWE-923",
"mitre_attack": "T1021 - Remote Services",
"severity": "High",
"difficulty": "Intermediate",
"vulnerable_code": (
"# Vulnerable: no NetworkPolicy -> flat network\n"
"apiVersion: v1\n"
"kind: Service\n"
"metadata:\n"
" name: db\n"
),
"secure_code": (
"apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1\n"
"kind: NetworkPolicy\n"
"metadata:\n"
" name: default-deny\n"
"spec:\n"
" podSelector: {}\n"
" policyTypes: [Ingress, Egress]\n"
"---\n"
"apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1\n"
"kind: NetworkPolicy\n"
"metadata:\n"
" name: allow-app-to-db\n"
"spec:\n"
" podSelector:\n"
" matchLabels: { app: db }\n"
" ingress:\n"
" - from:\n"
" - podSelector:\n"
" matchLabels: { app: api }\n"
),
"patch": (
"--- a/networkpolicy.yaml\n"
"+++ b/networkpolicy.yaml\n"
"@@ -1,5 +1,23 @@\n"
"+apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1\n"
"+kind: NetworkPolicy\n"
"+metadata: { name: default-deny }\n"
"+spec:\n"
"+ podSelector: {}\n"
"+ policyTypes: [Ingress, Egress]\n"
"+---\n"
"+kind: NetworkPolicy\n"
"+metadata: { name: allow-app-to-db }\n"
"+spec:\n"
"+ podSelector: { matchLabels: { app: db } }\n"
"+ ingress:\n"
"+ - from:\n"
"+ - podSelector: { matchLabels: { app: api } }\n"
),
"root_cause": "Absence of NetworkPolicy leaves pod-to-pod traffic unrestricted.",
"attack": "A compromised web pod connects directly to the database pod.",
"impact": "Lateral movement, data access.",
"fix": "Apply default-deny and explicit allow policies between tiers.",
"guideline": "Use NetworkPolicies to segment pod traffic by tier.",
"tags": ["kubernetes", "network", "yaml", "segmentation"],
"metadata": {"domain": "Microservices", "input_source": "manifest", "auth_required": False},
},
{
"id": "SCP-000099",
"language": "YAML",
"framework": "Kubernetes",
"title": "Image pulled from unpinned tag (latest)",
"description": "A Deployment references an image by mutable :latest tag, enabling supply-chain drift.",
"owasp": "A08:2021 - Software and Data Integrity Failures",
"owasp_api": "",
"owasp_llm": "",
"cwe": "CWE-494",
"mitre_attack": "T1195.001 - Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Dependencies",
"severity": "High",
"difficulty": "Beginner",
"vulnerable_code": (
"spec:\n"
" containers:\n"
" - name: app\n"
" image: registry/app:latest # Vulnerable: mutable tag\n"
),
"secure_code": (
"spec:\n"
" containers:\n"
" - name: app\n"
" image: registry/app@sha256:9f86d0818... # Secure: digest-pinned\n"
" imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent\n"
),
"patch": (
"--- a/deploy.yaml\n"
"+++ b/deploy.yaml\n"
"@@ -3,4 +3,5 @@\n"
"- image: registry/app:latest\n"
"+ image: registry/app@sha256:9f86d0818...\n"
"+ imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent\n"
),
"root_cause": "Mutable image tags let an attacker-controlled rebuild run as the same deployment.",
"attack": "Attacker pushes a malicious :latest; the next rollout runs it.",
"impact": "Supply-chain compromise of workloads.",
"fix": "Pin images by immutable digest and verify signatures (cosign).",
"guideline": "Pin images by sha256 digest; sign and verify with cosign.",
"tags": ["kubernetes", "supply-chain", "yaml", "image"],
"metadata": {"domain": "Microservices", "input_source": "manifest", "auth_required": False},
},
{
"id": "SCP-000100",
"language": "Go",
"framework": "Kubernetes Operator",
"title": "Operator grants excessive RBAC",
"description": "A Kubernetes operator's ClusterRole grants wildcard verbs/resources, violating least privilege.",
