name: Pre-Release

# PRE-RELEASE PROCESS
#
# === Automated activities ===
#
# 1.  [Seal] Bump to release version and export source code with integrity hash
# 2.  [Quality check] Restore sealed source code, run tests, linting, security and complexity base line
# 3.  [Build] Restore sealed source code, create and export hashed build artifact for PyPi release (wheel, tarball)
# 4.  [Provenance] Generates provenance for build, signs attestation with GitHub OIDC claims to confirm it came from this release pipeline, commit, org, repo, branch, hash, etc.
# 5.  [Release] Restore built artifact, and publish package to PyPi prod repository
# 6.  [PR to bump version] Restore sealed source code, and create a PR to update trunk with latest released project metadata

# NOTE
#
# See MAINTAINERS.md "Releasing a new version" for release mechanisms
#
# Every job is isolated and starts a new fresh container.

env:
  RELEASE_COMMIT: ${{ github.sha }}

on:
  workflow_dispatch:
    inputs:
      skip_code_quality:
        description: "Skip tests, linting, and baseline. Only use if release fail for reasons beyond our control and you need a quick release."
        default: false
        type: boolean
        required: false
      skip_pypi:
        description: "Skip publishing to PyPi. Used for testing release steps."
        default: false
        type: boolean
        required: false
  schedule:
    # Note: run daily on weekdays at 8am UTC time
    - cron: "0 8 * * 1-5"

permissions:
  contents: read

jobs:

  # This job bumps the package version to the pre-release version
  # creates an integrity hash from the source code
  # uploads the artifact with the integrity hash as the key name
  # so subsequent jobs can restore from a trusted point in time to prevent tampering
  seal:
    # ignore forks
    if: github.repository == 'aws-powertools/powertools-lambda-python'

    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    permissions:
      contents: read
    outputs:
        integrity_hash: ${{ steps.seal_source_code.outputs.integrity_hash }}
        artifact_name: ${{ steps.seal_source_code.outputs.artifact_name }}
        RELEASE_VERSION: ${{ steps.release_version.outputs.RELEASE_VERSION }}
    steps:
      # NOTE: Different from prod release, we need both poetry and source code available in earlier steps to bump and verify.

      # We use a pinned version of Poetry to be certain it won't modify source code before we create a hash
      - name: Install poetry
        run: |
          pipx install git+https://github.com/python-poetry/poetry@68b88e5390720a3dd84f02940ec5200bfce39ac6 # v1.5.0
          pipx inject poetry git+https://github.com/monim67/poetry-bumpversion@315fe3324a699fa12ec20e202eb7375d4327d1c4 # v0.3.1

      - uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683  # v4.2.2
        with:
          ref: ${{ env.RELEASE_COMMIT }}

      - name: Bump and export release version
        id: release_version
        run: |
          RELEASE_VERSION="$(poetry version prerelease --short | head -n1 | tr -d '\n')"

          echo "RELEASE_VERSION=${RELEASE_VERSION}" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"

      - name: Verifies pre-release version semantics
        # verify pre-release semantics before proceeding to avoid versioning pollution
        # e.g., 2.40.0a1 and 2.40.0b2 are valid while 2.40.0 is not
        # NOTE. we do it in a separate step to handle edge cases like
        # `poetry` CLI uses immutable install, versioning behaviour could change even in a minor version (we had breaking changes before)
        # a separate step allows us to pinpoint what happened (before/after)
        run: |
          if [[ ! "$RELEASE_VERSION" =~ ^[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+[a-b].*$ ]]; then
            echo "Version $VERSION doesn't look like a pre-release version; aborting"
            exit 1
          fi
        env:
          RELEASE_VERSION: ${{ steps.release_version.outputs.RELEASE_VERSION}}

      - name: Seal and upload
        id: seal_source_code
        uses: ./.github/actions/seal
        with:
          artifact_name_prefix: "source"

  # This job runs our automated test suite, complexity and security baselines
  # it ensures previously merged have been tested as part of the pull request process
  #
  # NOTE
  #
  # we don't upload the artifact after testing to prevent any tampering of our source code dependencies
  quality_check:
    needs: seal
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    permissions:
      contents: read
    steps:
      # NOTE: we need actions/checkout to configure git first (pre-commit hooks in make dev)
      - uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683  # v4.2.2
        with:
          ref: ${{ env.RELEASE_COMMIT }}

      - name: Restore sealed source code
        uses: ./.github/actions/seal-restore
        with:
          integrity_hash: ${{ needs.seal.outputs.integrity_hash }}
          artifact_name: ${{ needs.seal.outputs.artifact_name }}

      - name: Debug cache restore
        run: cat pyproject.toml

      - name: Install poetry
        run: pipx install git+https://github.com/python-poetry/poetry@68b88e5390720a3dd84f02940ec5200bfce39ac6 # v1.5.0
      - name: Set up Python
        uses: actions/setup-python@0b93645e9fea7318ecaed2b359559ac225c90a2b # v5.3.0
        with:
          python-version: "3.12"
          cache: "poetry"
      - name: Install dependencies
        run: make dev
      - name: Run all tests, linting and baselines
        run: make pr

  # This job creates a release artifact (tar.gz, wheel)
  # it checks out code from release commit for custom actions to work
  # then restores the sealed source code (overwrites any potential tampering)
  # it's done separately from release job to enforce least privilege.
  # We export just the final build artifact for release
  build:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    needs: [quality_check, seal]
    permissions:
      contents: read
    outputs:
      integrity_hash: ${{ steps.seal_build.outputs.integrity_hash }}
      artifact_name: ${{ steps.seal_build.outputs.artifact_name }}
      attestation_hashes: ${{ steps.encoded_hash.outputs.attestation_hashes }}
    steps:
      # NOTE: we need actions/checkout to configure git first (pre-commit hooks in make dev)
      - uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683  # v4.2.2
        with:
          ref: ${{ env.RELEASE_COMMIT }}

