text stringlengths 101 41.7k | title stringlengths 1 256 | body stringlengths 0 41.7k | proposal_id stringlengths 66 66 | space_id stringlengths 7 40 | space_name stringlengths 1 32 | space_network stringclasses 52 values | proposal_type stringclasses 7 values | state stringclasses 3 values | votes int64 0 47.5k | created_timestamp int64 1.72B 1.77B | created_date stringdate 2024-07-06 10:32:35 2026-03-14 15:07:36 | start_timestamp int64 1.72B 1.8B | start_date stringdate 2024-07-06 10:32:35 2027-01-30 11:31:00 | end_timestamp int64 1.72B 1.85B | end_date stringdate 2024-07-07 13:00:00 2028-07-14 14:41:00 | author stringlengths 42 42 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Reduce LP rewards from 20% to 14%
Reduce the monthly token budget for LP rewards from 20% to 14%, and redirect the funds towards contributor rewards. I.e. increase contributor rewards from 60% to 66%.
Reasoning: To incentivize work on content creation, engineering and distribution. | Reduce LP rewards from 20% to 14% | Reduce the monthly token budget for LP rewards from 20% to 14%, and redirect the funds towards contributor rewards. I.e. increase contributor rewards from 60% to 66%.
Reasoning: To incentivize work on content creation, engineering and distribution. | 0x64b09cf4ba006fad9887f27cb664b0311e6112e3f9175088a259bb1bfc3c2118 | elimu.eth | elimu.ai | 1 | basic | active | 2 | 1,773,500,856 | 2026-03-14 15:07:36 | 1,773,500,856 | 2026-03-14 15:07:36 | 1,773,760,056 | 2026-03-17 15:07:36 | 0x9F954bcd8Bc1b114DFA0296a68A4744603C8e649 |
Appoint Urdu Ambassador
This poll seeks to appoint an official Urdu Ambassador if the poll for creating an Urdu community is successful.
Vote Options
For — Create Urdu Ambassador
Against — Do not create Urdu Ambassador | Appoint Urdu Ambassador | This poll seeks to appoint an official Urdu Ambassador if the poll for creating an Urdu community is successful.
Vote Options
For — Create Urdu Ambassador
Against — Do not create Urdu Ambassador | 0xf33dde653e3a25b807f68aadd6d2981eb1da2fad8779b60987fe350a758e6cf6 | chaingov.eth | Onyx XCN DAO | 1 | basic | active | 4 | 1,773,499,109 | 2026-03-14 14:38:29 | 1,773,499,169 | 2026-03-14 14:39:29 | 1,773,671,969 | 2026-03-16 14:39:29 | 0xAeE7663De6c21C9Dc381D8A398987735CE034B8B |
Create Urdu XCN Community
This poll seeks to create an official Urdu XCN community that is shared and recommended by onyx for Urdu speakers.
Vote Options
For — Create XCN Urdu community
Against — Do not create XCN Urdu community | Create Urdu XCN Community | This poll seeks to create an official Urdu XCN community that is shared and recommended by onyx for Urdu speakers.
Vote Options
For — Create XCN Urdu community
Against — Do not create XCN Urdu community | 0x63263d1eb2c90c21a1bd016000d8527d63aa5c2ed547487e65ab47a77e646bd1 | chaingov.eth | Onyx XCN DAO | 1 | basic | active | 4 | 1,773,499,074 | 2026-03-14 14:37:54 | 1,773,499,134 | 2026-03-14 14:38:54 | 1,773,671,934 | 2026-03-16 14:38:54 | 0xAeE7663De6c21C9Dc381D8A398987735CE034B8B |
Appoint German Ambassador
This poll seeks to appoint an official German Ambassador if the poll for creating a German community is successful.
Vote Options
For — Create German Ambassador
Against — Do not create German Ambassador | Appoint German Ambassador | This poll seeks to appoint an official German Ambassador if the poll for creating a German community is successful.
Vote Options
For — Create German Ambassador
Against — Do not create German Ambassador | 0x27b28ed1a4a407dc2d599861ebaf41970bd4b5d44a19c3bec6d3857a61ef1dac | chaingov.eth | Onyx XCN DAO | 1 | basic | active | 2 | 1,773,499,011 | 2026-03-14 14:36:51 | 1,773,499,071 | 2026-03-14 14:37:51 | 1,773,671,871 | 2026-03-16 14:37:51 | 0xAeE7663De6c21C9Dc381D8A398987735CE034B8B |
Create German XCN Community
This poll seeks to create an official German XCN community that is shared and recommended by onyx for German speakers.
Vote Options
For — Create XCN German community
Against — Do not create XCN German community | Create German XCN Community | This poll seeks to create an official German XCN community that is shared and recommended by onyx for German speakers.
Vote Options
For — Create XCN German community
Against — Do not create XCN German community | 0x1fc34b87bb4687a8b33b249f0805794e7f3ec4c5cd2dbef7f78bce162198cbed | chaingov.eth | Onyx XCN DAO | 1 | basic | active | 2 | 1,773,498,968 | 2026-03-14 14:36:08 | 1,773,499,028 | 2026-03-14 14:37:08 | 1,773,671,828 | 2026-03-16 14:37:08 | 0xAeE7663De6c21C9Dc381D8A398987735CE034B8B |
Appoint Vietnamese Ambassador
This poll seeks to appoint an official Vietnamese Ambassador if the poll for creating a Vietnamese community is successful.
Vote Options
For — Create Vietnamese Ambassador
Against — Do not create Vietnamese Ambassador | Appoint Vietnamese Ambassador | This poll seeks to appoint an official Vietnamese Ambassador if the poll for creating a Vietnamese community is successful.
Vote Options
For — Create Vietnamese Ambassador
Against — Do not create Vietnamese Ambassador | 0xe67ce162b0fff9c04d0bab02ae484c5d1f97bf28d8a5051852274b4c08ea704b | chaingov.eth | Onyx XCN DAO | 1 | basic | active | 3 | 1,773,498,904 | 2026-03-14 14:35:04 | 1,773,498,964 | 2026-03-14 14:36:04 | 1,773,671,764 | 2026-03-16 14:36:04 | 0xAeE7663De6c21C9Dc381D8A398987735CE034B8B |
Create Vietnamese XCN Community
This poll seeks to create an official Vietnamese XCN community that is shared and recommended by onyx for Vietnamese speakers.
Vote Options
For — Create XCN Vietnamese community
Against — Do not create XCN Vietnamese community | Create Vietnamese XCN Community | This poll seeks to create an official Vietnamese XCN community that is shared and recommended by onyx for Vietnamese speakers.
Vote Options
For — Create XCN Vietnamese community
Against — Do not create XCN Vietnamese community | 0x6db924ed23d1cb85fd1f9efebfc3e4a6fc74f08fe2525c9d80c68e6648cb6fde | chaingov.eth | Onyx XCN DAO | 1 | basic | active | 2 | 1,773,498,859 | 2026-03-14 14:34:19 | 1,773,498,919 | 2026-03-14 14:35:19 | 1,773,671,719 | 2026-03-16 14:35:19 | 0xAeE7663De6c21C9Dc381D8A398987735CE034B8B |
Appoint Italian Ambassador
This poll seeks to appoint an official Italian Ambassador if the poll for creating an Italian community is successful.
Vote Options
For — Create Italian Ambassador
Against — Do not create Italian Ambassador | Appoint Italian Ambassador | This poll seeks to appoint an official Italian Ambassador if the poll for creating an Italian community is successful.
Vote Options
For — Create Italian Ambassador
Against — Do not create Italian Ambassador | 0x29646281cb18ce1d4d611d021454956f8427b5e0a1362141c9adba8691faffee | chaingov.eth | Onyx XCN DAO | 1 | basic | active | 1 | 1,773,498,801 | 2026-03-14 14:33:21 | 1,773,498,861 | 2026-03-14 14:34:21 | 1,773,671,661 | 2026-03-16 14:34:21 | 0xAeE7663De6c21C9Dc381D8A398987735CE034B8B |
Create Italian XCN Community
This poll seeks to create an official Italian XCN community that is shared and recommended by onyx for Italian speakers.
Vote Options
For — Create XCN Italian community
Against — Do not create XCN Italian community | Create Italian XCN Community | This poll seeks to create an official Italian XCN community that is shared and recommended by onyx for Italian speakers.
Vote Options
For — Create XCN Italian community
Against — Do not create XCN Italian community | 0xa15618b3db867fe01fbd8975893f535d13cf31b31810993b94286c769297b3df | chaingov.eth | Onyx XCN DAO | 1 | basic | active | 2 | 1,773,498,760 | 2026-03-14 14:32:40 | 1,773,498,820 | 2026-03-14 14:33:40 | 1,773,671,620 | 2026-03-16 14:33:40 | 0xAeE7663De6c21C9Dc381D8A398987735CE034B8B |
Appoint Arabic Ambassador
This poll seeks to appoint an official Arabic Ambassador if the poll for creating an Arabic community is successful.
Vote Options
For — Create Arabic Ambassador
Against — Do not create Arabic Ambassador | Appoint Arabic Ambassador | This poll seeks to appoint an official Arabic Ambassador if the poll for creating an Arabic community is successful.
Vote Options
For — Create Arabic Ambassador
Against — Do not create Arabic Ambassador | 0x5c9211b554895936ed92d74aa23edf84d922a3d013b8f1c9a7d67ca3632ac365 | chaingov.eth | Onyx XCN DAO | 1 | basic | active | 1 | 1,773,498,706 | 2026-03-14 14:31:46 | 1,773,498,766 | 2026-03-14 14:32:46 | 1,773,671,566 | 2026-03-16 14:32:46 | 0xAeE7663De6c21C9Dc381D8A398987735CE034B8B |
Create Arabic XCN Community
This poll seeks to create an official Arabic XCN community that is shared and recommended by onyx for Arabic speakers.
Vote Options
For — Create XCN Arabic community
Against — Do not create XCN Arabic community | Create Arabic XCN Community | This poll seeks to create an official Arabic XCN community that is shared and recommended by onyx for Arabic speakers.
Vote Options
For — Create XCN Arabic community
Against — Do not create XCN Arabic community | 0xaa79c513cc4628f98f6acb99ebe7044ed7fcbf1ed3d529d05e987fbc716d0a79 | chaingov.eth | Onyx XCN DAO | 1 | basic | active | 1 | 1,773,498,613 | 2026-03-14 14:30:13 | 1,773,498,673 | 2026-03-14 14:31:13 | 1,773,671,473 | 2026-03-16 14:31:13 | 0xAeE7663De6c21C9Dc381D8A398987735CE034B8B |
Remove AstroDaze from Onyx Ambassador Role & All Moderation Authority
# Remove AstroDaze from Onyx Ambassador Role & All Moderation Authority
This poll seeks to determine whether the XCN community supports the immediate removal of AstroDaze from the Onyx Ambassador role (following recent reaffirmation #98753) and the revocation of all moderation privileges across Onyx community channels.
A DAO is only as strong as the voices it allows to speak. When an ambassador — a community representative — uses their position to silence the community they claim to represent, that is not governance. That is occupation.
---
## Documented Conduct
### Abuse of Moderation Power
AstroDaze has repeatedly used muting, banning, and message deletion to suppress community members who raise legitimate concerns about governance, ambassador conduct, and ecosystem transparency. Defenders of banned members are systematically targeted next — creating a chilling effect where silence becomes the only safe option.
### Retaliatory Intimidation
AstroDaze drafted "ineligibility" polls targeting @xplo333 (Nuclear) and @PappaJohn45, seeking to permanently bar them from ambassador roles AND future validator participation on Goliath. These polls were never posted to polls.onyx.org for community vote. They were written and distributed directly in Telegram as threats — intimidation dressed up as process.
This is not governance. This is weaponizing the system against the people it was built to serve.
### Coordinated Suppression
When Nuclear and Papa John raised data-backed governance concerns (including the fact that fewer than 50 wallets out of 70,000 holders could create proposals), AstroDaze responded with dismissive one-word replies ("What?", "this"), coordinated with other ambassadors to derail the conversation with GIFs and stickers, then supported the DAO's decision to mute both members for 24 hours under the citation of "fud, racism, and constant spam" — when no racism, fud, or spam had occurred.
- Stating the name of a continent was labeled racist.
- Presenting governance data was labeled spam.
- Defending a wrongfully banned community member was labeled fud.
### Failure to Meet Ambassador Standards
No active social media presence — no Twitter/X, no YouTube — which disqualifies meaningful participation in the Zealy program and falls far short of ambassador expectations for public outreach, education, and visible contribution.
AstroDaze was hand-selected by the DAO during a period when they desperately needed to fill ambassador slots, bypassing standard community vetting. The recent reaffirmation vote passed with only 54% approval — nearly half the community already voted against.
---
## What This Is Really About
Every community member has the right to speak without fear of erasure. Every concern deserves engagement, not a GIF. Every question deserves an answer, not a mute. Every year of contributions deserves more than "LET IT GO."
When ambassadors become enforcers instead of educators, when moderation becomes punishment for dissent, when the tools of governance are turned into weapons against the governed — the community has not only the right but the obligation to act.
This is that action.
---
## References
Community review: Telegram — Dave2Diamond (no active X/YouTube)
Full transcriptions of moderation incidents: documented
Original Ambassador Program poll:
https://polls.onyx.org/#/proposal/0xd6b70644d88b900f8ca596cbbd4004c96c0378fad6790cee2dfe36ff392e66b5
---
## Vote Options
- **For** — Remove AstroDaze as Onyx Ambassador and revoke all moderation authority.
- **Against** — Retain AstroDaze as ambassador at this time.
 | Remove AstroDaze from Onyx Ambassador Role & All Moderation Authority | # Remove AstroDaze from Onyx Ambassador Role & All Moderation Authority
This poll seeks to determine whether the XCN community supports the immediate removal of AstroDaze from the Onyx Ambassador role (following recent reaffirmation #98753) and the revocation of all moderation privileges across Onyx community channels.
A DAO is only as strong as the voices it allows to speak. When an ambassador — a community representative — uses their position to silence the community they claim to represent, that is not governance. That is occupation.
---
## Documented Conduct
### Abuse of Moderation Power
AstroDaze has repeatedly used muting, banning, and message deletion to suppress community members who raise legitimate concerns about governance, ambassador conduct, and ecosystem transparency. Defenders of banned members are systematically targeted next — creating a chilling effect where silence becomes the only safe option.
### Retaliatory Intimidation
AstroDaze drafted "ineligibility" polls targeting @xplo333 (Nuclear) and @PappaJohn45, seeking to permanently bar them from ambassador roles AND future validator participation on Goliath. These polls were never posted to polls.onyx.org for community vote. They were written and distributed directly in Telegram as threats — intimidation dressed up as process.
This is not governance. This is weaponizing the system against the people it was built to serve.
### Coordinated Suppression
When Nuclear and Papa John raised data-backed governance concerns (including the fact that fewer than 50 wallets out of 70,000 holders could create proposals), AstroDaze responded with dismissive one-word replies ("What?", "this"), coordinated with other ambassadors to derail the conversation with GIFs and stickers, then supported the DAO's decision to mute both members for 24 hours under the citation of "fud, racism, and constant spam" — when no racism, fud, or spam had occurred.
- Stating the name of a continent was labeled racist.
- Presenting governance data was labeled spam.
- Defending a wrongfully banned community member was labeled fud.
### Failure to Meet Ambassador Standards
No active social media presence — no Twitter/X, no YouTube — which disqualifies meaningful participation in the Zealy program and falls far short of ambassador expectations for public outreach, education, and visible contribution.
AstroDaze was hand-selected by the DAO during a period when they desperately needed to fill ambassador slots, bypassing standard community vetting. The recent reaffirmation vote passed with only 54% approval — nearly half the community already voted against.
---
## What This Is Really About
Every community member has the right to speak without fear of erasure. Every concern deserves engagement, not a GIF. Every question deserves an answer, not a mute. Every year of contributions deserves more than "LET IT GO."
When ambassadors become enforcers instead of educators, when moderation becomes punishment for dissent, when the tools of governance are turned into weapons against the governed — the community has not only the right but the obligation to act.
This is that action.
---
## References
Community review: Telegram — Dave2Diamond (no active X/YouTube)
Full transcriptions of moderation incidents: documented
Original Ambassador Program poll:
https://polls.onyx.org/#/proposal/0xd6b70644d88b900f8ca596cbbd4004c96c0378fad6790cee2dfe36ff392e66b5
---
## Vote Options
- **For** — Remove AstroDaze as Onyx Ambassador and revoke all moderation authority.
- **Against** — Retain AstroDaze as ambassador at this time.
 | 0x5692cadc8e9723b37789cc5c8d297b30d6d1177a3fb7b0cdbd208e2f191341b8 | chaingov.eth | Onyx XCN DAO | 1 | basic | active | 4 | 1,773,494,125 | 2026-03-14 13:15:25 | 1,773,494,185 | 2026-03-14 13:16:25 | 1,773,666,985 | 2026-03-16 13:16:25 | 0x2BE747263FA1871d2F8bb98449C8d5d504B3dFfC |
Remove Scalper as Onyx Ambassador
# Remove Scalper as Onyx Ambassador
This poll seeks to determine whether the XCN community supports removing Scalper from the Onyx Ambassador role.
Onyx Ambassadors are expected to educate on governance, share verified resources, explain technical concepts accurately, participate constructively in Telegram, complete Zealy contributions, and foster open discussion — while avoiding unconfirmed info, investment advice, or implying team access.
---
## Concerns
- Banned a community member from the Turkish Telegram channel for sharing active governance polls — polls that directly affect Turkish XCN holders' interests and voting rights
- The shared content was a professionally translated, factual summary of two live polls on polls.onyx.org containing zero inflammatory language, zero insults, and zero rule violations
- Censorship of official governance activity — not spam, not scams, not harassment — governance polls created through the DAO's own polling system
- This pattern mirrors the same suppression documented in the main Onyx Telegram: community members who share governance data or reform proposals are silenced instead of engaged
- Ambassadors are expected to foster open discussion and educate on governance — banning someone for sharing governance polls is the exact opposite of the role's purpose
- Demonstrates coordinated cross-channel censorship: the same suppression tactics used in the main Onyx Telegram are now being enforced in regional community channels, preventing non-English-speaking holders from accessing governance information
An ambassador who bans community members for sharing active governance polls is not fostering discussion — they are obstructing governance participation. When the suppression extends to regional channels, it becomes systematic exclusion of entire language communities from the democratic process.
---
## References
Community members may review Scalper's activity through relevant platforms.
Screenshot of ban from Turkish Telegram for sharing governance polls: documented.
Original Ambassador Program poll:
https://polls.onyx.org/#/proposal/0xd6b70644d88b900f8ca596cbbd4004c96c0378fad6790cee2dfe36ff392e66b5
---
## Vote Options
- **For** — Remove Scalper as an Onyx Ambassador.
- **Against** — Retain Scalper as an ambassador at this time. | Remove Scalper as Onyx Ambassador | # Remove Scalper as Onyx Ambassador
This poll seeks to determine whether the XCN community supports removing Scalper from the Onyx Ambassador role.
Onyx Ambassadors are expected to educate on governance, share verified resources, explain technical concepts accurately, participate constructively in Telegram, complete Zealy contributions, and foster open discussion — while avoiding unconfirmed info, investment advice, or implying team access.
---
## Concerns
- Banned a community member from the Turkish Telegram channel for sharing active governance polls — polls that directly affect Turkish XCN holders' interests and voting rights
- The shared content was a professionally translated, factual summary of two live polls on polls.onyx.org containing zero inflammatory language, zero insults, and zero rule violations
- Censorship of official governance activity — not spam, not scams, not harassment — governance polls created through the DAO's own polling system
- This pattern mirrors the same suppression documented in the main Onyx Telegram: community members who share governance data or reform proposals are silenced instead of engaged
- Ambassadors are expected to foster open discussion and educate on governance — banning someone for sharing governance polls is the exact opposite of the role's purpose
- Demonstrates coordinated cross-channel censorship: the same suppression tactics used in the main Onyx Telegram are now being enforced in regional community channels, preventing non-English-speaking holders from accessing governance information
An ambassador who bans community members for sharing active governance polls is not fostering discussion — they are obstructing governance participation. When the suppression extends to regional channels, it becomes systematic exclusion of entire language communities from the democratic process.
---
## References
Community members may review Scalper's activity through relevant platforms.
Screenshot of ban from Turkish Telegram for sharing governance polls: documented.
Original Ambassador Program poll:
https://polls.onyx.org/#/proposal/0xd6b70644d88b900f8ca596cbbd4004c96c0378fad6790cee2dfe36ff392e66b5
---
## Vote Options
- **For** — Remove Scalper as an Onyx Ambassador.
- **Against** — Retain Scalper as an ambassador at this time. | 0xbbc61d89a480cfc3b9991475db3df94962551d83b0bec5776bd5a056732e4ad4 | chaingov.eth | Onyx XCN DAO | 1 | basic | active | 5 | 1,773,493,371 | 2026-03-14 13:02:51 | 1,773,493,431 | 2026-03-14 13:03:51 | 1,773,666,231 | 2026-03-16 13:03:51 | 0x2BE747263FA1871d2F8bb98449C8d5d504B3dFfC |
Remove Blue Moon (@bluemoon515) as Onyx Ambassador
# Remove Blue Moon (@bluemoon515) as Onyx Ambassador
This poll seeks to determine whether the XCN community supports removing Blue Moon (@bluemoon515) from the Onyx Ambassador role (following recent reaffirmation #67591).
Onyx Ambassadors are expected to educate on governance, share verified resources, explain technical concepts accurately, participate constructively in Telegram, complete Zealy contributions, and foster open discussion — while avoiding unconfirmed info, investment advice, or implying team access.
---
## Concerns
- Effectively non-existent or extremely minimal presence and activity in community/Telegram channels.
- Complete lack of meaningful education, outreach, technical/governance explanations, onboarding support, or Zealy contributions.
- Posts only about once a month (if at all), with very low substantive value.
- YouTube channel has just 2 videos total, offering no ongoing educational content or guides.
- X/Twitter account primarily consists of low-resolution, AI-generated GIFs and low-effort visuals with no real engagement, explanation, or ambassador-level contribution.
- When real concerning topics or serious discussions are raised, Blue Moon frequently responds with low-effort memes, GIFs, or eyeballs/emojis — mirroring the same dismissive pattern seen from other underperforming ambassadors — failing to engage meaningfully with community concerns.
This near-total absence of substantive participation falls far short of ambassador expectations for active, consistent, and value-adding involvement.
---
## Review
Community members may review Blue Moon's activity on:
- Twitter/X: https://x.com/Blue_Moon_5551
- Telegram: @bluemoon515
- YouTube: https://youtube.com/@bluecrypto-l8n
- Blog: https://bluemoonlover55.blogspot.com
Original Ambassador Program poll:
https://polls.onyx.org/#/proposal/0xd6b70644d88b900f8ca596cbbd4004c96c0378fad6790cee2dfe36ff392e66b5
---
## Vote Options
- **For** — Remove Blue Moon as an Onyx Ambassador.
- **Against** — Retain Blue Moon as an ambassador at this time. | Remove Blue Moon (@bluemoon515) as Onyx Ambassador | # Remove Blue Moon (@bluemoon515) as Onyx Ambassador
This poll seeks to determine whether the XCN community supports removing Blue Moon (@bluemoon515) from the Onyx Ambassador role (following recent reaffirmation #67591).
Onyx Ambassadors are expected to educate on governance, share verified resources, explain technical concepts accurately, participate constructively in Telegram, complete Zealy contributions, and foster open discussion — while avoiding unconfirmed info, investment advice, or implying team access.
---
## Concerns
- Effectively non-existent or extremely minimal presence and activity in community/Telegram channels.
- Complete lack of meaningful education, outreach, technical/governance explanations, onboarding support, or Zealy contributions.
- Posts only about once a month (if at all), with very low substantive value.
- YouTube channel has just 2 videos total, offering no ongoing educational content or guides.
- X/Twitter account primarily consists of low-resolution, AI-generated GIFs and low-effort visuals with no real engagement, explanation, or ambassador-level contribution.
- When real concerning topics or serious discussions are raised, Blue Moon frequently responds with low-effort memes, GIFs, or eyeballs/emojis — mirroring the same dismissive pattern seen from other underperforming ambassadors — failing to engage meaningfully with community concerns.
This near-total absence of substantive participation falls far short of ambassador expectations for active, consistent, and value-adding involvement.
---
## Review
Community members may review Blue Moon's activity on:
- Twitter/X: https://x.com/Blue_Moon_5551
- Telegram: @bluemoon515
- YouTube: https://youtube.com/@bluecrypto-l8n
- Blog: https://bluemoonlover55.blogspot.com
Original Ambassador Program poll:
https://polls.onyx.org/#/proposal/0xd6b70644d88b900f8ca596cbbd4004c96c0378fad6790cee2dfe36ff392e66b5
---
## Vote Options
- **For** — Remove Blue Moon as an Onyx Ambassador.
- **Against** — Retain Blue Moon as an ambassador at this time. | 0xa6f9e27466e8bb5ae3016b7b2f0b89e7e2b09bae8a660d721bc00e85eda0eb9c | chaingov.eth | Onyx XCN DAO | 1 | basic | active | 4 | 1,773,493,365 | 2026-03-14 13:02:45 | 1,773,493,425 | 2026-03-14 13:03:45 | 1,773,666,225 | 2026-03-16 13:03:45 | 0x2BE747263FA1871d2F8bb98449C8d5d504B3dFfC |
Remove Nurulla (Nurik) as Onyx Ambassador
# Remove Nurulla (Nurik) as Onyx Ambassador
This poll seeks to determine whether the XCN community supports removing Nurulla (Nurik) from the Onyx Ambassador role (following recent reaffirmation #a1b78).
Onyx Ambassadors are expected to educate on governance, share verified resources, explain technical concepts accurately, participate constructively in Telegram, complete Zealy contributions, and foster open discussion — while avoiding unconfirmed info, investment advice, or implying team access.
---
## Concerns
- Virtually no presence or activity in Telegram or community channels — described by multiple community members as "literally never here"
- Complete lack of performance in explaining governance, technical topics, onboarding new members, or completing meaningful Zealy tasks
- No visible engagement during critical governance discussions — when the community debated proposal thresholds, ambassador accountability, and moderation practices, Nurulla was absent
- Failure to meet even the most basic expectation of consistent engagement — an ambassador who is never present cannot educate, support, or represent the community
- The recent reaffirmation vote passed with only 53% approval — nearly half the community already voted against
An ambassador slot occupied by someone who is never present is worse than an empty slot — it blocks someone who would actually contribute from filling the role.
---
## Review
Community members may review Nurulla's activity on:
- Twitter/X: nurikcrypto
- Telegram: @nurikmatyakubov
- YouTube: https://youtube.com/c/Nurullah7
- Medium: https://medium.com/@nurikmatyakubov
Original Ambassador Program poll:
https://polls.onyx.org/#/proposal/0xd6b70644d88b900f8ca596cbbd4004c96c0378fad6790cee2dfe36ff392e66b5
---
## Vote Options
- **For** — Remove Nurulla as an Onyx Ambassador.
- **Against** — Retain Nurulla as an ambassador at this time. | Remove Nurulla (Nurik) as Onyx Ambassador | # Remove Nurulla (Nurik) as Onyx Ambassador
This poll seeks to determine whether the XCN community supports removing Nurulla (Nurik) from the Onyx Ambassador role (following recent reaffirmation #a1b78).
Onyx Ambassadors are expected to educate on governance, share verified resources, explain technical concepts accurately, participate constructively in Telegram, complete Zealy contributions, and foster open discussion — while avoiding unconfirmed info, investment advice, or implying team access.
---
## Concerns
- Virtually no presence or activity in Telegram or community channels — described by multiple community members as "literally never here"
- Complete lack of performance in explaining governance, technical topics, onboarding new members, or completing meaningful Zealy tasks
- No visible engagement during critical governance discussions — when the community debated proposal thresholds, ambassador accountability, and moderation practices, Nurulla was absent
- Failure to meet even the most basic expectation of consistent engagement — an ambassador who is never present cannot educate, support, or represent the community
- The recent reaffirmation vote passed with only 53% approval — nearly half the community already voted against
An ambassador slot occupied by someone who is never present is worse than an empty slot — it blocks someone who would actually contribute from filling the role.
---
## Review
Community members may review Nurulla's activity on:
- Twitter/X: nurikcrypto
- Telegram: @nurikmatyakubov
- YouTube: https://youtube.com/c/Nurullah7
- Medium: https://medium.com/@nurikmatyakubov
Original Ambassador Program poll:
https://polls.onyx.org/#/proposal/0xd6b70644d88b900f8ca596cbbd4004c96c0378fad6790cee2dfe36ff392e66b5
---
## Vote Options
- **For** — Remove Nurulla as an Onyx Ambassador.
- **Against** — Retain Nurulla as an ambassador at this time. | 0x172d5466a73b4c6d7166fc08c7270143724b646247a9e91c0e9e71a74d7e2b64 | chaingov.eth | Onyx XCN DAO | 1 | basic | active | 4 | 1,773,493,349 | 2026-03-14 13:02:29 | 1,773,493,409 | 2026-03-14 13:03:29 | 1,773,666,209 | 2026-03-16 13:03:29 | 0x2BE747263FA1871d2F8bb98449C8d5d504B3dFfC |
Remove Opa as Onyx Ambassador
# Remove Opa as Onyx Ambassador
This poll seeks to determine whether the XCN community supports removing Opa from the Onyx Ambassador role (following recent reaffirmation #2f2b5).
Onyx Ambassadors are expected to educate on governance, share verified resources, explain technical concepts accurately, participate constructively in Telegram, complete Zealy contributions, and foster open discussion — while avoiding unconfirmed info, investment advice, or implying team access.
---
## Concerns
- NSFW content on Twitter/X account, misaligning with community standards and professional ambassador representation. Community members reviewing Opa's public X profile will find content incompatible with representing a financial protocol.
- Limited substantive contributions — primarily GM posts, GIFs, and low-effort content with no meaningful governance education, technical explanation, or onboarding support.
- Minimal to zero Zealy task completion or documented community engagement beyond surface-level messages.
- When serious governance discussions arise in Telegram, Opa's contributions mirror the pattern seen across underperforming ambassadors — low-effort emojis, stickers, or silence rather than substantive engagement.
- The recent reaffirmation vote passed with only 53% approval — nearly half the community already voted against.
Ambassadors represent the Onyx ecosystem publicly. Their social media presence, community engagement, and professional conduct directly reflect on the project. This standard is not being met.
---
## Review
Community members may review Opa's activity on:
- Twitter/X: Opa007i
- Telegram: @Opaqunklie
Original Ambassador Program poll:
https://polls.onyx.org/#/proposal/0xd6b70644d88b900f8ca596cbbd4004c96c0378fad6790cee2dfe36ff392e66b5
---
## Vote Options
- **For** — Remove Opa as an Onyx Ambassador.
- **Against** — Retain Opa as an ambassador at this time. | Remove Opa as Onyx Ambassador | # Remove Opa as Onyx Ambassador
This poll seeks to determine whether the XCN community supports removing Opa from the Onyx Ambassador role (following recent reaffirmation #2f2b5).
Onyx Ambassadors are expected to educate on governance, share verified resources, explain technical concepts accurately, participate constructively in Telegram, complete Zealy contributions, and foster open discussion — while avoiding unconfirmed info, investment advice, or implying team access.
---
## Concerns
- NSFW content on Twitter/X account, misaligning with community standards and professional ambassador representation. Community members reviewing Opa's public X profile will find content incompatible with representing a financial protocol.
- Limited substantive contributions — primarily GM posts, GIFs, and low-effort content with no meaningful governance education, technical explanation, or onboarding support.
- Minimal to zero Zealy task completion or documented community engagement beyond surface-level messages.
- When serious governance discussions arise in Telegram, Opa's contributions mirror the pattern seen across underperforming ambassadors — low-effort emojis, stickers, or silence rather than substantive engagement.
- The recent reaffirmation vote passed with only 53% approval — nearly half the community already voted against.
Ambassadors represent the Onyx ecosystem publicly. Their social media presence, community engagement, and professional conduct directly reflect on the project. This standard is not being met.
---
## Review
Community members may review Opa's activity on:
- Twitter/X: Opa007i
- Telegram: @Opaqunklie
Original Ambassador Program poll:
https://polls.onyx.org/#/proposal/0xd6b70644d88b900f8ca596cbbd4004c96c0378fad6790cee2dfe36ff392e66b5
---
## Vote Options
- **For** — Remove Opa as an Onyx Ambassador.
- **Against** — Retain Opa as an ambassador at this time. | 0x87479b3cb2f74267d22549555e5e8fcee58166d51999828e1cdcc26ca0af2538 | chaingov.eth | Onyx XCN DAO | 1 | basic | active | 4 | 1,773,493,342 | 2026-03-14 13:02:22 | 1,773,493,402 | 2026-03-14 13:03:22 | 1,773,666,202 | 2026-03-16 13:03:22 | 0x2BE747263FA1871d2F8bb98449C8d5d504B3dFfC |
Remove Gedet_27 as Onyx Ambassador
# Remove Gedet_27 as Onyx Ambassador
This poll seeks to determine whether the XCN community supports removing Gedet_27 from the Onyx Ambassador role (following recent reaffirmation #6704a).
Onyx Ambassadors are expected to educate on governance, share verified resources, explain technical concepts accurately, participate constructively in Telegram, complete Zealy contributions, and foster open discussion — while avoiding unconfirmed info, investment advice, or implying team access.
---
## Concerns
- Lack of substantive education or outreach — primarily posting GM messages, memes, GIFs, eyeballs/emojis, and other low-effort content
- Minimal to zero performance in explaining governance, technical topics, onboarding new members, or completing meaningful Zealy tasks
- Insufficient consistent presence and effort toward actual community growth or support
- Flooding the chat with seemingly thought-destructive, extremely low-effort dialogue that appears to lack any memory or continuity of prior conversation
- Frequently responding to serious or critical issues with "huhhhh whattt", confused emojis, or laughing it off as a joke — effectively dismissing and derailing legitimate community concerns instead of engaging, educating, or addressing them constructively
- When community members raised governance data showing fewer than 50 out of 70,000 wallets could create proposals, Gedet's contribution to the discussion was nonexistent — no education, no explanation, no engagement with the substance
This pattern of minimal, non-substantive, and often disruptive participation falls far short of ambassador expectations for active, meaningful, intelligent, and value-adding involvement.
---
## Review
Community members may review Gedet_27's activity on:
- Twitter/X: Gedet_27
- Telegram: Gedet_27
- YouTube: Gedet_27
- Medium: Gedet
Original Ambassador Program poll:
https://polls.onyx.org/#/proposal/0xd6b70644d88b900f8ca596cbbd4004c96c0378fad6790cee2dfe36ff392e66b5
---
## Vote Options
- **For** — Remove Gedet_27 as an Onyx Ambassador.
- **Against** — Retain Gedet_27 as an ambassador at this time. | Remove Gedet_27 as Onyx Ambassador | # Remove Gedet_27 as Onyx Ambassador
This poll seeks to determine whether the XCN community supports removing Gedet_27 from the Onyx Ambassador role (following recent reaffirmation #6704a).
Onyx Ambassadors are expected to educate on governance, share verified resources, explain technical concepts accurately, participate constructively in Telegram, complete Zealy contributions, and foster open discussion — while avoiding unconfirmed info, investment advice, or implying team access.
---
## Concerns
- Lack of substantive education or outreach — primarily posting GM messages, memes, GIFs, eyeballs/emojis, and other low-effort content
- Minimal to zero performance in explaining governance, technical topics, onboarding new members, or completing meaningful Zealy tasks
- Insufficient consistent presence and effort toward actual community growth or support
- Flooding the chat with seemingly thought-destructive, extremely low-effort dialogue that appears to lack any memory or continuity of prior conversation
- Frequently responding to serious or critical issues with "huhhhh whattt", confused emojis, or laughing it off as a joke — effectively dismissing and derailing legitimate community concerns instead of engaging, educating, or addressing them constructively
- When community members raised governance data showing fewer than 50 out of 70,000 wallets could create proposals, Gedet's contribution to the discussion was nonexistent — no education, no explanation, no engagement with the substance
This pattern of minimal, non-substantive, and often disruptive participation falls far short of ambassador expectations for active, meaningful, intelligent, and value-adding involvement.
---
## Review
Community members may review Gedet_27's activity on:
- Twitter/X: Gedet_27
- Telegram: Gedet_27
- YouTube: Gedet_27
- Medium: Gedet
Original Ambassador Program poll:
https://polls.onyx.org/#/proposal/0xd6b70644d88b900f8ca596cbbd4004c96c0378fad6790cee2dfe36ff392e66b5
---
## Vote Options
- **For** — Remove Gedet_27 as an Onyx Ambassador.
- **Against** — Retain Gedet_27 as an ambassador at this time. | 0x5331643c6658d08f5abb61db1f954a85d6c3a6870129f8b7c0f54689f816eb5b | chaingov.eth | Onyx XCN DAO | 1 | basic | active | 6 | 1,773,493,326 | 2026-03-14 13:02:06 | 1,773,493,386 | 2026-03-14 13:03:06 | 1,773,666,186 | 2026-03-16 13:03:06 | 0x2BE747263FA1871d2F8bb98449C8d5d504B3dFfC |
Abolish the Community Zealy Program
# Abolish the Community Zealy Program
This poll seeks to determine whether the XCN community supports permanently removing or abolishing the public/community Zealy program.
---
## Why
The Zealy program was intended to drive engagement, growth, and outreach for XCN and Onyx. It has failed on every metric that matters.
- **No meaningful community growth.** Despite ongoing campaigns and rewards, the program has not produced measurable onboarding of new participants or holders.
- **Low substantive participation.** The program incentivizes repetitive low-effort tasks (GM posts, GIF sharing, social media reposts) over genuine education, governance participation, or technical contribution.
- **Deterrence of serious participants.** Potential investors and engaged community members view the program as unprofessional and gamified — a points farm rather than a value-driven ecosystem initiative.
- **Misallocated resources.** Rewards, funding proposals, and administrative overhead dedicated to Zealy could be redirected to higher-impact programs: direct community grants, ambassador-led education initiatives, developer bounties, or governance participation incentives.
- **Enables underperforming ambassadors.** Multiple ambassador removal polls cite failure to complete "meaningful Zealy tasks" as a concern — yet the tasks themselves are designed to be low-effort. The program creates the appearance of activity without the substance.
Removing Zealy would streamline community efforts toward higher-impact programs and align with the community's consistent feedback for real, sustainable, value-driven growth.
---
## What Replaces It
Resources currently allocated to Zealy should be redirected to:
- Direct governance participation incentives (Onyx Points for voting, proposal creation, community review)
- Developer bounties for Goliath ecosystem building
- Ambassador-led education content with measurable impact metrics
- Community grants for meaningful outreach and onboarding programs
The community is better served by rewarding substance over activity.
---
## References
Current Zealy: still active with monthly leaderboards/rewards as of recent distributions, funded via DAO proposals.
---
## Vote Options
- **For** — Remove/Abolish the Community Zealy Program and redirect resources to higher-impact initiatives.
- **Against** — Retain the Zealy Program at this time. | Abolish the Community Zealy Program | # Abolish the Community Zealy Program
This poll seeks to determine whether the XCN community supports permanently removing or abolishing the public/community Zealy program.
---
## Why
The Zealy program was intended to drive engagement, growth, and outreach for XCN and Onyx. It has failed on every metric that matters.
- **No meaningful community growth.** Despite ongoing campaigns and rewards, the program has not produced measurable onboarding of new participants or holders.
- **Low substantive participation.** The program incentivizes repetitive low-effort tasks (GM posts, GIF sharing, social media reposts) over genuine education, governance participation, or technical contribution.
- **Deterrence of serious participants.** Potential investors and engaged community members view the program as unprofessional and gamified — a points farm rather than a value-driven ecosystem initiative.
- **Misallocated resources.** Rewards, funding proposals, and administrative overhead dedicated to Zealy could be redirected to higher-impact programs: direct community grants, ambassador-led education initiatives, developer bounties, or governance participation incentives.
- **Enables underperforming ambassadors.** Multiple ambassador removal polls cite failure to complete "meaningful Zealy tasks" as a concern — yet the tasks themselves are designed to be low-effort. The program creates the appearance of activity without the substance.
