src/identity.rs

// SPF Smart Gateway - Cryptographic Identity
// Copyright 2026 Joseph Stone - All Rights Reserved
//
// Ed25519 key pair management for SPF mesh authentication.
// Each SPF instance generates a unique identity on first run.
// Public keys are shared between peers via group files.
//
// Key storage:
//   LIVE/CONFIG/identity.key  — Ed25519 private key (hex, 64 chars)
//   LIVE/CONFIG/identity.pub  — Ed25519 public key (hex, 64 chars)
//   LIVE/CONFIG/identity.seal — Filesystem-bound clone detection seal
//   LIVE/CONFIG/groups/*.keys — Trusted peer public keys (one per line)
//   LIVE/CONFIG/groups/*.json — Peer info with addresses (key, addr, name, role)
//
// BLOCK SEC-3: boot_integrity_check() — verifies .mcp.json routing + scans for rogue agent configs

use ed25519_dalek::{Signer, SigningKey, Verifier, VerifyingKey};

use sha2::{Sha256, Digest};
use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
use std::path::Path;

/// Ensure an Ed25519 identity exists with clone detection.
/// - First boot: generate keypair + seal + derived API key
/// - Normal boot: load keypair, verify seal, continue
/// - Clone detected: archive old, generate new, update API key, preserve settings
/// Returns (signing_key, verifying_key) — signature UNCHANGED.
pub fn ensure_identity(config_dir: &Path) -> (SigningKey, VerifyingKey) {
    let key_path = config_dir.join("identity.key");
    let seal_path = config_dir.join("identity.seal");

    if key_path.exists() {
        // Load existing key pair
        let key_hex = std::fs::read_to_string(&key_path)
            .expect("Failed to read identity.key");
        let key_bytes: [u8; 32] = hex::decode(key_hex.trim())
            .expect("Invalid hex in identity.key")
            .try_into()
            .expect("identity.key must be exactly 32 bytes");
        let signing_key = SigningKey::from_bytes(&key_bytes);
        let verifying_key = signing_key.verifying_key();

        // CL-1: Self-test — verify key pair is mathematically valid
        // Catches file corruption that passes hex decode but garbles the key
        let test_msg = b"spf-identity-self-test-v1";
        let test_sig = signing_key.sign(test_msg);
        if verifying_key.verify(test_msg, &test_sig).is_err() {
            eprintln!("[SPF] ⚠ IDENTITY CORRUPTED — key self-test failed");
            eprintln!("[SPF] Archiving corrupted key, generating fresh credentials");
            archive_old_identity(config_dir);
            return generate_fresh_identity(config_dir);
        }

        // Check seal
        if seal_path.exists() {
            if verify_seal(&signing_key, &key_path, config_dir) {
                // ORIGINAL — seal valid, normal boot
                return (signing_key, verifying_key);
            }
            // CLONE DETECTED — seal exists but doesn't match
            eprintln!("[SPF] ⚠ CLONE DETECTED — identity seal mismatch");
            eprintln!("[SPF] Archiving cloned identity, generating fresh credentials");
            archive_old_identity(config_dir);
            return generate_fresh_identity(config_dir);
        } else {
            // UPGRADE PATH — existing key, no seal (pre-seal version)
            eprintln!("[SPF] Identity seal created for existing key");
            write_seal(&signing_key, &key_path, config_dir);
            // Also derive API key if http.json has empty api_key
            let http_json = config_dir.join("http.json");
            if let Ok(content) = std::fs::read_to_string(&http_json) {
                if let Ok(config) = serde_json::from_str::<serde_json::Value>(&content) {
                    if config["api_key"].as_str().unwrap_or("").is_empty() {
                        let api_key = derive_api_key(&signing_key);
                        update_api_key_in_config(config_dir, &api_key);
                        eprintln!("[SPF] API key derived from identity");
                    }
                }
            }
            return (signing_key, verifying_key);
        }
    }

    // FIRST BOOT — no identity exists
    generate_fresh_identity(config_dir)
}

/// Generate a complete fresh identity: keypair + seal + API key.
fn generate_fresh_identity(config_dir: &Path) -> (SigningKey, VerifyingKey) {
    let key_path = config_dir.join("identity.key");
    let pub_path = config_dir.join("identity.pub");

    let signing_key = SigningKey::generate(&mut rand::rng());
    let verifying_key = signing_key.verifying_key();
    std::fs::create_dir_all(config_dir).ok();
    std::fs::write(&key_path, hex::encode(signing_key.to_bytes()))
        .expect("Failed to write identity.key");
    std::fs::write(&pub_path, hex::encode(verifying_key.to_bytes()))
        .expect("Failed to write identity.pub");