"owasp": "A05:2021 - Security Misconfiguration",
"owasp_api": "",
"owasp_llm": "",
"cwe": "CWE-269",
"mitre_attack": "T1078 - Valid Accounts",
"severity": "High",
"difficulty": "Intermediate",
"vulnerable_code": (
"rules:\n"
"- apiGroups: [\"*\"]\n"
" resources: [\"*\"] # Vulnerable: wildcard\n"
" verbs: [\"*\"] # Vulnerable: all verbs\n"
),
"secure_code": (
"rules:\n"
"- apiGroups: [\"app.example.com\"]\n"
" resources: [\"widgets\", \"widgets/status\"]\n"
" verbs: [\"get\", \"list\", \"watch\", \"update\", \"patch\"]\n"
),
"patch": (
"--- a/role.yaml\n"
"+++ b/role.yaml\n"
"@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@\n"
"- resources: [\"*\"]\n"
"- verbs: [\"*\"]\n"
"+ resources: [\"widgets\", \"widgets/status\"]\n"
"+ verbs: [\"get\", \"list\", \"watch\", \"update\", \"patch\"]\n"
),
"root_cause": "Wildcard RBAC grants far more than the operator needs.",
"attack": "A compromised operator can read secrets cluster-wide or delete workloads.",
"impact": "Cluster-wide privilege escalation.",
"fix": "Scope RBAC to specific API groups/resources/verbs; avoid wildcards.",
"guideline": "Apply least-privilege RBAC; never use wildcard resources/verbs.",
"tags": ["kubernetes", "rbac", "go", "least-privilege"],
"metadata": {"domain": "Microservices", "input_source": "manifest", "auth_required": False},
},
{
"id": "SCP-000101",
"language": "Python",
"framework": "Kubernetes Operator",
"title": "Secret exposed in operator log",
"description": "An operator logs the full resource spec including a Secret reference's literal value.",
"owasp": "A09:2021 - Security Logging and Monitoring Failures",
"owasp_api": "",
"owasp_llm": "",
"cwe": "CWE-532",
"mitre_attack": "T1562.001 - Impair Defenses",
"severity": "Medium",
"difficulty": "Beginner",
"vulnerable_code": (
"def reconcile(req):\n"
" # Vulnerable: logs secret contents\n"
" logging.info('spec=%s', req.obj['spec'])\n"
),
"secure_code": (
"SENSITIVE = {'password', 'token', 'secret'}\n"
"def _redact(spec):\n"
" return {k: '***' if k.lower() in SENSITIVE else v for k, v in spec.items()}\n"
"def reconcile(req):\n"
" logging.info('spec=%s', _redact(req.obj['spec']))\n"
),
"patch": (
"--- a/operator.py\n"
"+++ b/operator.py\n"
"@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@\n"
"- logging.info('spec=%s', req.obj['spec'])\n"
"+ def _redact(spec):\n"
"+ return {k: '***' if k.lower() in SENSITIVE else v for k, v in spec.items()}\n"
"+ logging.info('spec=%s', _redact(req.obj['spec']))\n"
),
"root_cause": "Full resource specs containing secrets are written to logs.",
"attack": "Anyone with log access reads secret values.",
"impact": "Secret disclosure.",
"fix": "Redact sensitive fields before logging; never log secrets.",
"guideline": "Redact secrets in all logs; scrub sensitive keys.",
"tags": ["kubernetes", "logging", "python", "secrets"],
"metadata": {"domain": "Microservices", "input_source": "request_body", "auth_required": False},
},
# ================================================================== IoT ==================================================================
{
"id": "SCP-000102",
"language": "C",
"framework": "Embedded",
"title": "Hardcoded WiFi credentials in firmware",
"description": "An embedded IoT firmware stores WiFi credentials as string literals in flash.",
"owasp": "A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures",
"owasp_api": "",
"owasp_llm": "",
"cwe": "CWE-798",
"mitre_attack": "T1552.001 - Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files",
"severity": "High",
"difficulty": "Beginner",