Removing Zealy would streamline community efforts toward higher-impact programs and align with the community's consistent feedback for real, sustainable, value-driven growth.
---
## What Replaces It
Resources currently allocated to Zealy should be redirected to:
- Direct governance participation incentives (Onyx Points for voting, proposal creation, community review)
- Developer bounties for Goliath ecosystem building
- Ambassador-led education content with measurable impact metrics
- Community grants for meaningful outreach and onboarding programs
The community is better served by rewarding substance over activity.
---
## References
Current Zealy: still active with monthly leaderboards/rewards as of recent distributions, funded via DAO proposals.
---
## Vote Options
- **For** — Remove/Abolish the Community Zealy Program and redirect resources to higher-impact initiatives.
- **Against** — Retain the Zealy Program at this time. | 0x50f3400e8d92a27b09d2bbfc2b74b5f2823a9dccd5808254d5f43de3d2248f04 | chaingov.eth | Onyx XCN DAO | 1 | basic | active | 4 | 1,773,493,305 | 2026-03-14 13:01:45 | 1,773,493,365 | 2026-03-14 13:02:45 | 1,773,666,165 | 2026-03-16 13:02:45 | 0x2BE747263FA1871d2F8bb98449C8d5d504B3dFfC |
Transform Onyx Telegram into a Free and Open Discussion Channel
# Transform Onyx Telegram into a Free and Open Discussion Channel
This poll seeks to determine whether the XCN community supports transforming the main Onyx Telegram group (@Onyx) into a fully free and open discussion channel with enforceable transparency standards.
---
## Proposed Rules
### All Topics Permitted
All discussions concerning the Onyx ecosystem, XCN, governance, ambassadors, proposals, partnerships, development, tokenomics, or related matters must be allowed without restriction, pre-emptive removal, or deletion. Criticism, tough questions, and dissenting views are protected speech within this channel.
### Ambassadors Must Respond
Ambassadors and official representatives are required to answer legitimate ecosystem-related questions promptly during active hours. "Just make a poll" is not an answer. "We have bigger things to focus on" is not an answer. Engagement, education, and transparency are the job.
### Equal Voice
Every community member must be allowed an equal voice. No selective muting, banning, or message deletion based on opinions, criticism, or differing views. The person who asks an uncomfortable question has the same right to speak as the person who posts a GM sticker.
### Censorship Limited to Actual Harm
Moderation is permitted only for:
- Direct personal attacks, threats, or harassment
- Doxxing or sharing private information
- Verified scam links or phishing attempts
- Illegal content
- Actual spam (commercial spam, not governance proposals)
The following do NOT qualify as grounds for moderation:
- Criticism of the DAO, ambassadors, or governance decisions
- Sharing governance polls or reform proposals
- Presenting data or analysis that contradicts official narratives
- Defending banned community members
- Asking questions the DAO doesn't want to answer
---
## Why This Matters
The Onyx DAO claims to be decentralized and community-governed. A decentralized protocol with a censored Telegram is a contradiction. Recent documented incidents include:
- Community members banned in sequence for raising governance concerns
- A year of message history permanently deleted by an unappointed individual
- The official DAO account mocking a member's grief with an Elsa "LET IT GO!" GIF
- Community members muted for 24 hours under false citations of "fud, racism, and constant spam"
- Governance data labeled as spam, continent names labeled as racist, defending banned members labeled as fud
- A member banned from the Turkish Telegram for sharing active governance polls
An open chat aligns with the DAO's stated values by:
- Encouraging constructive dialogue and rapid education
- Preventing disproportionate bans for raising legitimate concerns
- Building trust and attracting serious participants
- Redirecting ambassador efforts toward helpful responses rather than suppression
---
## Scope
This applies to the main Onyx discussion group (@Onyx) and all regional community channels (Turkish, Korean, etc.). It does not affect separate announcement/news channels. If passed, ambassadors must adapt their practices accordingly, with community oversight via future polls for enforcement.
---
## References
Ambassador expectations: educate, share resources, encourage discussion.
Original Ambassador Program and governance framework: https://polls.onyx.org
---
## Vote Options
- **For** — Implement free and open chat rules as described: minimal censorship, prompt ambassador responses, equal voice, protected governance discussion.
- **Against** — Retain current moderation practices at this time. | Transform Onyx Telegram into a Free and Open Discussion Channel | # Transform Onyx Telegram into a Free and Open Discussion Channel
This poll seeks to determine whether the XCN community supports transforming the main Onyx Telegram group (@Onyx) into a fully free and open discussion channel with enforceable transparency standards.
---
## Proposed Rules
### All Topics Permitted
All discussions concerning the Onyx ecosystem, XCN, governance, ambassadors, proposals, partnerships, development, tokenomics, or related matters must be allowed without restriction, pre-emptive removal, or deletion. Criticism, tough questions, and dissenting views are protected speech within this channel.
### Ambassadors Must Respond
Ambassadors and official representatives are required to answer legitimate ecosystem-related questions promptly during active hours. "Just make a poll" is not an answer. "We have bigger things to focus on" is not an answer. Engagement, education, and transparency are the job.
### Equal Voice
Every community member must be allowed an equal voice. No selective muting, banning, or message deletion based on opinions, criticism, or differing views. The person who asks an uncomfortable question has the same right to speak as the person who posts a GM sticker.
### Censorship Limited to Actual Harm
Moderation is permitted only for:
- Direct personal attacks, threats, or harassment
- Doxxing or sharing private information
- Verified scam links or phishing attempts
- Illegal content
- Actual spam (commercial spam, not governance proposals)
The following do NOT qualify as grounds for moderation:
- Criticism of the DAO, ambassadors, or governance decisions
- Sharing governance polls or reform proposals
- Presenting data or analysis that contradicts official narratives
- Defending banned community members
- Asking questions the DAO doesn't want to answer
---
## Why This Matters
The Onyx DAO claims to be decentralized and community-governed. A decentralized protocol with a censored Telegram is a contradiction. Recent documented incidents include:
- Community members banned in sequence for raising governance concerns
- A year of message history permanently deleted by an unappointed individual
- The official DAO account mocking a member's grief with an Elsa "LET IT GO!" GIF
- Community members muted for 24 hours under false citations of "fud, racism, and constant spam"
- Governance data labeled as spam, continent names labeled as racist, defending banned members labeled as fud
- A member banned from the Turkish Telegram for sharing active governance polls
An open chat aligns with the DAO's stated values by:
- Encouraging constructive dialogue and rapid education
- Preventing disproportionate bans for raising legitimate concerns
- Building trust and attracting serious participants
- Redirecting ambassador efforts toward helpful responses rather than suppression
---
## Scope
This applies to the main Onyx discussion group (@Onyx) and all regional community channels (Turkish, Korean, etc.). It does not affect separate announcement/news channels. If passed, ambassadors must adapt their practices accordingly, with community oversight via future polls for enforcement.
---
## References
Ambassador expectations: educate, share resources, encourage discussion.
Original Ambassador Program and governance framework: https://polls.onyx.org
---
## Vote Options
- **For** — Implement free and open chat rules as described: minimal censorship, prompt ambassador responses, equal voice, protected governance discussion.
- **Against** — Retain current moderation practices at this time. | 0x83db847314c1e941c8727837367453d61ba41ddaa2e039b90f0bc073d82a8fff | chaingov.eth | Onyx XCN DAO | 1 | basic | active | 4 | 1,773,493,285 | 2026-03-14 13:01:25 | 1,773,493,345 | 2026-03-14 13:02:25 | 1,773,666,145 | 2026-03-16 13:02:25 | 0x2BE747263FA1871d2F8bb98449C8d5d504B3dFfC |
Restrict Insider Voting, Transfer DAO Accounts, Freeze Ambassador Pay & Lower Quorum
# POLL 2: Restrict Insider Voting, Transfer DAO Accounts, Freeze Ambassador Pay & Lower Quorum
This poll seeks to determine whether the XCN community supports restricting insider wallets from governance voting, transferring administrative control of all DAO accounts to the new 5-of-9 MultiSig, freezing all ambassador compensation until the restructure is complete, and lowering poll quorum back to 100,000,000 XCN.
**Summary of Actions in This Poll:**
1. Functionally revoke Justin Sun / HTX ecosystem participation
2. Restrict ambassador voting on self-related matters
3. Restrict DAO wallet from all governance voting
4. Transfer all DAO accounts to new 5-of-9 MultiSig
5. Freeze all ambassador compensation until restructure complete
6. Enshrine anti-censorship protections for governance proposals
7. Lower poll quorum to 100M XCN
This poll is designed to work in conjunction with Poll 1 (MultiSig Restructure). Together they form a complete governance reform. Each stands on its own merit but both are needed for full implementation.
---
### Justin Sun / HTX — Total Voting Restriction & Functional Revocation
All wallets associated with the Justin Sun / HTX 500M XCN grant (OIP-52) shall be immediately restricted from all participation in the Onyx ecosystem including the address that created OIP-51/OIP-52. (0x243137bCb403EbD3e1437CeFA009dA7Ef16Eae46)
**The Facts:**
- OIP-52 granted 500M XCN to Justin Sun / HTX
- Justin Sun then used those granted tokens to vote in favor of his own grant — circular self-approval that no legitimate governance system would recognize
- The 500M XCN was a grant from the DAO treasury, not a market purchase — these are community funds repurposed as voting power
- The community voted unanimously in May 2025 to require a lockup smart contract — compliance is still unverified 10 months later
- The community passed the "Justin Sun Transparency" poll (#38ae6) with 100% approval and 110% quorum demanding an official explanation of the 500M XCN grant. The DAO has historically shut down all discussion of this topic.
- Zero meaningful governance participation, community engagement, or documented "market support" despite this being the stated purpose of the grant
- 500M XCN of granted tokens creates a permanent insider override — one wallet outweighs thousands of community holders combined
**Upon passage of this poll, all wallets associated with the OIP-52 grant are permanently excluded from:**
- All governance voting (polls and OIPs)
- All staking and staking rewards
- All Onyx Points accrual
- All airdrops, distributions, and community programs
- All Goliath mainnet participation (validator, delegator, or user incentives)
- All future DAO grants, partnerships, or allocations
**OIP-52 is declared illegitimate** on the basis that the beneficiary voted to approve his own grant with granted tokens — a governance action that fails basic conflict of interest standards.
This declaration of illegitimacy is not a general precedent for retroactive invalidation of governance outcomes. It applies exclusively to OIP-52 based on a specific, documented, and unrepeatable conflict of interest: the sole beneficiary of a treasury grant used that same grant to vote in favor of awarding it to himself. No other OIP in the DAO's history meets this standard. This is not rewriting history — it is correcting a governance action that should never have been counted as legitimate in the first place.
**Implementation:**
- All wallets that received XCN from the OIP-52 grant must be identified and publicly flagged
- A smart contract tracking mechanism shall be deployed to trace all movements of OIP-52 tokens — from origin wallet through any transfers, splits, bridges, or swaps
- Any wallet found to have received OIP-52 tokens directly or indirectly is excluded from all ecosystem participation (Including 0x243137bCb403EbD3e1437CeFA009dA7Ef16Eae46)
- Flagged wallets are excluded from both vote tallies and quorum calculations
- The DAO formally requests voluntary return of 500M XCN within 30 days
**If returned:**
- Tokens redirected to Community Strategic Voting Pool and community treasury
**If NOT returned:**
- Public breach statement published across all DAO channels
- Partnership permanently terminated
- All associated wallets blacklisted from Goliath at the smart contract level upon mainnet launch
- Legal consultation initiated on recovery options
- Community vote on whether to pursue full protocol-level blacklisting across Ethereum, Base, and BNB Chain
**The tokens remain in his wallet. But they can't vote, can't stake, can't earn, can't participate, and can't interact with any Onyx product or protocol. 500M XCN that exist on paper and do nothing in practice.**
**This is a precaution, not a punishment.**
The Onyx community welcomes Justin Sun / HTX's future cooperation and participation in the ecosystem. If compliance with the May 2025 lockup vote is independently verified and the 500M XCN is confirmed locked in a properly deployed smart contract, the community will vote to restore ecosystem participation rights proportional to demonstrated engagement.
The door is not closed. It is conditional. Comply with the terms the community already voted for unanimously, demonstrate genuine market support and governance participation, and the restrictions lift through the same democratic process that imposed them.
This restriction exists because trust was broken — not because it can't be rebuilt.
This restriction is permanent until the community votes to lift it — and that vote itself must exclude all flagged wallets from the tally.
### Current and Future Ambassadors — Partial Voting Restriction
Ambassadors cannot vote on matters directly affecting their own role, compensation, or standing.
**Applies to:** Ambassador reaffirmation/removal polls, compensation and budget proposals, program structure and standards proposals, Ambassador Leader appointment or removal, any proposal naming a specific ambassador as beneficiary or subject.
**Does NOT apply to:** Protocol upgrades, staking rates, tokenomics, partnerships, technical proposals, or any governance matter that does not directly reference ambassador roles or compensation — ambassadors retain full voting rights on all of these.
**Implementation:**
- Ambassador wallet addresses must be publicly registered
- Registered wallets automatically excluded from vote tallies on ambassador-related proposals
- Ambassadors who transfer tokens to secondary wallets to circumvent this restriction will be immediately removed and permanently barred from the program
### DAO Wallet — Total Voting Restriction
The Onyx DAO official wallet(s) holding approximately 100M+ XCN shall be immediately restricted from participating in any governance vote.
**Why:**
- The DAO wallet is not the community. It is the treasury. The treasury voting on how to spend itself is a conflict of interest by definition.
- DAO wallet participation in polls has historically inflated quorum for insider-benefiting proposals while community improvement polls fail at 27-54% quorum
- The DAO wallet tipping the scale on votes about its own leadership, its own spending, and its own ambassadors is not governance — it is self-approval
- No other serious DAO allows treasury wallets to vote on their own governance proposals
The DAO wallet's historical voting record shows a consistent pattern: participation in proposals that benefit insider interests (149-319% quorum on spending proposals) and non-participation in proposals that benefit the community (27-54% quorum on community improvement proposals with 97%+ approval). Removing the DAO wallet from voting does not harm community proposals — it simply removes the artificial inflation that made insider proposals appear to have broader support than they did.
**Implementation:**
- All DAO-controlled wallets identified and excluded from vote tallies
- Applies to all polls and OIPs effective immediately
- DAO wallets may still create proposals but cannot vote on them
- This restriction is permanent and can only be lifted by a community vote where DAO wallets are excluded from the tally
---
## Transfer DAO Account Administrative Control
Administrative control of all official Onyx DAO accounts shall be transferred to the new 5-of-9 MultiSig members within 7 days of poll passage.
**Accounts included:**
- @TheOnyxDAO (Telegram)
- Official Onyx X/Twitter account
- polls.onyx.org admin access
- community.onyx.org (forums) admin access
- Any other DAO-branded platform, channel, or account
**Why:**
- The official DAO accounts are currently controlled by the same insiders being removed in Poll 1 — leaving them in control of the communication channels means they can manipulate narratives, delete evidence, and suppress community activity even after losing their MultiSig seats
- The official Onyx DAO Telegram account was used to mock a community member's grief with an Elsa "LET IT GO!" GIF (Users can view attached content below) — an account that represents 60,000+ holders was used for personal retaliation. That account cannot remain in the hands of the people who used it that way.
- Controlling the treasury means nothing if the old guard still controls the microphone
**Implementation:**
- All current admin/moderator credentials for removed individuals (Shawn, VT, AstroDaze) revoked simultaneously with the transfer — no transition period, no shared access, no residual control
- The 5-of-9 MultiSig members designate communication responsibilities among themselves
- Ambassador Leader (Papa John) manages day-to-day Telegram moderation with the MultiSig retaining oversight authority
- A public log of all account access holders AND chat logs on all platforms must be published and maintained
---
## Immediate Halt of All Ambassador Compensation
All ambassador compensation — base pay, performance bonuses, XCN rewards, USDT payments, and any other form of payment — shall be immediately frozen for all current ambassadors until the full restructure is complete.
**Why:**
- Ambassadors currently being paid have documented failures to meet basic program expectations
- The ambassador program is being restructured under new leadership (Papa John)
- Continuing to pay ambassadors during a restructure rewards the same conduct these polls seek to correct
- Removal polls for multiple ambassadors are pending.
- No compensation disclosure has ever been published — the community does not even know how much is being paid, to whom, or from which wallets
**Terms:**
- All ambassador payments frozen effective immediately upon poll passage
- Freeze applies to ALL current ambassadors without exception
- Freeze remains in effect until: (1) new Ambassador Leader (Papa John) is installed, (2) MultiSig restructure is complete, (3) new performance standards are published, and (4) each ambassador is individually re-evaluated under the new framework
- Ambassadors who pass re-evaluation resume compensation at rates determined by new leadership
- Ambassadors who fail re-evaluation or are removed by community poll receive no further compensation
- A full accounting of all historical ambassador payments must be published within 30 days
No more paying people to post GM messages and confused emojis while the community members doing actual governance work get banned.
---
## Anti-Censorship of Governance Proposals
No governance poll shall be removed, hidden, or invalidated on the basis of quantity, frequency, or subjective quality determinations by DAO officials, ambassadors, or moderators.
**Why:**
The DAO has previously used "spam" as justification for maintaining high proposal thresholds and suppressing community governance activity. This framing is fundamentally anti-democratic. The community — not the DAO — decides what constitutes a quality proposal through voting.
**Therefore:**
- Any community member meeting the XCN threshold may create as many polls as they choose
- It is up to the voters' discretion to understand the difference between a quality poll and a low quality poll
- If voters can make that differentiation, they can vote against low quality polls and have clear voting power on quality ones
- It is not the DAO's word that holds proposals accountable — it is the community's vote
- No poll may be removed or suppressed by moderators, ambassadors, or DAO officials for any reason other than verified scam links, illegal content, or impersonation
- Removal of a legitimate governance poll by any official will be treated as a governance violation and grounds for immediate removal from their role
- The polling system exists for the community to speak. Silencing proposals is silencing the community. That is the one thing a DAO must never do.
- A public log of ALL generated polls must be published and maintained (Including ones removed due to verified scam links, illegal content, or impersonation)
---
## Lower Poll Quorum Back to 100,000,000 XCN
**Why:**
- The increase from 100M to 200M passed with only 52% approval — the tightest margin of any governance vote in DAO history
- As of March 14, 2026, active polls on Goliath Validator Incentives (97% approval) and Testnet Reward Plans (94% approval) are sitting at only 57-58% quorum despite overwhelming support — demonstrating that the current quorum level continues to block community-supported initiatives
- The quorum increase was implemented before ambassador reaffirmation votes, effectively raising the bar for community accountability at the exact moment accountability was needed most
- With DAO wallets and Justin Sun wallets excluded from voting (as proposed above), the 200M quorum becomes functionally impossible for the community to reach independently
- 100M quorum was the standard for over a year and produced legitimate governance outcomes
- The Justin Sun Transparency poll (#38ae6) achieved 110% quorum — demonstrating that when the community is united on an issue, quorum is reachable even at 200M. The problem is not that 200M is always unachievable — it is that it is selectively unachievable for proposals that challenge insider interests, while insider-benefiting proposals consistently exceed it.
- The 200M quorum serves one purpose: making it harder for the community to pass proposals the insiders don't want passed
**Implementation:**
- Poll quorum reduced to 100,000,000 XCN effective immediately upon passage
- OIP creation threshold remains at 100,000,000 XCN (unchanged)
- This quorum can be adjusted in the future through a community poll where DAO and Justin Sun wallets are excluded from the tally.
---
## Compliance with United States Law
All actions proposed in this poll shall be executed in full compliance with applicable United States federal and state law, including but not limited to:
- **Securities Law:** All voting restrictions, token flagging, and ecosystem exclusions shall comply with applicable SEC guidance on digital assets and governance rights
- **Anti-Money Laundering (AML):** The smart contract tracking mechanism deployed to trace OIP-52 token movements shall comply with U.S. AML regulations and may be shared with relevant authorities if evidence of illicit activity is discovered
- **Property Rights:** The functional revocation of Justin Sun / HTX ecosystem participation does not constitute seizure of assets. Tokens remain in the holder's wallet. This poll restricts protocol-level interaction rights, not ownership — consistent with terms-of-service restrictions used by every regulated platform operating under U.S. law
- **First Amendment & Anti-Censorship:** The Anti-Censorship of Governance Proposals provision enshrines the community's right to participate in governance without suppression. This is consistent with — not in conflict with — U.S. free speech principles as applied to decentralized governance platforms
- **Account Transfers:** The transfer of DAO account administrative control shall be executed through standard platform credential transfer processes in compliance with applicable terms of service for each platform (Telegram, X/Twitter, etc.)
- **Contractual Enforcement:** All voting restrictions, quorum changes, and compensation freezes shall be executed through legally recognizable mechanisms
- **Dispute Resolution:** Any dispute arising from the implementation of this poll shall be resolved under United States law, with jurisdiction in the state where Chain.com is incorporated
- **Decentralization Alignment:** Nothing in this compliance framework shall be interpreted to centralize authority, restrict community voting rights, or concentrate power in any single entity, jurisdiction, or legal structure. U.S. law compliance serves as a baseline for accountability — not a mechanism for control. The DAO remains a decentralized, community-governed protocol. Legal compliance strengthens decentralization by ensuring that the individuals entrusted with treasury access, signing authority, and operational roles are held to verifiable standards — not by subjecting the community's governance rights to centralized legal gatekeeping.
No provision of this poll shall be interpreted to require or permit any action that violates United States law. If any specific provision is found to conflict with applicable law, that provision shall be modified to the minimum extent necessary to achieve compliance while preserving the intent of the community vote. All remaining provisions continue in full force.
---
## If Implementation Is Blocked
This poll acknowledges that the current leadership structure may refuse to execute these provisions. This refusal is anticipated and accounted for.
If the current MultiSig signers or DAO officials refuse to implement the results of this community vote within 7 days, all escalation paths outlined in Poll 1 apply equally to this poll — including public documentation, Chain.com accountability, legal escalation, community migration, and investor/regulatory notification.
Poll 1 and Poll 2 are companion proposals. Obstruction of either constitutes obstruction of both. The escalation framework is unified.
---
## Immediate Implementation — No OIP Required
This poll, if passed with quorum, shall be implemented immediately and directly without requiring a separate OIP, ratification vote, or additional governance approval of any kind.
- This poll bypasses all OIP creation thresholds, ratification requirements, and execution queues.
- Upon reaching quorum and majority approval, the results are binding and must be executed within 7 days.
- Chain.com, as the remaining MultiSig signer and lead developer, is responsible for executing all provisions of this poll including voting restrictions, account transfers, ambassador compensation freeze, quorum reduction, and Justin Sun / HTX functional revocation.
- Any delay, obstruction, or refusal to implement the results of this poll will be publicly documented and treated as a governance violation.
- If implementation is blocked by current MultiSig signers, this constitutes proof that the MultiSig is being used to protect insiders rather than protect the protocol — validating every concern raised in this proposal.
The community does not need permission from the people it is holding accountable. That is the entire point.
If only one poll passes: the provisions of that poll are implemented independently. If Poll 1 passes and Poll 2 does not, the MultiSig restructure proceeds under current voting rules. If Poll 2 passes and Poll 1 does not, voting restrictions and quorum changes take effect under the current MultiSig structure. Neither outcome creates instability — both improve governance independently.
---
## Vote Options
- **For** — Functionally revoke all ecosystem participation for Justin Sun / HTX OIP-52 wallets. Declare OIP-52 illegitimate. Request voluntary return of 500M XCN. Restrict ambassador wallets from voting on ambassador-related proposals. Restrict DAO wallets from all governance voting. Transfer all DAO account administrative access to the new 5-of-9 MultiSig. Freeze all ambassador compensation until restructure is complete. Protect governance proposals from censorship. Lower poll quorum to 100,000,000 XCN.
- **Against** — Retain all current voting privileges, account control, compensation structures, and quorum requirements.
 | Restrict Insider Voting, Transfer DAO Accounts, Freeze Ambassador Pay & Lower Quorum | # POLL 2: Restrict Insider Voting, Transfer DAO Accounts, Freeze Ambassador Pay & Lower Quorum
This poll seeks to determine whether the XCN community supports restricting insider wallets from governance voting, transferring administrative control of all DAO accounts to the new 5-of-9 MultiSig, freezing all ambassador compensation until the restructure is complete, and lowering poll quorum back to 100,000,000 XCN.
**Summary of Actions in This Poll:**
1. Functionally revoke Justin Sun / HTX ecosystem participation
2. Restrict ambassador voting on self-related matters
3. Restrict DAO wallet from all governance voting
4. Transfer all DAO accounts to new 5-of-9 MultiSig
5. Freeze all ambassador compensation until restructure complete
6. Enshrine anti-censorship protections for governance proposals
7. Lower poll quorum to 100M XCN
This poll is designed to work in conjunction with Poll 1 (MultiSig Restructure). Together they form a complete governance reform. Each stands on its own merit but both are needed for full implementation.
---
### Justin Sun / HTX — Total Voting Restriction & Functional Revocation
All wallets associated with the Justin Sun / HTX 500M XCN grant (OIP-52) shall be immediately restricted from all participation in the Onyx ecosystem including the address that created OIP-51/OIP-52. (0x243137bCb403EbD3e1437CeFA009dA7Ef16Eae46)
**The Facts:**
- OIP-52 granted 500M XCN to Justin Sun / HTX
- Justin Sun then used those granted tokens to vote in favor of his own grant — circular self-approval that no legitimate governance system would recognize
- The 500M XCN was a grant from the DAO treasury, not a market purchase — these are community funds repurposed as voting power
- The community voted unanimously in May 2025 to require a lockup smart contract — compliance is still unverified 10 months later
- The community passed the "Justin Sun Transparency" poll (#38ae6) with 100% approval and 110% quorum demanding an official explanation of the 500M XCN grant. The DAO has historically shut down all discussion of this topic.
- Zero meaningful governance participation, community engagement, or documented "market support" despite this being the stated purpose of the grant
- 500M XCN of granted tokens creates a permanent insider override — one wallet outweighs thousands of community holders combined
**Upon passage of this poll, all wallets associated with the OIP-52 grant are permanently excluded from:**
- All governance voting (polls and OIPs)
- All staking and staking rewards
- All Onyx Points accrual
- All airdrops, distributions, and community programs
- All Goliath mainnet participation (validator, delegator, or user incentives)
- All future DAO grants, partnerships, or allocations
**OIP-52 is declared illegitimate** on the basis that the beneficiary voted to approve his own grant with granted tokens — a governance action that fails basic conflict of interest standards.
This declaration of illegitimacy is not a general precedent for retroactive invalidation of governance outcomes. It applies exclusively to OIP-52 based on a specific, documented, and unrepeatable conflict of interest: the sole beneficiary of a treasury grant used that same grant to vote in favor of awarding it to himself. No other OIP in the DAO's history meets this standard. This is not rewriting history — it is correcting a governance action that should never have been counted as legitimate in the first place.
**Implementation:**
- All wallets that received XCN from the OIP-52 grant must be identified and publicly flagged
- A smart contract tracking mechanism shall be deployed to trace all movements of OIP-52 tokens — from origin wallet through any transfers, splits, bridges, or swaps
- Any wallet found to have received OIP-52 tokens directly or indirectly is excluded from all ecosystem participation (Including 0x243137bCb403EbD3e1437CeFA009dA7Ef16Eae46)
- Flagged wallets are excluded from both vote tallies and quorum calculations
- The DAO formally requests voluntary return of 500M XCN within 30 days
**If returned:**
- Tokens redirected to Community Strategic Voting Pool and community treasury
**If NOT returned:**
- Public breach statement published across all DAO channels
- Partnership permanently terminated
- All associated wallets blacklisted from Goliath at the smart contract level upon mainnet launch
- Legal consultation initiated on recovery options
- Community vote on whether to pursue full protocol-level blacklisting across Ethereum, Base, and BNB Chain
**The tokens remain in his wallet. But they can't vote, can't stake, can't earn, can't participate, and can't interact with any Onyx product or protocol. 500M XCN that exist on paper and do nothing in practice.**
**This is a precaution, not a punishment.**
The Onyx community welcomes Justin Sun / HTX's future cooperation and participation in the ecosystem. If compliance with the May 2025 lockup vote is independently verified and the 500M XCN is confirmed locked in a properly deployed smart contract, the community will vote to restore ecosystem participation rights proportional to demonstrated engagement.
The door is not closed. It is conditional. Comply with the terms the community already voted for unanimously, demonstrate genuine market support and governance participation, and the restrictions lift through the same democratic process that imposed them.
This restriction exists because trust was broken — not because it can't be rebuilt.
This restriction is permanent until the community votes to lift it — and that vote itself must exclude all flagged wallets from the tally.
### Current and Future Ambassadors — Partial Voting Restriction
Ambassadors cannot vote on matters directly affecting their own role, compensation, or standing.
**Applies to:** Ambassador reaffirmation/removal polls, compensation and budget proposals, program structure and standards proposals, Ambassador Leader appointment or removal, any proposal naming a specific ambassador as beneficiary or subject.
**Does NOT apply to:** Protocol upgrades, staking rates, tokenomics, partnerships, technical proposals, or any governance matter that does not directly reference ambassador roles or compensation — ambassadors retain full voting rights on all of these.
**Implementation:**
- Ambassador wallet addresses must be publicly registered
- Registered wallets automatically excluded from vote tallies on ambassador-related proposals
- Ambassadors who transfer tokens to secondary wallets to circumvent this restriction will be immediately removed and permanently barred from the program
### DAO Wallet — Total Voting Restriction
The Onyx DAO official wallet(s) holding approximately 100M+ XCN shall be immediately restricted from participating in any governance vote.
**Why:**
- The DAO wallet is not the community. It is the treasury. The treasury voting on how to spend itself is a conflict of interest by definition.
- DAO wallet participation in polls has historically inflated quorum for insider-benefiting proposals while community improvement polls fail at 27-54% quorum
- The DAO wallet tipping the scale on votes about its own leadership, its own spending, and its own ambassadors is not governance — it is self-approval
- No other serious DAO allows treasury wallets to vote on their own governance proposals
The DAO wallet's historical voting record shows a consistent pattern: participation in proposals that benefit insider interests (149-319% quorum on spending proposals) and non-participation in proposals that benefit the community (27-54% quorum on community improvement proposals with 97%+ approval). Removing the DAO wallet from voting does not harm community proposals — it simply removes the artificial inflation that made insider proposals appear to have broader support than they did.
**Implementation:**
- All DAO-controlled wallets identified and excluded from vote tallies
- Applies to all polls and OIPs effective immediately
- DAO wallets may still create proposals but cannot vote on them
- This restriction is permanent and can only be lifted by a community vote where DAO wallets are excluded from the tally
---
## Transfer DAO Account Administrative Control
Administrative control of all official Onyx DAO accounts shall be transferred to the new 5-of-9 MultiSig members within 7 days of poll passage.
**Accounts included:**
- @TheOnyxDAO (Telegram)
- Official Onyx X/Twitter account
- polls.onyx.org admin access
- community.onyx.org (forums) admin access
- Any other DAO-branded platform, channel, or account
**Why:**
- The official DAO accounts are currently controlled by the same insiders being removed in Poll 1 — leaving them in control of the communication channels means they can manipulate narratives, delete evidence, and suppress community activity even after losing their MultiSig seats
- The official Onyx DAO Telegram account was used to mock a community member's grief with an Elsa "LET IT GO!" GIF (Users can view attached content below) — an account that represents 60,000+ holders was used for personal retaliation. That account cannot remain in the hands of the people who used it that way.
- Controlling the treasury means nothing if the old guard still controls the microphone
**Implementation:**
- All current admin/moderator credentials for removed individuals (Shawn, VT, AstroDaze) revoked simultaneously with the transfer — no transition period, no shared access, no residual control
- The 5-of-9 MultiSig members designate communication responsibilities among themselves
- Ambassador Leader (Papa John) manages day-to-day Telegram moderation with the MultiSig retaining oversight authority
- A public log of all account access holders AND chat logs on all platforms must be published and maintained
---
## Immediate Halt of All Ambassador Compensation
All ambassador compensation — base pay, performance bonuses, XCN rewards, USDT payments, and any other form of payment — shall be immediately frozen for all current ambassadors until the full restructure is complete.
**Why:**
- Ambassadors currently being paid have documented failures to meet basic program expectations
- The ambassador program is being restructured under new leadership (Papa John)
- Continuing to pay ambassadors during a restructure rewards the same conduct these polls seek to correct
- Removal polls for multiple ambassadors are pending.
- No compensation disclosure has ever been published — the community does not even know how much is being paid, to whom, or from which wallets
**Terms:**
- All ambassador payments frozen effective immediately upon poll passage
- Freeze applies to ALL current ambassadors without exception
- Freeze remains in effect until: (1) new Ambassador Leader (Papa John) is installed, (2) MultiSig restructure is complete, (3) new performance standards are published, and (4) each ambassador is individually re-evaluated under the new framework
- Ambassadors who pass re-evaluation resume compensation at rates determined by new leadership
- Ambassadors who fail re-evaluation or are removed by community poll receive no further compensation
- A full accounting of all historical ambassador payments must be published within 30 days
No more paying people to post GM messages and confused emojis while the community members doing actual governance work get banned.
---
## Anti-Censorship of Governance Proposals
No governance poll shall be removed, hidden, or invalidated on the basis of quantity, frequency, or subjective quality determinations by DAO officials, ambassadors, or moderators.
**Why:**
The DAO has previously used "spam" as justification for maintaining high proposal thresholds and suppressing community governance activity. This framing is fundamentally anti-democratic. The community — not the DAO — decides what constitutes a quality proposal through voting.
**Therefore:**
- Any community member meeting the XCN threshold may create as many polls as they choose
- It is up to the voters' discretion to understand the difference between a quality poll and a low quality poll
- If voters can make that differentiation, they can vote against low quality polls and have clear voting power on quality ones
- It is not the DAO's word that holds proposals accountable — it is the community's vote
- No poll may be removed or suppressed by moderators, ambassadors, or DAO officials for any reason other than verified scam links, illegal content, or impersonation
- Removal of a legitimate governance poll by any official will be treated as a governance violation and grounds for immediate removal from their role
- The polling system exists for the community to speak. Silencing proposals is silencing the community. That is the one thing a DAO must never do.
- A public log of ALL generated polls must be published and maintained (Including ones removed due to verified scam links, illegal content, or impersonation)
---
## Lower Poll Quorum Back to 100,000,000 XCN
**Why:**
- The increase from 100M to 200M passed with only 52% approval — the tightest margin of any governance vote in DAO history
- As of March 14, 2026, active polls on Goliath Validator Incentives (97% approval) and Testnet Reward Plans (94% approval) are sitting at only 57-58% quorum despite overwhelming support — demonstrating that the current quorum level continues to block community-supported initiatives
- The quorum increase was implemented before ambassador reaffirmation votes, effectively raising the bar for community accountability at the exact moment accountability was needed most
- With DAO wallets and Justin Sun wallets excluded from voting (as proposed above), the 200M quorum becomes functionally impossible for the community to reach independently
- 100M quorum was the standard for over a year and produced legitimate governance outcomes
- The Justin Sun Transparency poll (#38ae6) achieved 110% quorum — demonstrating that when the community is united on an issue, quorum is reachable even at 200M. The problem is not that 200M is always unachievable — it is that it is selectively unachievable for proposals that challenge insider interests, while insider-benefiting proposals consistently exceed it.
- The 200M quorum serves one purpose: making it harder for the community to pass proposals the insiders don't want passed
**Implementation:**
- Poll quorum reduced to 100,000,000 XCN effective immediately upon passage
- OIP creation threshold remains at 100,000,000 XCN (unchanged)
- This quorum can be adjusted in the future through a community poll where DAO and Justin Sun wallets are excluded from the tally.
---
## Compliance with United States Law
All actions proposed in this poll shall be executed in full compliance with applicable United States federal and state law, including but not limited to:
- **Securities Law:** All voting restrictions, token flagging, and ecosystem exclusions shall comply with applicable SEC guidance on digital assets and governance rights
- **Anti-Money Laundering (AML):** The smart contract tracking mechanism deployed to trace OIP-52 token movements shall comply with U.S. AML regulations and may be shared with relevant authorities if evidence of illicit activity is discovered
- **Property Rights:** The functional revocation of Justin Sun / HTX ecosystem participation does not constitute seizure of assets. Tokens remain in the holder's wallet. This poll restricts protocol-level interaction rights, not ownership — consistent with terms-of-service restrictions used by every regulated platform operating under U.S. law
- **First Amendment & Anti-Censorship:** The Anti-Censorship of Governance Proposals provision enshrines the community's right to participate in governance without suppression. This is consistent with — not in conflict with — U.S. free speech principles as applied to decentralized governance platforms
- **Account Transfers:** The transfer of DAO account administrative control shall be executed through standard platform credential transfer processes in compliance with applicable terms of service for each platform (Telegram, X/Twitter, etc.)
- **Contractual Enforcement:** All voting restrictions, quorum changes, and compensation freezes shall be executed through legally recognizable mechanisms
- **Dispute Resolution:** Any dispute arising from the implementation of this poll shall be resolved under United States law, with jurisdiction in the state where Chain.com is incorporated
- **Decentralization Alignment:** Nothing in this compliance framework shall be interpreted to centralize authority, restrict community voting rights, or concentrate power in any single entity, jurisdiction, or legal structure. U.S. law compliance serves as a baseline for accountability — not a mechanism for control. The DAO remains a decentralized, community-governed protocol. Legal compliance strengthens decentralization by ensuring that the individuals entrusted with treasury access, signing authority, and operational roles are held to verifiable standards — not by subjecting the community's governance rights to centralized legal gatekeeping.
No provision of this poll shall be interpreted to require or permit any action that violates United States law. If any specific provision is found to conflict with applicable law, that provision shall be modified to the minimum extent necessary to achieve compliance while preserving the intent of the community vote. All remaining provisions continue in full force.
---
## If Implementation Is Blocked
This poll acknowledges that the current leadership structure may refuse to execute these provisions. This refusal is anticipated and accounted for.
If the current MultiSig signers or DAO officials refuse to implement the results of this community vote within 7 days, all escalation paths outlined in Poll 1 apply equally to this poll — including public documentation, Chain.com accountability, legal escalation, community migration, and investor/regulatory notification.
Poll 1 and Poll 2 are companion proposals. Obstruction of either constitutes obstruction of both. The escalation framework is unified.
---
## Immediate Implementation — No OIP Required
This poll, if passed with quorum, shall be implemented immediately and directly without requiring a separate OIP, ratification vote, or additional governance approval of any kind.
- This poll bypasses all OIP creation thresholds, ratification requirements, and execution queues.
- Upon reaching quorum and majority approval, the results are binding and must be executed within 7 days.
- Chain.com, as the remaining MultiSig signer and lead developer, is responsible for executing all provisions of this poll including voting restrictions, account transfers, ambassador compensation freeze, quorum reduction, and Justin Sun / HTX functional revocation.
- Any delay, obstruction, or refusal to implement the results of this poll will be publicly documented and treated as a governance violation.
- If implementation is blocked by current MultiSig signers, this constitutes proof that the MultiSig is being used to protect insiders rather than protect the protocol — validating every concern raised in this proposal.
The community does not need permission from the people it is holding accountable. That is the entire point.
If only one poll passes: the provisions of that poll are implemented independently. If Poll 1 passes and Poll 2 does not, the MultiSig restructure proceeds under current voting rules. If Poll 2 passes and Poll 1 does not, voting restrictions and quorum changes take effect under the current MultiSig structure. Neither outcome creates instability — both improve governance independently.
---
## Vote Options
- **For** — Functionally revoke all ecosystem participation for Justin Sun / HTX OIP-52 wallets. Declare OIP-52 illegitimate. Request voluntary return of 500M XCN. Restrict ambassador wallets from voting on ambassador-related proposals. Restrict DAO wallets from all governance voting. Transfer all DAO account administrative access to the new 5-of-9 MultiSig. Freeze all ambassador compensation until restructure is complete. Protect governance proposals from censorship. Lower poll quorum to 100,000,000 XCN.