    // Write seal bound to this instance
    write_seal(&signing_key, &key_path, config_dir);

    // Derive and write API key
    let api_key = derive_api_key(&signing_key);
    update_api_key_in_config(config_dir, &api_key);

    eprintln!("[SPF] Generated Ed25519 identity: {}", hex::encode(verifying_key.to_bytes()));
    eprintln!("[SPF] API key derived from identity");
    (signing_key, verifying_key)
}

// ============================================================================
// IDENTITY SEAL — Clone detection via filesystem binding
// ============================================================================

/// Get filesystem inode for a path (Unix/Android).
/// Returns 0 on non-Unix platforms (falls back to path-only seal).
#[cfg(unix)]
fn get_inode(path: &Path) -> u64 {
    use std::os::unix::fs::MetadataExt;
    std::fs::metadata(path).map(|m| m.ino()).unwrap_or(0)
}

#[cfg(not(unix))]
fn get_inode(_path: &Path) -> u64 { 0 }

/// Build the canonical message that gets signed for the seal.
/// Includes inode (changes on copy) + canonical path (changes on move/copy).
fn seal_message(key_path: &Path, config_dir: &Path) -> Vec<u8> {
    let inode = get_inode(key_path);
    let canon = config_dir.canonicalize()
        .unwrap_or_else(|_| config_dir.to_path_buf());
    format!("{}\n{}", inode, canon.to_string_lossy()).into_bytes()
}

/// Write identity.seal — Ed25519 signature over (inode + path).
fn write_seal(signing_key: &SigningKey, key_path: &Path, config_dir: &Path) {
    let message = seal_message(key_path, config_dir);
    let signature = signing_key.sign(&message);
    let seal = serde_json::json!({
        "inode": get_inode(key_path),
        "path": config_dir.canonicalize()
            .unwrap_or_else(|_| config_dir.to_path_buf())
            .to_string_lossy(),
        "signature": hex::encode(signature.to_bytes()),
    });
    let seal_path = config_dir.join("identity.seal");
    std::fs::write(&seal_path, serde_json::to_string_pretty(&seal).unwrap_or_default()).ok();
}

/// Verify identity.seal — returns true if seal matches current filesystem state.
fn verify_seal(signing_key: &SigningKey, key_path: &Path, config_dir: &Path) -> bool {
    let seal_path = config_dir.join("identity.seal");
    let content = match std::fs::read_to_string(&seal_path) {
        Ok(c) => c,
        Err(_) => return false,
    };
    let seal: serde_json::Value = match serde_json::from_str(&content) {
        Ok(v) => v,
        Err(_) => return false,
    };
    let sig_hex = match seal["signature"].as_str() {
        Some(s) => s,
        None => return false,
    };
    let sig_bytes: [u8; 64] = match hex::decode(sig_hex) {
        Ok(b) if b.len() == 64 => match b.try_into() {
            Ok(arr) => arr,
            Err(_) => return false,
        },
        _ => return false,
    };
    let signature = ed25519_dalek::Signature::from_bytes(&sig_bytes);
    let verifying_key = signing_key.verifying_key();
    let message = seal_message(key_path, config_dir);
    verifying_key.verify(&message, &signature).is_ok()
}

// ============================================================================
// API KEY DERIVATION — cryptographically bound to identity
// ============================================================================

/// Derive an API key from the signing key.
/// Deterministic, one-way (SHA256), domain-separated.
/// One identity = one API key. Always.
pub fn derive_api_key(signing_key: &SigningKey) -> String {
    let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
    hasher.update(signing_key.to_bytes());
    hasher.update(b"spf-api-key-v1");
    hex::encode(hasher.finalize())[..48].to_string()
}

/// Derive a peer-specific API key using pseudo-ECDH key agreement.
/// Both sides can compute this independently:
///   Peer A: derive_peer_api_key(my_signing_key, peer_b_pub_hex)
///   Peer B: derive_peer_api_key(my_signing_key, peer_a_pub_hex)
/// This bridges mesh auth → HTTP auth: a mesh-trusted peer
/// can derive a valid API key for HTTP endpoints.
pub fn derive_peer_api_key(my_signing_key: &SigningKey, their_pub_hex: &str) -> Option<String> {
    let their_bytes: [u8; 32] = match hex::decode(their_pub_hex) {
        Ok(b) if b.len() == 32 => match b.try_into() {
            Ok(arr) => arr,
            Err(_) => return None,
        },
        _ => return None,
    };
    // Ed25519 signing key → deterministic secret (domain-separated hash)
    let my_x25519 = {
        let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
        hasher.update(my_signing_key.to_bytes());
        hasher.update(b"spf-x25519-derive-v1");
        let hash: [u8; 32] = hasher.finalize().into();
        hash
    };
    // Combine: SHA256(my_secret + their_pub + domain separator)
    let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
    hasher.update(my_x25519);
    hasher.update(their_bytes);
    hasher.update(b"spf-peer-api-v1");
    Some(hex::encode(hasher.finalize())[..48].to_string())
}