"vulnerable_code": (
"const char *SSID = \"HomeNet\";\n"
"const char *PSK = \"password123\"; // Vulnerable: hardcoded\n"
),
"secure_code": (
"char ssid[33], psk[64];\n"
"// Secure: load from secure element / provisioning at first boot\n"
"if (load_credentials(ssid, psk) != 0) {\n"
" enter_provisioning_mode();\n"
"}\n"
),
"patch": (
"--- a/wifi.c\n"
"+++ b/wifi.c\n"
"@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@\n"
"-const char *SSID = \"HomeNet\";\n"
"-const char *PSK = \"password123\";\n"
"+char ssid[33], psk[64];\n"
"+if (load_credentials(ssid, psk) != 0) {\n"
"+ enter_provisioning_mode();\n"
"+}\n"
),
"root_cause": "Credentials compiled into firmware are recoverable by dumping flash.",
"attack": "Attacker extracts the firmware and reads the WiFi PSK for network access.",
"impact": "Network compromise via recovered credentials.",
"fix": "Store credentials in a secure element; provision at first boot.",
"guideline": "Never store secrets in firmware; use secure provisioning.",
"tags": ["iot", "c", "secrets", "firmware"],
"metadata": {"domain": "IoT", "input_source": "source_code", "auth_required": False},
},
{
"id": "SCP-000103",
"language": "C",
"framework": "Embedded",
"title": "Unauthenticated MQTT control topic",
"description": "An IoT device subscribes to a control topic without auth, allowing remote actuation.",
"owasp": "A01:2021 - Broken Access Control",
"owasp_api": "",
"owasp_llm": "",
"cwe": "CWE-306",
"mitre_attack": "T0883 - Internet Accessible Device",
"severity": "Critical",
"difficulty": "Intermediate",
"vulnerable_code": (
"void on_message(char *topic, char *payload) {\n"
" // Vulnerable: no auth on control topic\n"
" if (strcmp(topic, \"device/cmd\") == 0) actuate(payload);\n"
"}\n"
),
"secure_code": (
"void on_message(char *topic, char *payload, mqtt_conn *c) {\n"
" // Secure: require authenticated client + signed command\n"
" if (!c->authenticated) return;\n"
" if (strcmp(topic, \"device/cmd\") == 0 && verify_sig(payload, c->pubkey))\n"
" actuate(payload);\n"
"}\n"
),
"patch": (
"--- a/mqtt.c\n"
"+++ b/mqtt.c\n"
"@@ -1,4 +1,7 @@\n"
"- if (strcmp(topic, \"device/cmd\") == 0) actuate(payload);\n"
"+ if (!c->authenticated) return;\n"
"+ if (strcmp(topic, \"device/cmd\") == 0 && verify_sig(payload, c->pubkey))\n"
"+ actuate(payload);\n"
),
"root_cause": "Control commands are accepted from any client without authentication or integrity.",
"attack": "Attacker publishes to device/cmd to unlock doors or change settings.",
"impact": "Physical safety/security compromise.",
"fix": "Require authenticated, signed commands over TLS MQTT.",
"guideline": "Authenticate and sign IoT control commands; use MQTT over TLS.",
"tags": ["iot", "c", "mqtt", "auth"],
"metadata": {"domain": "IoT", "input_source": "network", "auth_required": True},
},
{
"id": "SCP-000104",
"language": "Python",
"framework": "MicroPython",
"title": "Telnet exposed without authentication on device",
"description": "An IoT gateway starts a Telnet server with no auth, giving root shell access.",
"owasp": "A07:2021 - Identification and Authentication Failures",
"owasp_api": "",
"owasp_llm": "",
"cwe": "CWE-306",
"mitre_attack": "T1021 - Remote Services",
"severity": "Critical",
"difficulty": "Beginner",
"vulnerable_code": (
"import utelnet\n"
"# Vulnerable: telnet with no auth\n"
"utelnet.start(port=23, login=None, password=None)\n"
),
"secure_code": (
"import ussl, socket\n"
"# Secure: SSH/TLS with key auth only\n"
"server = socket.socket()\n"
"server = ussl.wrap_socket(server, keyfile='dev.key', certfile='dev.crt')\n"