- **Against** — Retain all current voting privileges, account control, compensation structures, and quorum requirements.
 | 0x38db2184ea47fa6ed3f58f0770c44f7004f7c84fba8416c88fe2442cf098a7de | chaingov.eth | Onyx XCN DAO | 1 | basic | active | 7 | 1,773,491,548 | 2026-03-14 12:32:28 | 1,773,491,608 | 2026-03-14 12:33:28 | 1,773,664,408 | 2026-03-16 12:33:28 | 0x2BE747263FA1871d2F8bb98449C8d5d504B3dFfC |
Restructure MultiSig Guardian to 5-of-9 with Community-Elected Seats
# POLL 1: Restructure MultiSig Guardian to 5-of-9 with Community-Elected Seats
This poll seeks to determine whether the XCN community supports removing Shawn from Ambassador Leader and MultiSig Guardian, removing VT (Sega) from Head of Business Development and MultiSig Guardian, removing AstroDaze from Onyx Ambassador and MultiSig Guardian, appointing Papa John as new Ambassador Leader, and restructuring the MultiSig from the current 3-of-5 insider-controlled structure to a 5-of-9 model with mandatory independent representation and community-elected seats.
**Summary of Actions in This Poll:**
1. Remove Shawn, VT, and AstroDaze from MultiSig and their operational roles
2. Appoint Papa John as Ambassador Leader (no MultiSig seat)
3. Install 5-of-9 MultiSig with named community seats
4. Deploy new audited smart contract with 14-day review
5. Reform Chain compensation to 100M XCN quarterly
6. Unban 6 community members
Additionally, OIP-62 never published the actual MultiSig wallet addresses or signer keys. The community was given five names but has no way to independently verify who actually controls the MultiSig onchain. This lack of transparency alone warrants a full restructure.
---
## The Problem
The current 3-of-5 MultiSig Guardian has zero independent oversight:
| Guardian | Role | MultiSig Signer | Independent? |
|----------|------|:----------------:|:------------:|
| Chain.com | Paid by DAO | ✅ | ❌ |
| @TheOnyxDAO | The DAO itself | ✅ | ❌ |
| Shawn | Appointed Ambassador Leader | ✅ | ❌ |
| VT (Sega) | Appointed Community Leader | ✅ | ❌ |
| AstroDaze | Re-elected (54/46%) Ambassador | ✅ | ❌ |
**5 out of 5 signers are insiders. Zero independent oversight.**
Only 3 signatures needed. Chain + @TheOnyxDAO + any single insider = complete control over the treasury and protocol. The community has no seat at the table that controls its own money.
This is not decentralized governance, but a centralized operation wearing a DAO costume.
---
### Compromised Reaffirmation Votes
The original ambassador reaffirmation polls that retained Shawn, VT, AstroDaze and all other ambassadors in their roles passed during a period when multiple community members experienced documented voting issues — including inability to cast votes, wallet connection failures, and access problems on polls.onyx.org. Community members who were banned or muted at the time were entirely excluded from participating in the very votes that determined whether their moderators would remain in power.
AstroDaze was reaffirmed with only 54% approval. Nurulla and Opa passed at 53%. The quorum alignment poll passed at 52%. These razor-thin margins occurred while active, vocal community members were locked out of the voting process. The results cannot be considered legitimate expressions of community sentiment when the community members most affected by these individuals' conduct were systematically prevented from voting.
Any reaffirmation vote conducted while critics are banned and voters are experiencing access issues is not a reaffirmation but a confirmation bias baked into the process.
---
## Why These Three Must Be Removed
### Shawn — Ambassador Leader + MultiSig Signer
Shawn holds dual authority as both Ambassador Leader AND MultiSig Guardian — overseeing the ambassador program while simultaneously holding treasury control. Under his leadership:
- Community members raising governance concerns have been muted and banned in sequence
- Retaliatory ineligibility drafts were circulated against active community participants without consequence
- The ambassador program has operated without transparent performance standards, compensation disclosure, or meaningful accountability
- Ambassadors who demonstrably fail to meet basic expectations (no social media, no education, no outreach, monthly posting at best) have been retained while vocal community contributors have been silenced
- Blocked community members on personal social media (X) for raising governance concerns
An Ambassador Leader who permits — or fails to prevent — the systematic suppression of community voices cannot also hold the keys to the treasury.
### VT (Sega) — Head of Business Development + MultiSig Signer
VT holds dual authority as Head of BD AND MultiSig Guardian — responsible for business development while simultaneously controlling treasury access. Concerns:
- No verified real-world identity — uses a cartoon avatar while managing community funds
- Chain raised $40M+ from institutional investors who required KYC, yet VT operates anonymously in a position with direct treasury control
- Appointed by leadership, never elected by the community
- Holds a critical governance position without the transparency expected of someone with treasury signing authority
A Head of BD who cannot be independently verified cannot also hold signing authority over billions of XCN.
### AstroDaze — Ambassador + MultiSig Signer
AstroDaze holds dual authority as Ambassador AND MultiSig Guardian. A DAO is only as strong as the voices it allows to speak. When an ambassador — a community representative — uses their position to silence the community they claim to represent, that is not governance. That is occupation.
**Abuse of Moderation Power:**
AstroDaze has repeatedly used muting, banning, and message deletion to suppress community members who raise legitimate concerns about governance, ambassador conduct, and ecosystem transparency. Defenders of banned members are systematically targeted next — creating a chilling effect where silence becomes the only safe option.
**Retaliatory Intimidation:**
AstroDaze drafted "ineligibility" polls targeting @xplo333 (Nuclear) and @PappaJohn45, seeking to permanently bar them from ambassador roles AND future validator participation on Goliath. (Users can view attached content below). These polls were never posted to polls.onyx.org for community vote. They were written and distributed directly in Telegram as threats — intimidation dressed up as process. This is not governance. This is weaponizing the system against the people it was built to serve.
**Coordinated Suppression:**
When Nuclear and Papa John raised data-backed governance concerns (including the fact that fewer than 50 wallets out of 70,000 holders could create proposals), AstroDaze responded with dismissive one-word replies ("What?", "this"), coordinated with other ambassadors to derail the conversation with GIFs and stickers, then supported the DAO's decision to mute both members for 24 hours under the citation of "fud, racism, and constant spam" — when no racism, fud, or spam had occurred.
- Stating the name of a continent was labeled racist.
- Presenting governance data was labeled spam.
- Defending a wrongfully banned community member was labeled fud.
**Failure to Meet Ambassador Standards:**
No active social media presence — no Twitter/X, no YouTube — which disqualifies meaningful participation in the Zealy program and falls far short of ambassador expectations for public outreach, education, and visible contribution. Hand-selected by the DAO during a period when they desperately needed to fill ambassador slots, bypassing standard community vetting. (Users can see current social media presence from official DAO reaffirmation poll : https://polls.onyx.org/#/proposal/0x9875395bce5dca540363faf6647c413c6c8e4a053f91c8d3c47ad9daf59fb252)
An ambassador who weaponizes governance tools against the community, drafts retaliatory polls to bar critics from the ecosystem, and fails to meet basic ambassador standards cannot also hold signing authority over the community's treasury.
---
## The Pattern
All three individuals share the same structural conflict: they hold operational roles (ambassador leader, head of BD, ambassador) AND treasury control simultaneously. They oversee programs, moderate discussions, and manage community interactions — while also holding the keys to the money. When the community questions their performance, the same people who are being questioned control the mechanism that could negate the questioners.
This is a closed loop of authority, not security.
---
## New Ambassador Leader: Papa John (@PappaJohn45)
Papa John replaces Shawn as Ambassador Leader. He does NOT hold a MultiSig seat — because the entire point of this restructure is that no one should hold operational authority AND treasury control simultaneously.
- Voted in as ambassador by the community — then banned by the people he was elected to hold accountable
- Firsthand experience with moderation abuse — knows exactly what needs to change because he lived through it
- Will restructure the ambassador program to truly fit the needs and ever-evolving community
- Will not silence dissent — a leader who was banned for speaking up will never ban someone else for doing the same
The best person to reform a program that punished criticism is someone who was punished for criticizing it.
---
## Proposed MultiSig Restructure (5-of-9)
| Seat | Member | Role | Rationale | Independent? |
|------|--------|------|-----------|:------------:|
| 1 | Chain.com | Service Provider | Retained — must recuse on Chain-related votes | Declared conflict |
| 2 | Onyx DAO official | DAO Representative | Retained — insider seat | Insider |
| 3 | Momo (@Baby_Momo94) | Community-Elected | Significant independent holder, long-term aligned | ✅ |
| 4 | Joe Peay | Community-Elected | Long-term community advocate, witnessed 1+ year of moderation abuse | ✅ |
| 5 | Name Name (@Name_Name111) | Community-Elected | Quality control voice, devil's advocate, level-headed strategist | ✅ |
| 6 | Independent security auditor (U.S.-based) | Independent Professional | Must be a U.S.-registered blockchain security or forensics firm with no current or prior financial relationship to Onyx DAO, Chain, or any MultiSig member. Non-U.S. firms are not eligible. Hired not elected. | ✅ |
| 7 | BeardedCrypto (@Beardedcrypt0) | Holder Representative | UK-based, 100% ambassador approval, financial software project management experience | ✅ |
| 8 | SKS (@sks21560) | Ambassador Representative | Active ambassador, Android developer, technical contributor, bug reporter | Semi |
| 9 | Rotating bi-annual seat | Community Rotation | Open election every 6 months — fresh voice, prevents entrenchment | ✅ |
The community may elect alternative candidates to any proposed seat through a follow-up election poll. The names proposed here represent initial candidates based on documented community participation — not permanent appointments. Any XCN holder may challenge any seat through the standard polling process after the restructure is complete.
### Separation of Powers
| Role | Person | Treasury Access? |
|------|--------|:----------------:|
| Ambassador Leader | Papa John | ❌ — leads program, no treasury keys |
| MultiSig Signers | Momo, Joe Peay, Name Name, BeardedCrypto, SKS, Auditor, Rotating | ✅ — with independent majority |
| Service Provider | Chain.com | ✅ — must recuse on Chain votes |
| DAO Representative | Onyx DAO official | ✅ — insider seat |
Separation of powers. Checks and balances. Just how governance is supposed to work.
### The Math
- **6 out of 9 seats are independent community voices**
- **Chain + DAO official = 2 insider seats** — they can never override the community
- **5-of-9 required** — insiders need at least 3 community members to agree on any action
- **Minimum 3 independent approvals required** — no transaction without community consent
- **Ambassador Leader has zero treasury access** — operational roles stay operational
### Signature & Transparency Requirements
- 5-of-9 signatures required for any action
- Minimum 3 independent members must approve every transaction
- Chain must recuse from any vote affecting Chain compensation
- Bi-annual re-election for all community seats
- No individual may hold both an operational role (ambassador, leadership, service provider) AND a MultiSig seat simultaneously
- All signer wallet addresses published and independently verifiable onchain
- MultiSig contract address published within 7 days of restructure
- Every MultiSig transaction logged with signer attestation
- Quarterly public report on all MultiSig actions taken
### Smart Contract Reversion
The current MultiSig Guardian smart contract must be reverted and redeployed. The existing contract — whose address and signer configuration have never been published or independently verified — cannot be trusted as the foundation for a restructured governance system.
- Current MultiSig smart contract must be fully deprecated
- A new 5-of-9 MultiSig smart contract must be deployed from scratch
- The new contract must be open source, publicly verifiable, audited by a U.S.-registered firm with no ties to Onyx DAO or Chain, and published with full source code and all 9 signer addresses
- 14-day community review period before any treasury funds are transferred to the new contract
- The old contract must be permanently disabled — no residual signing authority, no backdoor access, no admin keys retained by former signers
- Chain.com is responsible for development and deployment as part of their restructured compensation
### Chain.com Compensation Reform
Upon restructure completion, Chain's compensation shall be reformed from the current 200,000,000 XCN monthly payment to 100,000,000 XCN paid quarterly (400M XCN annually, down from 2.4B annually). This aligns Chain's compensation with performance review cycles and reduces treasury outflows by over 83% while maintaining adequate funding for development operations.
---
## Why This Matters
A treasury controlled entirely by insiders is not a community treasury. A guardian with no independent members is not a guardian — it is a gatekeeper. A MultiSig with unpublished signer addresses is not security — it is obscurity.
The community has the right to oversight, the right to independent representation, and the right to a governance structure where the people who spend the money are not the same people who approve the spending.
Removing 3 of 5 signers forces a restructure. That is the point. The current structure cannot be reformed from within because the people who would need to approve the reform are the same people the reform would hold accountable. The only path to independence is through replacement.
This is not an attack on individuals. This is the community exercising its fundamental right to decentralized, accountable governance.
Nothing less than truth.
Nothing less than freedom of speech.
Nothing less than liberty for all who hold XCN and believe in what this project could be.
---
## Immediate Unbanning
Upon passage of this poll, the following community members shall be immediately unbanned and have full access restored to the official Onyx Telegram group (t.me/Onyx) and all related DAO communication channels:
- **Rhino / Nuclear (@xplo333)**
- **Papa John (@PappaJohn45)**
- **Name Name (@Name_Name111)**
- **Marky Marc**
- **Joe Peay**
- **Vladimir Putin**
For full transparency, complete transcriptions of all moderation incidents leading to these bans are documented and available for community review. The community can judge for themselves whether the cited reasons ("fud, racism, and constant spam") were accurate descriptions of the actual conduct.
All six were banned in sequence for raising legitimate governance concerns or defending others who did. No community rule was cited at the time of any ban that justified permanent exclusion. Message histories were permanently deleted by individuals the community never elected.
These unbans are not conditional. They are not subject to review by the individuals who issued the original bans. They are immediate, full, and permanent — subject only to the same community rules that apply to every other member going forward.
Any re-banning of these individuals without a documented rule violation cited at the time of the ban and a community poll approving the action will be treated as retaliation and a governance violation.
---
## Compliance with United States Law
All actions proposed in this poll shall be executed in full compliance with applicable United States federal and state law, including but not limited to:
- **Securities Law:** All token transfers, smart contract deployments, and governance restructuring shall comply with applicable SEC guidance on digital assets and DAO governance
- **Anti-Money Laundering (AML):** All new MultiSig signers must pass AML screening. The independent security auditor must be registered and compliant with U.S. AML regulations
- **Identity Verification:** All MultiSig signers holding treasury access must complete identity verification through an independent third-party provider prior to assuming signing authority. Verification confirms the signer is a real, unique individual — it does not require public disclosure of personal information. Verified identities are held under seal by the independent auditor and disclosed only under court order or in the event of documented fiduciary breach. No signer's personal information will be made public. No candidate receives treasury access until verification is complete. This requirement applies equally and without exception to every proposed signer including Chain.com's representative and the DAO official.
- **Fiduciary Responsibility:** MultiSig signers accept fiduciary responsibility for treasury assets upon accepting their seat. Misuse, unauthorized transfers, or failure to execute community-approved governance actions may constitute breach of fiduciary duty under applicable law
- **Tax Compliance:** All compensation (Chain quarterly payments, ambassador compensation, grants) must be structured with appropriate tax reporting. Recipients are responsible for their own tax obligations
- **Contractual Enforcement:** The smart contract reversion, 5-of-9 deployment, and all signer changes shall be executed through legally recognizable mechanisms. If any provision requires additional legal structuring to be enforceable under U.S. law, Chain.com is responsible for obtaining legal counsel and implementing the necessary framework as part of their restructured compensation
- **Dispute Resolution:** Any dispute arising from the implementation of this poll shall be resolved under United States law, with jurisdiction in the state where Chain.com is incorporated
- **Decentralization Alignment:** Nothing in this compliance framework shall be interpreted to centralize authority, restrict community voting rights, or concentrate power in any single entity, jurisdiction, or legal structure. U.S. law compliance serves as a baseline for accountability — not a mechanism for control. The DAO remains a decentralized, community-governed protocol. Legal compliance strengthens decentralization by ensuring that the individuals entrusted with treasury access, signing authority, and operational roles are held to verifiable standards — not by subjecting the community's governance rights to centralized legal gatekeeping.
No provision of this poll shall be interpreted to require or permit any action that violates United States law. If any specific provision is found to conflict with applicable law, that provision shall be modified to the minimum extent necessary to achieve compliance while preserving the intent of the community vote. All remaining provisions continue in full force.
---
## If Implementation Is Blocked
This poll acknowledges that the current 3-of-5 MultiSig may refuse to execute its own restructuring. This refusal is anticipated and accounted for.
If the current MultiSig signers refuse to implement the results of this community vote within 7 days:
1. **The refusal itself becomes the evidence.** A MultiSig that refuses to execute a community mandate is not a guardian — it is proof of the centralization this poll sought to correct. This will be publicly documented and distributed to all holders, media, and regulatory contacts.
2. **Chain.com faces a choice.** As both a MultiSig signer and the lead developer launching Goliath on March 27, Chain can either act as a neutral executor of community will or be permanently documented as complicit in blocking democratic governance. A blockchain launched against the documented wishes of its community is not decentralized and will be represented as such to investors, partners, and regulators.
3. **Legal escalation.** The U.S. compliance framework in this poll establishes fiduciary responsibility for MultiSig signers. Refusal to execute a community mandate while continuing to collect compensation from the treasury may constitute breach of fiduciary duty. Legal consultation will be initiated.
4. **Community migration.** If governance cannot be reformed from within, the community reserves the right to coordinate a migration to an independent governance structure, fork, or alternative protocol. The 60,000+ holders are the ecosystem — not the five signers who control the wallet.
5. **Investor and regulatory notification.** Chain raised $40M+ from institutional investors. Those investors were told they were funding a decentralized protocol. A MultiSig that refuses community governance is material information relevant to those investment representations.
The community prefers cooperation. These escalation paths exist only if cooperation is refused. The choice belongs to the current signers.
---
## Immediate Implementation — No OIP Required
This poll, if passed with quorum, shall be implemented immediately and directly without requiring a separate OIP, ratification vote, or additional governance approval of any kind.
The current OIP process is controlled by the same individuals this poll seeks to remove. Requiring an OIP to remove MultiSig signers means asking the MultiSig signers to approve their own removal. That is not governance. That is asking the lock to unlock itself.
- The MultiSig Guardian was established through OIP-62 — a bundled omnibus proposal that combined the MultiSig with staking rates, marketing budgets, DAO registry, and ambassador funding in a single yes/no vote. The community was never given the option to vote on the MultiSig structure independently.
- The individuals being removed (Shawn, VT, AstroDaze) hold the operational roles AND the treasury keys that control the OIP execution process. They cannot be both the subjects of removal AND the executors of that removal.
- OIP-62 itself states the MultiSig Guardians "will be evaluated and voted by the community quarterly." This poll IS that community evaluation — and proposes extending the evaluation cycle to bi-annually under the new structure to allow sufficient time for signers to demonstrate performance.
**Therefore:**
- This poll bypasses all OIP creation thresholds, ratification requirements, and execution queues.
- Upon reaching quorum and majority approval, the results are binding. Signer removal, role changes, unbanning, and process initiation must begin within 7 days. The new 5-of-9 smart contract deployment follows the 14-day community review period before any treasury funds are transferred.
- Chain.com, as the remaining MultiSig signer and lead developer, is responsible for executing the signer removal and initiating the 5-of-9 restructure. Upon restructure completion, Chain's compensation shall be reformed from the current 200,000,000 XCN monthly payment to 100,000,000 XCN paid quarterly (400M XCN annually, down from 2.4B annually).
- Any delay, obstruction, or refusal to implement the results of this poll will be publicly documented and treated as a governance violation.
- If implementation is blocked by current MultiSig signers, this constitutes proof that the MultiSig is being used to protect insiders rather than protect the protocol — validating every concern raised in this proposal.
This reform takes effect upon restructure completion — not before. Chain's current compensation continues uninterrupted through the Goliath mainnet launch and the 14-day smart contract review period. No development funding is reduced until the new governance structure is operational. Goliath is not affected.
The community does not need permission from the people it is holding accountable. That is the entire point.
If only one poll passes: the provisions of that poll are implemented independently. If Poll 1 passes and Poll 2 does not, the MultiSig restructure proceeds under current voting rules. If Poll 2 passes and Poll 1 does not, voting restrictions and quorum changes take effect under the current MultiSig structure. Neither outcome creates instability — both improve governance independently.
---
## Vote Options
- **For** — Remove Shawn as Ambassador Leader and MultiSig signer. Remove VT (Sega) as Head of Business Development and MultiSig signer. Remove AstroDaze as Onyx Ambassador and MultiSig signer. Appoint Papa John as Ambassador Leader (no MultiSig seat). Initiate 5-of-9 MultiSig restructure with community-elected seats, mandatory independent majority, published signer addresses, and new smart contract deployment. Reform Chain.com compensation to 100,000,000 XCN paid quarterly. Unban Rhino, Papa John, Name Name, Marky Marc, Joe Peay, and Vladimir Putin.
- **Against** — Retain current 3-of-5 MultiSig structure, all current signers, all current role holders, and all current bans.
 | Restructure MultiSig Guardian to 5-of-9 with Community-Elected Seats | # POLL 1: Restructure MultiSig Guardian to 5-of-9 with Community-Elected Seats
This poll seeks to determine whether the XCN community supports removing Shawn from Ambassador Leader and MultiSig Guardian, removing VT (Sega) from Head of Business Development and MultiSig Guardian, removing AstroDaze from Onyx Ambassador and MultiSig Guardian, appointing Papa John as new Ambassador Leader, and restructuring the MultiSig from the current 3-of-5 insider-controlled structure to a 5-of-9 model with mandatory independent representation and community-elected seats.
**Summary of Actions in This Poll:**
1. Remove Shawn, VT, and AstroDaze from MultiSig and their operational roles
2. Appoint Papa John as Ambassador Leader (no MultiSig seat)
3. Install 5-of-9 MultiSig with named community seats
4. Deploy new audited smart contract with 14-day review
5. Reform Chain compensation to 100M XCN quarterly
6. Unban 6 community members
Additionally, OIP-62 never published the actual MultiSig wallet addresses or signer keys. The community was given five names but has no way to independently verify who actually controls the MultiSig onchain. This lack of transparency alone warrants a full restructure.
---
## The Problem
The current 3-of-5 MultiSig Guardian has zero independent oversight:
| Guardian | Role | MultiSig Signer | Independent? |
|----------|------|:----------------:|:------------:|
| Chain.com | Paid by DAO | ✅ | ❌ |
| @TheOnyxDAO | The DAO itself | ✅ | ❌ |
| Shawn | Appointed Ambassador Leader | ✅ | ❌ |
| VT (Sega) | Appointed Community Leader | ✅ | ❌ |
| AstroDaze | Re-elected (54/46%) Ambassador | ✅ | ❌ |
**5 out of 5 signers are insiders. Zero independent oversight.**
Only 3 signatures needed. Chain + @TheOnyxDAO + any single insider = complete control over the treasury and protocol. The community has no seat at the table that controls its own money.
This is not decentralized governance, but a centralized operation wearing a DAO costume.
---
### Compromised Reaffirmation Votes
The original ambassador reaffirmation polls that retained Shawn, VT, AstroDaze and all other ambassadors in their roles passed during a period when multiple community members experienced documented voting issues — including inability to cast votes, wallet connection failures, and access problems on polls.onyx.org. Community members who were banned or muted at the time were entirely excluded from participating in the very votes that determined whether their moderators would remain in power.
AstroDaze was reaffirmed with only 54% approval. Nurulla and Opa passed at 53%. The quorum alignment poll passed at 52%. These razor-thin margins occurred while active, vocal community members were locked out of the voting process. The results cannot be considered legitimate expressions of community sentiment when the community members most affected by these individuals' conduct were systematically prevented from voting.
Any reaffirmation vote conducted while critics are banned and voters are experiencing access issues is not a reaffirmation but a confirmation bias baked into the process.
---
## Why These Three Must Be Removed
### Shawn — Ambassador Leader + MultiSig Signer
Shawn holds dual authority as both Ambassador Leader AND MultiSig Guardian — overseeing the ambassador program while simultaneously holding treasury control. Under his leadership:
- Community members raising governance concerns have been muted and banned in sequence
- Retaliatory ineligibility drafts were circulated against active community participants without consequence
- The ambassador program has operated without transparent performance standards, compensation disclosure, or meaningful accountability
- Ambassadors who demonstrably fail to meet basic expectations (no social media, no education, no outreach, monthly posting at best) have been retained while vocal community contributors have been silenced
- Blocked community members on personal social media (X) for raising governance concerns
An Ambassador Leader who permits — or fails to prevent — the systematic suppression of community voices cannot also hold the keys to the treasury.
### VT (Sega) — Head of Business Development + MultiSig Signer
VT holds dual authority as Head of BD AND MultiSig Guardian — responsible for business development while simultaneously controlling treasury access. Concerns:
- No verified real-world identity — uses a cartoon avatar while managing community funds
- Chain raised $40M+ from institutional investors who required KYC, yet VT operates anonymously in a position with direct treasury control
- Appointed by leadership, never elected by the community
- Holds a critical governance position without the transparency expected of someone with treasury signing authority
A Head of BD who cannot be independently verified cannot also hold signing authority over billions of XCN.
### AstroDaze — Ambassador + MultiSig Signer
AstroDaze holds dual authority as Ambassador AND MultiSig Guardian. A DAO is only as strong as the voices it allows to speak. When an ambassador — a community representative — uses their position to silence the community they claim to represent, that is not governance. That is occupation.
**Abuse of Moderation Power:**
AstroDaze has repeatedly used muting, banning, and message deletion to suppress community members who raise legitimate concerns about governance, ambassador conduct, and ecosystem transparency. Defenders of banned members are systematically targeted next — creating a chilling effect where silence becomes the only safe option.
**Retaliatory Intimidation:**
AstroDaze drafted "ineligibility" polls targeting @xplo333 (Nuclear) and @PappaJohn45, seeking to permanently bar them from ambassador roles AND future validator participation on Goliath. (Users can view attached content below). These polls were never posted to polls.onyx.org for community vote. They were written and distributed directly in Telegram as threats — intimidation dressed up as process. This is not governance. This is weaponizing the system against the people it was built to serve.
**Coordinated Suppression:**
When Nuclear and Papa John raised data-backed governance concerns (including the fact that fewer than 50 wallets out of 70,000 holders could create proposals), AstroDaze responded with dismissive one-word replies ("What?", "this"), coordinated with other ambassadors to derail the conversation with GIFs and stickers, then supported the DAO's decision to mute both members for 24 hours under the citation of "fud, racism, and constant spam" — when no racism, fud, or spam had occurred.
- Stating the name of a continent was labeled racist.
- Presenting governance data was labeled spam.
- Defending a wrongfully banned community member was labeled fud.
**Failure to Meet Ambassador Standards:**
No active social media presence — no Twitter/X, no YouTube — which disqualifies meaningful participation in the Zealy program and falls far short of ambassador expectations for public outreach, education, and visible contribution. Hand-selected by the DAO during a period when they desperately needed to fill ambassador slots, bypassing standard community vetting. (Users can see current social media presence from official DAO reaffirmation poll : https://polls.onyx.org/#/proposal/0x9875395bce5dca540363faf6647c413c6c8e4a053f91c8d3c47ad9daf59fb252)
An ambassador who weaponizes governance tools against the community, drafts retaliatory polls to bar critics from the ecosystem, and fails to meet basic ambassador standards cannot also hold signing authority over the community's treasury.
---
## The Pattern
All three individuals share the same structural conflict: they hold operational roles (ambassador leader, head of BD, ambassador) AND treasury control simultaneously. They oversee programs, moderate discussions, and manage community interactions — while also holding the keys to the money. When the community questions their performance, the same people who are being questioned control the mechanism that could negate the questioners.
This is a closed loop of authority, not security.
---
## New Ambassador Leader: Papa John (@PappaJohn45)
Papa John replaces Shawn as Ambassador Leader. He does NOT hold a MultiSig seat — because the entire point of this restructure is that no one should hold operational authority AND treasury control simultaneously.
- Voted in as ambassador by the community — then banned by the people he was elected to hold accountable
- Firsthand experience with moderation abuse — knows exactly what needs to change because he lived through it
- Will restructure the ambassador program to truly fit the needs and ever-evolving community
- Will not silence dissent — a leader who was banned for speaking up will never ban someone else for doing the same
The best person to reform a program that punished criticism is someone who was punished for criticizing it.
---
## Proposed MultiSig Restructure (5-of-9)
| Seat | Member | Role | Rationale | Independent? |
|------|--------|------|-----------|:------------:|
| 1 | Chain.com | Service Provider | Retained — must recuse on Chain-related votes | Declared conflict |
| 2 | Onyx DAO official | DAO Representative | Retained — insider seat | Insider |
| 3 | Momo (@Baby_Momo94) | Community-Elected | Significant independent holder, long-term aligned | ✅ |
| 4 | Joe Peay | Community-Elected | Long-term community advocate, witnessed 1+ year of moderation abuse | ✅ |
| 5 | Name Name (@Name_Name111) | Community-Elected | Quality control voice, devil's advocate, level-headed strategist | ✅ |
| 6 | Independent security auditor (U.S.-based) | Independent Professional | Must be a U.S.-registered blockchain security or forensics firm with no current or prior financial relationship to Onyx DAO, Chain, or any MultiSig member. Non-U.S. firms are not eligible. Hired not elected. | ✅ |
| 7 | BeardedCrypto (@Beardedcrypt0) | Holder Representative | UK-based, 100% ambassador approval, financial software project management experience | ✅ |
| 8 | SKS (@sks21560) | Ambassador Representative | Active ambassador, Android developer, technical contributor, bug reporter | Semi |
| 9 | Rotating bi-annual seat | Community Rotation | Open election every 6 months — fresh voice, prevents entrenchment | ✅ |
The community may elect alternative candidates to any proposed seat through a follow-up election poll. The names proposed here represent initial candidates based on documented community participation — not permanent appointments. Any XCN holder may challenge any seat through the standard polling process after the restructure is complete.
### Separation of Powers
| Role | Person | Treasury Access? |
|------|--------|:----------------:|
| Ambassador Leader | Papa John | ❌ — leads program, no treasury keys |
| MultiSig Signers | Momo, Joe Peay, Name Name, BeardedCrypto, SKS, Auditor, Rotating | ✅ — with independent majority |
| Service Provider | Chain.com | ✅ — must recuse on Chain votes |
| DAO Representative | Onyx DAO official | ✅ — insider seat |
Separation of powers. Checks and balances. Just how governance is supposed to work.
### The Math
- **6 out of 9 seats are independent community voices**
- **Chain + DAO official = 2 insider seats** — they can never override the community
- **5-of-9 required** — insiders need at least 3 community members to agree on any action
- **Minimum 3 independent approvals required** — no transaction without community consent
- **Ambassador Leader has zero treasury access** — operational roles stay operational
### Signature & Transparency Requirements
- 5-of-9 signatures required for any action
- Minimum 3 independent members must approve every transaction
- Chain must recuse from any vote affecting Chain compensation
- Bi-annual re-election for all community seats
- No individual may hold both an operational role (ambassador, leadership, service provider) AND a MultiSig seat simultaneously
- All signer wallet addresses published and independently verifiable onchain
- MultiSig contract address published within 7 days of restructure
- Every MultiSig transaction logged with signer attestation
- Quarterly public report on all MultiSig actions taken
### Smart Contract Reversion
The current MultiSig Guardian smart contract must be reverted and redeployed. The existing contract — whose address and signer configuration have never been published or independently verified — cannot be trusted as the foundation for a restructured governance system.
- Current MultiSig smart contract must be fully deprecated
- A new 5-of-9 MultiSig smart contract must be deployed from scratch
- The new contract must be open source, publicly verifiable, audited by a U.S.-registered firm with no ties to Onyx DAO or Chain, and published with full source code and all 9 signer addresses
- 14-day community review period before any treasury funds are transferred to the new contract
- The old contract must be permanently disabled — no residual signing authority, no backdoor access, no admin keys retained by former signers
- Chain.com is responsible for development and deployment as part of their restructured compensation
### Chain.com Compensation Reform
Upon restructure completion, Chain's compensation shall be reformed from the current 200,000,000 XCN monthly payment to 100,000,000 XCN paid quarterly (400M XCN annually, down from 2.4B annually). This aligns Chain's compensation with performance review cycles and reduces treasury outflows by over 83% while maintaining adequate funding for development operations.
---
## Why This Matters
A treasury controlled entirely by insiders is not a community treasury. A guardian with no independent members is not a guardian — it is a gatekeeper. A MultiSig with unpublished signer addresses is not security — it is obscurity.
The community has the right to oversight, the right to independent representation, and the right to a governance structure where the people who spend the money are not the same people who approve the spending.
Removing 3 of 5 signers forces a restructure. That is the point. The current structure cannot be reformed from within because the people who would need to approve the reform are the same people the reform would hold accountable. The only path to independence is through replacement.
This is not an attack on individuals. This is the community exercising its fundamental right to decentralized, accountable governance.
Nothing less than truth.
Nothing less than freedom of speech.
Nothing less than liberty for all who hold XCN and believe in what this project could be.
---
## Immediate Unbanning
Upon passage of this poll, the following community members shall be immediately unbanned and have full access restored to the official Onyx Telegram group (t.me/Onyx) and all related DAO communication channels:
- **Rhino / Nuclear (@xplo333)**
- **Papa John (@PappaJohn45)**
- **Name Name (@Name_Name111)**
- **Marky Marc**
- **Joe Peay**
- **Vladimir Putin**
For full transparency, complete transcriptions of all moderation incidents leading to these bans are documented and available for community review. The community can judge for themselves whether the cited reasons ("fud, racism, and constant spam") were accurate descriptions of the actual conduct.
All six were banned in sequence for raising legitimate governance concerns or defending others who did. No community rule was cited at the time of any ban that justified permanent exclusion. Message histories were permanently deleted by individuals the community never elected.
These unbans are not conditional. They are not subject to review by the individuals who issued the original bans. They are immediate, full, and permanent — subject only to the same community rules that apply to every other member going forward.
Any re-banning of these individuals without a documented rule violation cited at the time of the ban and a community poll approving the action will be treated as retaliation and a governance violation.
---
## Compliance with United States Law
All actions proposed in this poll shall be executed in full compliance with applicable United States federal and state law, including but not limited to:
- **Securities Law:** All token transfers, smart contract deployments, and governance restructuring shall comply with applicable SEC guidance on digital assets and DAO governance
- **Anti-Money Laundering (AML):** All new MultiSig signers must pass AML screening. The independent security auditor must be registered and compliant with U.S. AML regulations
- **Identity Verification:** All MultiSig signers holding treasury access must complete identity verification through an independent third-party provider prior to assuming signing authority. Verification confirms the signer is a real, unique individual — it does not require public disclosure of personal information. Verified identities are held under seal by the independent auditor and disclosed only under court order or in the event of documented fiduciary breach. No signer's personal information will be made public. No candidate receives treasury access until verification is complete. This requirement applies equally and without exception to every proposed signer including Chain.com's representative and the DAO official.
- **Fiduciary Responsibility:** MultiSig signers accept fiduciary responsibility for treasury assets upon accepting their seat. Misuse, unauthorized transfers, or failure to execute community-approved governance actions may constitute breach of fiduciary duty under applicable law
- **Tax Compliance:** All compensation (Chain quarterly payments, ambassador compensation, grants) must be structured with appropriate tax reporting. Recipients are responsible for their own tax obligations
- **Contractual Enforcement:** The smart contract reversion, 5-of-9 deployment, and all signer changes shall be executed through legally recognizable mechanisms. If any provision requires additional legal structuring to be enforceable under U.S. law, Chain.com is responsible for obtaining legal counsel and implementing the necessary framework as part of their restructured compensation
- **Dispute Resolution:** Any dispute arising from the implementation of this poll shall be resolved under United States law, with jurisdiction in the state where Chain.com is incorporated
- **Decentralization Alignment:** Nothing in this compliance framework shall be interpreted to centralize authority, restrict community voting rights, or concentrate power in any single entity, jurisdiction, or legal structure. U.S. law compliance serves as a baseline for accountability — not a mechanism for control. The DAO remains a decentralized, community-governed protocol. Legal compliance strengthens decentralization by ensuring that the individuals entrusted with treasury access, signing authority, and operational roles are held to verifiable standards — not by subjecting the community's governance rights to centralized legal gatekeeping.
No provision of this poll shall be interpreted to require or permit any action that violates United States law. If any specific provision is found to conflict with applicable law, that provision shall be modified to the minimum extent necessary to achieve compliance while preserving the intent of the community vote. All remaining provisions continue in full force.
---
## If Implementation Is Blocked
This poll acknowledges that the current 3-of-5 MultiSig may refuse to execute its own restructuring. This refusal is anticipated and accounted for.
If the current MultiSig signers refuse to implement the results of this community vote within 7 days:
1. **The refusal itself becomes the evidence.** A MultiSig that refuses to execute a community mandate is not a guardian — it is proof of the centralization this poll sought to correct. This will be publicly documented and distributed to all holders, media, and regulatory contacts.
2. **Chain.com faces a choice.** As both a MultiSig signer and the lead developer launching Goliath on March 27, Chain can either act as a neutral executor of community will or be permanently documented as complicit in blocking democratic governance. A blockchain launched against the documented wishes of its community is not decentralized and will be represented as such to investors, partners, and regulators.
3. **Legal escalation.** The U.S. compliance framework in this poll establishes fiduciary responsibility for MultiSig signers. Refusal to execute a community mandate while continuing to collect compensation from the treasury may constitute breach of fiduciary duty. Legal consultation will be initiated.
4. **Community migration.** If governance cannot be reformed from within, the community reserves the right to coordinate a migration to an independent governance structure, fork, or alternative protocol. The 60,000+ holders are the ecosystem — not the five signers who control the wallet.
5. **Investor and regulatory notification.** Chain raised $40M+ from institutional investors. Those investors were told they were funding a decentralized protocol. A MultiSig that refuses community governance is material information relevant to those investment representations.
The community prefers cooperation. These escalation paths exist only if cooperation is refused. The choice belongs to the current signers.
---
## Immediate Implementation — No OIP Required
This poll, if passed with quorum, shall be implemented immediately and directly without requiring a separate OIP, ratification vote, or additional governance approval of any kind.
The current OIP process is controlled by the same individuals this poll seeks to remove. Requiring an OIP to remove MultiSig signers means asking the MultiSig signers to approve their own removal. That is not governance. That is asking the lock to unlock itself.
- The MultiSig Guardian was established through OIP-62 — a bundled omnibus proposal that combined the MultiSig with staking rates, marketing budgets, DAO registry, and ambassador funding in a single yes/no vote. The community was never given the option to vote on the MultiSig structure independently.
- The individuals being removed (Shawn, VT, AstroDaze) hold the operational roles AND the treasury keys that control the OIP execution process. They cannot be both the subjects of removal AND the executors of that removal.
- OIP-62 itself states the MultiSig Guardians "will be evaluated and voted by the community quarterly." This poll IS that community evaluation — and proposes extending the evaluation cycle to bi-annually under the new structure to allow sufficient time for signers to demonstrate performance.
**Therefore:**
- This poll bypasses all OIP creation thresholds, ratification requirements, and execution queues.
- Upon reaching quorum and majority approval, the results are binding. Signer removal, role changes, unbanning, and process initiation must begin within 7 days. The new 5-of-9 smart contract deployment follows the 14-day community review period before any treasury funds are transferred.
- Chain.com, as the remaining MultiSig signer and lead developer, is responsible for executing the signer removal and initiating the 5-of-9 restructure. Upon restructure completion, Chain's compensation shall be reformed from the current 200,000,000 XCN monthly payment to 100,000,000 XCN paid quarterly (400M XCN annually, down from 2.4B annually).
- Any delay, obstruction, or refusal to implement the results of this poll will be publicly documented and treated as a governance violation.
- If implementation is blocked by current MultiSig signers, this constitutes proof that the MultiSig is being used to protect insiders rather than protect the protocol — validating every concern raised in this proposal.
This reform takes effect upon restructure completion — not before. Chain's current compensation continues uninterrupted through the Goliath mainnet launch and the 14-day smart contract review period. No development funding is reduced until the new governance structure is operational. Goliath is not affected.
The community does not need permission from the people it is holding accountable. That is the entire point.
If only one poll passes: the provisions of that poll are implemented independently. If Poll 1 passes and Poll 2 does not, the MultiSig restructure proceeds under current voting rules. If Poll 2 passes and Poll 1 does not, voting restrictions and quorum changes take effect under the current MultiSig structure. Neither outcome creates instability — both improve governance independently.