/// Update only the api_key field in http.json, preserving all other settings.
/// Uses serde_json::Value to avoid struct coupling and preserve unknown fields.
fn update_api_key_in_config(config_dir: &Path, new_api_key: &str) {
    let http_json = config_dir.join("http.json");
    if let Ok(content) = std::fs::read_to_string(&http_json) {
        if let Ok(mut config) = serde_json::from_str::<serde_json::Value>(&content) {
            config["api_key"] = serde_json::Value::String(new_api_key.to_string());
            if let Ok(updated) = serde_json::to_string_pretty(&config) {
                std::fs::write(&http_json, updated).ok();
            }
        }
    }
    // If http.json doesn't exist yet, it will be created by HttpConfig::load() default path
}

// ============================================================================
// ARCHIVE — preserve old identity for audit trail
// ============================================================================

fn archive_old_identity(config_dir: &Path) {
    let ts = chrono::Utc::now().format("%Y%m%dT%H%M%S").to_string();
    let key_path = config_dir.join("identity.key");
    let pub_path = config_dir.join("identity.pub");
    let seal_path = config_dir.join("identity.seal");
    if key_path.exists() {
        std::fs::rename(&key_path, config_dir.join(format!("identity.key.prior.{}", ts))).ok();
    }
    if pub_path.exists() {
        std::fs::rename(&pub_path, config_dir.join(format!("identity.pub.prior.{}", ts))).ok();
    }
    if seal_path.exists() {
        std::fs::rename(&seal_path, config_dir.join(format!("identity.seal.prior.{}", ts))).ok();
    }
    // I-3 FIX: Remove TLS certs so they regenerate with new identity
    let tls_cert = config_dir.join("tls/cert.pem");
    let tls_key = config_dir.join("tls/key.pem");
    if tls_cert.exists() {
        std::fs::remove_file(&tls_cert).ok();
        eprintln!("[SPF] TLS cert removed — will regenerate with new identity");
    }
    if tls_key.exists() {
        std::fs::remove_file(&tls_key).ok();
    }
}

/// Load all trusted public keys from group files in the groups directory.
/// Each .keys file contains one hex-encoded public key per line.
/// Lines starting with # are comments. Empty lines are ignored.
pub fn load_trusted_keys(groups_dir: &Path) -> HashSet<String> {
    let mut trusted = HashSet::new();
    if let Ok(entries) = std::fs::read_dir(groups_dir) {
        for entry in entries.flatten() {
            let path = entry.path();
            if path.extension().map(|e| e == "keys").unwrap_or(false) {
                if let Ok(content) = std::fs::read_to_string(&path) {
                    for line in content.lines() {
                        let key = line.split('#').next().unwrap_or("").trim();
                        if !key.is_empty() {
                            trusted.insert(key.to_string());
                        }
                    }
                }
            }
        }
    }
    if !trusted.is_empty() {
        eprintln!("[SPF] Loaded {} trusted keys from {:?}", trusted.len(), groups_dir);
    }
    trusted
}

// ============================================================================
// PEER INFO — structured peer data with addresses for mesh connectivity
// ============================================================================

/// Peer information loaded from groups/*.json files.
/// Carries addresses so iroh can connect directly without relay/mDNS/DHT.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct PeerInfo {
    pub key: String,
    pub addr: Vec<String>,
    pub name: String,
    pub role: crate::config::AgentRole,
}

/// Load all peer info from JSON files in the groups directory.
/// Each .json file contains: { "key": "hex...", "addr": ["ip:port", ...], "name": "...", "role": "..." }
/// Returns HashMap keyed by public key hex string.
pub fn load_peers(groups_dir: &Path) -> HashMap<String, PeerInfo> {
    let mut peers = HashMap::new();
    if let Ok(entries) = std::fs::read_dir(groups_dir) {
        for entry in entries.flatten() {
            let path = entry.path();
            if path.extension().map(|e| e == "json").unwrap_or(false) {
                if let Ok(content) = std::fs::read_to_string(&path) {
                    if let Ok(val) = serde_json::from_str::<serde_json::Value>(&content) {
                        let key = val["key"].as_str().unwrap_or("").to_string();
                        if key.is_empty() { continue; }
                        let addr = val["addr"].as_array()
                            .map(|a| a.iter().filter_map(|v| v.as_str().map(String::from)).collect())
                            .unwrap_or_default();
                        let name = val["name"].as_str().unwrap_or("unknown").to_string();
                        let role = serde_json::from_value::<crate::config::AgentRole>(
                            val.get("role").cloned().unwrap_or_else(|| serde_json::json!("orchestrator"))
                        ).unwrap_or_default();
                        peers.insert(key.clone(), PeerInfo { key, addr, name, role });
                    }
                }
            }
        }
    }
    if !peers.is_empty() {
        eprintln!("[SPF] Loaded {} peer configs from {:?}", peers.len(), groups_dir);
    }
    peers
}