      - name: Restore sealed source code
        uses: ./.github/actions/seal-restore
        with:
          integrity_hash: ${{ needs.seal.outputs.integrity_hash }}
          artifact_name: ${{ needs.seal.outputs.artifact_name }}

      - name: Install poetry
        run: pipx install git+https://github.com/python-poetry/poetry@68b88e5390720a3dd84f02940ec5200bfce39ac6 # v1.5.0
      - name: Set up Python
        uses: actions/setup-python@0b93645e9fea7318ecaed2b359559ac225c90a2b # v5.3.0
        with:
          python-version: "3.12"
          cache: "poetry"

      - name: Build python package and wheel
        run: poetry build

      - name: Seal and upload
        id: seal_build
        uses: ./.github/actions/seal
        with:
          artifact_name_prefix: "build"
          files: "dist/"

      # NOTE: SLSA retraces our build to its artifact to ensure it wasn't tampered
      # coupled with GitHub OIDC, SLSA can then confidently sign it came from this release pipeline+commit+branch+org+repo+actor+integrity hash
      - name: Create attestation encoded hash for provenance
        id: encoded_hash
        working-directory: dist
        run: echo "attestation_hashes=$(sha256sum ./* | base64 -w0)" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"

  # This job creates a provenance file that describes how our release was built (all steps)
  # after it verifies our build is reproducible within the same pipeline
  # it confirms that its own software and the CI build haven't been tampered with (Trust but verify)
  # lastly, it creates and sign an attestation (multiple.intoto.jsonl) that confirms
  # this build artifact came from this GitHub org, branch, actor, commit ID, inputs that triggered this pipeline, and matches its integrity hash
  # NOTE: supply chain threats review (we protect against all of them now): https://slsa.dev/spec/v1.0/threats-overview
  provenance:
    needs: [seal, build]
    permissions:
      contents: write # nested job explicitly require despite upload assets being set to false
      actions: read # To read the workflow path.
      id-token: write # To sign the provenance.
    # NOTE: provenance fails if we use action pinning... it's a Github limitation
    # because SLSA needs to trace & attest it came from a given branch; pinning doesn't expose that information
    # https://github.com/slsa-framework/slsa-github-generator/blob/main/internal/builders/generic/README.md#referencing-the-slsa-generator
    uses: slsa-framework/slsa-github-generator/.github/workflows/generator_generic_slsa3.yml@v2.0.0
    with:
      base64-subjects: ${{ needs.build.outputs.attestation_hashes }}
      upload-assets: false  # we upload its attestation in create_tag job, otherwise it creates a new release

  # This job uses release artifact to publish to PyPi
  # it exchanges JWT tokens with GitHub to obtain PyPi credentials
  # since it's already registered as a Trusted Publisher.
  # It uses the sealed build artifact (.whl, .tar.gz) to release it
  release:
    needs: [build, seal, provenance]
    environment: pre-release
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    permissions:
      id-token: write # OIDC for PyPi Trusted Publisher feature
    env:
      RELEASE_VERSION: ${{ needs.seal.outputs.RELEASE_VERSION }}
    steps:
      # NOTE: we need actions/checkout in order to use our local actions (e.g., ./.github/actions)
      - uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683  # v4.2.2
        with:
          ref: ${{ env.RELEASE_COMMIT }}

      - name: Restore sealed source code
        uses: ./.github/actions/seal-restore
        with:
          integrity_hash: ${{ needs.build.outputs.integrity_hash }}
          artifact_name: ${{ needs.build.outputs.artifact_name }}

      - name: Upload to PyPi prod
        if: ${{ !inputs.skip_pypi }}
        uses: pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish@15c56dba361d8335944d31a2ecd17d700fc7bcbc # v1.12.2

  # Creates a PR with the latest version we've just released
  # since our trunk is protected against any direct pushes from automation
  bump_version:
    needs: [release, seal, provenance]
    permissions:
      contents: write  # create-pr action creates a temporary branch
      pull-requests: write # create-pr action creates a PR using the temporary branch
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      # NOTE: we need actions/checkout to authenticate and configure git first
      - uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683  # v4.2.2
        with:
          ref: ${{ env.RELEASE_COMMIT }}

      - name: Restore sealed source code
        uses: ./.github/actions/seal-restore
        with:
          integrity_hash: ${{ needs.seal.outputs.integrity_hash }}
          artifact_name: ${{ needs.seal.outputs.artifact_name }}

      - name: Download provenance
        uses: actions/download-artifact@fa0a91b85d4f404e444e00e005971372dc801d16 # v4.1.8
        with:
          name: ${{needs.provenance.outputs.provenance-name}}

      - name: Update provenance
        run: mkdir -p "${PROVENANCE_DIR}" && mv "${PROVENANCE_FILE}" "${PROVENANCE_DIR}/"
        env:
          PROVENANCE_FILE: ${{ needs.provenance.outputs.provenance-name }}
          PROVENANCE_DIR: provenance/${{ needs.seal.outputs.RELEASE_VERSION}}

      - name: Create PR
        id: create-pr
        uses: ./.github/actions/create-pr
        with:
          files: "pyproject.toml aws_lambda_powertools/shared/version.py provenance/"
          temp_branch_prefix: "ci-bump"
          pull_request_title: "chore(ci): new pre-release ${{ needs.seal.outputs.RELEASE_VERSION }}"
          github_token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}