---
## Vote Options
- **For** — Remove Shawn as Ambassador Leader and MultiSig signer. Remove VT (Sega) as Head of Business Development and MultiSig signer. Remove AstroDaze as Onyx Ambassador and MultiSig signer. Appoint Papa John as Ambassador Leader (no MultiSig seat). Initiate 5-of-9 MultiSig restructure with community-elected seats, mandatory independent majority, published signer addresses, and new smart contract deployment. Reform Chain.com compensation to 100,000,000 XCN paid quarterly. Unban Rhino, Papa John, Name Name, Marky Marc, Joe Peay, and Vladimir Putin.
- **Against** — Retain current 3-of-5 MultiSig structure, all current signers, all current role holders, and all current bans.
 | 0x87e24b6b04acf5dbd2dbc5190d026d76ed75350e764122aacf205c8dc0dd84f2 | chaingov.eth | Onyx XCN DAO | 1 | basic | active | 6 | 1,773,491,420 | 2026-03-14 12:30:20 | 1,773,491,480 | 2026-03-14 12:31:20 | 1,773,664,280 | 2026-03-16 12:31:20 | 0x2BE747263FA1871d2F8bb98449C8d5d504B3dFfC |
Add the location 118,-131 to the Points of Interest
> by 0xa6f391fb93e1607f61a14f960777d2d2d612d297 (P0AP)
## POAP
Should the scene located at 118,-131 be added to the Point of Interest list?
## Description
DCL POAP OFFICE
Here you can find how to set a POAP in DCL.
**[This proposal is summarized due to technical limitations. To view it complete and vote on it, visit the DCL DAO Governance dApp](https://decentraland.org/governance/proposal/?id=3cce1eee-6a3c-4f4c-a436-3838f850b8c0)** | Add the location 118,-131 to the Points of Interest | > by 0xa6f391fb93e1607f61a14f960777d2d2d612d297 (P0AP)
## POAP
Should the scene located at 118,-131 be added to the Point of Interest list?
## Description
DCL POAP OFFICE
Here you can find how to set a POAP in DCL.
**[This proposal is summarized due to technical limitations. To view it complete and vote on it, visit the DCL DAO Governance dApp](https://decentraland.org/governance/proposal/?id=3cce1eee-6a3c-4f4c-a436-3838f850b8c0)** | 0x0e4ff9ab421988e74cd42c333963552b364916707156a0a3b2edc1619cf1e086 | snapshot.dcl.eth | Decentraland | 1 | single-choice | active | 5 | 1,773,476,383 | 2026-03-14 08:19:43 | 1,773,476,340 | 2026-03-14 08:19:00 | 1,774,081,140 | 2026-03-21 08:19:00 | 0xBB7B59Afa3A0E5Be143b8fE9C641F00c1ecB9d69 |
[DIP-50] Introduction of Effective Balance Oracles, Effective Balance Accounting, ETH-denominated Payments, and SSV Staking
## **Proposal Summary**
The ssv.network DAO ("DAO") proposes introducing SSV Staking as part of a _broader set of protocol upgrades_ designed to support ETH-denominated payments and native effective balance accounting within the SSV Network.
The transition to ETH payments simplifies the protocol's economic model by aligning fee settlement with the asset in which validator rewards are generated. Moving fee payments to ETH removes cross-asset dependencies, reduces operational complexity, and enables more direct and predictable protocol-level accounting.
In parallel, supporting Ethereum's post-Pectra validator model requires effective balance-aware accounting. Effective Balance Accounting (EBA) ensures that fees, runway calculations, and liquidation logic scale with the actual stake secured by validators, rather than relying on fixed assumptions. Implementing this model natively requires the protocol to reflect validator effective balances on-chain throughout their lifecycle.
To bridge the gap between Ethereum's consensus layer and on-chain accounting, the protocol introduces Effective Balance Oracles (EBO), which track validator balances and update protocol state. Operating this oracle system in a decentralized and resilient manner requires participation and delegation by parties economically aligned with the protocol.
SSV Staking provides such a delegation mechanism, allowing SSV holders to stake their tokens and delegate their stake toward the selection of EBOs. Initially, there will be four permissioned EBOs; later, a DAO proposal will follow to allow permissionless EBOs. In doing so, protocol fee flows are reflected through the staking mechanism in proportion to protocol usage, strengthening alignment between token holders and the network.
### **Proposal Particulars**
This proposal establishes the following:
1. Proposal Summary
2. Proposal Particulars
3. Proposal Applicability
- a. Payment, Validator and Operator Changes
- b. Effective Balance Accounting and Effective Balance Oracle Introduction
- c. ssv.network DAO Multi-sig Committee Required Actions
- i. SSV Parameters
- ii. ETH Parameters
- iii. Operator's fee transition to ETH fees
- iv. SSV Staking Parameters
- d. Incentivized Mainnet Changes
- c. SSV Foundation Required Actions
## Proposal Applicability
If this proposal were to pass, the following would be its consequences:
### Payment, Validator and Operator Changes
1. A transition to ETH payments, which means all new clusters will operate with ETH payments from the outset, meaning:
- a. Operator fees are paid in ETH.
- b. Network fees are paid in ETH.
- c. ETH must be deposited upfront to fund the cluster's operational runway.
- d. Support for actively operating existing SSV-based clusters under the SSV payment model is removed. While these clusters may continue running as long as they have sufficient runway, they can no longer be maintained through operational changes.
This means that adding new validators, reactivating liquidated clusters or depositing additional SSV to extend a cluster's runway is no longer supported. As a result, the only path forward for maintaining an existing cluster is migration to ETH payments, which restores full cluster functionality under the new payment and accounting model.
For cluster owners who do not wish to migrate or are unable to do so, the remaining option is to voluntarily liquidate the cluster. Self-liquidation returns the remaining cluster balance to the owner and signals operators to stop operating the cluster's validators. However, if the intention is to continue operating the validators in the future, migration to ETH payments will be required in order to do so.
2. Cluster migration - To migrate, the cluster owner initiates the migration and deposits sufficient ETH to fund the cluster's future operation runway under the ETH payment model. As part of the migration, the cluster's accounting is switched from SSV to ETH, and any remaining SSV balance is returned to the cluster owner. Migration is a one-way process - once a cluster is migrated to ETH payments, it cannot revert back to SSV-based payments.
3. New Operators - New operators onboard directly with ETH-denominated fees. From launch onward, operators registering in the network will not be able to define or configure fees in SSV, and will operate exclusively under the ETH payment model.
4. Existing Operators - Existing operators continue earning SSV-denominated fees only for clusters that have not yet migrated. These SSV fees continue to accrue, but operators are no longer able to modify or adjust their SSV fee configuration. Accrued fees can still be withdrawn. Once their clusters migrate to ETH payments, or when new ETH-denominated clusters are onboarded, operators begin earning fees in ETH based on their pre-assigned ETH fee configuration. The relevant fee can be found further below.
### Effective Balance Accounting and Effective Balance Oracle Introduction
5. Introduction of EBA - In the ETH-based model effective balance becomes the billing unit. Fees are defined per 32 ETH of effective balance and scale with a cluster's total effective balance, rather than with validator count:
Here, _total effective balance_ refers to the cumulative effective balance of all validators belonging to the cluster. All accounting is performed using this aggregated cluster-level value. As a result, ETH-based clusters pay fees proportional to the actual effective balance they secure, independent of how that balance is distributed across validator keys.
EBA replaces the SSV-based model where each validator is implicitly assumed to represent a fixed 32 ETH of effective balance. Fees, runway calculations and liquidation conditions, therefore scale linearly with the number of validators in the cluster, regardless of how much effective balance those validators actually secure. This is currently calculated by `(fees per validator) x validatorCount` and under this mode, Fees are defined per validator. Total fees scale with validator count**.** Consolidated validators are not fully accounted for. This model continues to apply to all SSV-based clusters. As a result, Network fee deduction for compensation via the Incentivized Mainnet script continues to operate. Operators managing SSV-based clusters are not compensated based on the amount of stake they manage.
Because updates are performed through periodic cluster-level sweeps, validators added to or removed from a cluster are initially accounted for using a default assumption of 32 ETH per validator. The actual effective balance of these validators - such as in the case of consolidated validators - will only be reflected once the next sweep occurs. As a result, cluster owners must account for the potential impact of delayed updates on runway and fee accrual, particularly when adding validators with higher effective balances.
6. Introduction of permissioned EBOs.
- a. EBOs are responsible for tracking validator effective balances on the beacon chain and enabling the protocol to keep its on-chain accounting aligned with real validator state as balances evolve over time.
- b. Validator effective balances live on Ethereum's consensus layer. Smart contracts operate on the execution layer. Contracts cannot directly query consensus-layer states. Therefore, a bridging mechanism is required to reflect the consensus-layer balance state on-chain. EBOs provide that bridge.
- c. In order to achieve the DAO's stated goal of decentralizing Ethereum but doing so in the most ETH-aligned way, the suggestion is that the DAO adopt EBOs that will perform Effective Balance Accounting. In this regard, the EBOs on ssv.network play a similar role to that of validators on the Ethereum blockchain, both requiring a staking mechanism and possibly a delegation to a third-party performing the needed duties, thus fulfilling a crucial and integral part of the process. While oracles don't validate transactions as validators do, they do maintain the integrity and security of the protocol by accurately attesting what a validator's effective balance is, which is key for the safety of the ssv.network.
- d. The protocol will initially launch with a set of permissioned EBOs for several practical reasons. From a testing and security standpoint, a fixed set of 4 oracles allows for a deterministic 3-of-4 quorum (75%), eliminates the risk of Sybil attacks, and keeps the attack surface well-defined and manageable. Operationally, permissioned EBOs ensure predictable uptime, clear responsibilities, guaranteed liveness, and a controlled environment to test infrastructure during the bootstrapping phase. This setup also simplifies debugging and incident response, guards against early adversarial behavior, and provides time to calibrate incentives before opening participation to the broader community.
- Kraken - 0xc61f7bd9ee5a3d011caf47aa0e5411f720593920
- InfStones - 0xc07332e05cec1c4896555a6d10361233fdf14422
- Ethernodes - 0x28bEa5B242362974d5DDb8f17a1E0e525446960B
- SSV Labs - 0x3A98EE5f80268Ed91F8A5880d93468b76a9F3bB4
- e. Effective balance updates are performed in two steps, moving from global observation to cluster-level updates. Effective Balance Oracles continuously track validator effective balances on the beacon chain. At defined intervals, they take a snapshot of all validator balances, aggregate them per cluster, and construct a Merkle tree representing the effective balances of all clusters at that snapshot. To reach consensus on this snapshot, each oracle independently commits the Merkle root representing this snapshot. Once a threshold of oracle commitments is reached, the snapshot is accepted by the protocol as the authoritative and accurate view of effective balances for that point in time. This threshold-based mechanism ensures both the correctness of the data and that no single oracle can dictate balance updates. Once a snapshot is accepted, cluster-level effective balances can be updated on-chain by submitting a proof derived from the committed Merkle tree for a specific cluster. Updating cluster balances is permissionless so that anyone can submit a valid proof and bear the transaction cost. As a failsafe, EBOs are expected to periodically perform these updates themselves to ensure cluster balances remain current even if third parties do not act. When a cluster's effective balance is updated, the protocol updates all related accounting based on the new value. This affects cluster runway calculations as well as future network and operator fee accruals tied to the amount of effective balance being managed. If an update causes a cluster to fall below liquidation thresholds, the cluster will be liquidated as part of the same process, ensuring that increases in effective balance are always matched by sufficient funding and collateral.
### ssv.network DAO Multi-sig Committee Required Actions
7. The ssv.network DAO Multi-sig (MC) will update the following audited smart contracts to support the above operations:
- a. SSVNetwork ([0xDD9BC35aE942eF0cFa76930954a156B3fF30a4E1](https://etherscan.io/address/0xDD9BC35aE942eF0cFa76930954a156B3fF30a4E1))
- b. SSVNetworkViews ([0xafE830B6Ee262ba11cce5F32fDCd760FFE6a66e4](https://etherscan.io/address/0xafE830B6Ee262ba11cce5F32fDCd760FFE6a66e4))
8. The MC will be required to add new smart contract modules to the abovementioned smart contracts, via the update mechanism already used in [[DIP-19] Scaling Permissioned Operators Upgrade](https://forum.ssv.network/t/dip-19-scaling-permissioned-operators-upgrade/1420) :
- a. SSVStaking
- b. SSVValidators
9. The MC will be required to update the modules of the abovementioned smart contracts, which are:
- a. SSVClusters
- b. SSVDAO
- c. SSVOperators
- d. SSVOperatorsWhitelist
- e. SSVViews
10. The "SSVNetwork" smart contract (section 7. subsection a) will gain the right to mint and burn cSSV. An ERC-20 token is received when SSV is staked into the abovementioned SSV Staking module by owners of SSV tokens, and it represents their staked position at a 1:1 ratio. Protocol fees accrue continuously as validators operate on the SSV Network and generate ongoing network fees. Stakers earn a pro-rata share of ETH-denominated fees, based on their share of the total staked SSV. Rewards can be claimed at any time without unstaking, and claiming does not affect the staking position.
When cSSV is transferred, rewards accrued up to that point remain claimable by the original holder, while the new holder begins accruing rewards only from the moment they receive the cSSV. cSSV represents a claim on the underlying staked SSV, as well as a share of protocol fees accrued to stakers. Staked SSV, represented by cSSV, retains full governance and voting power. For SSV to be unstaked a two-step process needs to be followed. First, the staker submits a withdrawal request. At this point, the specified amount of cSSV is immediately burned, and the corresponding amount of underlying SSV is set aside for the user. This action starts the cooldown period (proposed to launch at 7 days) and stops reward accrual from that moment. During the cooldown, the user no longer holds cSSV and therefore no longer has governance power or oracle weight for the withdrawn amount. Once the cooldown period ends, the staker can finalize the withdrawal and receive the reserved SSV at a 1:1 ratio relative to the original stake. Stakers may submit multiple withdrawal requests over time. When finalizing an unstake, the staker can claim the cumulative amount of all requests whose lock period has fully elapsed, while any requests still in their lock period remain locked. A maximum of 2,000 active withdrawal requests per address is supported.
11. If any source of the variables required for the formulas listed under section 16. was not adequately defined or is ambiguous, the Master of Coin will have the discretion to decide the source and method of calculation of such a variable. Any such decision must be publicized to the DAO forum in order to be effective. The MoC can only do this once per variable. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the MC will have the authority to amend any such source or method of calculation if any source or method becomes corrupted, unavailable, or becomes a security concern for the protocol. Such a decision by the multisig will follow the steps described by the Detrimental Situation procedure as described in [[DIP-2] Multi-Sig Committee](https://snapshot.box/#/s:mainnet.ssvnetwork.eth/proposal/0x393b81f83e63e6ecbd95a61d88ecc53d8668e6a2b32a5f323291860c280dd050)**.**
12. SSV-denominated clusters will use the following formulas for their parameters:
- a. Minimum Liquidation Collateral (prescribed by [[DIP-44] Re-Evaluation of Liquidation Collateral and Network Fee Parameters](https://snapshot.org/#/s:mainnet.ssvnetwork.eth/proposal/0x5ab8383681f4efec61c1e89388477e18de3f1b9a34ce1fef001e55043a8f3273) (“DIP-44”):
The sources and values for the variables of the Minimum Liquidation Collateral calculation are as follows:
- a. **Gas Units:** 252800
- b. Liquidation Threshold (prescribed by DIP-44):
- c. Network Fee - Prescribed by [[DIP-49] Network Fee Ratio Maximum](https://snapshot.org/#/s:mainnet.ssvnetwork.eth/proposal/0x5300de7fd0df8c07b06b1e4ad71bdf036945b26787b0157d70ab80fee3ad4126)
13. ETH-denominated clusters will use the following formulas for their parameters:
- a. Minimum Liquidation Collateral:
The sources and values for the variables of the Minimum Liquidation Collateral calculation are as follows:
- b. **Gas Units:** 226578
- b. Liquidation Threshold:
- c. Network fee:
The sources and values for the variables of the network fee are as follows:
- i. **Ethereum APR**: defined as the 30-day trailing moving average of the [ETH.STORE](https://docs.beaconcha.in/api-reference/ethstore%C2%AE/ethstore-daily-aggregates) numbers from the API.
- ii. **NetworkFee:** Determined by the DAO as 1% of ETH staking APR, as determined by [[DIP-11] Mainnet Proposal](https://snapshot.box/#/s:mainnet.ssvnetwork.eth/proposal/0x90af2241fb2b3b3242dfb98efb9185b5bafac00d1cb300542a107d0df4ef6e12)
- iii. **BlocksPerYear:** 2613400
14. The MC will be tasked with updating the parameters listed under section 12 subsection (a), section 12 subsection (b), section 13 subsection (a), section 13 subsection (b), every quarter starting in April in the First Scheduled Batch of the months as described by [[DIP-26] ssv.network DAO Four-Year Budget (2024-2028)](https://snapshot.org/#/s:mainnet.ssvnetwork.eth/proposal/0xff1b868f97de48db3ba26c5254e9902645ed55b5107a84ee0cbcb98b31973f27) ("DIP-26"), using a 6-month trailing moving average, for the variables listed under the aforementioned sections, with data available at [etherscan.io](http://etherscan.io).
15. If the proposed parameter changes are implemented after March 31, 2026, the MC must recalculate all values and variables using the most recent data available from either the First or Second Scheduled Batch (per DIP-26). If implementation occurs before the Second Scheduled Batch, the First Scheduled Batch data will be used instead.
16. The following will become DAO-controlled parameters:
#### **SSV Parameters**
The following parameters will be set for SSV-Denominated clusters:
| Variable | Proposed Value |
| :--- | :--- |
| **_minimumLiquidationCollateralSSV_** | 0.673652 SSV |
| **_minimumBlocksBeforeLiquidationSSV_** | 50,120 |
#### **ETH Parameters**
The following parameters will be set for ETH-denominated clusters:
| Variable | Description | Update function | Proposed Value |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| **_ethNetworkFee_** | Protocol network fee charged in ETH. | updateNetworkFee(uint256 fee) | 3557600000 wei ETH (~0.00929768 ETH Annual) |
| **_minimumLiquidationCollateral_** | Minimum ETH collateral an ETH-denominated cluster must maintain; falling below this level contributes to liquidation eligibility. | updateMinimumLiquidationCollateral(uint256 amount) | 644852000000000 wei ETH |
| **_minimumBlocksBeforeLiquidation_** | Minimum number of blocks an ETH-denominated cluster must maintain a sufficient balance before becoming eligible for liquidation. | updateLiquidationThresholdPeriod(uint64 blocks) | 21,480 |
| **_minimumOperatorEthFee_** | Minimum operator fee cap for fees denominated in ETH. | updateMinimumOperatorEthFee(uint256 minFee) | 10000000 wei ETH(~0.0000262 ETH annual) |
| **_operatorMaxFee_** | Maximum operator fee cap, setting a technical upper bound on operator fees denominated in ETH. This parameter exists as a protocol safety constraint to prevent extreme fee configurations and is not intended to express economic policy or target fee levels. | updateMaximumOperatorFee(uint256 maxFee) | 5336500000 wei ETH (~0.01395 ETH annual) |
| **_defaultOperatorETHFee_** | Default ETH-denominated operator fee applied to existing operators during the transition from SSV-denominated fees to ETH-denominated fees. | Not governance-controlled. The default value is defined in the contract and applied automatically; it exists solely to facilitate operator migration and ensure continuity during the transition period. | 1778800000 wei ETH (~0.00465 ETH annual) |
**Operator's fee transition to ETH fees**
| Operator charging | New Operator fees |
| :--- | :--- |
| **0 SSV** | 0 ETH |
| **<0 SSV** | 1778800000 wei ETH (~0.00465 ETH annual) |
#### **SSV Staking Parameters**
| Variable | Proposed Value | Description |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| **cooldownDuration** | 604800 | Unstake cooldown duration (in seconds): the period users must wait between requesting an unstake and being able to withdraw their unlocked SSV. |
| **quorumBps** | 7500 (75.00%) | Quorum threshold (in BPS) required for committing an effective balance snapshot |
### **Incentivized Mainnet Changes**
17. With the introduction of ETH payments, network fees for ETH-denominated clusters are no longer compatible with the Incentivized Mainnet (IM) fee deduction mechanism. Because ETH-cluster fees are already enforced on-chain via the new effective balance accounting model, off-chain deductions via the IM script are obsolete. For ETH-denominated clusters**,** Network fee deductions are removed. For SSV-based clusters**,** Network fees continue to be deducted from IM rewards under the existing model. To support this separation between legacy SSV-based and ETH-denominated clusters, a new Merkle Distributor contract will be deployed. This architectural separation ensures that incentive distribution remains aligned with each cluster's accounting model. For Legacy clusters**,** claim rewards from the existing distributor. For ETH-denominated clusters**,** claim rewards exclusively through the new distributor contract. For Dual Participants**,** claim rewards separately per accounting type, interacting with both contracts accordingly.
- a. Incentivized Mainnet Program Administrator (IMPA) Responsibilities - The IMPA will now cover both distributor contracts. This includes the generation, validation, and publication of Merkle roots, as well as maintaining the integrity and correctness of reward calculations across both accounting types. The same applies to the SDVT and CSM administrator.
- b. MC Responsibilities - The MC will be tasked with updating the Merkle Root based on the updated IMP script and its results published by the IMPA.
### **SSV Foundation Required Actions**
18. The SSV Foundation (Foundation) will be tasked with compensating the abovementioned EBOs. The funding will be provided by the Foundation from the [[DIP-42] SSV Foundation business development budget](https://snapshot.box/#/s:mainnet.ssvnetwork.eth/proposal/0x38dbd28c90eade3a77c3d6ab638c04743cb3f4de7e3293990674979b85cd06ea) in the amount of 250 USD denominated in SSV, per month, based on a 7-day trailing moving average, calculated on the first of the month, for the previous month, executed in the First Scheduled batch for the duration of the permissioned phase of EBOs. Additionally, the Foundation will reimburse all Ethereum transaction costs incurred by the EBOs as part of their oracle duties, including balance updates and Merkle root submissions. In order to avoid unforeseen activity and liability, a cap to this reimbursement shall be defined as follows: in any given month, no single EBO will be reimbursed more than 0.5 ETH for the incurred transaction costs.
19. The Foundation and the DAO will not participate in SSV staking for 6 months from the passing of this proposal. After this period, the DAO will reassess in a new DAO proposal whether and to what extent the Foundation or the DAO will participate in SSV Staking.
20. The Foundation will update the SSV Network snapshot space and delegation-related tooling to adapt the voting strategies to support the cSSV token. | [DIP-50] Introduction of Effective Balance Oracles, Effective Balance Accounting, ETH-denominated Payments, and SSV Staking | ## **Proposal Summary**
The ssv.network DAO ("DAO") proposes introducing SSV Staking as part of a _broader set of protocol upgrades_ designed to support ETH-denominated payments and native effective balance accounting within the SSV Network.
The transition to ETH payments simplifies the protocol's economic model by aligning fee settlement with the asset in which validator rewards are generated. Moving fee payments to ETH removes cross-asset dependencies, reduces operational complexity, and enables more direct and predictable protocol-level accounting.
In parallel, supporting Ethereum's post-Pectra validator model requires effective balance-aware accounting. Effective Balance Accounting (EBA) ensures that fees, runway calculations, and liquidation logic scale with the actual stake secured by validators, rather than relying on fixed assumptions. Implementing this model natively requires the protocol to reflect validator effective balances on-chain throughout their lifecycle.
To bridge the gap between Ethereum's consensus layer and on-chain accounting, the protocol introduces Effective Balance Oracles (EBO), which track validator balances and update protocol state. Operating this oracle system in a decentralized and resilient manner requires participation and delegation by parties economically aligned with the protocol.
SSV Staking provides such a delegation mechanism, allowing SSV holders to stake their tokens and delegate their stake toward the selection of EBOs. Initially, there will be four permissioned EBOs; later, a DAO proposal will follow to allow permissionless EBOs. In doing so, protocol fee flows are reflected through the staking mechanism in proportion to protocol usage, strengthening alignment between token holders and the network.
### **Proposal Particulars**
This proposal establishes the following:
1. Proposal Summary
2. Proposal Particulars
3. Proposal Applicability
- a. Payment, Validator and Operator Changes
- b. Effective Balance Accounting and Effective Balance Oracle Introduction
- c. ssv.network DAO Multi-sig Committee Required Actions
- i. SSV Parameters
- ii. ETH Parameters
- iii. Operator's fee transition to ETH fees
- iv. SSV Staking Parameters
- d. Incentivized Mainnet Changes
- c. SSV Foundation Required Actions
## Proposal Applicability
If this proposal were to pass, the following would be its consequences:
### Payment, Validator and Operator Changes
1. A transition to ETH payments, which means all new clusters will operate with ETH payments from the outset, meaning:
- a. Operator fees are paid in ETH.
- b. Network fees are paid in ETH.
- c. ETH must be deposited upfront to fund the cluster's operational runway.
- d. Support for actively operating existing SSV-based clusters under the SSV payment model is removed. While these clusters may continue running as long as they have sufficient runway, they can no longer be maintained through operational changes.
This means that adding new validators, reactivating liquidated clusters or depositing additional SSV to extend a cluster's runway is no longer supported. As a result, the only path forward for maintaining an existing cluster is migration to ETH payments, which restores full cluster functionality under the new payment and accounting model.
For cluster owners who do not wish to migrate or are unable to do so, the remaining option is to voluntarily liquidate the cluster. Self-liquidation returns the remaining cluster balance to the owner and signals operators to stop operating the cluster's validators. However, if the intention is to continue operating the validators in the future, migration to ETH payments will be required in order to do so.
2. Cluster migration - To migrate, the cluster owner initiates the migration and deposits sufficient ETH to fund the cluster's future operation runway under the ETH payment model. As part of the migration, the cluster's accounting is switched from SSV to ETH, and any remaining SSV balance is returned to the cluster owner. Migration is a one-way process - once a cluster is migrated to ETH payments, it cannot revert back to SSV-based payments.
3. New Operators - New operators onboard directly with ETH-denominated fees. From launch onward, operators registering in the network will not be able to define or configure fees in SSV, and will operate exclusively under the ETH payment model.
4. Existing Operators - Existing operators continue earning SSV-denominated fees only for clusters that have not yet migrated. These SSV fees continue to accrue, but operators are no longer able to modify or adjust their SSV fee configuration. Accrued fees can still be withdrawn. Once their clusters migrate to ETH payments, or when new ETH-denominated clusters are onboarded, operators begin earning fees in ETH based on their pre-assigned ETH fee configuration. The relevant fee can be found further below.
### Effective Balance Accounting and Effective Balance Oracle Introduction
5. Introduction of EBA - In the ETH-based model effective balance becomes the billing unit. Fees are defined per 32 ETH of effective balance and scale with a cluster's total effective balance, rather than with validator count:
Here, _total effective balance_ refers to the cumulative effective balance of all validators belonging to the cluster. All accounting is performed using this aggregated cluster-level value. As a result, ETH-based clusters pay fees proportional to the actual effective balance they secure, independent of how that balance is distributed across validator keys.
EBA replaces the SSV-based model where each validator is implicitly assumed to represent a fixed 32 ETH of effective balance. Fees, runway calculations and liquidation conditions, therefore scale linearly with the number of validators in the cluster, regardless of how much effective balance those validators actually secure. This is currently calculated by `(fees per validator) x validatorCount` and under this mode, Fees are defined per validator. Total fees scale with validator count**.** Consolidated validators are not fully accounted for. This model continues to apply to all SSV-based clusters. As a result, Network fee deduction for compensation via the Incentivized Mainnet script continues to operate. Operators managing SSV-based clusters are not compensated based on the amount of stake they manage.
Because updates are performed through periodic cluster-level sweeps, validators added to or removed from a cluster are initially accounted for using a default assumption of 32 ETH per validator. The actual effective balance of these validators - such as in the case of consolidated validators - will only be reflected once the next sweep occurs. As a result, cluster owners must account for the potential impact of delayed updates on runway and fee accrual, particularly when adding validators with higher effective balances.
6. Introduction of permissioned EBOs.
- a. EBOs are responsible for tracking validator effective balances on the beacon chain and enabling the protocol to keep its on-chain accounting aligned with real validator state as balances evolve over time.
- b. Validator effective balances live on Ethereum's consensus layer. Smart contracts operate on the execution layer. Contracts cannot directly query consensus-layer states. Therefore, a bridging mechanism is required to reflect the consensus-layer balance state on-chain. EBOs provide that bridge.
- c. In order to achieve the DAO's stated goal of decentralizing Ethereum but doing so in the most ETH-aligned way, the suggestion is that the DAO adopt EBOs that will perform Effective Balance Accounting. In this regard, the EBOs on ssv.network play a similar role to that of validators on the Ethereum blockchain, both requiring a staking mechanism and possibly a delegation to a third-party performing the needed duties, thus fulfilling a crucial and integral part of the process. While oracles don't validate transactions as validators do, they do maintain the integrity and security of the protocol by accurately attesting what a validator's effective balance is, which is key for the safety of the ssv.network.
- d. The protocol will initially launch with a set of permissioned EBOs for several practical reasons. From a testing and security standpoint, a fixed set of 4 oracles allows for a deterministic 3-of-4 quorum (75%), eliminates the risk of Sybil attacks, and keeps the attack surface well-defined and manageable. Operationally, permissioned EBOs ensure predictable uptime, clear responsibilities, guaranteed liveness, and a controlled environment to test infrastructure during the bootstrapping phase. This setup also simplifies debugging and incident response, guards against early adversarial behavior, and provides time to calibrate incentives before opening participation to the broader community.
- Kraken - 0xc61f7bd9ee5a3d011caf47aa0e5411f720593920
- InfStones - 0xc07332e05cec1c4896555a6d10361233fdf14422
- Ethernodes - 0x28bEa5B242362974d5DDb8f17a1E0e525446960B
- SSV Labs - 0x3A98EE5f80268Ed91F8A5880d93468b76a9F3bB4
- e. Effective balance updates are performed in two steps, moving from global observation to cluster-level updates. Effective Balance Oracles continuously track validator effective balances on the beacon chain. At defined intervals, they take a snapshot of all validator balances, aggregate them per cluster, and construct a Merkle tree representing the effective balances of all clusters at that snapshot. To reach consensus on this snapshot, each oracle independently commits the Merkle root representing this snapshot. Once a threshold of oracle commitments is reached, the snapshot is accepted by the protocol as the authoritative and accurate view of effective balances for that point in time. This threshold-based mechanism ensures both the correctness of the data and that no single oracle can dictate balance updates. Once a snapshot is accepted, cluster-level effective balances can be updated on-chain by submitting a proof derived from the committed Merkle tree for a specific cluster. Updating cluster balances is permissionless so that anyone can submit a valid proof and bear the transaction cost. As a failsafe, EBOs are expected to periodically perform these updates themselves to ensure cluster balances remain current even if third parties do not act. When a cluster's effective balance is updated, the protocol updates all related accounting based on the new value. This affects cluster runway calculations as well as future network and operator fee accruals tied to the amount of effective balance being managed. If an update causes a cluster to fall below liquidation thresholds, the cluster will be liquidated as part of the same process, ensuring that increases in effective balance are always matched by sufficient funding and collateral.
### ssv.network DAO Multi-sig Committee Required Actions
7. The ssv.network DAO Multi-sig (MC) will update the following audited smart contracts to support the above operations:
- a. SSVNetwork ([0xDD9BC35aE942eF0cFa76930954a156B3fF30a4E1](https://etherscan.io/address/0xDD9BC35aE942eF0cFa76930954a156B3fF30a4E1))
- b. SSVNetworkViews ([0xafE830B6Ee262ba11cce5F32fDCd760FFE6a66e4](https://etherscan.io/address/0xafE830B6Ee262ba11cce5F32fDCd760FFE6a66e4))
8. The MC will be required to add new smart contract modules to the abovementioned smart contracts, via the update mechanism already used in [[DIP-19] Scaling Permissioned Operators Upgrade](https://forum.ssv.network/t/dip-19-scaling-permissioned-operators-upgrade/1420) :
- a. SSVStaking
- b. SSVValidators
9. The MC will be required to update the modules of the abovementioned smart contracts, which are:
- a. SSVClusters
- b. SSVDAO
- c. SSVOperators
- d. SSVOperatorsWhitelist
- e. SSVViews
10. The "SSVNetwork" smart contract (section 7. subsection a) will gain the right to mint and burn cSSV. An ERC-20 token is received when SSV is staked into the abovementioned SSV Staking module by owners of SSV tokens, and it represents their staked position at a 1:1 ratio. Protocol fees accrue continuously as validators operate on the SSV Network and generate ongoing network fees. Stakers earn a pro-rata share of ETH-denominated fees, based on their share of the total staked SSV. Rewards can be claimed at any time without unstaking, and claiming does not affect the staking position.
When cSSV is transferred, rewards accrued up to that point remain claimable by the original holder, while the new holder begins accruing rewards only from the moment they receive the cSSV. cSSV represents a claim on the underlying staked SSV, as well as a share of protocol fees accrued to stakers. Staked SSV, represented by cSSV, retains full governance and voting power. For SSV to be unstaked a two-step process needs to be followed. First, the staker submits a withdrawal request. At this point, the specified amount of cSSV is immediately burned, and the corresponding amount of underlying SSV is set aside for the user. This action starts the cooldown period (proposed to launch at 7 days) and stops reward accrual from that moment. During the cooldown, the user no longer holds cSSV and therefore no longer has governance power or oracle weight for the withdrawn amount. Once the cooldown period ends, the staker can finalize the withdrawal and receive the reserved SSV at a 1:1 ratio relative to the original stake. Stakers may submit multiple withdrawal requests over time. When finalizing an unstake, the staker can claim the cumulative amount of all requests whose lock period has fully elapsed, while any requests still in their lock period remain locked. A maximum of 2,000 active withdrawal requests per address is supported.
11. If any source of the variables required for the formulas listed under section 16. was not adequately defined or is ambiguous, the Master of Coin will have the discretion to decide the source and method of calculation of such a variable. Any such decision must be publicized to the DAO forum in order to be effective. The MoC can only do this once per variable. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the MC will have the authority to amend any such source or method of calculation if any source or method becomes corrupted, unavailable, or becomes a security concern for the protocol. Such a decision by the multisig will follow the steps described by the Detrimental Situation procedure as described in [[DIP-2] Multi-Sig Committee](https://snapshot.box/#/s:mainnet.ssvnetwork.eth/proposal/0x393b81f83e63e6ecbd95a61d88ecc53d8668e6a2b32a5f323291860c280dd050)**.**
12. SSV-denominated clusters will use the following formulas for their parameters:
- a. Minimum Liquidation Collateral (prescribed by [[DIP-44] Re-Evaluation of Liquidation Collateral and Network Fee Parameters](https://snapshot.org/#/s:mainnet.ssvnetwork.eth/proposal/0x5ab8383681f4efec61c1e89388477e18de3f1b9a34ce1fef001e55043a8f3273) (“DIP-44”):
The sources and values for the variables of the Minimum Liquidation Collateral calculation are as follows:
- a. **Gas Units:** 252800
- b. Liquidation Threshold (prescribed by DIP-44):
- c. Network Fee - Prescribed by [[DIP-49] Network Fee Ratio Maximum](https://snapshot.org/#/s:mainnet.ssvnetwork.eth/proposal/0x5300de7fd0df8c07b06b1e4ad71bdf036945b26787b0157d70ab80fee3ad4126)
13. ETH-denominated clusters will use the following formulas for their parameters:
- a. Minimum Liquidation Collateral:
The sources and values for the variables of the Minimum Liquidation Collateral calculation are as follows:
- b. **Gas Units:** 226578
- b. Liquidation Threshold:
- c. Network fee:
The sources and values for the variables of the network fee are as follows:
- i. **Ethereum APR**: defined as the 30-day trailing moving average of the [ETH.STORE](https://docs.beaconcha.in/api-reference/ethstore%C2%AE/ethstore-daily-aggregates) numbers from the API.
- ii. **NetworkFee:** Determined by the DAO as 1% of ETH staking APR, as determined by [[DIP-11] Mainnet Proposal](https://snapshot.box/#/s:mainnet.ssvnetwork.eth/proposal/0x90af2241fb2b3b3242dfb98efb9185b5bafac00d1cb300542a107d0df4ef6e12)
- iii. **BlocksPerYear:** 2613400
14. The MC will be tasked with updating the parameters listed under section 12 subsection (a), section 12 subsection (b), section 13 subsection (a), section 13 subsection (b), every quarter starting in April in the First Scheduled Batch of the months as described by [[DIP-26] ssv.network DAO Four-Year Budget (2024-2028)](https://snapshot.org/#/s:mainnet.ssvnetwork.eth/proposal/0xff1b868f97de48db3ba26c5254e9902645ed55b5107a84ee0cbcb98b31973f27) ("DIP-26"), using a 6-month trailing moving average, for the variables listed under the aforementioned sections, with data available at [etherscan.io](http://etherscan.io).
15. If the proposed parameter changes are implemented after March 31, 2026, the MC must recalculate all values and variables using the most recent data available from either the First or Second Scheduled Batch (per DIP-26). If implementation occurs before the Second Scheduled Batch, the First Scheduled Batch data will be used instead.
16. The following will become DAO-controlled parameters:
#### **SSV Parameters**
The following parameters will be set for SSV-Denominated clusters:
| Variable | Proposed Value |
| :--- | :--- |
| **_minimumLiquidationCollateralSSV_** | 0.673652 SSV |
| **_minimumBlocksBeforeLiquidationSSV_** | 50,120 |
#### **ETH Parameters**
The following parameters will be set for ETH-denominated clusters:
| Variable | Description | Update function | Proposed Value |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| **_ethNetworkFee_** | Protocol network fee charged in ETH. | updateNetworkFee(uint256 fee) | 3557600000 wei ETH (~0.00929768 ETH Annual) |
| **_minimumLiquidationCollateral_** | Minimum ETH collateral an ETH-denominated cluster must maintain; falling below this level contributes to liquidation eligibility. | updateMinimumLiquidationCollateral(uint256 amount) | 644852000000000 wei ETH |
| **_minimumBlocksBeforeLiquidation_** | Minimum number of blocks an ETH-denominated cluster must maintain a sufficient balance before becoming eligible for liquidation. | updateLiquidationThresholdPeriod(uint64 blocks) | 21,480 |
| **_minimumOperatorEthFee_** | Minimum operator fee cap for fees denominated in ETH. | updateMinimumOperatorEthFee(uint256 minFee) | 10000000 wei ETH(~0.0000262 ETH annual) |
| **_operatorMaxFee_** | Maximum operator fee cap, setting a technical upper bound on operator fees denominated in ETH. This parameter exists as a protocol safety constraint to prevent extreme fee configurations and is not intended to express economic policy or target fee levels. | updateMaximumOperatorFee(uint256 maxFee) | 5336500000 wei ETH (~0.01395 ETH annual) |
| **_defaultOperatorETHFee_** | Default ETH-denominated operator fee applied to existing operators during the transition from SSV-denominated fees to ETH-denominated fees. | Not governance-controlled. The default value is defined in the contract and applied automatically; it exists solely to facilitate operator migration and ensure continuity during the transition period. | 1778800000 wei ETH (~0.00465 ETH annual) |
**Operator's fee transition to ETH fees**
| Operator charging | New Operator fees |
| :--- | :--- |
| **0 SSV** | 0 ETH |
| **<0 SSV** | 1778800000 wei ETH (~0.00465 ETH annual) |
#### **SSV Staking Parameters**
| Variable | Proposed Value | Description |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| **cooldownDuration** | 604800 | Unstake cooldown duration (in seconds): the period users must wait between requesting an unstake and being able to withdraw their unlocked SSV. |
| **quorumBps** | 7500 (75.00%) | Quorum threshold (in BPS) required for committing an effective balance snapshot |
### **Incentivized Mainnet Changes**
17. With the introduction of ETH payments, network fees for ETH-denominated clusters are no longer compatible with the Incentivized Mainnet (IM) fee deduction mechanism. Because ETH-cluster fees are already enforced on-chain via the new effective balance accounting model, off-chain deductions via the IM script are obsolete. For ETH-denominated clusters**,** Network fee deductions are removed. For SSV-based clusters**,** Network fees continue to be deducted from IM rewards under the existing model. To support this separation between legacy SSV-based and ETH-denominated clusters, a new Merkle Distributor contract will be deployed. This architectural separation ensures that incentive distribution remains aligned with each cluster's accounting model. For Legacy clusters**,** claim rewards from the existing distributor. For ETH-denominated clusters**,** claim rewards exclusively through the new distributor contract. For Dual Participants**,** claim rewards separately per accounting type, interacting with both contracts accordingly.