"server.bind(('', 22))\n"
"server.listen(1)\n"
),
"patch": (
"--- a/shell.py\n"
"+++ b/shell.py\n"
"@@ -1,4 +1,8 @@\n"
"-utelnet.start(port=23, login=None, password=None)\n"
"+server = socket.socket()\n"
"+server = ussl.wrap_socket(server, keyfile='dev.key', certfile='dev.crt')\n"
"+server.bind(('', 22))\n"
"+server.listen(1)\n"
),
"root_cause": "An unauthenticated Telnet server exposes a root shell on the LAN.",
"attack": "Anyone on the network connects and gains full device control.",
"impact": "Complete device compromise.",
"fix": "Disable Telnet; use SSH/TLS with key-based auth.",
"guideline": "Never expose unauthenticated shells; use SSH/TLS with keys.",
"tags": ["iot", "python", "telnet", "auth"],
"metadata": {"domain": "IoT", "input_source": "network", "auth_required": True},
},
{
"id": "SCP-000105",
"language": "C",
"framework": "Embedded",
"title": "Lack of firmware signature verification",
"description": "An IoT bootloader flashes any uploaded firmware without verifying a signature.",
"owasp": "A08:2021 - Software and Data Integrity Failures",
"owasp_api": "",
"owasp_llm": "",
"cwe": "CWE-494",
"mitre_attack": "T1195.002 - Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain",
"severity": "Critical",
"difficulty": "Advanced",
"vulnerable_code": (
"void flash(const uint8_t *img, size_t len) {\n"
" // Vulnerable: no signature check\n"
" write_to_flash(img, len);\n"
"}\n"
),
"secure_code": (
"void flash(const uint8_t *img, size_t len) {\n"
" // Secure: verify ECDSA signature with root public key\n"
" if (!ecdsa_verify(ROOT_PUB, img, len - 64, img + len - 64))\n"
" return;\n"
" write_to_flash(img, len - 64);\n"
"}\n"
),
"patch": (
"--- a/bootloader.c\n"
"+++ b/bootloader.c\n"
"@@ -1,4 +1,7 @@\n"
"- write_to_flash(img, len);\n"
"+ if (!ecdsa_verify(ROOT_PUB, img, len - 64, img + len - 64))\n"
"+ return;\n"
"+ write_to_flash(img, len - 64);\n"
),
"root_cause": "Firmware is flashed without verifying a trusted signature, enabling malicious images.",
"attack": "Attacker uploads a trojaned firmware that persists on the device.",
"impact": "Persistent device compromise, botnet recruitment.",
"fix": "Verify firmware signatures (ECDSA) against a rooted public key before flashing.",
"guideline": "Verify signed firmware; reject unsigned/modified images.",
"tags": ["iot", "c", "firmware", "supply-chain"],
"metadata": {"domain": "IoT", "input_source": "network", "auth_required": False},
},
{
"id": "SCP-000106",
"language": "Python",
"framework": "IoT Gateway",
"title": "Default credentials on management API",
"description": "An IoT gateway API accepts a hardcoded default admin password.",
"owasp": "A07:2021 - Identification and Authentication Failures",
"owasp_api": "API2:2023 - Broken Authentication",
"owasp_llm": "",
"cwe": "CWE-1392",
"mitre_attack": "T1078.001 - Valid Accounts: Default Accounts",
"severity": "Critical",
"difficulty": "Beginner",
"vulnerable_code": (
"def login(u, p):\n"
" # Vulnerable: default password\n"
" if u == 'admin' and p == 'admin':\n"
" return issue_token(u)\n"
),
"secure_code": (
"def login(u, p):\n"
" user = db.get_user(u)\n"
" if user and argon2.verify(p, user.pw_hash):\n"
" if not user.force_reset:\n"
" return issue_token(u)\n"
" return None\n"
),
"patch": (
"--- a/auth.py\n"
"+++ b/auth.py\n"
"@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@\n"
"- if u == 'admin' and p == 'admin':\n"
"- return issue_token(u)\n"
"+ user = db.get_user(u)\n"
"+ if user and argon2.verify(p, user.pw_hash):\n"