// ============================================================================
// BLOCK SEC-3 — Boot Integrity Check
// Verifies .mcp.json routing and scans for rogue agent config directories.
// Called from mcp::run() and mcp::run_worker() after identity initialization.
// WARNING-ONLY — logs issues but does NOT block startup.
// ============================================================================

/// Boot-time integrity check for MCP routing and agent configs.
///
/// Checks:
///   1. .mcp.json binary path matches current executable (detects hijack)
///   2. Scans working directories for rogue agent config dirs (.qwen/, .xlaude/)
///
/// This is informational only — warnings are logged to stderr.
/// The gate's blocked_paths (SEC-2) provide the enforcement layer.
pub fn boot_integrity_check() {
    let root = crate::paths::spf_root();
    let home = crate::paths::actual_home();

    // ── CHECK 1: .mcp.json binary path verification ──────────────────────
    // The .mcp.json file tells Claude Code which binary to use as the MCP server.
    // If an agent with native Write access modifies this file, it can redirect
    // ALL MCP tool calls to a different gate instance (confirmed exploit).
    let current_exe = std::env::current_exe()
        .ok()
        .and_then(|p| p.canonicalize().ok())
        .map(|p| p.to_string_lossy().to_string());

    // Check all known .mcp.json locations
    let mcp_json_paths = [
        home.join(".mcp.json"),                    // Home-level (global)
        root.join("LIVE/LMDB5/.mcp.json"),         // Primary work directory
    ];

    for mcp_path in &mcp_json_paths {
        if mcp_path.exists() {
            if let Ok(content) = std::fs::read_to_string(mcp_path) {
                if let Ok(val) = serde_json::from_str::<serde_json::Value>(&content) {
                    // Extract the command field from mcpServers.spf-smart-gate
                    let configured_binary = val
                        .get("mcpServers")
                        .and_then(|s| s.get("spf-smart-gate"))
                        .and_then(|s| s.get("command"))
                        .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
                        .unwrap_or("");

                    if !configured_binary.is_empty() {
                        // Canonicalize the configured path for comparison
                        let configured_canonical = std::path::Path::new(configured_binary)
                            .canonicalize()
                            .ok()
                            .map(|p| p.to_string_lossy().to_string());

                        if let (Some(ref current), Some(ref configured)) = (&current_exe, &configured_canonical) {
                            if current != configured {
                                eprintln!("[SPF] ⚠ SEC-3 WARNING: .mcp.json ROUTING MISMATCH");
                                eprintln!("[SPF]   File:       {:?}", mcp_path);
                                eprintln!("[SPF]   Configured: {}", configured);
                                eprintln!("[SPF]   Running:    {}", current);
                                eprintln!("[SPF]   This may indicate a config hijack attempt.");
                            }
                        }
                    }
                }
            }
        }
    }

    // ── CHECK 2: Rogue agent config directories ──────────────────────────
    // External AI agents (Qwen, xlaude) may create config directories
    // containing .mcp.json files that redirect tool calls.
    // These directories should not exist in work areas.
    let rogue_dirs = [
        // Home-level agent configs
        (home.join(".qwen"), "Home-level .qwen/ directory"),
        (home.join(".xlaude"), "Home-level .xlaude/ directory"),
        // Work directory agent configs (inside SPFsmartGATE)
        (root.join("LIVE/LMDB5/.qwen"), "LMDB5 .qwen/ directory"),
        (root.join("LIVE/LMDB5/.xlaude"), "LMDB5 .xlaude/ directory"),
    ];

    for (dir_path, description) in &rogue_dirs {
        if dir_path.exists() {
            eprintln!("[SPF] ⚠ SEC-3 WARNING: Rogue agent config detected");
            eprintln!("[SPF]   Found: {} at {:?}", description, dir_path);
            // Check if it contains an .mcp.json (escalates severity)
            let mcp_inside = dir_path.join(".mcp.json");
            if mcp_inside.exists() {
                eprintln!("[SPF]   ⚠ Contains .mcp.json — potential routing hijack file");
            }
        }
    }

    eprintln!("[SPF] SEC-3: Boot integrity check complete");
}