- a. Incentivized Mainnet Program Administrator (IMPA) Responsibilities - The IMPA will now cover both distributor contracts. This includes the generation, validation, and publication of Merkle roots, as well as maintaining the integrity and correctness of reward calculations across both accounting types. The same applies to the SDVT and CSM administrator.
- b. MC Responsibilities - The MC will be tasked with updating the Merkle Root based on the updated IMP script and its results published by the IMPA.
### **SSV Foundation Required Actions**
18. The SSV Foundation (Foundation) will be tasked with compensating the abovementioned EBOs. The funding will be provided by the Foundation from the [[DIP-42] SSV Foundation business development budget](https://snapshot.box/#/s:mainnet.ssvnetwork.eth/proposal/0x38dbd28c90eade3a77c3d6ab638c04743cb3f4de7e3293990674979b85cd06ea) in the amount of 250 USD denominated in SSV, per month, based on a 7-day trailing moving average, calculated on the first of the month, for the previous month, executed in the First Scheduled batch for the duration of the permissioned phase of EBOs. Additionally, the Foundation will reimburse all Ethereum transaction costs incurred by the EBOs as part of their oracle duties, including balance updates and Merkle root submissions. In order to avoid unforeseen activity and liability, a cap to this reimbursement shall be defined as follows: in any given month, no single EBO will be reimbursed more than 0.5 ETH for the incurred transaction costs.
19. The Foundation and the DAO will not participate in SSV staking for 6 months from the passing of this proposal. After this period, the DAO will reassess in a new DAO proposal whether and to what extent the Foundation or the DAO will participate in SSV Staking.
20. The Foundation will update the SSV Network snapshot space and delegation-related tooling to adapt the voting strategies to support the cSSV token. | 0x5a5ee1ef6d4ab1895885a72b35c8d198b8f2ea1b41749817f6c14d9a8f167c51 | mainnet.ssvnetwork.eth | ssv.network | 1 | basic | active | 4 | 1,773,436,078 | 2026-03-13 21:07:58 | 1,773,439,200 | 2026-03-13 22:00:00 | 1,774,044,000 | 2026-03-20 22:00:00 | 0x0B399d2667733659F4A5fDCB030F3E26D26cC0Fe |
Ratification of the DGEN DAO Whitepaper
The DGEN DAO Whitepaper has been published to GitBook and represents the foundational document describing how the DAO will operate moving forward. The document establishes the governance model, outlines the responsibilities of the Community Council, defines treasury oversight, and provides the framework for how initiatives and proposals will be executed under the DGEN DAO structure.
If this proposal passes, the Whitepaper will be formally ratified as the guiding living document of the DAO. The Community Council will be authorized to execute and operate under the framework described in the Whitepaper.
In preparation for this transition, the Community Council has been added to the Treasury Safe and the treasury signer configuration has been updated to 3 of 4 required signers to ensure proper multi-signature oversight and operational capability.
Whitepaper:
https://dgen-dao.gitbook.io/dgen-dao-whitepaper
Voting Options:
For — Ratify the DGEN DAO Whitepaper and authorize its execution
Against — Do not ratify the Whitepaper | Ratification of the DGEN DAO Whitepaper | The DGEN DAO Whitepaper has been published to GitBook and represents the foundational document describing how the DAO will operate moving forward. The document establishes the governance model, outlines the responsibilities of the Community Council, defines treasury oversight, and provides the framework for how initiatives and proposals will be executed under the DGEN DAO structure.
If this proposal passes, the Whitepaper will be formally ratified as the guiding living document of the DAO. The Community Council will be authorized to execute and operate under the framework described in the Whitepaper.
In preparation for this transition, the Community Council has been added to the Treasury Safe and the treasury signer configuration has been updated to 3 of 4 required signers to ensure proper multi-signature oversight and operational capability.
Whitepaper:
https://dgen-dao.gitbook.io/dgen-dao-whitepaper
Voting Options:
For — Ratify the DGEN DAO Whitepaper and authorize its execution
Against — Do not ratify the Whitepaper | 0x2848080c10773628c54c30eb55d27becc752562ff911b5d39c7e128c6c5b2cb0 | dgendao.eth | DGEN DAO | 8453 | basic | active | 1 | 1,773,434,427 | 2026-03-13 20:40:27 | 1,773,434,700 | 2026-03-13 20:45:00 | 1,773,693,900 | 2026-03-16 20:45:00 | 0x1621962820802Fa5a80652b782f82544ED2d2324 |
[EXAIP-29] Exa Labs Development Plan for Q2-26
Proposal ID: EXAIP-29
Proposer: Exa Labs
Date: March 13, 2026
# **Summary**
This proposal requests allocating up to 130k USDC per month to Exa Labs during Q2 2026 (April–June), for a maximum total of 390k USDC.
This budget continues the model established in EXAIP-22 and EXAIP-27, ensuring stable development, maintenance, and operations for the Exa App and Exactly Protocol.
# **Motivation**
Exa Labs is responsible for all core development and operational needs of the Exa App and Exactly Protocol, including:
* Smart contracts and protocol maintenance
* Exa App development (credit flows, wallet infra, gas sponsorship)
* Integrations (Uphold, Rain Cards, Persona ID, Base App)
* Backend/API services
* Infrastructure and node/RPC systems (Alchemy)
* Security and audit readiness (ABDK, Sherlock)
As usage grows and card volume increases, maintaining uninterrupted development capacity becomes essential. This proposal ensures continuity throughout Q2 2026.
# **Budget**
**Q2-26 Total: 390,000 USDC**
* April 2026: 130,000 USDC
* May 2026: 130,000 USDC
* June 2026: 130,000 USDC
Funds will be streamed monthly from the DAO Saving Account Multisig, following the same structure as defined in EXAIP-22 and EXIP-27.
# **Scope of Work**
**1. Core Protocol Development**
* Contract maintenance and upgrades
* Exa Card repayment + BNPL flows
* New integrations and protocol improvements
**2. Infrastructure**
* RPC/node services
* Backend API and database maintenance
* CI/CD pipelines and monitoring
**3. Security**
* Internal audits
* External audit preparation
* Dependency and library updates
**4. Exa App Enhancements**
* UX/UI improvements
* Wallet/multisig support
* Onchain credit workflows
* Analytics, limits, repayment options
**5. Operations & Documentation**
* Developer documentation
* Governance reporting
* Production support
# **Conclusion**
The proposed budget:
* Maintains stability as Exa Card transaction volume grows
* Supports mission-critical infra (KYC flows, lending, onchain credit)
* Provides predictable development continuity
* Follows the precedent set by EXAIP-22 and EXAIP-27 | [EXAIP-29] Exa Labs Development Plan for Q2-26 | Proposal ID: EXAIP-29
Proposer: Exa Labs
Date: March 13, 2026
# **Summary**
This proposal requests allocating up to 130k USDC per month to Exa Labs during Q2 2026 (April–June), for a maximum total of 390k USDC.
This budget continues the model established in EXAIP-22 and EXAIP-27, ensuring stable development, maintenance, and operations for the Exa App and Exactly Protocol.
# **Motivation**
Exa Labs is responsible for all core development and operational needs of the Exa App and Exactly Protocol, including:
* Smart contracts and protocol maintenance
* Exa App development (credit flows, wallet infra, gas sponsorship)
* Integrations (Uphold, Rain Cards, Persona ID, Base App)
* Backend/API services
* Infrastructure and node/RPC systems (Alchemy)
* Security and audit readiness (ABDK, Sherlock)
As usage grows and card volume increases, maintaining uninterrupted development capacity becomes essential. This proposal ensures continuity throughout Q2 2026.
# **Budget**
**Q2-26 Total: 390,000 USDC**
* April 2026: 130,000 USDC
* May 2026: 130,000 USDC
* June 2026: 130,000 USDC
Funds will be streamed monthly from the DAO Saving Account Multisig, following the same structure as defined in EXAIP-22 and EXIP-27.
# **Scope of Work**
**1. Core Protocol Development**
* Contract maintenance and upgrades
* Exa Card repayment + BNPL flows
* New integrations and protocol improvements
**2. Infrastructure**
* RPC/node services
* Backend API and database maintenance
* CI/CD pipelines and monitoring
**3. Security**
* Internal audits
* External audit preparation
* Dependency and library updates
**4. Exa App Enhancements**
* UX/UI improvements
* Wallet/multisig support
* Onchain credit workflows
* Analytics, limits, repayment options
**5. Operations & Documentation**
* Developer documentation
* Governance reporting
* Production support
# **Conclusion**
The proposed budget:
* Maintains stability as Exa Card transaction volume grows
* Supports mission-critical infra (KYC flows, lending, onchain credit)
* Provides predictable development continuity
* Follows the precedent set by EXAIP-22 and EXAIP-27 | 0x900acc1d237b981e34c3741830af9152b032dd921d1ed4b28577437a7376077e | gov.exa.eth | Exactly Protocol | 10 | basic | pending | 0 | 1,773,430,167 | 2026-03-13 19:29:27 | 1,773,516,567 | 2026-03-14 19:29:27 | 1,773,948,567 | 2026-03-19 19:29:27 | 0x13FD608F64C9dE7627e28C8906350ad4F0E1C24d |
SDGP-65: Allow the refund of affected users from the March 12, 2026 incident from the treasury
Author: Stake DAO Association
Summary
A security incident occurred on Votemarket on March 12, 2026, and led to the loss of approximately $176,000 of user rewards.
As with all DeFi protocols, interactions with smart contracts involve inherent technical risks, including vulnerabilities or exploits.
The reimbursement is proposed as an ex gratia community support measure and does not constitute an admission of liability, fault, or legal responsibility by Stake DAO, its contributors, or affiliated entities.
This proposal is to give authorization to the DAO to use treasury funds to refund users.
It is following an emergency ad hoc protocol: the proposal will be executable as soon as >50% of veSDT supply (17,075,675.5 veSDT) have voted in favor of the proposal.
Context
A security incident occurred on Votemarket on March 12, 2026. A full report of the situation is available here: https://www.stakedao.org/blog/incident-disclosure-12-03-2026
Some of the lost funds corresponded to refunds or liquidity mining rewards that should have been deposited as direct rewards with the start of the new period, and are currently not streaming, creating a drop of rewards for the corresponding pools, and a difficult situation for Votemarket depositors.
An emergency proposal can help them use refund rewards to continue their liquidity mining program.
Proposal
Give permission to the treasury committee to use DAO funds to proceed with the reimbursement of lost user rewards (approximately $176k).
The reimbursement will apply only to users and campaigns directly affected by the March 12, 2026 incident as identified in the incident report.
Proposal Specifications
Admins: veSDT holders
Community Feedback: Simultaneous with the voting period
Voting Duration: 7 days, executable as soon as the proposal reaches 17,075,675.5 favourable votes.
Voting Options
YAE — Authorise the treasury committee to proceed with the reimbursement of lost rewards
NAE — Rework the proposal with another solution.
ABSTAIN: No preference.
**
Disclaimers**
This proposal does not constitute a financial product or investment solicitation.
All SDT transfers are executed on-chain through transparent and auditable smart contracts.
No third-party funds are managed or held by the DAO beyond the governance-approved emission schedule.
Stake DAO acts solely as a decentralised coordination framework, not as a financial intermediary. Stake DAO does not provide financial services, fiduciary services, or custodial services. | SDGP-65: Allow the refund of affected users from the March 12, 2026 incident from the treasury | Author: Stake DAO Association
Summary
A security incident occurred on Votemarket on March 12, 2026, and led to the loss of approximately $176,000 of user rewards.
As with all DeFi protocols, interactions with smart contracts involve inherent technical risks, including vulnerabilities or exploits.
The reimbursement is proposed as an ex gratia community support measure and does not constitute an admission of liability, fault, or legal responsibility by Stake DAO, its contributors, or affiliated entities.
This proposal is to give authorization to the DAO to use treasury funds to refund users.
It is following an emergency ad hoc protocol: the proposal will be executable as soon as >50% of veSDT supply (17,075,675.5 veSDT) have voted in favor of the proposal.
Context
A security incident occurred on Votemarket on March 12, 2026. A full report of the situation is available here: https://www.stakedao.org/blog/incident-disclosure-12-03-2026
Some of the lost funds corresponded to refunds or liquidity mining rewards that should have been deposited as direct rewards with the start of the new period, and are currently not streaming, creating a drop of rewards for the corresponding pools, and a difficult situation for Votemarket depositors.
An emergency proposal can help them use refund rewards to continue their liquidity mining program.
Proposal
Give permission to the treasury committee to use DAO funds to proceed with the reimbursement of lost user rewards (approximately $176k).
The reimbursement will apply only to users and campaigns directly affected by the March 12, 2026 incident as identified in the incident report.
Proposal Specifications
Admins: veSDT holders
Community Feedback: Simultaneous with the voting period
Voting Duration: 7 days, executable as soon as the proposal reaches 17,075,675.5 favourable votes.
Voting Options
YAE — Authorise the treasury committee to proceed with the reimbursement of lost rewards
NAE — Rework the proposal with another solution.
ABSTAIN: No preference.
**
Disclaimers**
This proposal does not constitute a financial product or investment solicitation.
All SDT transfers are executed on-chain through transparent and auditable smart contracts.
No third-party funds are managed or held by the DAO beyond the governance-approved emission schedule.
Stake DAO acts solely as a decentralised coordination framework, not as a financial intermediary. Stake DAO does not provide financial services, fiduciary services, or custodial services. | 0xf0630034b91b5b10897e758d8219f79dd45dae34e2915794d2a0cdb23703f4f4 | stakedao.eth | Stake DAO | 1 | weighted | active | 33 | 1,773,418,587 | 2026-03-13 16:16:27 | 1,773,418,587 | 2026-03-13 16:16:27 | 1,774,023,360 | 2026-03-20 16:16:00 | 0x188B6264a706a55E59eFDaEBe0aB99d7ADF773C7 |
[COMPOUND] Topping up Ethereum and Optimism COMP rewards
# Topping up Ethereum and Optimism COMP rewards
# Simple Summary
Gauntlet recommends adding additional COMP to Optimism and Ethereum reward contracts.
| Chain | Reward Amount |
| -------- | ------------- |
| Ethereum | 3525 |
| Optimism | 750 |
### Analysis
Below is the projected runway in each chain’s rewards contract.
| Chain | Rewards contract COMP token holdings | Remaining days of runway |
| -------- | ------------------------------------ | ------------------------ |
| Ethereum | 2448 | 14 |
| Optimism | 255 | 21 |
Ethereum and Optimism currently have a runway of less than 30 days. Gauntlet recommends topping up an additional thirty days’ worth of incentives to the listed networks.
More details on this proposal can be found [here](https://www.comp.xyz/t/gauntlet-topping-up-ethereum-and-optimism-comp-rewards/7676?u=gauntlet)
https://tally.xyz/gov/compound/proposal/552 | [COMPOUND] Topping up Ethereum and Optimism COMP rewards | # Topping up Ethereum and Optimism COMP rewards
# Simple Summary
Gauntlet recommends adding additional COMP to Optimism and Ethereum reward contracts.
| Chain | Reward Amount |
| -------- | ------------- |
| Ethereum | 3525 |
| Optimism | 750 |
### Analysis
Below is the projected runway in each chain’s rewards contract.
| Chain | Rewards contract COMP token holdings | Remaining days of runway |
| -------- | ------------------------------------ | ------------------------ |
| Ethereum | 2448 | 14 |
| Optimism | 255 | 21 |
Ethereum and Optimism currently have a runway of less than 30 days. Gauntlet recommends topping up an additional thirty days’ worth of incentives to the listed networks.
More details on this proposal can be found [here](https://www.comp.xyz/t/gauntlet-topping-up-ethereum-and-optimism-comp-rewards/7676?u=gauntlet)
https://tally.xyz/gov/compound/proposal/552 | 0x628636fa6b4deedb4d9e19c5bb20d17adede42e738565285edbc8bd4eb0ec610 | hvax.eth | Event Horizon | 1 | single-choice | pending | 0 | 1,773,417,589 | 2026-03-13 15:59:49 | 1,773,572,783 | 2026-03-15 11:06:23 | 1,773,659,183 | 2026-03-16 11:06:23 | 0xFAD69Bd739c64cC8e3f1C3bb3B60fe4f160174Cc |
Rollbit 1% Proposal
Overview:
Team is proposing an initiative to maintain a 1% stake in the Rollbit buy-and-burn mechanism. Recently, the Kongtroller account has been between .8% and 1% of the total buy-and-burn amount. We would like to stay at 1% to maintain steady and predictable cash-flow via the Rollbit ecosystem. Kongtroller's stake was previously 1%, but has decreased since Q4 of 2024 when the DAO acquired 41 V1 Rollbots. The DAO has had great success tying portions of our portfolio to the Rollbit ecosystem and this initiative is an extension of that sentiment that also allows us to maintain steady cashflow.
Summary:
The team will actively monitor the V1 marketplace and look for value priced Rollbots in order to keep the DAO revenue share as close to 1% as possible. When an appropriate V1 is available, the DAO will purchase and stake it in order to gain the buy-and-burn revenue. This will be an ongoing pursuit. The DAO will not spend more than $4,000 in any quarter nor will it pay more than $2,000 for any V1 Rollbot.
The proposal's objective is to give the team the authority to execute these actions to maintain a 1% share or the Rollbit buy and burn mechanism without requiring a separate vote for each transaction. | Rollbit 1% Proposal | Overview:
Team is proposing an initiative to maintain a 1% stake in the Rollbit buy-and-burn mechanism. Recently, the Kongtroller account has been between .8% and 1% of the total buy-and-burn amount. We would like to stay at 1% to maintain steady and predictable cash-flow via the Rollbit ecosystem. Kongtroller's stake was previously 1%, but has decreased since Q4 of 2024 when the DAO acquired 41 V1 Rollbots. The DAO has had great success tying portions of our portfolio to the Rollbit ecosystem and this initiative is an extension of that sentiment that also allows us to maintain steady cashflow.
Summary:
The team will actively monitor the V1 marketplace and look for value priced Rollbots in order to keep the DAO revenue share as close to 1% as possible. When an appropriate V1 is available, the DAO will purchase and stake it in order to gain the buy-and-burn revenue. This will be an ongoing pursuit. The DAO will not spend more than $4,000 in any quarter nor will it pay more than $2,000 for any V1 Rollbot.
The proposal's objective is to give the team the authority to execute these actions to maintain a 1% share or the Rollbit buy and burn mechanism without requiring a separate vote for each transaction. | 0x388f757cb4b12b657db435c8f44c263c9af1bc6e2bfde6dbf4e2ede863ad27ae | kongsdao.eth | K.I.N.G. DAO | 1 | basic | active | 23 | 1,773,417,120 | 2026-03-13 15:52:00 | 1,773,417,120 | 2026-03-13 15:52:00 | 1,773,676,320 | 2026-03-16 15:52:00 | 0x316ac1067e7208Ed60Eb1d5b448B834448739213 |
PIP-21: Dashboard Upgrade for Clear Yield, Interest, and Net Equity Insights (With/Without Rewards)
Author: @materionaut (Sam Yilmaz)
Summary:
This proposal seeks to upgrade the Piku app dashboard to prominently display key financial metrics for users: yield earned from USDC deposits, interest incurred on loans, net return on equity, and yield percentages shown both with and without Piku rewards. This simple UX enhancement will make it effortless for users to track their real performance at a glance, reducing friction and boosting engagement—much like successful transparency upgrades in other DAOs that drove TVL growth.
Motivation:
Picture this: You're a busy DeFi user who's deposited USDC into Piku for yields and maybe taken a loan against it. But to figure out your actual returns, you end up piecing together data from multiple screens, calculating interest offsets, and even building your own spreadsheet just to see the net picture. It's frustrating, right? That's the pain point many of us face today—it kills momentum and trust. We've seen this in other protocols where opaque dashboards led to user drop-off. By fixing this, we make Piku more approachable, encouraging longer holds and bigger deposits.
For context, my own experience highlighted auditing liquidity pools and UX hurdles, forcing me to compile a custom spreadsheet to track yields vs. interests. If the dashboard natively showed these, I'd save time and feel more confident scaling up.
Proposal Details:
Core Features to Add:
Deposit Yield Display: A clear section showing total yield earned from USDC deposits (e.g., "Your USDC Yield: $X.XX at Y.YY% APY").
Loan Interest Tracking: Breakdown of interest paid on loans (e.g., "Interest Incurred: $Z.ZZ at W.WW% APR").
Net Return on Equity: Calculated as (Deposit Yield - Loan Interest) / Equity, displayed prominently (e.g., "Net Equity Return: V.VV%").
Yield With/Without Rewards: Toggle or side-by-side view for APYs (e.g., "Base Yield: A.AA% | With Piku Rewards: B.BB%").
Implementation: Low-lift frontend update to the existing dashboard. Pull data from on-chain sources (e.g., via subgraph queries) and integrate with the app's UI framework. Estimated dev time: 1-2 weeks. No smart contract changes needed—focus on user-facing transparency. Budget: 5,000 PIKU tokens for dev bounties (or equivalent from treasury).
Timeline: If approved, dev starts within 1 month; rollout in next app update.
Benefits and Precedents:
This isn't reinventing the wheel—it's borrowing from wins in other DAOs. Remember AAVE's Proposal 45 (AIP-45) in 2021? It added detailed APY breakdowns with reward toggles to their dashboard. Snapshot vote: 98% yes (over 1M votes). Post-implementation, AAVE's TVL jumped 25% in 3 months (from ~$10B to $12.5B), and AAVE token price rose ~15% amid higher user retention. Similarly, Compound's Proposal 62 (2022) introduced net borrow/lend return calcs—passed with 95% approval (500K+ votes), boosting TVL by 18% and COMP value by 10% as users felt more empowered. In Curve/Convex ecosystems, CRV-123 (2023) enhanced reward yield visibility, leading to a 20% TVL spike and CRV price uplift of 12%. These examples show how relatable, transparent UX tweaks build community loyalty and protocol value. For Piku, this could similarly attract more USDC liquidity, stabilizing USP yields and lifting PIKU token demand.
Risks:
Minimal—UI changes won't affect protocol security. Worst case: Minor bugs in display logic, fixable via hotfix. No treasury spend if community devs step up.
Voting Options:
Yes: Implement the dashboard upgrade.
No: Do not implement.
Abstain.
Let's make Piku the go-to for hassle-free stablecoin yields. Your thoughts, community? | PIP-21: Dashboard Upgrade for Clear Yield, Interest, and Net Equity Insights (With/Without Rewards) | Author: @materionaut (Sam Yilmaz)
Summary:
This proposal seeks to upgrade the Piku app dashboard to prominently display key financial metrics for users: yield earned from USDC deposits, interest incurred on loans, net return on equity, and yield percentages shown both with and without Piku rewards. This simple UX enhancement will make it effortless for users to track their real performance at a glance, reducing friction and boosting engagement—much like successful transparency upgrades in other DAOs that drove TVL growth.
Motivation:
Picture this: You're a busy DeFi user who's deposited USDC into Piku for yields and maybe taken a loan against it. But to figure out your actual returns, you end up piecing together data from multiple screens, calculating interest offsets, and even building your own spreadsheet just to see the net picture. It's frustrating, right? That's the pain point many of us face today—it kills momentum and trust. We've seen this in other protocols where opaque dashboards led to user drop-off. By fixing this, we make Piku more approachable, encouraging longer holds and bigger deposits.
For context, my own experience highlighted auditing liquidity pools and UX hurdles, forcing me to compile a custom spreadsheet to track yields vs. interests. If the dashboard natively showed these, I'd save time and feel more confident scaling up.
Proposal Details:
Core Features to Add:
Deposit Yield Display: A clear section showing total yield earned from USDC deposits (e.g., "Your USDC Yield: $X.XX at Y.YY% APY").
Loan Interest Tracking: Breakdown of interest paid on loans (e.g., "Interest Incurred: $Z.ZZ at W.WW% APR").
Net Return on Equity: Calculated as (Deposit Yield - Loan Interest) / Equity, displayed prominently (e.g., "Net Equity Return: V.VV%").
Yield With/Without Rewards: Toggle or side-by-side view for APYs (e.g., "Base Yield: A.AA% | With Piku Rewards: B.BB%").
Implementation: Low-lift frontend update to the existing dashboard. Pull data from on-chain sources (e.g., via subgraph queries) and integrate with the app's UI framework. Estimated dev time: 1-2 weeks. No smart contract changes needed—focus on user-facing transparency. Budget: 5,000 PIKU tokens for dev bounties (or equivalent from treasury).
Timeline: If approved, dev starts within 1 month; rollout in next app update.
Benefits and Precedents:
This isn't reinventing the wheel—it's borrowing from wins in other DAOs. Remember AAVE's Proposal 45 (AIP-45) in 2021? It added detailed APY breakdowns with reward toggles to their dashboard. Snapshot vote: 98% yes (over 1M votes). Post-implementation, AAVE's TVL jumped 25% in 3 months (from ~$10B to $12.5B), and AAVE token price rose ~15% amid higher user retention. Similarly, Compound's Proposal 62 (2022) introduced net borrow/lend return calcs—passed with 95% approval (500K+ votes), boosting TVL by 18% and COMP value by 10% as users felt more empowered. In Curve/Convex ecosystems, CRV-123 (2023) enhanced reward yield visibility, leading to a 20% TVL spike and CRV price uplift of 12%. These examples show how relatable, transparent UX tweaks build community loyalty and protocol value. For Piku, this could similarly attract more USDC liquidity, stabilizing USP yields and lifting PIKU token demand.
Risks:
Minimal—UI changes won't affect protocol security. Worst case: Minor bugs in display logic, fixable via hotfix. No treasury spend if community devs step up.
Voting Options:
Yes: Implement the dashboard upgrade.
No: Do not implement.
Abstain.
Let's make Piku the go-to for hassle-free stablecoin yields. Your thoughts, community? | 0x5575df3948682d119565d77458619c1b780eab12cf35dac20f12ca486b97afe6 | pikudao.eth | PikuDAO | 1 | basic | active | 20 | 1,773,366,008 | 2026-03-13 01:40:08 | 1,773,366,008 | 2026-03-13 01:40:08 | 1,773,538,808 | 2026-03-15 01:40:08 | 0x5dD95E0dBbe426969cc467db8bAa64c48740AA10 |
950: V2 Proposal to Gift Noun 586 to Gramajo ⌐◨-◨
**View proposal:** https://lilnouns.wtf/vote/nouns/950 | 950: V2 Proposal to Gift Noun 586 to Gramajo ⌐◨-◨ | **View proposal:** https://lilnouns.wtf/vote/nouns/950 | 0xf770f030a697ff35b8733abf311dda52df97fd6e50927ca874d7f9ec115d877b | leagueoflils.eth | League of Lils | 1 | single-choice | active | 1 | 1,773,361,801 | 2026-03-13 00:30:01 | 1,773,361,800 | 2026-03-13 00:30:00 | 1,773,793,800 | 2026-03-18 00:30:00 | 0x906F1AF505ab02faa27342D2882E4cCba0C04bD3 |
Integrate Lido into the Galaxy Challenge Game 🚀
Galaxy Challenge is a skill-based Web3 arcade game where players pilot a starship, dodge crypto coins, and survive waves of increasing difficulty. We propose integrating Lido (stETH/wstETH) as a supported deposit & reward token.
Also, The idea is that players will also see the Lido logo in the game, helping to promote Lido in a fun and engaging way.
Galaxy Challange: [https://Galaxy.gift](url)
The Lido logo will appear in the game, and the spaceship can shoot at the logo as part of the gameplay. This allows players to interact with the brand while enjoying the game experience.
 | Integrate Lido into the Galaxy Challenge Game 🚀 | Galaxy Challenge is a skill-based Web3 arcade game where players pilot a starship, dodge crypto coins, and survive waves of increasing difficulty. We propose integrating Lido (stETH/wstETH) as a supported deposit & reward token.
Also, The idea is that players will also see the Lido logo in the game, helping to promote Lido in a fun and engaging way.
Galaxy Challange: [https://Galaxy.gift](url)
The Lido logo will appear in the game, and the spaceship can shoot at the logo as part of the gameplay. This allows players to interact with the brand while enjoying the game experience.
 | 0x0b429993f28a10915f8b233293f29cef37f8b27aa158e1348ae1d0b387c493e7 | lido-snapshot.eth | Lido | 1 | basic | active | 0 | 1,773,349,169 | 2026-03-12 20:59:29 | 1,773,349,169 | 2026-03-12 20:59:29 | 1,773,608,369 | 2026-03-15 20:59:29 | 0x1d1b8C01B347664347621e96849a334FD6EFf61c |
[sdCRV] Add a gauge for the following pool: iREET/pmUSD on Mainnet (RAAC)
Quorum: 10% asdCRV
View more on https://curve.finance/dao/#/ethereum/proposals/1361-OWNERSHIP | [sdCRV] Add a gauge for the following pool: iREET/pmUSD on Mainnet (RAAC) | Quorum: 10% asdCRV
View more on https://curve.finance/dao/#/ethereum/proposals/1361-OWNERSHIP | 0x4d2f09bf911e5ba4ff28b3ee3dd7d7752e38e2215922f1b484aac4f34687815d | concentratordao.eth | Concentrator | 1 | single-choice | active | 0 | 1,773,347,482 | 2026-03-12 20:31:22 | 1,773,346,331 | 2026-03-12 20:12:11 | 1,773,598,331 | 2026-03-15 18:12:11 | 0x192F0fc41d78B15a84Dfeb2C8704FC99DdAf10e1 |
Add a gauge for the following pool: iREET/pmUSD on Mainnet (RAAC)
View more on https://curve.finance/dao/#/ethereum/proposals/1361-OWNERSHIP | Add a gauge for the following pool: iREET/pmUSD on Mainnet (RAAC) | View more on https://curve.finance/dao/#/ethereum/proposals/1361-OWNERSHIP | 0xb472bf5eaf630e994b0edc2fd052f3c8b6c1447c2a4e7f16d7bbe6c14dd7832e | sdcrv-gov.eth | sdCRV-Governance | 1 | single-choice | active | 0 | 1,773,347,466 | 2026-03-12 20:31:06 | 1,773,346,331 | 2026-03-12 20:12:11 | 1,773,605,531 | 2026-03-15 20:12:11 | 0xb4542526AfeE2FdA1D584213D1521272a398B42a |
[Curve] Ownership DAO Vote ID: 1361
Quorum: 10% veCLEV
Add a gauge for the following pool: iREET/pmUSD on Mainnet (RAAC)
Action 1
----------
To: Curve Gauge Controller
Function: AddGauge
Gauge: 0xF814283bfd37dC24B2fB5515982F5C0708E508b6 (https://etherscan.io/address/0xF814283bfd37dC24B2fB5515982F5C0708E508b6)
Type: Ethereum Chain
Weight: 0
Is official gauge? ✅Yes!✅ | [Curve] Ownership DAO Vote ID: 1361 | Quorum: 10% veCLEV
Add a gauge for the following pool: iREET/pmUSD on Mainnet (RAAC)
Action 1
----------
To: Curve Gauge Controller
Function: AddGauge
Gauge: 0xF814283bfd37dC24B2fB5515982F5C0708E508b6 (https://etherscan.io/address/0xF814283bfd37dC24B2fB5515982F5C0708E508b6)
Type: Ethereum Chain
Weight: 0
Is official gauge? ✅Yes!✅ | 0xd2a9e4b4d40f8cee24041661528a2cc76b2c780f98e6ec2342afb17584fe28cf | aladdindao.eth | AladdinDAO | 1 | single-choice | active | 0 | 1,773,346,377 | 2026-03-12 20:12:57 | 1,773,346,338 | 2026-03-12 20:12:18 | 1,773,598,338 | 2026-03-15 18:12:18 | 0x3538C75bE8bA1d308685f5D3Ba461C861B421a92 |
[Curve] Ownership DAO Vote ID: 1361
Quorum: 10% veCLEV
Add a gauge for the following pool: iREET/pmUSD on Mainnet (RAAC)
Action 1
----------
To: Curve Gauge Controller
Function: AddGauge
Gauge: 0xF814283bfd37dC24B2fB5515982F5C0708E508b6 (https://etherscan.io/address/0xF814283bfd37dC24B2fB5515982F5C0708E508b6)
Type: Ethereum Chain
Weight: 0
Is official gauge? ✅Yes!✅ | [Curve] Ownership DAO Vote ID: 1361 | Quorum: 10% veCLEV
Add a gauge for the following pool: iREET/pmUSD on Mainnet (RAAC)
Action 1
----------
To: Curve Gauge Controller
Function: AddGauge
Gauge: 0xF814283bfd37dC24B2fB5515982F5C0708E508b6 (https://etherscan.io/address/0xF814283bfd37dC24B2fB5515982F5C0708E508b6)
Type: Ethereum Chain
Weight: 0
Is official gauge? ✅Yes!✅ | 0x23aec7eb986d1a01d15838de465d1119b9519986764c39a1353497fcad04f078 | veclev.eth | CLever | 1 | single-choice | active | 2 | 1,773,346,360 | 2026-03-12 20:12:40 | 1,773,346,338 | 2026-03-12 20:12:18 | 1,773,601,938 | 2026-03-15 19:12:18 | 0x3538C75bE8bA1d308685f5D3Ba461C861B421a92 |
[Curve] Ownership DAO Vote ID: 1361
Quorum: 6.68m CVX
Add a gauge for the following pool: iREET/pmUSD on Mainnet (RAAC)
Action 1
----------
To: Curve Gauge Controller
Function: AddGauge
Gauge: 0xF814283bfd37dC24B2fB5515982F5C0708E508b6 (https://etherscan.io/address/0xF814283bfd37dC24B2fB5515982F5C0708E508b6)
Type: Ethereum Chain
Weight: 0
Is official gauge? ✅Yes!✅ | [Curve] Ownership DAO Vote ID: 1361 | Quorum: 6.68m CVX
Add a gauge for the following pool: iREET/pmUSD on Mainnet (RAAC)
Action 1
----------
To: Curve Gauge Controller
Function: AddGauge
Gauge: 0xF814283bfd37dC24B2fB5515982F5C0708E508b6 (https://etherscan.io/address/0xF814283bfd37dC24B2fB5515982F5C0708E508b6)
Type: Ethereum Chain
Weight: 0
Is official gauge? ✅Yes!✅ | 0x075cba3d9eef1c71b835108970a954b842c54e0be022f0dfa92b58d2f0f9ff06 | cvx.eth | Convex Finance | 1 | single-choice | active | 9 | 1,773,346,341 | 2026-03-12 20:12:21 | 1,773,346,338 | 2026-03-12 20:12:18 | 1,773,605,538 | 2026-03-15 20:12:18 | 0x724061efDFef4a421e8be05133ad24922D07b5Bf |
Put a decent volume slider in the ui..
> by 0xb2223f4038def8a62a86e3c4b108cdfe00a74c4f (Chillin)
Put a speaker icon in the sidebar..
Click to mute.. hover to increase/decrease volume..
Settings > Sound > Master
Is too many clicks..
- Yes
- No
- Invalid question/options
**[This proposal is summarized due to technical limitations. To view it complete and vote on it, visit the DCL DAO Governance dApp](https://decentraland.org/governance/proposal/?id=11f8f743-7cd1-4c85-b3e1-338f2e94c794)** | Put a decent volume slider in the ui.. | > by 0xb2223f4038def8a62a86e3c4b108cdfe00a74c4f (Chillin)
Put a speaker icon in the sidebar..
Click to mute.. hover to increase/decrease volume..
Settings > Sound > Master
Is too many clicks..
- Yes
- No
- Invalid question/options
**[This proposal is summarized due to technical limitations. To view it complete and vote on it, visit the DCL DAO Governance dApp](https://decentraland.org/governance/proposal/?id=11f8f743-7cd1-4c85-b3e1-338f2e94c794)** | 0x050b24f88fb0580ac9af74978cf8e89b2340560ba2b49a428745b7d9284bfb95 | snapshot.dcl.eth | Decentraland | 1 | single-choice | active | 14 | 1,773,332,746 | 2026-03-12 16:25:46 | 1,773,332,700 | 2026-03-12 16:25:00 | 1,773,764,700 | 2026-03-17 16:25:00 | 0xBB7B59Afa3A0E5Be143b8fE9C641F00c1ecB9d69 |
SCP‑211: Creation of the International UX Workstream, March 2026 to August 2026
**Workstream Name:** International UX Workstream
**Workstream Leader:** **Giantkin**
* Empowered per SCP‑92 and SCP‑151 (granted budget allocation, administrative authority, and leadership responsibilities).
* Oversees contributor payments and bounty distributions, and manages the Workstream budget.
* Requests no personal compensation during this term.
**Executive Contributor:** **Fireb0mb1**
**International UX and Translations Lead ([Full Job Description](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1h-Ll83yEb6V3yAngsenoNP77rVfbGNY7ntO7zmTf2Uc/edit?usp=sharing))**
* Responsible for operational execution of translations
* Translation coordination, translation tooling setup/maintenance
* French translations
* QA reviews, bounty translations budget tracking, and DAO documentation updates concerning translation processes.
* Contributes to Product/\#polish efforts through frequent testing, bug reporting, and UI refinement suggestions. Both to enhance the quality of the English and localized user experiences (UX).
* Maintains the [listings for ShapeShift products](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1Xh1ikz2O-8dwKdZEV31kuKdxbldPjqF8u4PUsnSv388/edit?usp=sharing) that require any amount of development and GitHub Pull requests (e.g. Zapper, Defilama, ethereum.org, etc.).
* Ensures community engagement on Discord (sometimes referred to as the “greeter” role) to guide users seeking help/support or just joining our community.
## Summary
This proposal seeks the DAO’s approval to establish and fund the new International UX Workstream under the leadership of Giantkin for a six-month term with the purpose of continuing professional multilingual support and a variety of important operational activities overseen by Fireb0mb1 (previously within the MKDB Workstream). The Workstream will ensure high-quality translations of ShapeShift’s app and website in order to preserve brand trust and global user engagement. The term will run from March 1, 2026, through August 31, 2026 (retroactive start reflecting ongoing operational continuity).
## Abstract
Following the MKBD Workstream’s sunset, ShapeShift faces a gap in maintaining professional localization for its global user base. This new Workstream aims to preserve continuity, improve quality assurance, and maintain the professional standards required to inspire confidence among ShapeShift’s international users.
The translation services and other operational activities described here have already been provided to the DAO by the same team of qualified contributors under multiple Workstreams over the years. During this time they have been refined and for the localization already make use of Machine Translations/AI and automation, but always rely on human translations and reviews to ensure the level of quality required for financial services.
## Motivation
Translations are essential for a global DeFi platform like ShapeShift, providing clarity and trust for international users making financial decisions. Over the last year, approximately 20% of users who connected a wallet used a language other than English.
To that effect, this Workstream will:
* Provide translations for:
* The app: [app.shapeshift.com](http://app.shapeshift.com) in French, German, Japanese, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish, Turkish, Ukrainian, and Simplified Chinese.
* The official Website: [shapeshift.com](http://shapeshift.com) in French (manually reviewed), German, Russian, Spanish, and Simplified Chinese.
* Preserve the current tasks and role executed by Fireb0mb1 (see Job Description above)
* Support the automation efforts initiated recently by the Engineering Workstream by providing translations/reviews to create better rules/glossaries for the new AI Agent-based translations system within the means provided by the allocated budget for bounty translations.
The target for the viability of this new system remains set at 1-2% error rate which is what our translators provide currently. If it cannot be reached without human reviews, they will remain in place to maintain our product’s quality.
* Continue the frequent tests, bug reporting, UX improvements, and suggestions in both English and translated versions of the app.
From a financial standpoint, quality translations have shown to be a strategically valuable investment for the DAO. Over the last 12 months, users whose app locale was set to a non-English language generated approximately $10.3 million in trading volume, resulting in about $58,000 in protocol revenues (assuming a constant 56 bps fee, which are now getting increased to 60 bps).