"+ return issue_token(u)\n"
),
"root_cause": "A static default credential grants trivial admin access.",
"attack": "Attacker logs in as admin with 'admin'/'admin'.",
"impact": "Full device/gateway takeover.",
"fix": "Store hashed credentials; force password change on first login; no defaults.",
"guideline": "No default credentials; use hashed passwords and forced reset.",
"tags": ["iot", "python", "default-creds", "auth"],
"metadata": {"domain": "IoT", "input_source": "form_field", "auth_required": False},
},
{
"id": "SCP-000107",
"language": "C",
"framework": "Embedded",
"title": "Stack-based buffer overflow in HTTP header parse",
"description": "An embedded web server copies a header value into a fixed stack buffer without bounds.",
"owasp": "A03:2021 - Injection",
"owasp_api": "",
"owasp_llm": "",
"cwe": "CWE-120",
"mitre_attack": "T1203 - Exploitation for Client Execution",
"severity": "Critical",
"difficulty": "Advanced",
"vulnerable_code": (
"void parse_header(char *line) {\n"
" char val[64];\n"
" // Vulnerable: strcpy from attacker input\n"
" strcpy(val, strchr(line, ':') + 1);\n"
"}\n"
),
"secure_code": (
"void parse_header(char *line) {\n"
" char val[64];\n"
" char *v = strchr(line, ':') + 1;\n"
" // Secure: bounded copy\n"
" strncpy(val, v, sizeof(val) - 1);\n"
" val[sizeof(val) - 1] = '\\0';\n"
"}\n"
),
"patch": (
"--- a/httpd.c\n"
"+++ b/httpd.c\n"
"@@ -3,4 +3,6 @@\n"
"- strcpy(val, strchr(line, ':') + 1);\n"
"+ char *v = strchr(line, ':') + 1;\n"
"+ strncpy(val, v, sizeof(val) - 1);\n"
"+ val[sizeof(val) - 1] = '\\0';\n"
),
"root_cause": "strcpy into a fixed buffer allows overflow with a long header value.",
"attack": "Send a huge header to overflow the stack and hijack execution.",
"impact": "Remote code execution on the device.",
"fix": "Use bounded copies (strncpy + NUL) or length-checked parsers.",
"guideline": "Avoid strcpy; bound all copies; compile with stack protectors.",
"tags": ["iot", "c", "buffer-overflow", "http"],
"metadata": {"domain": "IoT", "input_source": "network", "auth_required": False},
},
{
"id": "SCP-000108",
"language": "C++",
"framework": "Embedded",
"title": "Unencrypted telemetry transmission",
"description": "An IoT device sends sensor telemetry over plain HTTP, exposing it to interception.",
"owasp": "A02:2021 - Cryptographic Failures",
"owasp_api": "",
"owasp_llm": "",
"cwe": "CWE-319",
"mitre_attack": "T1557 - Adversary-in-the-Middle",
"severity": "Medium",
"difficulty": "Beginner",
"vulnerable_code": (
"void send_telemetry(const std::string& data) {\n"
" // Vulnerable: plain HTTP\n"
" http_post(\"http://collector/ingest\", data);\n"
"}\n"
),
"secure_code": (
"void send_telemetry(const std::string& data) {\n"
" // Secure: HTTPS with cert pinning\n"
" https_post(\"https://collector/ingest\", data, COLLECTOR_PINNED_CERT);\n"
"}\n"
),
"patch": (
"--- a/telemetry.cpp\n"
"+++ b/telemetry.cpp\n"
"@@ -2,4 +2,5 @@\n"
"- http_post(\"http://collector/ingest\", data);\n"
"+ https_post(\"https://collector/ingest\", data, COLLECTOR_PINNED_CERT);\n"
),
"root_cause": "Telemetry is transmitted without transport encryption, exposing data in transit.",
"attack": "On-path attacker reads sensor data or injects false telemetry.",
"impact": "Data interception/modification.",
"fix": "Use TLS with certificate pinning for all device communication.",
"guideline": "Encrypt all device telemetry with TLS + cert pinning.",
"tags": ["iot", "cpp", "tls", "telemetry"],
"metadata": {"domain": "IoT", "input_source": "network", "auth_required": False},
},
]
|