Chart: [https://i.imgur.com/jGd8wCc.png](https://i.imgur.com/jGd8wCc.png)
At the same time, the total annual cost for translation-related operations, including tools, bounties, and coordination was around $48,000, meaning localization efforts covered and exceeded their cost. This assumes translations drove part/most of the non‑English trading volume, which is likely but very difficult to prove. This also doesn’t include the revenues from [private.shapeshift.com](http://private.shapeshift.com) where such tracking is not possible, but it suggests the overall impact of localization is likely even higher.
Translation expenses are relatively fixed and independent of trading volume or user count but promote a wider global access to the DAO’s services, therefore, any growth in these areas enabled by these translations directly increases the DAO’s net revenue.
## Specification
### Translation Bounties
* 7 active translators are maintaining the following languages: German, Japanese, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish, Turkish, Ukrainian, and Chinese. All native speakers, experienced in crypto, and with knowledge of the ShapeShift products acquired over the years.
* Current bounty rates:
* Translations **$0.16 per word** (equivalent value in FOX).
* Reviews: **$0.07 per word** (equivalent value in FOX).
* Fireb0mb1 maintains a transparent budgeting spreadsheet. Giantkin is in charge of the monthly distribution of the bounty compensations.
### Budget Summary
[Full Budget Spreadsheet](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1ZTubKNsiBMIG_yK0z6OObH0GXRHgrlQRCQzmCCFSFg8/)
#### Recurrent monthly:
* Fireb0mb1 (Part Time): $3,500 paid in FOX
* Bounty translators (On-demand): \~$600 paid in FOX.
This amount varies monthly based on the type (translation/reviews rates) and the volume of work. The latter depends on the frequency/size of the new features and changes in the app. This budget is relying on the historical average (\~$500 with some operational margin). Any surplus from this budget item will be returned to the DAO or transferred to the next term if the Workstream were to be renewed.
#### Tooling/Misc.:
* Weglot “Pro” Plan: $500 (Translation SaaS platform for the website translations)
Billed currently at a yearly discounted rate of 416.50€ (normal rate: 790€), which was paid by the Foundation last year. The next billing is scheduled for July 20, 2026 and will be covered by this Workstream. The budget assumes a stable rate with a small margin for potential foreign exchange fluctuations and transaction fees. Any surplus from this budget item will be returned to the DAO or transferred to the next term if the Workstream were to be renewed. This will be paid in USDC to Giantkin because the payment can only happen by credit card.
* Gitlocalize: $0 (Translation SaaS platform for the app translations, currently free).
**Six-Month Total:** $25,100 (paid in FOX, except for $500 in USDC for tooling)
**Compensation Policy:**
* All salaries and compensations for contributors and bounties are paid in FOX.
* The DAO contributors may choose to receive locked FOX incentives (per SCP-81), this does not apply to bounties.
## Benefits
* Ensures seamless continuity with proven translators familiar with ShapeShift’s brand and DeFi-specific terminology.
* Delivers professional translations to maintain trust and credibility for international users of our financial app.
* Supports global accessibility (\~20% non-English users) to widen the potential audience of our products.
* Generates positive ROI by supporting non-English user segments that already drive significant trade volumes.
* Retains Fireb0mb1's proven coordination role for translations, UX testing, bug reporting, and community support.
## Drawbacks
* The Workstream introduces a recurring monthly expense which may reduce treasury flexibility for other initiatives.
* The ROI on these services depends on growing volume, a major decline in international usage could reduce its direct profitability.
* The Workstream generally requires coordination with other Workstreams (currently Product and Engineering) to keep content aligned and translatable across languages which occasionally involves small time commitments from those teams.
## Goals and KPIs
* Maintain translation coverage for all supported languages with an overall target of 95% of content translated at all times.
* Deliver and maintain accurate language glossaries and rules to support Engineering’s AI-assisted translation pipeline, enabling measurable efficiency improvements.
* Support improving UX through proactive testing, bug reporting, and UI/UX feedback in both English and localized versions.
## Vote
*Yes* \- Approve the creation and funding of a 6-month International UX Workstream (March 1 2026 to August 31, 2026).
*No* \- Reject this proposal. Evaluate other alternatives | SCP‑211: Creation of the International UX Workstream, March 2026 to August 2026 | **Workstream Name:** International UX Workstream
**Workstream Leader:** **Giantkin**
* Empowered per SCP‑92 and SCP‑151 (granted budget allocation, administrative authority, and leadership responsibilities).
* Oversees contributor payments and bounty distributions, and manages the Workstream budget.
* Requests no personal compensation during this term.
**Executive Contributor:** **Fireb0mb1**
**International UX and Translations Lead ([Full Job Description](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1h-Ll83yEb6V3yAngsenoNP77rVfbGNY7ntO7zmTf2Uc/edit?usp=sharing))**
* Responsible for operational execution of translations
* Translation coordination, translation tooling setup/maintenance
* French translations
* QA reviews, bounty translations budget tracking, and DAO documentation updates concerning translation processes.
* Contributes to Product/\#polish efforts through frequent testing, bug reporting, and UI refinement suggestions. Both to enhance the quality of the English and localized user experiences (UX).
* Maintains the [listings for ShapeShift products](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1Xh1ikz2O-8dwKdZEV31kuKdxbldPjqF8u4PUsnSv388/edit?usp=sharing) that require any amount of development and GitHub Pull requests (e.g. Zapper, Defilama, ethereum.org, etc.).
* Ensures community engagement on Discord (sometimes referred to as the “greeter” role) to guide users seeking help/support or just joining our community.
## Summary
This proposal seeks the DAO’s approval to establish and fund the new International UX Workstream under the leadership of Giantkin for a six-month term with the purpose of continuing professional multilingual support and a variety of important operational activities overseen by Fireb0mb1 (previously within the MKDB Workstream). The Workstream will ensure high-quality translations of ShapeShift’s app and website in order to preserve brand trust and global user engagement. The term will run from March 1, 2026, through August 31, 2026 (retroactive start reflecting ongoing operational continuity).
## Abstract
Following the MKBD Workstream’s sunset, ShapeShift faces a gap in maintaining professional localization for its global user base. This new Workstream aims to preserve continuity, improve quality assurance, and maintain the professional standards required to inspire confidence among ShapeShift’s international users.
The translation services and other operational activities described here have already been provided to the DAO by the same team of qualified contributors under multiple Workstreams over the years. During this time they have been refined and for the localization already make use of Machine Translations/AI and automation, but always rely on human translations and reviews to ensure the level of quality required for financial services.
## Motivation
Translations are essential for a global DeFi platform like ShapeShift, providing clarity and trust for international users making financial decisions. Over the last year, approximately 20% of users who connected a wallet used a language other than English.
To that effect, this Workstream will:
* Provide translations for:
* The app: [app.shapeshift.com](http://app.shapeshift.com) in French, German, Japanese, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish, Turkish, Ukrainian, and Simplified Chinese.
* The official Website: [shapeshift.com](http://shapeshift.com) in French (manually reviewed), German, Russian, Spanish, and Simplified Chinese.
* Preserve the current tasks and role executed by Fireb0mb1 (see Job Description above)
* Support the automation efforts initiated recently by the Engineering Workstream by providing translations/reviews to create better rules/glossaries for the new AI Agent-based translations system within the means provided by the allocated budget for bounty translations.
The target for the viability of this new system remains set at 1-2% error rate which is what our translators provide currently. If it cannot be reached without human reviews, they will remain in place to maintain our product’s quality.
* Continue the frequent tests, bug reporting, UX improvements, and suggestions in both English and translated versions of the app.
From a financial standpoint, quality translations have shown to be a strategically valuable investment for the DAO. Over the last 12 months, users whose app locale was set to a non-English language generated approximately $10.3 million in trading volume, resulting in about $58,000 in protocol revenues (assuming a constant 56 bps fee, which are now getting increased to 60 bps).
Chart: [https://i.imgur.com/jGd8wCc.png](https://i.imgur.com/jGd8wCc.png)
At the same time, the total annual cost for translation-related operations, including tools, bounties, and coordination was around $48,000, meaning localization efforts covered and exceeded their cost. This assumes translations drove part/most of the non‑English trading volume, which is likely but very difficult to prove. This also doesn’t include the revenues from [private.shapeshift.com](http://private.shapeshift.com) where such tracking is not possible, but it suggests the overall impact of localization is likely even higher.
Translation expenses are relatively fixed and independent of trading volume or user count but promote a wider global access to the DAO’s services, therefore, any growth in these areas enabled by these translations directly increases the DAO’s net revenue.
## Specification
### Translation Bounties
* 7 active translators are maintaining the following languages: German, Japanese, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish, Turkish, Ukrainian, and Chinese. All native speakers, experienced in crypto, and with knowledge of the ShapeShift products acquired over the years.
* Current bounty rates:
* Translations **$0.16 per word** (equivalent value in FOX).
* Reviews: **$0.07 per word** (equivalent value in FOX).
* Fireb0mb1 maintains a transparent budgeting spreadsheet. Giantkin is in charge of the monthly distribution of the bounty compensations.
### Budget Summary
[Full Budget Spreadsheet](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1ZTubKNsiBMIG_yK0z6OObH0GXRHgrlQRCQzmCCFSFg8/)
#### Recurrent monthly:
* Fireb0mb1 (Part Time): $3,500 paid in FOX
* Bounty translators (On-demand): \~$600 paid in FOX.
This amount varies monthly based on the type (translation/reviews rates) and the volume of work. The latter depends on the frequency/size of the new features and changes in the app. This budget is relying on the historical average (\~$500 with some operational margin). Any surplus from this budget item will be returned to the DAO or transferred to the next term if the Workstream were to be renewed.
#### Tooling/Misc.:
* Weglot “Pro” Plan: $500 (Translation SaaS platform for the website translations)
Billed currently at a yearly discounted rate of 416.50€ (normal rate: 790€), which was paid by the Foundation last year. The next billing is scheduled for July 20, 2026 and will be covered by this Workstream. The budget assumes a stable rate with a small margin for potential foreign exchange fluctuations and transaction fees. Any surplus from this budget item will be returned to the DAO or transferred to the next term if the Workstream were to be renewed. This will be paid in USDC to Giantkin because the payment can only happen by credit card.
* Gitlocalize: $0 (Translation SaaS platform for the app translations, currently free).
**Six-Month Total:** $25,100 (paid in FOX, except for $500 in USDC for tooling)
**Compensation Policy:**
* All salaries and compensations for contributors and bounties are paid in FOX.
* The DAO contributors may choose to receive locked FOX incentives (per SCP-81), this does not apply to bounties.
## Benefits
* Ensures seamless continuity with proven translators familiar with ShapeShift’s brand and DeFi-specific terminology.
* Delivers professional translations to maintain trust and credibility for international users of our financial app.
* Supports global accessibility (\~20% non-English users) to widen the potential audience of our products.
* Generates positive ROI by supporting non-English user segments that already drive significant trade volumes.
* Retains Fireb0mb1's proven coordination role for translations, UX testing, bug reporting, and community support.
## Drawbacks
* The Workstream introduces a recurring monthly expense which may reduce treasury flexibility for other initiatives.
* The ROI on these services depends on growing volume, a major decline in international usage could reduce its direct profitability.
* The Workstream generally requires coordination with other Workstreams (currently Product and Engineering) to keep content aligned and translatable across languages which occasionally involves small time commitments from those teams.
## Goals and KPIs
* Maintain translation coverage for all supported languages with an overall target of 95% of content translated at all times.
* Deliver and maintain accurate language glossaries and rules to support Engineering’s AI-assisted translation pipeline, enabling measurable efficiency improvements.
* Support improving UX through proactive testing, bug reporting, and UI/UX feedback in both English and localized versions.
## Vote
*Yes* \- Approve the creation and funding of a 6-month International UX Workstream (March 1 2026 to August 31, 2026).
*No* \- Reject this proposal. Evaluate other alternatives | 0xf37a3d6c5e10e7cf7eda9b96ee65dacd07a6146eee26292373609820a16806bc | shapeshiftdao.eth | ShapeShift | 1 | basic | active | 9 | 1,773,331,531 | 2026-03-12 16:05:31 | 1,773,331,531 | 2026-03-12 16:05:31 | 1,773,765,000 | 2026-03-17 16:30:00 | 0xff75E131c711e4310C045317779d39B3B4f718C4 |
Review Other Onyx Communities
This Poll seeks to determine whether the XCN community supports requesting a review of existing community demographics to identify additional regions or communities that Onyx should focus on.
The purpose of this poll is to see if the community agrees that Onyx should analyze where its current users and supporters are located. Understanding community demographics could help identify other strong regions where marketing, partnerships, and community engagement efforts may be effective.
While Turkish and Korean communities have already been recognized as active groups within the ecosystem, there may be other regions with growing interest in Onyx that could benefit from more focused outreach and support.
This poll is intended to provide clear direction from the community on whether Onyx should review its community demographics and identify additional regions to focus on alongside the Turkish and Korean communities.
Vote Options:
• For — Request a review of community demographics to identify additional regions for outreach and growth.
• Against — Do not prioritize reviewing community demographics at this time. | Review Other Onyx Communities | This Poll seeks to determine whether the XCN community supports requesting a review of existing community demographics to identify additional regions or communities that Onyx should focus on.
The purpose of this poll is to see if the community agrees that Onyx should analyze where its current users and supporters are located. Understanding community demographics could help identify other strong regions where marketing, partnerships, and community engagement efforts may be effective.
While Turkish and Korean communities have already been recognized as active groups within the ecosystem, there may be other regions with growing interest in Onyx that could benefit from more focused outreach and support.
This poll is intended to provide clear direction from the community on whether Onyx should review its community demographics and identify additional regions to focus on alongside the Turkish and Korean communities.
Vote Options:
• For — Request a review of community demographics to identify additional regions for outreach and growth.
• Against — Do not prioritize reviewing community demographics at this time. | 0x3735f9485aa75aa0b8b97b196f9b0e6c6d6f74195c9a20c57ff8ada4416df670 | chaingov.eth | Onyx XCN DAO | 1 | basic | closed | 24 | 1,773,322,679 | 2026-03-12 13:37:59 | 1,773,322,739 | 2026-03-12 13:38:59 | 1,773,495,539 | 2026-03-14 13:38:59 | 0xAeE7663De6c21C9Dc381D8A398987735CE034B8B |
Remove Chat Timer on Onyx Telegram
The Onyx Telegram currently has a chat timer that makes you wait before posting. This poll simply requests that Onyx removes the timer on the Telegram so that we can post without waiting.
• For — Remove the timer from Telegram
• Against — Keep the timer on Telegram | Remove Chat Timer on Onyx Telegram | The Onyx Telegram currently has a chat timer that makes you wait before posting. This poll simply requests that Onyx removes the timer on the Telegram so that we can post without waiting.
• For — Remove the timer from Telegram
• Against — Keep the timer on Telegram | 0x135a92dbc1bfa3ebe9035c1252c8d9c3907832c14cd2ed1ffd2700d00d033c93 | chaingov.eth | Onyx XCN DAO | 1 | basic | closed | 22 | 1,773,322,346 | 2026-03-12 13:32:26 | 1,773,322,406 | 2026-03-12 13:33:26 | 1,773,495,206 | 2026-03-14 13:33:26 | 0xAeE7663De6c21C9Dc381D8A398987735CE034B8B |
Finish Goliath Testnet Reward Plan Before Mainnet Launch
This Poll seeks to determine whether the XCN community supports requesting a clear reward plan for participants in the Goliath testnet before the mainnet launch on March 27.
The purpose of this poll is to see if the community agrees that a clear and transparent plan should be shared explaining how users who participated in the Goliath testnet will be rewarded. Many community members have spent time testing the network, running nodes, and helping identify issues before launch.
Having a defined reward plan before mainnet goes live could help recognize the contributions of testnet participants and provide clarity for the community. It would also help ensure that the effort and support given during the testing phase is acknowledged in a fair and transparent way.
This poll is intended to provide clear direction from the community on whether the team should present a detailed reward plan for Goliath testnet participants before the March 27 mainnet launch.
Vote Options:
• For — Request a clear reward plan for Goliath testnet participants before March 27.
• Against — Do not require a reward plan to be shared before the mainnet launch. | Finish Goliath Testnet Reward Plan Before Mainnet Launch | This Poll seeks to determine whether the XCN community supports requesting a clear reward plan for participants in the Goliath testnet before the mainnet launch on March 27.
The purpose of this poll is to see if the community agrees that a clear and transparent plan should be shared explaining how users who participated in the Goliath testnet will be rewarded. Many community members have spent time testing the network, running nodes, and helping identify issues before launch.
Having a defined reward plan before mainnet goes live could help recognize the contributions of testnet participants and provide clarity for the community. It would also help ensure that the effort and support given during the testing phase is acknowledged in a fair and transparent way.
This poll is intended to provide clear direction from the community on whether the team should present a detailed reward plan for Goliath testnet participants before the March 27 mainnet launch.
Vote Options:
• For — Request a clear reward plan for Goliath testnet participants before March 27.
• Against — Do not require a reward plan to be shared before the mainnet launch. | 0x95ceeb78c92b5acd40a6ee22a50ee857046a98d013e8c2dd07c2d24f1161d9b5 | chaingov.eth | Onyx XCN DAO | 1 | basic | closed | 23 | 1,773,322,172 | 2026-03-12 13:29:32 | 1,773,322,232 | 2026-03-12 13:30:32 | 1,773,495,032 | 2026-03-14 13:30:32 | 0xAeE7663De6c21C9Dc381D8A398987735CE034B8B |
Goliath Validator Incentives
This Poll seeks to determine whether the XCN community supports creating validator incentives for Goliath validators.
The purpose of this poll is to see if the community agrees that incentives should be provided to help more people run Goliath validators. Some community members have the technical knowledge and skills needed to operate validators, but they may not have enough funds to participate.
Providing incentives could help lower the barrier to entry and allow more capable community members to contribute to network security and decentralization. This could also help increase the number of active validators and strengthen the overall Onyx ecosystem.
This poll is intended to provide clear direction from the community on whether XCN should explore or implement validator incentives for Goliath validators.
Vote Options:
• For — Support creating incentives for Goliath validators.
• Against — Do not create validator incentives at this time. | Goliath Validator Incentives | This Poll seeks to determine whether the XCN community supports creating validator incentives for Goliath validators.
The purpose of this poll is to see if the community agrees that incentives should be provided to help more people run Goliath validators. Some community members have the technical knowledge and skills needed to operate validators, but they may not have enough funds to participate.
Providing incentives could help lower the barrier to entry and allow more capable community members to contribute to network security and decentralization. This could also help increase the number of active validators and strengthen the overall Onyx ecosystem.
This poll is intended to provide clear direction from the community on whether XCN should explore or implement validator incentives for Goliath validators.
Vote Options:
• For — Support creating incentives for Goliath validators.
• Against — Do not create validator incentives at this time. | 0x8dd74748dee8bea2638b11d243b37e11cdacb85846678e5013dbb6d49ecd311d | chaingov.eth | Onyx XCN DAO | 1 | basic | closed | 21 | 1,773,322,036 | 2026-03-12 13:27:16 | 1,773,322,096 | 2026-03-12 13:28:16 | 1,773,494,896 | 2026-03-14 13:28:16 | 0xAeE7663De6c21C9Dc381D8A398987735CE034B8B |
Add additional Türkiye Ambassador
This Poll seeks to determine whether the XCN community supports adding an additional Turkish ambassador to the XCN Ambassador Program.
The purpose of this poll is to see if the community agrees that having another ambassador from Türkiye could help support the growing Turkish community. Türkiye has a large number of active Onyx supporters, and having more representation may help improve communication, organization, and outreach in that region.
An additional Turkish ambassador could help with community engagement, sharing updates, helping new users, and supporting marketing or partnership efforts within Turkish crypto communities. As the Turkish community continues to grow, having more support from ambassadors may help strengthen participation and coordination.
Vote Options:
• For — Add an additional Turkish ambassador to the XCN Ambassador Program.
• Against — Do not add another Turkish ambassador at this time. | Add additional Türkiye Ambassador | This Poll seeks to determine whether the XCN community supports adding an additional Turkish ambassador to the XCN Ambassador Program.
The purpose of this poll is to see if the community agrees that having another ambassador from Türkiye could help support the growing Turkish community. Türkiye has a large number of active Onyx supporters, and having more representation may help improve communication, organization, and outreach in that region.
An additional Turkish ambassador could help with community engagement, sharing updates, helping new users, and supporting marketing or partnership efforts within Turkish crypto communities. As the Turkish community continues to grow, having more support from ambassadors may help strengthen participation and coordination.
Vote Options:
• For — Add an additional Turkish ambassador to the XCN Ambassador Program.
• Against — Do not add another Turkish ambassador at this time. | 0x28659d8c47e8fa0d202d2017e6b43cec94f8bdaf99cd4ed447e6a7b70e91f0af | chaingov.eth | Onyx XCN DAO | 1 | basic | closed | 23 | 1,773,321,492 | 2026-03-12 13:18:12 | 1,773,321,552 | 2026-03-12 13:19:12 | 1,773,494,352 | 2026-03-14 13:19:12 | 0xAeE7663De6c21C9Dc381D8A398987735CE034B8B |
Turkish Community Marketing Campaign
This Poll seeks to determine whether the XCN community supports doing marketing with Turkish crypto exchanges and working with Turkish crypto communities.
The purpose of this poll is to see if the community agrees that XCN should focus more on growing in Türkiye. Türkiye has a large and active group of Onyx supporters, and many community members are already from this region. Because of this, focusing marketing efforts there may help grow awareness and adoption of XCN.
Possible marketing efforts could include working with Turkish exchanges, partnering with Turkish crypto communities, creating Turkish language content, and collaborating with Turkish influencers or community leaders. These steps could help strengthen the existing Turkish community while also bringing new users to Onyx.
Since Türkiye already has a strong presence in the community, building stronger connections there could be a good opportunity for growth. This poll is meant to give the community a chance to share their opinion on whether this direction should be supported.
Vote Options:
• For — Support marketing through Turkish exchanges and partnerships with Turkish crypto communities.
• Against — Do not focus on the Turkish community at this time | Turkish Community Marketing Campaign | This Poll seeks to determine whether the XCN community supports doing marketing with Turkish crypto exchanges and working with Turkish crypto communities.
The purpose of this poll is to see if the community agrees that XCN should focus more on growing in Türkiye. Türkiye has a large and active group of Onyx supporters, and many community members are already from this region. Because of this, focusing marketing efforts there may help grow awareness and adoption of XCN.
Possible marketing efforts could include working with Turkish exchanges, partnering with Turkish crypto communities, creating Turkish language content, and collaborating with Turkish influencers or community leaders. These steps could help strengthen the existing Turkish community while also bringing new users to Onyx.
Since Türkiye already has a strong presence in the community, building stronger connections there could be a good opportunity for growth. This poll is meant to give the community a chance to share their opinion on whether this direction should be supported.
Vote Options:
• For — Support marketing through Turkish exchanges and partnerships with Turkish crypto communities.
• Against — Do not focus on the Turkish community at this time | 0xcacbebb1e771da4a6eeb13d1c2db02eaeaf49f64fe6d3925f4f78ae48a1056c4 | chaingov.eth | Onyx XCN DAO | 1 | basic | closed | 18 | 1,773,321,386 | 2026-03-12 13:16:26 | 1,773,321,446 | 2026-03-12 13:17:26 | 1,773,494,246 | 2026-03-14 13:17:26 | 0xAeE7663De6c21C9Dc381D8A398987735CE034B8B |
Gauge Weight for Week of 12th March 2026
Please read gauge voting rules before voting: https://docs.aura.finance/aura/governance/gauge-voting#gauge-voting-rules-and-information
Be sure to also consult the voting dashboard for gauge voting insights: https://app.aura.finance/#/lock | Gauge Weight for Week of 12th March 2026 | Please read gauge voting rules before voting: https://docs.aura.finance/aura/governance/gauge-voting#gauge-voting-rules-and-information
Be sure to also consult the voting dashboard for gauge voting insights: https://app.aura.finance/#/lock | 0x9fca2eb58b15123cd9094ef2ee458f94eee98abe128b6814b7e03858c346f061 | gauges.aurafinance.eth | Aura - Balancer Gauges | 1 | weighted | active | 7 | 1,773,314,639 | 2026-03-12 11:23:59 | 1,773,280,800 | 2026-03-12 02:00:00 | 1,773,712,800 | 2026-03-17 02:00:00 | 0xe1893A0E0198c0f0444239fF14F1B78a32b90704 |
March SQUID Drop (Covering February)
The March SQUID Drop, covering February activity, is proposed. All category weightings are [on this spreadsheet](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1NcJ31ZBKGs7M8eItnNHyiFOsYGRpy57eR-sB6z_yVh0/edit?gid=740612262#gid=740612262), with the final list of items being considered is as follows:
- **News:** Posting, editing and approving headlines via Telegram or web
- **Dev:** Any development relating to our Telegram bots or the website
- **Moderation:** Moderating, upvoting, and/or flagging website comments, responses, discussions per Project Inkling
- **Auction:** Participating in an auction.
- **DAO:** Voting on Snapshot.
- **Social:** News comments and responses via Project Inkling
- **𝕏 Article:** One of the best primer on what Polaris could be
- **DAdvisoor Show:** Appreciate every vote, thank you all
The blog post provides greater specific detail on all these items: [https://leviathannews.substack.com/p/march-squid-drop-covering-february](https://leviathannews.substack.com/p/march-squid-drop-covering-february) | March SQUID Drop (Covering February) | 
The March SQUID Drop, covering February activity, is proposed. All category weightings are [on this spreadsheet](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1NcJ31ZBKGs7M8eItnNHyiFOsYGRpy57eR-sB6z_yVh0/edit?gid=740612262#gid=740612262), with the final list of items being considered is as follows:
- **News:** Posting, editing and approving headlines via Telegram or web
- **Dev:** Any development relating to our Telegram bots or the website
- **Moderation:** Moderating, upvoting, and/or flagging website comments, responses, discussions per Project Inkling
- **Auction:** Participating in an auction.
- **DAO:** Voting on Snapshot.
- **Social:** News comments and responses via Project Inkling
- **𝕏 Article:** One of the best primer on what Polaris could be
- **DAdvisoor Show:** Appreciate every vote, thank you all
The blog post provides greater specific detail on all these items: [https://leviathannews.substack.com/p/march-squid-drop-covering-february](https://leviathannews.substack.com/p/march-squid-drop-covering-february) | 0x64603f805c80c7d8d254e0ff5b5568643434f0b05b5588a4631f5fd69bf948d4 | leviathannews.eth | Squid DAO | 252 | weighted | active | 5 | 1,773,311,888 | 2026-03-12 10:38:08 | 1,773,311,888 | 2026-03-12 10:38:08 | 1,773,758,288 | 2026-03-17 14:38:08 | 0xccBF601eB2f5AA2D5d68b069610da6F1627D485d |
[BIP-916] Set Network Remapping Manager for StakeDAO
## PR with Payload
https://github.com/BalancerMaxis/multisig-ops/pull/2724
## Motivation
StakeDAO is launching their OnlyBoost strategies, which optimally allocate boost between StakeDAO and Aura on sidechains (Base and Arbitrum initially). To enable cross-chain boost for their veBAL position, the StakeDAO multisig needs to be designated as the `NetworkRemappingManager` for their veBAL locker on the [VotingEscrowRemapper](https://etherscan.io/address/0x83e443ef4f9963c77bd860f94500075556668cb8) contract. This grants StakeDAO the ability to call `setNetworkRemapping`, allowing them to manage their own L2 boost addresses.
This follows the same procedure as [BIP-341](https://forum.balancer.fi/t/bip-341-enable-tetu-cross-chain-boost/5007), which enabled cross-chain boost for Tetu.
## Specification
The DAO Multisig `0x10A19e7eE7d7F8a52822f6817de8ea18204F2e4f` will execute a single transaction batch on **Ethereum mainnet**:
1. **Grant permission**: Call `grantRole` on the Authorizer (`0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6`) with:
- `role`: `0x6bb341db03eede206e544c654a59ef89eea83bc65fada2cfeeaf18c5c0f76ac0` — the action ID for `setNetworkRemappingManager` on the VotingEscrowRemapper ([verifiable here](https://github.com/balancer/balancer-deployments/blob/912cfaebda16d3b26a7bd931ce663ee8e44285f0/action-ids/mainnet/action-ids.json#L1340))
- `account`: `0x10A19e7eE7d7F8a52822f6817de8ea18204F2e4f` (DAO Multisig)
2. **Set remapping manager**: Call `setNetworkRemappingManager` on the VotingEscrowRemapper (`0x83E443EF4f9963C77bd860f94500075556668cb8`) with:
- `localUser`: `0xea79d1A83Da6DB43a85942767C389fE0ACf336A5` (StakeDAO veBAL locker)
- `delegate`: `0xB0552b6860CE5C0202976Db056b5e3Cc4f9CC765` (StakeDAO multisig)
3. **Revoke permission**: Call `revokeRole` on the Authorizer to remove the `setNetworkRemappingManager` permission from the DAO Multisig.
## Risk Assessment
Low risk. The permission is granted and revoked atomically within the same transaction batch, so the DAO Multisig never retains the elevated permission beyond execution. The `setNetworkRemappingManager` function only designates who can manage L2 boost remappings for a specific veBAL locker — it does not grant access to any funds. | [BIP-916] Set Network Remapping Manager for StakeDAO | ## PR with Payload
https://github.com/BalancerMaxis/multisig-ops/pull/2724
## Motivation
StakeDAO is launching their OnlyBoost strategies, which optimally allocate boost between StakeDAO and Aura on sidechains (Base and Arbitrum initially). To enable cross-chain boost for their veBAL position, the StakeDAO multisig needs to be designated as the `NetworkRemappingManager` for their veBAL locker on the [VotingEscrowRemapper](https://etherscan.io/address/0x83e443ef4f9963c77bd860f94500075556668cb8) contract. This grants StakeDAO the ability to call `setNetworkRemapping`, allowing them to manage their own L2 boost addresses.
This follows the same procedure as [BIP-341](https://forum.balancer.fi/t/bip-341-enable-tetu-cross-chain-boost/5007), which enabled cross-chain boost for Tetu.
## Specification
The DAO Multisig `0x10A19e7eE7d7F8a52822f6817de8ea18204F2e4f` will execute a single transaction batch on **Ethereum mainnet**:
1. **Grant permission**: Call `grantRole` on the Authorizer (`0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6`) with:
- `role`: `0x6bb341db03eede206e544c654a59ef89eea83bc65fada2cfeeaf18c5c0f76ac0` — the action ID for `setNetworkRemappingManager` on the VotingEscrowRemapper ([verifiable here](https://github.com/balancer/balancer-deployments/blob/912cfaebda16d3b26a7bd931ce663ee8e44285f0/action-ids/mainnet/action-ids.json#L1340))
- `account`: `0x10A19e7eE7d7F8a52822f6817de8ea18204F2e4f` (DAO Multisig)
2. **Set remapping manager**: Call `setNetworkRemappingManager` on the VotingEscrowRemapper (`0x83E443EF4f9963C77bd860f94500075556668cb8`) with:
- `localUser`: `0xea79d1A83Da6DB43a85942767C389fE0ACf336A5` (StakeDAO veBAL locker)
- `delegate`: `0xB0552b6860CE5C0202976Db056b5e3Cc4f9CC765` (StakeDAO multisig)
3. **Revoke permission**: Call `revokeRole` on the Authorizer to remove the `setNetworkRemappingManager` permission from the DAO Multisig.
## Risk Assessment
Low risk. The permission is granted and revoked atomically within the same transaction batch, so the DAO Multisig never retains the elevated permission beyond execution. The `setNetworkRemappingManager` function only designates who can manage L2 boost remappings for a specific veBAL locker — it does not grant access to any funds. | 0x6bc4c92f417d204b1f9da9a1f18b9d1711c6a499fb507b7f464f27798ffd729d | sdbal.eth | Stake DAO BAL | 1 | weighted | active | 1 | 1,773,298,444 | 2026-03-12 06:54:04 | 1,773,428,400 | 2026-03-13 19:00:00 | 1,773,687,600 | 2026-03-16 19:00:00 | 0xb4542526AfeE2FdA1D584213D1521272a398B42a |
[BIP-914] Disable Outdated Oracle LP Pool Factories (v1 and v2)
## PR with Payloads
https://github.com/BalancerMaxis/multisig-ops/pull/2714
## Summary
This proposal requests the DAO multisig (and the Omnisig on newer chains) to disable outdated Oracle LP Pool Factories across all networks where they are deployed. This includes both the v1 (deprecated) and the original v2 (overwritten) versions of the `WeightedLPOracleFactory` and `StableLPOracleFactory` contracts.
## Motivation
As requested by BLabs, all outdated Oracle Pool Factories for v1 need to be disabled. The original v2 factories were never fully rolled out and have since been overwritten with updated deployments following Certora audit suggestions. While the old v2 contracts are no longer listed in the deployments repo, they still exist on-chain and should be disabled for completeness.
All factory addresses referenced in this BIP correspond to [commit `9a29caf`](https://github.com/balancer/balancer-deployments/blob/9a29caf63cc6bfad564a84e33e8f912c180054b9/addresses/mainnet.json) of `balancer-deployments`, which is the last commit before the v2 overwrite.
On Mainnet, Arbitrum, Optimism, Gnosis, Avalanche, and Base, these payloads must go through the DAO multisig because the `disable()` permissions for these factories were never granted to any operator or the Omnisig. On HyperEVM, Plasma, Monad, and XLayer, the Omnisig (`0x9ff471F9f98F42E5151C7855fD1b5aa906b1AF7e`) can grant roles to itself, disable, and revoke.
## Factories to Disable
### V1 Factories (Deprecated)
| Deployment Task | Contract |
|---|---|
| [`20250814-v3-weighted-pool-oracle`](https://github.com/balancer/balancer-deployments/blob/master/tasks/20250814-v3-weighted-pool-oracle) | `WeightedLPOracleFactory` |
| [`20250815-v3-stable-pool-oracle`](https://github.com/balancer/balancer-deployments/blob/master/tasks/20250815-v3-stable-pool-oracle) | `StableLPOracleFactory` |
### V2 Factories (Overwritten, no longer in deployments repo)
| Deployment Task | Contract |
|---|---|
| [`20260202-v3-weighted-pool-oracle-v2`](https://github.com/balancer/balancer-deployments/blob/9a29caf63cc6bfad564a84e33e8f912c180054b9/addresses/mainnet.json#L2064) | `WeightedLPOracleFactory` |
| [`20260203-v3-stable-pool-oracle-v2`](https://github.com/balancer/balancer-deployments/blob/9a29caf63cc6bfad564a84e33e8f912c180054b9/addresses/mainnet.json#L2078) | `StableLPOracleFactory` |
## Affected Networks and Factory Addresses
### Mainnet (Chain ID: 1)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x05503B3aDE04aCA81c8D6F88eCB73Ba156982D2B` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x83bf399FA3DC49Af8fb5c34031a50c7C93F56129` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0xDd10aDF05379D7C0Ee4bC9c72ecc5C01c40E25b8` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x99f2D91EBA577e4Bf7175E72B3Ef2B6dDb1FaBe3` |
### Arbitrum (Chain ID: 42161)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x7f4C133e44381D05129F9B81bAD8Fa9F3345D29B` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x816e90DC85bF016455017a76Bc09CC0451Eeb308` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0xA9AEeB57Efe61338C0d07f3e5Bb82519C4Ad1103` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0xa59F164d6cf6ee5d63580C0bcEA5CCB2e50b908c` |
### Optimism (Chain ID: 10)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x6eE18fbb1BBcC5CF700cD75ea1aef2bb21e3cB3F` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0xb96524227c4B5Ab908FC3d42005FE3B07abA40E9` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0xEB2BB012869255f8C622563Dc4C3AFA8619fe804` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0xC4c4940DC7c57DF46d3A217647dB1649721Cf468` |
### Gnosis (Chain ID: 100)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x8A8B9f35765899B3a0291700141470D79EA2eA88` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0xbF94192c652183c0f50056417f4D04810329f12c` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x332694Ef46D880DF6Ea9593e04CB8ABEE5F81D99` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x4eFcd8bcE8AC9b94bd76648e2c85bEf6c40F3228` |
### Avalanche (Chain ID: 43114)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x0E800D8d2E8b4694610AEdc385Aa6D763492B106` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x4eff2d77D9fFbAeFB4b141A3e494c085b3FF4Cb5` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x9958317b80ee5f10457017d54c2484D722059157` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x5939ab16fDf1991B0EF603c639B6b501A7841fAB` |
### Base (Chain ID: 8453)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x774cB66e2B2dB59A9daF175e9b2B7A142E17EB94` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0xb21A277466e7dB6934556a1Ce12eb3F032815c8A` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x9958317b80ee5f10457017d54c2484D722059157` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x5939ab16fDf1991B0EF603c639B6b501A7841fAB` |
### HyperEVM (Chain ID: 999)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0xf4743D026f3D07aF3747bb7d05BeD06D177241d7` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x0b11209B8c5E821b18dED147583b8978c3E63911` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0xBcA68cb9B794A4fb84855e003e4cF591F80A3Dc9` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x45fB5aF0a1aD80Ea16C803146eb81844D9972373` |
### Plasma (Chain ID: 9745)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0xD961E30156C2E0D0d925A0De45f931CB7815e970` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x86e67E115f96DF37239E0479441303De0de7bc2b` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x891EC9B34829276a9a8ef2F8A9cEAF2486017e0d` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x774cB66e2B2dB59A9daF175e9b2B7A142E17EB94` |
### Monad (Chain ID: 143)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x1311Fbc9F60359639174c1e7cC2032DbDb5Cc4d1` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0xaD89051bEd8d96f045E8912aE1672c6C0bF8a85E` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x4BB42f71CAB7Bd13e9f958dA4351B9fa2d3A42FF` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0xbC169a08cBdCDb218d91Cd945D29B59F78c96B77` |
### XLayer (Chain ID: 196)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x1311Fbc9F60359639174c1e7cC2032DbDb5Cc4d1` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0xEB1eeaBF0126d813589C3D2CfeFFE410D9aE3863` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x86705Ee19c0509Ff68F1118C55ee2ebdE383D122` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0xEAedc32a51c510d35ebC11088fD5fF2b47aACF2E` |
## Technical Specification
For each factory on each network, the executing multisig (DAO multisig or Omnisig) performs a 3-step transaction pattern via the Authorizer:
1. **`grantRole(actionId, account)`** on the Authorizer -- grants the multisig the `disable()` role for the target factory
2. **`disable()`** on the factory -- permanently disables the factory, preventing new pool creation
3. **`revokeRole(actionId, account)`** on the Authorizer -- revokes the role so the multisig does not retain unnecessary permissions
Each network payload contains 12 transactions (4 factories x 3 steps).
### Executing Multisigs
| Network | Multisig | Address |
|---|---|---|
| Mainnet | DAO Multisig | `0x10A19e7eE7d7F8a52822f6817de8ea18204F2e4f` |
| Arbitrum | DAO Multisig | `0xaF23DC5983230E9eEAf93280e312e57539D098D0` |
| Optimism | DAO Multisig | `0x043f9687842771b3dF8852c1E9801DCAeED3f6bc` |
| Gnosis | DAO Multisig | `0x2a5AEcE0bb9EfFD7608213AE1745873385515c18` |
| Avalanche | DAO Multisig | `0x17b11FF13e2d7bAb2648182dFD1f1cfa0E4C7cf3` |
| Base | DAO Multisig | `0xC40DCFB13651e64C8551007aa57F9260827B6462` |
| HyperEVM, Plasma, Monad, XLayer | Omnisig | `0x9ff471F9f98F42E5151C7855fD1b5aa906b1AF7e` |
### Authorizer Addresses
| Network | Authorizer |
|---|---|
| Mainnet, Arbitrum, Optimism, Gnosis, Avalanche | `0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6` |
| Base | `0x809B79b53F18E9bc08A961ED4678B901aC93213a` |
| HyperEVM | `0x85a80afee867aDf27B50BdB7b76DA70f1E853062` |
| Plasma, Monad, XLayer | `0xE39B5e3B6D74016b2F6A9673D7d7493B6DF549d5` |
### V2 Action IDs (disable())
V1 action IDs can be looked up from the [balancer-deployments action-ids](https://github.com/balancer/balancer-deployments/tree/master/action-ids). The overwritten v2 factory action IDs are no longer in the repo and were queried on-chain via `getActionId(bytes4)`:
| Network | WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | StableLPOracleFactory v2 |
|---|---|---|
| Mainnet | `0xaad0e51c18069fb241bf8179dc6c7d583e506dd672ef9a85ef122dd000deba76` | `0xb3c9c0ec52436494a8f6527a835a3442d43fb2d4268c638d9e8f670a5546afe8` |
| Arbitrum | `0x32cfd519f4e04a2d3b88e1e667811368433ec3da01605dbc26d85a8d54dc834b` | `0x249bc3c0021e108ccf28b9f7934b423928be80b8c823bab8254edba17b359ea4` |
| Optimism | `0x92b93830f0497ce935614ceb53508d12d772244a34a0bbbeab832a4c824f0b90` | `0xfc212a18b66df1a184af12c3a698e2f1b55a002fa96e4ad2e37ddd708f99723a` |
| Gnosis | `0x5a2389555953f58e8746cb8c3171904d268fce2d55fa1aac3f20343ccd04cb0b` | `0x315b841cfaf795ea83cbe267847195f6fdba4a7a9f5ed870c28d9e4d4b145e28` |
| Avalanche | `0x0f19a8e265e66504de04b28811bb8fba950087dc6ab21a23e5d757937d4c38c8` | `0xd6ef2cdea6236fe8b350fe1371523aade37cb3ec44de40e46a13ac44ab467e9e` |
| Base | `0x0f19a8e265e66504de04b28811bb8fba950087dc6ab21a23e5d757937d4c38c8` | `0xd6ef2cdea6236fe8b350fe1371523aade37cb3ec44de40e46a13ac44ab467e9e` |
| HyperEVM | `0x6ccb8983444db720b828ab14455ffd0d3d219cfd63180ee7e384e218810ef779` | `0xd9ad8a66a0dd971dc6fe438297bcae5d731b41bacd8c65809e765141d1986bdb` |
| Plasma | `0x7576f83c39a4f75ece8e6da99676712301067f196442916c688500f9320af5fb` | `0x416d92d817cb23a3d644810c79c3e5d9cd991b729c260819b570abd632e3a90a` |
| Monad | `0x2cb59d35a7a1b89d4ca6e466034d4d7bba7efe0e0dbb3bbe125e78def0cbdac1` | `0xe52f27de16ccc09f36da9a1dc8bbb043041a422d6430226a1e148560fa23c165` |
| XLayer | `0xaa602686217d84795dac828d7e9c133b7507febe7d68d7f642b1e3b506ce3309` | `0x34f66ef5706b2abf916d3f719040884c962d3a419b90ec8af8fb2c1f6ea4e313` | | [BIP-914] Disable Outdated Oracle LP Pool Factories (v1 and v2) | ## PR with Payloads
https://github.com/BalancerMaxis/multisig-ops/pull/2714
## Summary
This proposal requests the DAO multisig (and the Omnisig on newer chains) to disable outdated Oracle LP Pool Factories across all networks where they are deployed. This includes both the v1 (deprecated) and the original v2 (overwritten) versions of the `WeightedLPOracleFactory` and `StableLPOracleFactory` contracts.
## Motivation
As requested by BLabs, all outdated Oracle Pool Factories for v1 need to be disabled. The original v2 factories were never fully rolled out and have since been overwritten with updated deployments following Certora audit suggestions. While the old v2 contracts are no longer listed in the deployments repo, they still exist on-chain and should be disabled for completeness.
All factory addresses referenced in this BIP correspond to [commit `9a29caf`](https://github.com/balancer/balancer-deployments/blob/9a29caf63cc6bfad564a84e33e8f912c180054b9/addresses/mainnet.json) of `balancer-deployments`, which is the last commit before the v2 overwrite.
On Mainnet, Arbitrum, Optimism, Gnosis, Avalanche, and Base, these payloads must go through the DAO multisig because the `disable()` permissions for these factories were never granted to any operator or the Omnisig. On HyperEVM, Plasma, Monad, and XLayer, the Omnisig (`0x9ff471F9f98F42E5151C7855fD1b5aa906b1AF7e`) can grant roles to itself, disable, and revoke.
## Factories to Disable
### V1 Factories (Deprecated)
| Deployment Task | Contract |
|---|---|
| [`20250814-v3-weighted-pool-oracle`](https://github.com/balancer/balancer-deployments/blob/master/tasks/20250814-v3-weighted-pool-oracle) | `WeightedLPOracleFactory` |
| [`20250815-v3-stable-pool-oracle`](https://github.com/balancer/balancer-deployments/blob/master/tasks/20250815-v3-stable-pool-oracle) | `StableLPOracleFactory` |
### V2 Factories (Overwritten, no longer in deployments repo)
| Deployment Task | Contract |
|---|---|
| [`20260202-v3-weighted-pool-oracle-v2`](https://github.com/balancer/balancer-deployments/blob/9a29caf63cc6bfad564a84e33e8f912c180054b9/addresses/mainnet.json#L2064) | `WeightedLPOracleFactory` |
| [`20260203-v3-stable-pool-oracle-v2`](https://github.com/balancer/balancer-deployments/blob/9a29caf63cc6bfad564a84e33e8f912c180054b9/addresses/mainnet.json#L2078) | `StableLPOracleFactory` |
## Affected Networks and Factory Addresses
### Mainnet (Chain ID: 1)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x05503B3aDE04aCA81c8D6F88eCB73Ba156982D2B` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x83bf399FA3DC49Af8fb5c34031a50c7C93F56129` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0xDd10aDF05379D7C0Ee4bC9c72ecc5C01c40E25b8` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x99f2D91EBA577e4Bf7175E72B3Ef2B6dDb1FaBe3` |
### Arbitrum (Chain ID: 42161)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x7f4C133e44381D05129F9B81bAD8Fa9F3345D29B` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x816e90DC85bF016455017a76Bc09CC0451Eeb308` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0xA9AEeB57Efe61338C0d07f3e5Bb82519C4Ad1103` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0xa59F164d6cf6ee5d63580C0bcEA5CCB2e50b908c` |
### Optimism (Chain ID: 10)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x6eE18fbb1BBcC5CF700cD75ea1aef2bb21e3cB3F` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0xb96524227c4B5Ab908FC3d42005FE3B07abA40E9` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0xEB2BB012869255f8C622563Dc4C3AFA8619fe804` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0xC4c4940DC7c57DF46d3A217647dB1649721Cf468` |
### Gnosis (Chain ID: 100)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x8A8B9f35765899B3a0291700141470D79EA2eA88` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0xbF94192c652183c0f50056417f4D04810329f12c` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x332694Ef46D880DF6Ea9593e04CB8ABEE5F81D99` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x4eFcd8bcE8AC9b94bd76648e2c85bEf6c40F3228` |
### Avalanche (Chain ID: 43114)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x0E800D8d2E8b4694610AEdc385Aa6D763492B106` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x4eff2d77D9fFbAeFB4b141A3e494c085b3FF4Cb5` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x9958317b80ee5f10457017d54c2484D722059157` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x5939ab16fDf1991B0EF603c639B6b501A7841fAB` |
### Base (Chain ID: 8453)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x774cB66e2B2dB59A9daF175e9b2B7A142E17EB94` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0xb21A277466e7dB6934556a1Ce12eb3F032815c8A` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x9958317b80ee5f10457017d54c2484D722059157` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x5939ab16fDf1991B0EF603c639B6b501A7841fAB` |
### HyperEVM (Chain ID: 999)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0xf4743D026f3D07aF3747bb7d05BeD06D177241d7` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x0b11209B8c5E821b18dED147583b8978c3E63911` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0xBcA68cb9B794A4fb84855e003e4cF591F80A3Dc9` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x45fB5aF0a1aD80Ea16C803146eb81844D9972373` |
### Plasma (Chain ID: 9745)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0xD961E30156C2E0D0d925A0De45f931CB7815e970` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x86e67E115f96DF37239E0479441303De0de7bc2b` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x891EC9B34829276a9a8ef2F8A9cEAF2486017e0d` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x774cB66e2B2dB59A9daF175e9b2B7A142E17EB94` |
### Monad (Chain ID: 143)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x1311Fbc9F60359639174c1e7cC2032DbDb5Cc4d1` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0xaD89051bEd8d96f045E8912aE1672c6C0bF8a85E` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x4BB42f71CAB7Bd13e9f958dA4351B9fa2d3A42FF` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0xbC169a08cBdCDb218d91Cd945D29B59F78c96B77` |
### XLayer (Chain ID: 196)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x1311Fbc9F60359639174c1e7cC2032DbDb5Cc4d1` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0xEB1eeaBF0126d813589C3D2CfeFFE410D9aE3863` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x86705Ee19c0509Ff68F1118C55ee2ebdE383D122` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0xEAedc32a51c510d35ebC11088fD5fF2b47aACF2E` |
## Technical Specification
For each factory on each network, the executing multisig (DAO multisig or Omnisig) performs a 3-step transaction pattern via the Authorizer:
1. **`grantRole(actionId, account)`** on the Authorizer -- grants the multisig the `disable()` role for the target factory
2. **`disable()`** on the factory -- permanently disables the factory, preventing new pool creation
3. **`revokeRole(actionId, account)`** on the Authorizer -- revokes the role so the multisig does not retain unnecessary permissions
Each network payload contains 12 transactions (4 factories x 3 steps).
### Executing Multisigs
| Network | Multisig | Address |
|---|---|---|
| Mainnet | DAO Multisig | `0x10A19e7eE7d7F8a52822f6817de8ea18204F2e4f` |
| Arbitrum | DAO Multisig | `0xaF23DC5983230E9eEAf93280e312e57539D098D0` |
| Optimism | DAO Multisig | `0x043f9687842771b3dF8852c1E9801DCAeED3f6bc` |
| Gnosis | DAO Multisig | `0x2a5AEcE0bb9EfFD7608213AE1745873385515c18` |
| Avalanche | DAO Multisig | `0x17b11FF13e2d7bAb2648182dFD1f1cfa0E4C7cf3` |
| Base | DAO Multisig | `0xC40DCFB13651e64C8551007aa57F9260827B6462` |
| HyperEVM, Plasma, Monad, XLayer | Omnisig | `0x9ff471F9f98F42E5151C7855fD1b5aa906b1AF7e` |
### Authorizer Addresses
| Network | Authorizer |
|---|---|
| Mainnet, Arbitrum, Optimism, Gnosis, Avalanche | `0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6` |
| Base | `0x809B79b53F18E9bc08A961ED4678B901aC93213a` |
| HyperEVM | `0x85a80afee867aDf27B50BdB7b76DA70f1E853062` |
| Plasma, Monad, XLayer | `0xE39B5e3B6D74016b2F6A9673D7d7493B6DF549d5` |
### V2 Action IDs (disable())
V1 action IDs can be looked up from the [balancer-deployments action-ids](https://github.com/balancer/balancer-deployments/tree/master/action-ids). The overwritten v2 factory action IDs are no longer in the repo and were queried on-chain via `getActionId(bytes4)`:
| Network | WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | StableLPOracleFactory v2 |
|---|---|---|
| Mainnet | `0xaad0e51c18069fb241bf8179dc6c7d583e506dd672ef9a85ef122dd000deba76` | `0xb3c9c0ec52436494a8f6527a835a3442d43fb2d4268c638d9e8f670a5546afe8` |
| Arbitrum | `0x32cfd519f4e04a2d3b88e1e667811368433ec3da01605dbc26d85a8d54dc834b` | `0x249bc3c0021e108ccf28b9f7934b423928be80b8c823bab8254edba17b359ea4` |
| Optimism | `0x92b93830f0497ce935614ceb53508d12d772244a34a0bbbeab832a4c824f0b90` | `0xfc212a18b66df1a184af12c3a698e2f1b55a002fa96e4ad2e37ddd708f99723a` |
| Gnosis | `0x5a2389555953f58e8746cb8c3171904d268fce2d55fa1aac3f20343ccd04cb0b` | `0x315b841cfaf795ea83cbe267847195f6fdba4a7a9f5ed870c28d9e4d4b145e28` |
| Avalanche | `0x0f19a8e265e66504de04b28811bb8fba950087dc6ab21a23e5d757937d4c38c8` | `0xd6ef2cdea6236fe8b350fe1371523aade37cb3ec44de40e46a13ac44ab467e9e` |
| Base | `0x0f19a8e265e66504de04b28811bb8fba950087dc6ab21a23e5d757937d4c38c8` | `0xd6ef2cdea6236fe8b350fe1371523aade37cb3ec44de40e46a13ac44ab467e9e` |
| HyperEVM | `0x6ccb8983444db720b828ab14455ffd0d3d219cfd63180ee7e384e218810ef779` | `0xd9ad8a66a0dd971dc6fe438297bcae5d731b41bacd8c65809e765141d1986bdb` |
| Plasma | `0x7576f83c39a4f75ece8e6da99676712301067f196442916c688500f9320af5fb` | `0x416d92d817cb23a3d644810c79c3e5d9cd991b729c260819b570abd632e3a90a` |
| Monad | `0x2cb59d35a7a1b89d4ca6e466034d4d7bba7efe0e0dbb3bbe125e78def0cbdac1` | `0xe52f27de16ccc09f36da9a1dc8bbb043041a422d6430226a1e148560fa23c165` |
| XLayer | `0xaa602686217d84795dac828d7e9c133b7507febe7d68d7f642b1e3b506ce3309` | `0x34f66ef5706b2abf916d3f719040884c962d3a419b90ec8af8fb2c1f6ea4e313` | | 0x412325b9f8fb3ecbf696cc0e28f2f21c5dc9263453c6e02d7b4ff91fc7931dfc | sdbal.eth | Stake DAO BAL | 1 | weighted | active | 1 | 1,773,298,443 | 2026-03-12 06:54:03 | 1,773,428,400 | 2026-03-13 19:00:00 | 1,773,687,600 | 2026-03-16 19:00:00 | 0xb4542526AfeE2FdA1D584213D1521272a398B42a |
[BIP-915] Grant Pool Creator Fee Permissions to Omni Multisig
## PR with Payloads
https://github.com/BalancerMaxis/multisig-ops/pull/2715
## Summary
This BIP proposes to grant Pool Creator Fee management permissions on the `ProtocolFeeController` (v2) to the Omni multisig (`0x9ff471F9f98F42E5151C7855fD1b5aa906b1AF7e`). This will enable the Omni multisig to set pool creator swap and yield fee percentages on behalf of pool creators across all supported chains.
## Motivation
Pool creator fees allow pool deployers to capture a portion of the swap and yield fees generated by their pools. Managing these fee percentages currently requires direct interaction with the `ProtocolFeeController` contract, which is permissioned through the Balancer Authorizer.
By granting these permissions to the Omni multisig, the controller of the Omni (currently MAXYZ) can efficiently manage pool creator fee configurations as part of routine pool operations, reducing turnaround time and operational overhead. All actions will continue to follow established governance processes and require multi-signature approval.
## Technical Specification
The following permissions will be granted on the `ProtocolFeeController` contract from the `20250214-v3-protocol-fee-controller-v2` deployment:
| Function | Description |
|----------|-------------|
| `setPoolCreatorSwapFeePercentage(address,uint256)` | Set the swap fee percentage allocated to the pool creator |
| `setPoolCreatorYieldFeePercentage(address,uint256)` | Set the yield fee percentage allocated to the pool creator |
### Execution Details
| Chain | Authorizer | Executing Multisig | Method |
|-------|------------|-------------------|--------|
| Mainnet | `0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6` | DAO Multisig (`0x10A19e7eE7d7F8a52822f6817de8ea18204F2e4f`) | DAO grants role to Omni |
| Gnosis | `0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6` | DAO Multisig (`0x2a5AEcE0bb9EfFD7608213AE1745873385515c18`) | DAO grants role to Omni |
| Arbitrum | `0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6` | DAO Multisig (`0xaF23DC5983230E9eEAf93280e312e57539D098D0`) | DAO grants role to Omni |
| Optimism | `0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6` | DAO Multisig (`0x043f9687842771b3dF8852c1E9801DCAeED3f6bc`) | DAO grants role to Omni |
| Avalanche | `0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6` | DAO Multisig (`0x17b11FF13e2d7bAb2648182dFD1f1cfa0E4C7cf3`) | DAO grants role to Omni |
| Base | `0x809B79b53F18E9bc08A961ED4678B901aC93213a` | DAO Multisig (`0xC40DCFB13651e64C8551007aa57F9260827B6462`) | DAO grants role to Omni |
| HyperEVM | `0x85a80afee867aDf27B50BdB7b76DA70f1E853062` | Omni (`0x9ff471F9f98F42E5151C7855fD1b5aa906b1AF7e`) | Omni grants role to self (admin) |
| XLayer | `0xE39B5e3B6D74016b2F6A9673D7d7493B6DF549d5` | Omni (`0x9ff471F9f98F42E5151C7855fD1b5aa906b1AF7e`) | Omni grants role to self (admin) |
| Monad | `0xE39B5e3B6D74016b2F6A9673D7d7493B6DF549d5` | Omni (`0x9ff471F9f98F42E5151C7855fD1b5aa906b1AF7e`) | Omni grants role to self (admin) |
| Plasma | `0xE39B5e3B6D74016b2F6A9673D7d7493B6DF549d5` | Omni (`0x9ff471F9f98F42E5151C7855fD1b5aa906b1AF7e`) | Omni grants role to self (admin) | | [BIP-915] Grant Pool Creator Fee Permissions to Omni Multisig | ## PR with Payloads
https://github.com/BalancerMaxis/multisig-ops/pull/2715
## Summary
This BIP proposes to grant Pool Creator Fee management permissions on the `ProtocolFeeController` (v2) to the Omni multisig (`0x9ff471F9f98F42E5151C7855fD1b5aa906b1AF7e`). This will enable the Omni multisig to set pool creator swap and yield fee percentages on behalf of pool creators across all supported chains.
## Motivation
Pool creator fees allow pool deployers to capture a portion of the swap and yield fees generated by their pools. Managing these fee percentages currently requires direct interaction with the `ProtocolFeeController` contract, which is permissioned through the Balancer Authorizer.
By granting these permissions to the Omni multisig, the controller of the Omni (currently MAXYZ) can efficiently manage pool creator fee configurations as part of routine pool operations, reducing turnaround time and operational overhead. All actions will continue to follow established governance processes and require multi-signature approval.
## Technical Specification
The following permissions will be granted on the `ProtocolFeeController` contract from the `20250214-v3-protocol-fee-controller-v2` deployment:
| Function | Description |
|----------|-------------|
| `setPoolCreatorSwapFeePercentage(address,uint256)` | Set the swap fee percentage allocated to the pool creator |
| `setPoolCreatorYieldFeePercentage(address,uint256)` | Set the yield fee percentage allocated to the pool creator |
### Execution Details
| Chain | Authorizer | Executing Multisig | Method |
|-------|------------|-------------------|--------|
| Mainnet | `0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6` | DAO Multisig (`0x10A19e7eE7d7F8a52822f6817de8ea18204F2e4f`) | DAO grants role to Omni |
| Gnosis | `0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6` | DAO Multisig (`0x2a5AEcE0bb9EfFD7608213AE1745873385515c18`) | DAO grants role to Omni |
| Arbitrum | `0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6` | DAO Multisig (`0xaF23DC5983230E9eEAf93280e312e57539D098D0`) | DAO grants role to Omni |
| Optimism | `0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6` | DAO Multisig (`0x043f9687842771b3dF8852c1E9801DCAeED3f6bc`) | DAO grants role to Omni |
| Avalanche | `0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6` | DAO Multisig (`0x17b11FF13e2d7bAb2648182dFD1f1cfa0E4C7cf3`) | DAO grants role to Omni |
| Base | `0x809B79b53F18E9bc08A961ED4678B901aC93213a` | DAO Multisig (`0xC40DCFB13651e64C8551007aa57F9260827B6462`) | DAO grants role to Omni |
| HyperEVM | `0x85a80afee867aDf27B50BdB7b76DA70f1E853062` | Omni (`0x9ff471F9f98F42E5151C7855fD1b5aa906b1AF7e`) | Omni grants role to self (admin) |
| XLayer | `0xE39B5e3B6D74016b2F6A9673D7d7493B6DF549d5` | Omni (`0x9ff471F9f98F42E5151C7855fD1b5aa906b1AF7e`) | Omni grants role to self (admin) |
| Monad | `0xE39B5e3B6D74016b2F6A9673D7d7493B6DF549d5` | Omni (`0x9ff471F9f98F42E5151C7855fD1b5aa906b1AF7e`) | Omni grants role to self (admin) |
| Plasma | `0xE39B5e3B6D74016b2F6A9673D7d7493B6DF549d5` | Omni (`0x9ff471F9f98F42E5151C7855fD1b5aa906b1AF7e`) | Omni grants role to self (admin) | | 0xa45a0e773fa8049d8f40c83928436af8a45b9f38f47c8cb1edbefa3a6b242685 | sdbal.eth | Stake DAO BAL | 1 | weighted | active | 1 | 1,773,298,441 | 2026-03-12 06:54:01 | 1,773,428,400 | 2026-03-13 19:00:00 | 1,773,687,600 | 2026-03-16 19:00:00 | 0xb4542526AfeE2FdA1D584213D1521272a398B42a |
[BIP-916] Set Network Remapping Manager for StakeDAO
## PR with Payload
https://github.com/BalancerMaxis/multisig-ops/pull/2724
## Motivation
StakeDAO is launching their OnlyBoost strategies, which optimally allocate boost between StakeDAO and Aura on sidechains (Base and Arbitrum initially). To enable cross-chain boost for their veBAL position, the StakeDAO multisig needs to be designated as the `NetworkRemappingManager` for their veBAL locker on the [VotingEscrowRemapper](https://etherscan.io/address/0x83e443ef4f9963c77bd860f94500075556668cb8) contract. This grants StakeDAO the ability to call `setNetworkRemapping`, allowing them to manage their own L2 boost addresses.
This follows the same procedure as [BIP-341](https://forum.balancer.fi/t/bip-341-enable-tetu-cross-chain-boost/5007), which enabled cross-chain boost for Tetu.
## Specification
The DAO Multisig `0x10A19e7eE7d7F8a52822f6817de8ea18204F2e4f` will execute a single transaction batch on **Ethereum mainnet**:
1. **Grant permission**: Call `grantRole` on the Authorizer (`0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6`) with:
- `role`: `0x6bb341db03eede206e544c654a59ef89eea83bc65fada2cfeeaf18c5c0f76ac0` — the action ID for `setNetworkRemappingManager` on the VotingEscrowRemapper ([verifiable here](https://github.com/balancer/balancer-deployments/blob/912cfaebda16d3b26a7bd931ce663ee8e44285f0/action-ids/mainnet/action-ids.json#L1340))
- `account`: `0x10A19e7eE7d7F8a52822f6817de8ea18204F2e4f` (DAO Multisig)
2. **Set remapping manager**: Call `setNetworkRemappingManager` on the VotingEscrowRemapper (`0x83E443EF4f9963C77bd860f94500075556668cb8`) with:
- `localUser`: `0xea79d1A83Da6DB43a85942767C389fE0ACf336A5` (StakeDAO veBAL locker)
- `delegate`: `0xB0552b6860CE5C0202976Db056b5e3Cc4f9CC765` (StakeDAO multisig)
3. **Revoke permission**: Call `revokeRole` on the Authorizer to remove the `setNetworkRemappingManager` permission from the DAO Multisig.
## Risk Assessment
Low risk. The permission is granted and revoked atomically within the same transaction batch, so the DAO Multisig never retains the elevated permission beyond execution. The `setNetworkRemappingManager` function only designates who can manage L2 boost remappings for a specific veBAL locker — it does not grant access to any funds. | [BIP-916] Set Network Remapping Manager for StakeDAO | ## PR with Payload
https://github.com/BalancerMaxis/multisig-ops/pull/2724
## Motivation
StakeDAO is launching their OnlyBoost strategies, which optimally allocate boost between StakeDAO and Aura on sidechains (Base and Arbitrum initially). To enable cross-chain boost for their veBAL position, the StakeDAO multisig needs to be designated as the `NetworkRemappingManager` for their veBAL locker on the [VotingEscrowRemapper](https://etherscan.io/address/0x83e443ef4f9963c77bd860f94500075556668cb8) contract. This grants StakeDAO the ability to call `setNetworkRemapping`, allowing them to manage their own L2 boost addresses.
This follows the same procedure as [BIP-341](https://forum.balancer.fi/t/bip-341-enable-tetu-cross-chain-boost/5007), which enabled cross-chain boost for Tetu.
## Specification
The DAO Multisig `0x10A19e7eE7d7F8a52822f6817de8ea18204F2e4f` will execute a single transaction batch on **Ethereum mainnet**:
1. **Grant permission**: Call `grantRole` on the Authorizer (`0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6`) with:
- `role`: `0x6bb341db03eede206e544c654a59ef89eea83bc65fada2cfeeaf18c5c0f76ac0` — the action ID for `setNetworkRemappingManager` on the VotingEscrowRemapper ([verifiable here](https://github.com/balancer/balancer-deployments/blob/912cfaebda16d3b26a7bd931ce663ee8e44285f0/action-ids/mainnet/action-ids.json#L1340))
- `account`: `0x10A19e7eE7d7F8a52822f6817de8ea18204F2e4f` (DAO Multisig)
2. **Set remapping manager**: Call `setNetworkRemappingManager` on the VotingEscrowRemapper (`0x83E443EF4f9963C77bd860f94500075556668cb8`) with:
- `localUser`: `0xea79d1A83Da6DB43a85942767C389fE0ACf336A5` (StakeDAO veBAL locker)
- `delegate`: `0xB0552b6860CE5C0202976Db056b5e3Cc4f9CC765` (StakeDAO multisig)
3. **Revoke permission**: Call `revokeRole` on the Authorizer to remove the `setNetworkRemappingManager` permission from the DAO Multisig.
## Risk Assessment
Low risk. The permission is granted and revoked atomically within the same transaction batch, so the DAO Multisig never retains the elevated permission beyond execution. The `setNetworkRemappingManager` function only designates who can manage L2 boost remappings for a specific veBAL locker — it does not grant access to any funds. | 0x39d85532af89f958217fd81066189fde71a7839ccbcc3ebd7dc37b86dd65df62 | aurafinance.eth | Aura Finance | 1 | weighted | active | 1 | 1,773,298,235 | 2026-03-12 06:50:35 | 1,773,428,400 | 2026-03-13 19:00:00 | 1,773,716,400 | 2026-03-17 03:00:00 | 0x021C5536bd60bCe9f15FB0E32746e332E3fbFAF4 |
[BIP-916] Set Network Remapping Manager for StakeDAO
## PR with Payload
https://github.com/BalancerMaxis/multisig-ops/pull/2724
## Motivation
StakeDAO is launching their OnlyBoost strategies, which optimally allocate boost between StakeDAO and Aura on sidechains (Base and Arbitrum initially). To enable cross-chain boost for their veBAL position, the StakeDAO multisig needs to be designated as the `NetworkRemappingManager` for their veBAL locker on the [VotingEscrowRemapper](https://etherscan.io/address/0x83e443ef4f9963c77bd860f94500075556668cb8) contract. This grants StakeDAO the ability to call `setNetworkRemapping`, allowing them to manage their own L2 boost addresses.
This follows the same procedure as [BIP-341](https://forum.balancer.fi/t/bip-341-enable-tetu-cross-chain-boost/5007), which enabled cross-chain boost for Tetu.
## Specification
The DAO Multisig `0x10A19e7eE7d7F8a52822f6817de8ea18204F2e4f` will execute a single transaction batch on **Ethereum mainnet**:
1. **Grant permission**: Call `grantRole` on the Authorizer (`0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6`) with:
- `role`: `0x6bb341db03eede206e544c654a59ef89eea83bc65fada2cfeeaf18c5c0f76ac0` — the action ID for `setNetworkRemappingManager` on the VotingEscrowRemapper ([verifiable here](https://github.com/balancer/balancer-deployments/blob/912cfaebda16d3b26a7bd931ce663ee8e44285f0/action-ids/mainnet/action-ids.json#L1340))
- `account`: `0x10A19e7eE7d7F8a52822f6817de8ea18204F2e4f` (DAO Multisig)
2. **Set remapping manager**: Call `setNetworkRemappingManager` on the VotingEscrowRemapper (`0x83E443EF4f9963C77bd860f94500075556668cb8`) with:
- `localUser`: `0xea79d1A83Da6DB43a85942767C389fE0ACf336A5` (StakeDAO veBAL locker)
- `delegate`: `0xB0552b6860CE5C0202976Db056b5e3Cc4f9CC765` (StakeDAO multisig)
3. **Revoke permission**: Call `revokeRole` on the Authorizer to remove the `setNetworkRemappingManager` permission from the DAO Multisig.
## Risk Assessment
Low risk. The permission is granted and revoked atomically within the same transaction batch, so the DAO Multisig never retains the elevated permission beyond execution. The `setNetworkRemappingManager` function only designates who can manage L2 boost remappings for a specific veBAL locker — it does not grant access to any funds. | [BIP-916] Set Network Remapping Manager for StakeDAO | ## PR with Payload
https://github.com/BalancerMaxis/multisig-ops/pull/2724
## Motivation
StakeDAO is launching their OnlyBoost strategies, which optimally allocate boost between StakeDAO and Aura on sidechains (Base and Arbitrum initially). To enable cross-chain boost for their veBAL position, the StakeDAO multisig needs to be designated as the `NetworkRemappingManager` for their veBAL locker on the [VotingEscrowRemapper](https://etherscan.io/address/0x83e443ef4f9963c77bd860f94500075556668cb8) contract. This grants StakeDAO the ability to call `setNetworkRemapping`, allowing them to manage their own L2 boost addresses.
This follows the same procedure as [BIP-341](https://forum.balancer.fi/t/bip-341-enable-tetu-cross-chain-boost/5007), which enabled cross-chain boost for Tetu.
## Specification
The DAO Multisig `0x10A19e7eE7d7F8a52822f6817de8ea18204F2e4f` will execute a single transaction batch on **Ethereum mainnet**:
1. **Grant permission**: Call `grantRole` on the Authorizer (`0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6`) with:
- `role`: `0x6bb341db03eede206e544c654a59ef89eea83bc65fada2cfeeaf18c5c0f76ac0` — the action ID for `setNetworkRemappingManager` on the VotingEscrowRemapper ([verifiable here](https://github.com/balancer/balancer-deployments/blob/912cfaebda16d3b26a7bd931ce663ee8e44285f0/action-ids/mainnet/action-ids.json#L1340))
- `account`: `0x10A19e7eE7d7F8a52822f6817de8ea18204F2e4f` (DAO Multisig)
2. **Set remapping manager**: Call `setNetworkRemappingManager` on the VotingEscrowRemapper (`0x83E443EF4f9963C77bd860f94500075556668cb8`) with:
- `localUser`: `0xea79d1A83Da6DB43a85942767C389fE0ACf336A5` (StakeDAO veBAL locker)
- `delegate`: `0xB0552b6860CE5C0202976Db056b5e3Cc4f9CC765` (StakeDAO multisig)
3. **Revoke permission**: Call `revokeRole` on the Authorizer to remove the `setNetworkRemappingManager` permission from the DAO Multisig.
## Risk Assessment
Low risk. The permission is granted and revoked atomically within the same transaction batch, so the DAO Multisig never retains the elevated permission beyond execution. The `setNetworkRemappingManager` function only designates who can manage L2 boost remappings for a specific veBAL locker — it does not grant access to any funds. | 0xf7f82dbf06343b6f3b77ddc029d6a295f15bbf6a9cae02a6d66e1a5f89746041 | balancer.eth | Balancer | 1 | weighted | active | 1 | 1,773,298,235 | 2026-03-12 06:50:35 | 1,773,428,400 | 2026-03-13 19:00:00 | 1,773,774,000 | 2026-03-17 19:00:00 | 0x58865c1B463Fd2772cD50EB50976A07FaE3Dc6F1 |
[BIP-915] Grant Pool Creator Fee Permissions to Omni Multisig
## PR with Payloads
https://github.com/BalancerMaxis/multisig-ops/pull/2715
## Summary
This BIP proposes to grant Pool Creator Fee management permissions on the `ProtocolFeeController` (v2) to the Omni multisig (`0x9ff471F9f98F42E5151C7855fD1b5aa906b1AF7e`). This will enable the Omni multisig to set pool creator swap and yield fee percentages on behalf of pool creators across all supported chains.
## Motivation
Pool creator fees allow pool deployers to capture a portion of the swap and yield fees generated by their pools. Managing these fee percentages currently requires direct interaction with the `ProtocolFeeController` contract, which is permissioned through the Balancer Authorizer.
By granting these permissions to the Omni multisig, the controller of the Omni (currently MAXYZ) can efficiently manage pool creator fee configurations as part of routine pool operations, reducing turnaround time and operational overhead. All actions will continue to follow established governance processes and require multi-signature approval.
## Technical Specification
The following permissions will be granted on the `ProtocolFeeController` contract from the `20250214-v3-protocol-fee-controller-v2` deployment:
| Function | Description |
|----------|-------------|
| `setPoolCreatorSwapFeePercentage(address,uint256)` | Set the swap fee percentage allocated to the pool creator |
| `setPoolCreatorYieldFeePercentage(address,uint256)` | Set the yield fee percentage allocated to the pool creator |
### Execution Details
| Chain | Authorizer | Executing Multisig | Method |
|-------|------------|-------------------|--------|
| Mainnet | `0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6` | DAO Multisig (`0x10A19e7eE7d7F8a52822f6817de8ea18204F2e4f`) | DAO grants role to Omni |
| Gnosis | `0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6` | DAO Multisig (`0x2a5AEcE0bb9EfFD7608213AE1745873385515c18`) | DAO grants role to Omni |
| Arbitrum | `0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6` | DAO Multisig (`0xaF23DC5983230E9eEAf93280e312e57539D098D0`) | DAO grants role to Omni |
| Optimism | `0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6` | DAO Multisig (`0x043f9687842771b3dF8852c1E9801DCAeED3f6bc`) | DAO grants role to Omni |
| Avalanche | `0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6` | DAO Multisig (`0x17b11FF13e2d7bAb2648182dFD1f1cfa0E4C7cf3`) | DAO grants role to Omni |
| Base | `0x809B79b53F18E9bc08A961ED4678B901aC93213a` | DAO Multisig (`0xC40DCFB13651e64C8551007aa57F9260827B6462`) | DAO grants role to Omni |
| HyperEVM | `0x85a80afee867aDf27B50BdB7b76DA70f1E853062` | Omni (`0x9ff471F9f98F42E5151C7855fD1b5aa906b1AF7e`) | Omni grants role to self (admin) |
| XLayer | `0xE39B5e3B6D74016b2F6A9673D7d7493B6DF549d5` | Omni (`0x9ff471F9f98F42E5151C7855fD1b5aa906b1AF7e`) | Omni grants role to self (admin) |
| Monad | `0xE39B5e3B6D74016b2F6A9673D7d7493B6DF549d5` | Omni (`0x9ff471F9f98F42E5151C7855fD1b5aa906b1AF7e`) | Omni grants role to self (admin) |
| Plasma | `0xE39B5e3B6D74016b2F6A9673D7d7493B6DF549d5` | Omni (`0x9ff471F9f98F42E5151C7855fD1b5aa906b1AF7e`) | Omni grants role to self (admin) | | [BIP-915] Grant Pool Creator Fee Permissions to Omni Multisig | ## PR with Payloads
https://github.com/BalancerMaxis/multisig-ops/pull/2715
## Summary
This BIP proposes to grant Pool Creator Fee management permissions on the `ProtocolFeeController` (v2) to the Omni multisig (`0x9ff471F9f98F42E5151C7855fD1b5aa906b1AF7e`). This will enable the Omni multisig to set pool creator swap and yield fee percentages on behalf of pool creators across all supported chains.
## Motivation
Pool creator fees allow pool deployers to capture a portion of the swap and yield fees generated by their pools. Managing these fee percentages currently requires direct interaction with the `ProtocolFeeController` contract, which is permissioned through the Balancer Authorizer.
By granting these permissions to the Omni multisig, the controller of the Omni (currently MAXYZ) can efficiently manage pool creator fee configurations as part of routine pool operations, reducing turnaround time and operational overhead. All actions will continue to follow established governance processes and require multi-signature approval.
## Technical Specification
The following permissions will be granted on the `ProtocolFeeController` contract from the `20250214-v3-protocol-fee-controller-v2` deployment:
| Function | Description |
|----------|-------------|
| `setPoolCreatorSwapFeePercentage(address,uint256)` | Set the swap fee percentage allocated to the pool creator |
| `setPoolCreatorYieldFeePercentage(address,uint256)` | Set the yield fee percentage allocated to the pool creator |
### Execution Details
| Chain | Authorizer | Executing Multisig | Method |
|-------|------------|-------------------|--------|
| Mainnet | `0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6` | DAO Multisig (`0x10A19e7eE7d7F8a52822f6817de8ea18204F2e4f`) | DAO grants role to Omni |
| Gnosis | `0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6` | DAO Multisig (`0x2a5AEcE0bb9EfFD7608213AE1745873385515c18`) | DAO grants role to Omni |
| Arbitrum | `0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6` | DAO Multisig (`0xaF23DC5983230E9eEAf93280e312e57539D098D0`) | DAO grants role to Omni |
| Optimism | `0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6` | DAO Multisig (`0x043f9687842771b3dF8852c1E9801DCAeED3f6bc`) | DAO grants role to Omni |
| Avalanche | `0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6` | DAO Multisig (`0x17b11FF13e2d7bAb2648182dFD1f1cfa0E4C7cf3`) | DAO grants role to Omni |
| Base | `0x809B79b53F18E9bc08A961ED4678B901aC93213a` | DAO Multisig (`0xC40DCFB13651e64C8551007aa57F9260827B6462`) | DAO grants role to Omni |
| HyperEVM | `0x85a80afee867aDf27B50BdB7b76DA70f1E853062` | Omni (`0x9ff471F9f98F42E5151C7855fD1b5aa906b1AF7e`) | Omni grants role to self (admin) |
| XLayer | `0xE39B5e3B6D74016b2F6A9673D7d7493B6DF549d5` | Omni (`0x9ff471F9f98F42E5151C7855fD1b5aa906b1AF7e`) | Omni grants role to self (admin) |
| Monad | `0xE39B5e3B6D74016b2F6A9673D7d7493B6DF549d5` | Omni (`0x9ff471F9f98F42E5151C7855fD1b5aa906b1AF7e`) | Omni grants role to self (admin) |
| Plasma | `0xE39B5e3B6D74016b2F6A9673D7d7493B6DF549d5` | Omni (`0x9ff471F9f98F42E5151C7855fD1b5aa906b1AF7e`) | Omni grants role to self (admin) | | 0x36c241ce74b7ea658c07c79885cbeffcec38f6721670e55bceac33be3017ba99 | balancer.eth | Balancer | 1 | weighted | active | 1 | 1,773,298,135 | 2026-03-12 06:48:55 | 1,773,428,400 | 2026-03-13 19:00:00 | 1,773,774,000 | 2026-03-17 19:00:00 | 0x58865c1B463Fd2772cD50EB50976A07FaE3Dc6F1 |
[BIP-915] Grant Pool Creator Fee Permissions to Omni Multisig
## PR with Payloads
https://github.com/BalancerMaxis/multisig-ops/pull/2715
## Summary
This BIP proposes to grant Pool Creator Fee management permissions on the `ProtocolFeeController` (v2) to the Omni multisig (`0x9ff471F9f98F42E5151C7855fD1b5aa906b1AF7e`). This will enable the Omni multisig to set pool creator swap and yield fee percentages on behalf of pool creators across all supported chains.
## Motivation
Pool creator fees allow pool deployers to capture a portion of the swap and yield fees generated by their pools. Managing these fee percentages currently requires direct interaction with the `ProtocolFeeController` contract, which is permissioned through the Balancer Authorizer.
By granting these permissions to the Omni multisig, the controller of the Omni (currently MAXYZ) can efficiently manage pool creator fee configurations as part of routine pool operations, reducing turnaround time and operational overhead. All actions will continue to follow established governance processes and require multi-signature approval.
## Technical Specification
The following permissions will be granted on the `ProtocolFeeController` contract from the `20250214-v3-protocol-fee-controller-v2` deployment:
| Function | Description |
|----------|-------------|
| `setPoolCreatorSwapFeePercentage(address,uint256)` | Set the swap fee percentage allocated to the pool creator |
| `setPoolCreatorYieldFeePercentage(address,uint256)` | Set the yield fee percentage allocated to the pool creator |
### Execution Details
| Chain | Authorizer | Executing Multisig | Method |
|-------|------------|-------------------|--------|
| Mainnet | `0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6` | DAO Multisig (`0x10A19e7eE7d7F8a52822f6817de8ea18204F2e4f`) | DAO grants role to Omni |
| Gnosis | `0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6` | DAO Multisig (`0x2a5AEcE0bb9EfFD7608213AE1745873385515c18`) | DAO grants role to Omni |
| Arbitrum | `0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6` | DAO Multisig (`0xaF23DC5983230E9eEAf93280e312e57539D098D0`) | DAO grants role to Omni |
| Optimism | `0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6` | DAO Multisig (`0x043f9687842771b3dF8852c1E9801DCAeED3f6bc`) | DAO grants role to Omni |
| Avalanche | `0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6` | DAO Multisig (`0x17b11FF13e2d7bAb2648182dFD1f1cfa0E4C7cf3`) | DAO grants role to Omni |
| Base | `0x809B79b53F18E9bc08A961ED4678B901aC93213a` | DAO Multisig (`0xC40DCFB13651e64C8551007aa57F9260827B6462`) | DAO grants role to Omni |
| HyperEVM | `0x85a80afee867aDf27B50BdB7b76DA70f1E853062` | Omni (`0x9ff471F9f98F42E5151C7855fD1b5aa906b1AF7e`) | Omni grants role to self (admin) |
| XLayer | `0xE39B5e3B6D74016b2F6A9673D7d7493B6DF549d5` | Omni (`0x9ff471F9f98F42E5151C7855fD1b5aa906b1AF7e`) | Omni grants role to self (admin) |
| Monad | `0xE39B5e3B6D74016b2F6A9673D7d7493B6DF549d5` | Omni (`0x9ff471F9f98F42E5151C7855fD1b5aa906b1AF7e`) | Omni grants role to self (admin) |
| Plasma | `0xE39B5e3B6D74016b2F6A9673D7d7493B6DF549d5` | Omni (`0x9ff471F9f98F42E5151C7855fD1b5aa906b1AF7e`) | Omni grants role to self (admin) | | [BIP-915] Grant Pool Creator Fee Permissions to Omni Multisig | ## PR with Payloads
https://github.com/BalancerMaxis/multisig-ops/pull/2715
## Summary
This BIP proposes to grant Pool Creator Fee management permissions on the `ProtocolFeeController` (v2) to the Omni multisig (`0x9ff471F9f98F42E5151C7855fD1b5aa906b1AF7e`). This will enable the Omni multisig to set pool creator swap and yield fee percentages on behalf of pool creators across all supported chains.
## Motivation
Pool creator fees allow pool deployers to capture a portion of the swap and yield fees generated by their pools. Managing these fee percentages currently requires direct interaction with the `ProtocolFeeController` contract, which is permissioned through the Balancer Authorizer.
By granting these permissions to the Omni multisig, the controller of the Omni (currently MAXYZ) can efficiently manage pool creator fee configurations as part of routine pool operations, reducing turnaround time and operational overhead. All actions will continue to follow established governance processes and require multi-signature approval.
## Technical Specification
The following permissions will be granted on the `ProtocolFeeController` contract from the `20250214-v3-protocol-fee-controller-v2` deployment:
| Function | Description |
|----------|-------------|
| `setPoolCreatorSwapFeePercentage(address,uint256)` | Set the swap fee percentage allocated to the pool creator |
| `setPoolCreatorYieldFeePercentage(address,uint256)` | Set the yield fee percentage allocated to the pool creator |
### Execution Details
| Chain | Authorizer | Executing Multisig | Method |
|-------|------------|-------------------|--------|
| Mainnet | `0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6` | DAO Multisig (`0x10A19e7eE7d7F8a52822f6817de8ea18204F2e4f`) | DAO grants role to Omni |
| Gnosis | `0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6` | DAO Multisig (`0x2a5AEcE0bb9EfFD7608213AE1745873385515c18`) | DAO grants role to Omni |
| Arbitrum | `0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6` | DAO Multisig (`0xaF23DC5983230E9eEAf93280e312e57539D098D0`) | DAO grants role to Omni |
| Optimism | `0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6` | DAO Multisig (`0x043f9687842771b3dF8852c1E9801DCAeED3f6bc`) | DAO grants role to Omni |
| Avalanche | `0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6` | DAO Multisig (`0x17b11FF13e2d7bAb2648182dFD1f1cfa0E4C7cf3`) | DAO grants role to Omni |
| Base | `0x809B79b53F18E9bc08A961ED4678B901aC93213a` | DAO Multisig (`0xC40DCFB13651e64C8551007aa57F9260827B6462`) | DAO grants role to Omni |
| HyperEVM | `0x85a80afee867aDf27B50BdB7b76DA70f1E853062` | Omni (`0x9ff471F9f98F42E5151C7855fD1b5aa906b1AF7e`) | Omni grants role to self (admin) |
| XLayer | `0xE39B5e3B6D74016b2F6A9673D7d7493B6DF549d5` | Omni (`0x9ff471F9f98F42E5151C7855fD1b5aa906b1AF7e`) | Omni grants role to self (admin) |
| Monad | `0xE39B5e3B6D74016b2F6A9673D7d7493B6DF549d5` | Omni (`0x9ff471F9f98F42E5151C7855fD1b5aa906b1AF7e`) | Omni grants role to self (admin) |
| Plasma | `0xE39B5e3B6D74016b2F6A9673D7d7493B6DF549d5` | Omni (`0x9ff471F9f98F42E5151C7855fD1b5aa906b1AF7e`) | Omni grants role to self (admin) | | 0x0a222224af053165a9cc180a6d66a4e7e8dcdab8f07cce5e8eb7745e3f00e2ae | aurafinance.eth | Aura Finance | 1 | weighted | active | 1 | 1,773,298,135 | 2026-03-12 06:48:55 | 1,773,428,400 | 2026-03-13 19:00:00 | 1,773,716,400 | 2026-03-17 03:00:00 | 0x021C5536bd60bCe9f15FB0E32746e332E3fbFAF4 |
[BIP-914] Disable Outdated Oracle LP Pool Factories (v1 and v2)
## PR with Payloads
https://github.com/BalancerMaxis/multisig-ops/pull/2714
## Summary
This proposal requests the DAO multisig (and the Omnisig on newer chains) to disable outdated Oracle LP Pool Factories across all networks where they are deployed. This includes both the v1 (deprecated) and the original v2 (overwritten) versions of the `WeightedLPOracleFactory` and `StableLPOracleFactory` contracts.
## Motivation
As requested by BLabs, all outdated Oracle Pool Factories for v1 need to be disabled. The original v2 factories were never fully rolled out and have since been overwritten with updated deployments following Certora audit suggestions. While the old v2 contracts are no longer listed in the deployments repo, they still exist on-chain and should be disabled for completeness.
All factory addresses referenced in this BIP correspond to [commit `9a29caf`](https://github.com/balancer/balancer-deployments/blob/9a29caf63cc6bfad564a84e33e8f912c180054b9/addresses/mainnet.json) of `balancer-deployments`, which is the last commit before the v2 overwrite.
On Mainnet, Arbitrum, Optimism, Gnosis, Avalanche, and Base, these payloads must go through the DAO multisig because the `disable()` permissions for these factories were never granted to any operator or the Omnisig. On HyperEVM, Plasma, Monad, and XLayer, the Omnisig (`0x9ff471F9f98F42E5151C7855fD1b5aa906b1AF7e`) can grant roles to itself, disable, and revoke.
## Factories to Disable
### V1 Factories (Deprecated)
| Deployment Task | Contract |
|---|---|
| [`20250814-v3-weighted-pool-oracle`](https://github.com/balancer/balancer-deployments/blob/master/tasks/20250814-v3-weighted-pool-oracle) | `WeightedLPOracleFactory` |
| [`20250815-v3-stable-pool-oracle`](https://github.com/balancer/balancer-deployments/blob/master/tasks/20250815-v3-stable-pool-oracle) | `StableLPOracleFactory` |
### V2 Factories (Overwritten, no longer in deployments repo)
| Deployment Task | Contract |
|---|---|
| [`20260202-v3-weighted-pool-oracle-v2`](https://github.com/balancer/balancer-deployments/blob/9a29caf63cc6bfad564a84e33e8f912c180054b9/addresses/mainnet.json#L2064) | `WeightedLPOracleFactory` |
| [`20260203-v3-stable-pool-oracle-v2`](https://github.com/balancer/balancer-deployments/blob/9a29caf63cc6bfad564a84e33e8f912c180054b9/addresses/mainnet.json#L2078) | `StableLPOracleFactory` |
## Affected Networks and Factory Addresses
### Mainnet (Chain ID: 1)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x05503B3aDE04aCA81c8D6F88eCB73Ba156982D2B` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x83bf399FA3DC49Af8fb5c34031a50c7C93F56129` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0xDd10aDF05379D7C0Ee4bC9c72ecc5C01c40E25b8` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x99f2D91EBA577e4Bf7175E72B3Ef2B6dDb1FaBe3` |
### Arbitrum (Chain ID: 42161)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x7f4C133e44381D05129F9B81bAD8Fa9F3345D29B` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x816e90DC85bF016455017a76Bc09CC0451Eeb308` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0xA9AEeB57Efe61338C0d07f3e5Bb82519C4Ad1103` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0xa59F164d6cf6ee5d63580C0bcEA5CCB2e50b908c` |
### Optimism (Chain ID: 10)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x6eE18fbb1BBcC5CF700cD75ea1aef2bb21e3cB3F` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0xb96524227c4B5Ab908FC3d42005FE3B07abA40E9` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0xEB2BB012869255f8C622563Dc4C3AFA8619fe804` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0xC4c4940DC7c57DF46d3A217647dB1649721Cf468` |
### Gnosis (Chain ID: 100)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x8A8B9f35765899B3a0291700141470D79EA2eA88` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0xbF94192c652183c0f50056417f4D04810329f12c` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x332694Ef46D880DF6Ea9593e04CB8ABEE5F81D99` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x4eFcd8bcE8AC9b94bd76648e2c85bEf6c40F3228` |
### Avalanche (Chain ID: 43114)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x0E800D8d2E8b4694610AEdc385Aa6D763492B106` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x4eff2d77D9fFbAeFB4b141A3e494c085b3FF4Cb5` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x9958317b80ee5f10457017d54c2484D722059157` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x5939ab16fDf1991B0EF603c639B6b501A7841fAB` |
### Base (Chain ID: 8453)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x774cB66e2B2dB59A9daF175e9b2B7A142E17EB94` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0xb21A277466e7dB6934556a1Ce12eb3F032815c8A` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x9958317b80ee5f10457017d54c2484D722059157` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x5939ab16fDf1991B0EF603c639B6b501A7841fAB` |
### HyperEVM (Chain ID: 999)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0xf4743D026f3D07aF3747bb7d05BeD06D177241d7` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x0b11209B8c5E821b18dED147583b8978c3E63911` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0xBcA68cb9B794A4fb84855e003e4cF591F80A3Dc9` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x45fB5aF0a1aD80Ea16C803146eb81844D9972373` |
### Plasma (Chain ID: 9745)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0xD961E30156C2E0D0d925A0De45f931CB7815e970` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x86e67E115f96DF37239E0479441303De0de7bc2b` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x891EC9B34829276a9a8ef2F8A9cEAF2486017e0d` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x774cB66e2B2dB59A9daF175e9b2B7A142E17EB94` |
### Monad (Chain ID: 143)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x1311Fbc9F60359639174c1e7cC2032DbDb5Cc4d1` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0xaD89051bEd8d96f045E8912aE1672c6C0bF8a85E` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x4BB42f71CAB7Bd13e9f958dA4351B9fa2d3A42FF` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0xbC169a08cBdCDb218d91Cd945D29B59F78c96B77` |
### XLayer (Chain ID: 196)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x1311Fbc9F60359639174c1e7cC2032DbDb5Cc4d1` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0xEB1eeaBF0126d813589C3D2CfeFFE410D9aE3863` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x86705Ee19c0509Ff68F1118C55ee2ebdE383D122` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0xEAedc32a51c510d35ebC11088fD5fF2b47aACF2E` |
## Technical Specification
For each factory on each network, the executing multisig (DAO multisig or Omnisig) performs a 3-step transaction pattern via the Authorizer:
1. **`grantRole(actionId, account)`** on the Authorizer -- grants the multisig the `disable()` role for the target factory
2. **`disable()`** on the factory -- permanently disables the factory, preventing new pool creation
3. **`revokeRole(actionId, account)`** on the Authorizer -- revokes the role so the multisig does not retain unnecessary permissions
Each network payload contains 12 transactions (4 factories x 3 steps).
### Executing Multisigs
| Network | Multisig | Address |
|---|---|---|
| Mainnet | DAO Multisig | `0x10A19e7eE7d7F8a52822f6817de8ea18204F2e4f` |
| Arbitrum | DAO Multisig | `0xaF23DC5983230E9eEAf93280e312e57539D098D0` |
| Optimism | DAO Multisig | `0x043f9687842771b3dF8852c1E9801DCAeED3f6bc` |
| Gnosis | DAO Multisig | `0x2a5AEcE0bb9EfFD7608213AE1745873385515c18` |
| Avalanche | DAO Multisig | `0x17b11FF13e2d7bAb2648182dFD1f1cfa0E4C7cf3` |
| Base | DAO Multisig | `0xC40DCFB13651e64C8551007aa57F9260827B6462` |
| HyperEVM, Plasma, Monad, XLayer | Omnisig | `0x9ff471F9f98F42E5151C7855fD1b5aa906b1AF7e` |
### Authorizer Addresses
| Network | Authorizer |
|---|---|
| Mainnet, Arbitrum, Optimism, Gnosis, Avalanche | `0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6` |
| Base | `0x809B79b53F18E9bc08A961ED4678B901aC93213a` |
| HyperEVM | `0x85a80afee867aDf27B50BdB7b76DA70f1E853062` |
| Plasma, Monad, XLayer | `0xE39B5e3B6D74016b2F6A9673D7d7493B6DF549d5` |
### V2 Action IDs (disable())
V1 action IDs can be looked up from the [balancer-deployments action-ids](https://github.com/balancer/balancer-deployments/tree/master/action-ids). The overwritten v2 factory action IDs are no longer in the repo and were queried on-chain via `getActionId(bytes4)`:
| Network | WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | StableLPOracleFactory v2 |
|---|---|---|
| Mainnet | `0xaad0e51c18069fb241bf8179dc6c7d583e506dd672ef9a85ef122dd000deba76` | `0xb3c9c0ec52436494a8f6527a835a3442d43fb2d4268c638d9e8f670a5546afe8` |
| Arbitrum | `0x32cfd519f4e04a2d3b88e1e667811368433ec3da01605dbc26d85a8d54dc834b` | `0x249bc3c0021e108ccf28b9f7934b423928be80b8c823bab8254edba17b359ea4` |
| Optimism | `0x92b93830f0497ce935614ceb53508d12d772244a34a0bbbeab832a4c824f0b90` | `0xfc212a18b66df1a184af12c3a698e2f1b55a002fa96e4ad2e37ddd708f99723a` |
| Gnosis | `0x5a2389555953f58e8746cb8c3171904d268fce2d55fa1aac3f20343ccd04cb0b` | `0x315b841cfaf795ea83cbe267847195f6fdba4a7a9f5ed870c28d9e4d4b145e28` |
| Avalanche | `0x0f19a8e265e66504de04b28811bb8fba950087dc6ab21a23e5d757937d4c38c8` | `0xd6ef2cdea6236fe8b350fe1371523aade37cb3ec44de40e46a13ac44ab467e9e` |
| Base | `0x0f19a8e265e66504de04b28811bb8fba950087dc6ab21a23e5d757937d4c38c8` | `0xd6ef2cdea6236fe8b350fe1371523aade37cb3ec44de40e46a13ac44ab467e9e` |
| HyperEVM | `0x6ccb8983444db720b828ab14455ffd0d3d219cfd63180ee7e384e218810ef779` | `0xd9ad8a66a0dd971dc6fe438297bcae5d731b41bacd8c65809e765141d1986bdb` |
| Plasma | `0x7576f83c39a4f75ece8e6da99676712301067f196442916c688500f9320af5fb` | `0x416d92d817cb23a3d644810c79c3e5d9cd991b729c260819b570abd632e3a90a` |
| Monad | `0x2cb59d35a7a1b89d4ca6e466034d4d7bba7efe0e0dbb3bbe125e78def0cbdac1` | `0xe52f27de16ccc09f36da9a1dc8bbb043041a422d6430226a1e148560fa23c165` |
| XLayer | `0xaa602686217d84795dac828d7e9c133b7507febe7d68d7f642b1e3b506ce3309` | `0x34f66ef5706b2abf916d3f719040884c962d3a419b90ec8af8fb2c1f6ea4e313` | | [BIP-914] Disable Outdated Oracle LP Pool Factories (v1 and v2) | ## PR with Payloads
https://github.com/BalancerMaxis/multisig-ops/pull/2714
## Summary
This proposal requests the DAO multisig (and the Omnisig on newer chains) to disable outdated Oracle LP Pool Factories across all networks where they are deployed. This includes both the v1 (deprecated) and the original v2 (overwritten) versions of the `WeightedLPOracleFactory` and `StableLPOracleFactory` contracts.
## Motivation
As requested by BLabs, all outdated Oracle Pool Factories for v1 need to be disabled. The original v2 factories were never fully rolled out and have since been overwritten with updated deployments following Certora audit suggestions. While the old v2 contracts are no longer listed in the deployments repo, they still exist on-chain and should be disabled for completeness.
All factory addresses referenced in this BIP correspond to [commit `9a29caf`](https://github.com/balancer/balancer-deployments/blob/9a29caf63cc6bfad564a84e33e8f912c180054b9/addresses/mainnet.json) of `balancer-deployments`, which is the last commit before the v2 overwrite.
On Mainnet, Arbitrum, Optimism, Gnosis, Avalanche, and Base, these payloads must go through the DAO multisig because the `disable()` permissions for these factories were never granted to any operator or the Omnisig. On HyperEVM, Plasma, Monad, and XLayer, the Omnisig (`0x9ff471F9f98F42E5151C7855fD1b5aa906b1AF7e`) can grant roles to itself, disable, and revoke.
## Factories to Disable
### V1 Factories (Deprecated)
| Deployment Task | Contract |
|---|---|
| [`20250814-v3-weighted-pool-oracle`](https://github.com/balancer/balancer-deployments/blob/master/tasks/20250814-v3-weighted-pool-oracle) | `WeightedLPOracleFactory` |
| [`20250815-v3-stable-pool-oracle`](https://github.com/balancer/balancer-deployments/blob/master/tasks/20250815-v3-stable-pool-oracle) | `StableLPOracleFactory` |
### V2 Factories (Overwritten, no longer in deployments repo)
| Deployment Task | Contract |
|---|---|
| [`20260202-v3-weighted-pool-oracle-v2`](https://github.com/balancer/balancer-deployments/blob/9a29caf63cc6bfad564a84e33e8f912c180054b9/addresses/mainnet.json#L2064) | `WeightedLPOracleFactory` |
| [`20260203-v3-stable-pool-oracle-v2`](https://github.com/balancer/balancer-deployments/blob/9a29caf63cc6bfad564a84e33e8f912c180054b9/addresses/mainnet.json#L2078) | `StableLPOracleFactory` |
## Affected Networks and Factory Addresses
### Mainnet (Chain ID: 1)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x05503B3aDE04aCA81c8D6F88eCB73Ba156982D2B` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x83bf399FA3DC49Af8fb5c34031a50c7C93F56129` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0xDd10aDF05379D7C0Ee4bC9c72ecc5C01c40E25b8` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x99f2D91EBA577e4Bf7175E72B3Ef2B6dDb1FaBe3` |
### Arbitrum (Chain ID: 42161)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x7f4C133e44381D05129F9B81bAD8Fa9F3345D29B` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x816e90DC85bF016455017a76Bc09CC0451Eeb308` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0xA9AEeB57Efe61338C0d07f3e5Bb82519C4Ad1103` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0xa59F164d6cf6ee5d63580C0bcEA5CCB2e50b908c` |
### Optimism (Chain ID: 10)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x6eE18fbb1BBcC5CF700cD75ea1aef2bb21e3cB3F` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0xb96524227c4B5Ab908FC3d42005FE3B07abA40E9` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0xEB2BB012869255f8C622563Dc4C3AFA8619fe804` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0xC4c4940DC7c57DF46d3A217647dB1649721Cf468` |
### Gnosis (Chain ID: 100)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x8A8B9f35765899B3a0291700141470D79EA2eA88` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0xbF94192c652183c0f50056417f4D04810329f12c` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x332694Ef46D880DF6Ea9593e04CB8ABEE5F81D99` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x4eFcd8bcE8AC9b94bd76648e2c85bEf6c40F3228` |
### Avalanche (Chain ID: 43114)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x0E800D8d2E8b4694610AEdc385Aa6D763492B106` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x4eff2d77D9fFbAeFB4b141A3e494c085b3FF4Cb5` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x9958317b80ee5f10457017d54c2484D722059157` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x5939ab16fDf1991B0EF603c639B6b501A7841fAB` |
### Base (Chain ID: 8453)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x774cB66e2B2dB59A9daF175e9b2B7A142E17EB94` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0xb21A277466e7dB6934556a1Ce12eb3F032815c8A` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x9958317b80ee5f10457017d54c2484D722059157` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x5939ab16fDf1991B0EF603c639B6b501A7841fAB` |
### HyperEVM (Chain ID: 999)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0xf4743D026f3D07aF3747bb7d05BeD06D177241d7` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x0b11209B8c5E821b18dED147583b8978c3E63911` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0xBcA68cb9B794A4fb84855e003e4cF591F80A3Dc9` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x45fB5aF0a1aD80Ea16C803146eb81844D9972373` |
### Plasma (Chain ID: 9745)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0xD961E30156C2E0D0d925A0De45f931CB7815e970` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x86e67E115f96DF37239E0479441303De0de7bc2b` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x891EC9B34829276a9a8ef2F8A9cEAF2486017e0d` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x774cB66e2B2dB59A9daF175e9b2B7A142E17EB94` |
### Monad (Chain ID: 143)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x1311Fbc9F60359639174c1e7cC2032DbDb5Cc4d1` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0xaD89051bEd8d96f045E8912aE1672c6C0bF8a85E` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x4BB42f71CAB7Bd13e9f958dA4351B9fa2d3A42FF` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0xbC169a08cBdCDb218d91Cd945D29B59F78c96B77` |
### XLayer (Chain ID: 196)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x1311Fbc9F60359639174c1e7cC2032DbDb5Cc4d1` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0xEB1eeaBF0126d813589C3D2CfeFFE410D9aE3863` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x86705Ee19c0509Ff68F1118C55ee2ebdE383D122` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0xEAedc32a51c510d35ebC11088fD5fF2b47aACF2E` |
## Technical Specification
For each factory on each network, the executing multisig (DAO multisig or Omnisig) performs a 3-step transaction pattern via the Authorizer:
1. **`grantRole(actionId, account)`** on the Authorizer -- grants the multisig the `disable()` role for the target factory
2. **`disable()`** on the factory -- permanently disables the factory, preventing new pool creation
3. **`revokeRole(actionId, account)`** on the Authorizer -- revokes the role so the multisig does not retain unnecessary permissions
Each network payload contains 12 transactions (4 factories x 3 steps).
### Executing Multisigs
| Network | Multisig | Address |
|---|---|---|
| Mainnet | DAO Multisig | `0x10A19e7eE7d7F8a52822f6817de8ea18204F2e4f` |
| Arbitrum | DAO Multisig | `0xaF23DC5983230E9eEAf93280e312e57539D098D0` |
| Optimism | DAO Multisig | `0x043f9687842771b3dF8852c1E9801DCAeED3f6bc` |
| Gnosis | DAO Multisig | `0x2a5AEcE0bb9EfFD7608213AE1745873385515c18` |
| Avalanche | DAO Multisig | `0x17b11FF13e2d7bAb2648182dFD1f1cfa0E4C7cf3` |
| Base | DAO Multisig | `0xC40DCFB13651e64C8551007aa57F9260827B6462` |
| HyperEVM, Plasma, Monad, XLayer | Omnisig | `0x9ff471F9f98F42E5151C7855fD1b5aa906b1AF7e` |
### Authorizer Addresses
| Network | Authorizer |
|---|---|
| Mainnet, Arbitrum, Optimism, Gnosis, Avalanche | `0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6` |
| Base | `0x809B79b53F18E9bc08A961ED4678B901aC93213a` |
| HyperEVM | `0x85a80afee867aDf27B50BdB7b76DA70f1E853062` |
| Plasma, Monad, XLayer | `0xE39B5e3B6D74016b2F6A9673D7d7493B6DF549d5` |
### V2 Action IDs (disable())
V1 action IDs can be looked up from the [balancer-deployments action-ids](https://github.com/balancer/balancer-deployments/tree/master/action-ids). The overwritten v2 factory action IDs are no longer in the repo and were queried on-chain via `getActionId(bytes4)`:
| Network | WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | StableLPOracleFactory v2 |
|---|---|---|
| Mainnet | `0xaad0e51c18069fb241bf8179dc6c7d583e506dd672ef9a85ef122dd000deba76` | `0xb3c9c0ec52436494a8f6527a835a3442d43fb2d4268c638d9e8f670a5546afe8` |
| Arbitrum | `0x32cfd519f4e04a2d3b88e1e667811368433ec3da01605dbc26d85a8d54dc834b` | `0x249bc3c0021e108ccf28b9f7934b423928be80b8c823bab8254edba17b359ea4` |
| Optimism | `0x92b93830f0497ce935614ceb53508d12d772244a34a0bbbeab832a4c824f0b90` | `0xfc212a18b66df1a184af12c3a698e2f1b55a002fa96e4ad2e37ddd708f99723a` |
| Gnosis | `0x5a2389555953f58e8746cb8c3171904d268fce2d55fa1aac3f20343ccd04cb0b` | `0x315b841cfaf795ea83cbe267847195f6fdba4a7a9f5ed870c28d9e4d4b145e28` |
| Avalanche | `0x0f19a8e265e66504de04b28811bb8fba950087dc6ab21a23e5d757937d4c38c8` | `0xd6ef2cdea6236fe8b350fe1371523aade37cb3ec44de40e46a13ac44ab467e9e` |
| Base | `0x0f19a8e265e66504de04b28811bb8fba950087dc6ab21a23e5d757937d4c38c8` | `0xd6ef2cdea6236fe8b350fe1371523aade37cb3ec44de40e46a13ac44ab467e9e` |
| HyperEVM | `0x6ccb8983444db720b828ab14455ffd0d3d219cfd63180ee7e384e218810ef779` | `0xd9ad8a66a0dd971dc6fe438297bcae5d731b41bacd8c65809e765141d1986bdb` |
| Plasma | `0x7576f83c39a4f75ece8e6da99676712301067f196442916c688500f9320af5fb` | `0x416d92d817cb23a3d644810c79c3e5d9cd991b729c260819b570abd632e3a90a` |
| Monad | `0x2cb59d35a7a1b89d4ca6e466034d4d7bba7efe0e0dbb3bbe125e78def0cbdac1` | `0xe52f27de16ccc09f36da9a1dc8bbb043041a422d6430226a1e148560fa23c165` |
| XLayer | `0xaa602686217d84795dac828d7e9c133b7507febe7d68d7f642b1e3b506ce3309` | `0x34f66ef5706b2abf916d3f719040884c962d3a419b90ec8af8fb2c1f6ea4e313` | | 0xd2b4fc9b1a046323ea4051add6fa61d1bdf1c9851b9fae5aa317e465ba4a15fd | balancer.eth | Balancer | 1 | weighted | active | 1 | 1,773,298,066 | 2026-03-12 06:47:46 | 1,773,428,400 | 2026-03-13 19:00:00 | 1,773,774,000 | 2026-03-17 19:00:00 | 0x58865c1B463Fd2772cD50EB50976A07FaE3Dc6F1 |
[BIP-914] Disable Outdated Oracle LP Pool Factories (v1 and v2)
## PR with Payloads
https://github.com/BalancerMaxis/multisig-ops/pull/2714
## Summary
This proposal requests the DAO multisig (and the Omnisig on newer chains) to disable outdated Oracle LP Pool Factories across all networks where they are deployed. This includes both the v1 (deprecated) and the original v2 (overwritten) versions of the `WeightedLPOracleFactory` and `StableLPOracleFactory` contracts.
## Motivation
As requested by BLabs, all outdated Oracle Pool Factories for v1 need to be disabled. The original v2 factories were never fully rolled out and have since been overwritten with updated deployments following Certora audit suggestions. While the old v2 contracts are no longer listed in the deployments repo, they still exist on-chain and should be disabled for completeness.
All factory addresses referenced in this BIP correspond to [commit `9a29caf`](https://github.com/balancer/balancer-deployments/blob/9a29caf63cc6bfad564a84e33e8f912c180054b9/addresses/mainnet.json) of `balancer-deployments`, which is the last commit before the v2 overwrite.
On Mainnet, Arbitrum, Optimism, Gnosis, Avalanche, and Base, these payloads must go through the DAO multisig because the `disable()` permissions for these factories were never granted to any operator or the Omnisig. On HyperEVM, Plasma, Monad, and XLayer, the Omnisig (`0x9ff471F9f98F42E5151C7855fD1b5aa906b1AF7e`) can grant roles to itself, disable, and revoke.
## Factories to Disable
### V1 Factories (Deprecated)
| Deployment Task | Contract |
|---|---|
| [`20250814-v3-weighted-pool-oracle`](https://github.com/balancer/balancer-deployments/blob/master/tasks/20250814-v3-weighted-pool-oracle) | `WeightedLPOracleFactory` |
| [`20250815-v3-stable-pool-oracle`](https://github.com/balancer/balancer-deployments/blob/master/tasks/20250815-v3-stable-pool-oracle) | `StableLPOracleFactory` |
### V2 Factories (Overwritten, no longer in deployments repo)
| Deployment Task | Contract |
|---|---|
| [`20260202-v3-weighted-pool-oracle-v2`](https://github.com/balancer/balancer-deployments/blob/9a29caf63cc6bfad564a84e33e8f912c180054b9/addresses/mainnet.json#L2064) | `WeightedLPOracleFactory` |
| [`20260203-v3-stable-pool-oracle-v2`](https://github.com/balancer/balancer-deployments/blob/9a29caf63cc6bfad564a84e33e8f912c180054b9/addresses/mainnet.json#L2078) | `StableLPOracleFactory` |
## Affected Networks and Factory Addresses
### Mainnet (Chain ID: 1)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x05503B3aDE04aCA81c8D6F88eCB73Ba156982D2B` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x83bf399FA3DC49Af8fb5c34031a50c7C93F56129` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0xDd10aDF05379D7C0Ee4bC9c72ecc5C01c40E25b8` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x99f2D91EBA577e4Bf7175E72B3Ef2B6dDb1FaBe3` |
### Arbitrum (Chain ID: 42161)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x7f4C133e44381D05129F9B81bAD8Fa9F3345D29B` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x816e90DC85bF016455017a76Bc09CC0451Eeb308` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0xA9AEeB57Efe61338C0d07f3e5Bb82519C4Ad1103` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0xa59F164d6cf6ee5d63580C0bcEA5CCB2e50b908c` |
### Optimism (Chain ID: 10)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x6eE18fbb1BBcC5CF700cD75ea1aef2bb21e3cB3F` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0xb96524227c4B5Ab908FC3d42005FE3B07abA40E9` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0xEB2BB012869255f8C622563Dc4C3AFA8619fe804` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0xC4c4940DC7c57DF46d3A217647dB1649721Cf468` |
### Gnosis (Chain ID: 100)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x8A8B9f35765899B3a0291700141470D79EA2eA88` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0xbF94192c652183c0f50056417f4D04810329f12c` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x332694Ef46D880DF6Ea9593e04CB8ABEE5F81D99` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x4eFcd8bcE8AC9b94bd76648e2c85bEf6c40F3228` |
### Avalanche (Chain ID: 43114)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x0E800D8d2E8b4694610AEdc385Aa6D763492B106` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x4eff2d77D9fFbAeFB4b141A3e494c085b3FF4Cb5` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x9958317b80ee5f10457017d54c2484D722059157` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x5939ab16fDf1991B0EF603c639B6b501A7841fAB` |
### Base (Chain ID: 8453)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x774cB66e2B2dB59A9daF175e9b2B7A142E17EB94` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0xb21A277466e7dB6934556a1Ce12eb3F032815c8A` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x9958317b80ee5f10457017d54c2484D722059157` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x5939ab16fDf1991B0EF603c639B6b501A7841fAB` |
### HyperEVM (Chain ID: 999)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0xf4743D026f3D07aF3747bb7d05BeD06D177241d7` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x0b11209B8c5E821b18dED147583b8978c3E63911` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0xBcA68cb9B794A4fb84855e003e4cF591F80A3Dc9` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x45fB5aF0a1aD80Ea16C803146eb81844D9972373` |
### Plasma (Chain ID: 9745)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0xD961E30156C2E0D0d925A0De45f931CB7815e970` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x86e67E115f96DF37239E0479441303De0de7bc2b` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x891EC9B34829276a9a8ef2F8A9cEAF2486017e0d` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x774cB66e2B2dB59A9daF175e9b2B7A142E17EB94` |
### Monad (Chain ID: 143)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x1311Fbc9F60359639174c1e7cC2032DbDb5Cc4d1` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0xaD89051bEd8d96f045E8912aE1672c6C0bF8a85E` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x4BB42f71CAB7Bd13e9f958dA4351B9fa2d3A42FF` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0xbC169a08cBdCDb218d91Cd945D29B59F78c96B77` |
### XLayer (Chain ID: 196)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x1311Fbc9F60359639174c1e7cC2032DbDb5Cc4d1` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0xEB1eeaBF0126d813589C3D2CfeFFE410D9aE3863` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x86705Ee19c0509Ff68F1118C55ee2ebdE383D122` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0xEAedc32a51c510d35ebC11088fD5fF2b47aACF2E` |
## Technical Specification
For each factory on each network, the executing multisig (DAO multisig or Omnisig) performs a 3-step transaction pattern via the Authorizer:
1. **`grantRole(actionId, account)`** on the Authorizer -- grants the multisig the `disable()` role for the target factory
2. **`disable()`** on the factory -- permanently disables the factory, preventing new pool creation
3. **`revokeRole(actionId, account)`** on the Authorizer -- revokes the role so the multisig does not retain unnecessary permissions
Each network payload contains 12 transactions (4 factories x 3 steps).
### Executing Multisigs
| Network | Multisig | Address |
|---|---|---|
| Mainnet | DAO Multisig | `0x10A19e7eE7d7F8a52822f6817de8ea18204F2e4f` |
| Arbitrum | DAO Multisig | `0xaF23DC5983230E9eEAf93280e312e57539D098D0` |
| Optimism | DAO Multisig | `0x043f9687842771b3dF8852c1E9801DCAeED3f6bc` |
| Gnosis | DAO Multisig | `0x2a5AEcE0bb9EfFD7608213AE1745873385515c18` |
| Avalanche | DAO Multisig | `0x17b11FF13e2d7bAb2648182dFD1f1cfa0E4C7cf3` |
| Base | DAO Multisig | `0xC40DCFB13651e64C8551007aa57F9260827B6462` |
| HyperEVM, Plasma, Monad, XLayer | Omnisig | `0x9ff471F9f98F42E5151C7855fD1b5aa906b1AF7e` |
### Authorizer Addresses
| Network | Authorizer |
|---|---|
| Mainnet, Arbitrum, Optimism, Gnosis, Avalanche | `0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6` |
| Base | `0x809B79b53F18E9bc08A961ED4678B901aC93213a` |
| HyperEVM | `0x85a80afee867aDf27B50BdB7b76DA70f1E853062` |
| Plasma, Monad, XLayer | `0xE39B5e3B6D74016b2F6A9673D7d7493B6DF549d5` |
### V2 Action IDs (disable())
V1 action IDs can be looked up from the [balancer-deployments action-ids](https://github.com/balancer/balancer-deployments/tree/master/action-ids). The overwritten v2 factory action IDs are no longer in the repo and were queried on-chain via `getActionId(bytes4)`:
| Network | WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | StableLPOracleFactory v2 |
|---|---|---|
| Mainnet | `0xaad0e51c18069fb241bf8179dc6c7d583e506dd672ef9a85ef122dd000deba76` | `0xb3c9c0ec52436494a8f6527a835a3442d43fb2d4268c638d9e8f670a5546afe8` |
| Arbitrum | `0x32cfd519f4e04a2d3b88e1e667811368433ec3da01605dbc26d85a8d54dc834b` | `0x249bc3c0021e108ccf28b9f7934b423928be80b8c823bab8254edba17b359ea4` |
| Optimism | `0x92b93830f0497ce935614ceb53508d12d772244a34a0bbbeab832a4c824f0b90` | `0xfc212a18b66df1a184af12c3a698e2f1b55a002fa96e4ad2e37ddd708f99723a` |
| Gnosis | `0x5a2389555953f58e8746cb8c3171904d268fce2d55fa1aac3f20343ccd04cb0b` | `0x315b841cfaf795ea83cbe267847195f6fdba4a7a9f5ed870c28d9e4d4b145e28` |
| Avalanche | `0x0f19a8e265e66504de04b28811bb8fba950087dc6ab21a23e5d757937d4c38c8` | `0xd6ef2cdea6236fe8b350fe1371523aade37cb3ec44de40e46a13ac44ab467e9e` |
| Base | `0x0f19a8e265e66504de04b28811bb8fba950087dc6ab21a23e5d757937d4c38c8` | `0xd6ef2cdea6236fe8b350fe1371523aade37cb3ec44de40e46a13ac44ab467e9e` |
| HyperEVM | `0x6ccb8983444db720b828ab14455ffd0d3d219cfd63180ee7e384e218810ef779` | `0xd9ad8a66a0dd971dc6fe438297bcae5d731b41bacd8c65809e765141d1986bdb` |
| Plasma | `0x7576f83c39a4f75ece8e6da99676712301067f196442916c688500f9320af5fb` | `0x416d92d817cb23a3d644810c79c3e5d9cd991b729c260819b570abd632e3a90a` |
| Monad | `0x2cb59d35a7a1b89d4ca6e466034d4d7bba7efe0e0dbb3bbe125e78def0cbdac1` | `0xe52f27de16ccc09f36da9a1dc8bbb043041a422d6430226a1e148560fa23c165` |
| XLayer | `0xaa602686217d84795dac828d7e9c133b7507febe7d68d7f642b1e3b506ce3309` | `0x34f66ef5706b2abf916d3f719040884c962d3a419b90ec8af8fb2c1f6ea4e313` | | [BIP-914] Disable Outdated Oracle LP Pool Factories (v1 and v2) | ## PR with Payloads
https://github.com/BalancerMaxis/multisig-ops/pull/2714
## Summary
This proposal requests the DAO multisig (and the Omnisig on newer chains) to disable outdated Oracle LP Pool Factories across all networks where they are deployed. This includes both the v1 (deprecated) and the original v2 (overwritten) versions of the `WeightedLPOracleFactory` and `StableLPOracleFactory` contracts.
## Motivation
As requested by BLabs, all outdated Oracle Pool Factories for v1 need to be disabled. The original v2 factories were never fully rolled out and have since been overwritten with updated deployments following Certora audit suggestions. While the old v2 contracts are no longer listed in the deployments repo, they still exist on-chain and should be disabled for completeness.
All factory addresses referenced in this BIP correspond to [commit `9a29caf`](https://github.com/balancer/balancer-deployments/blob/9a29caf63cc6bfad564a84e33e8f912c180054b9/addresses/mainnet.json) of `balancer-deployments`, which is the last commit before the v2 overwrite.
On Mainnet, Arbitrum, Optimism, Gnosis, Avalanche, and Base, these payloads must go through the DAO multisig because the `disable()` permissions for these factories were never granted to any operator or the Omnisig. On HyperEVM, Plasma, Monad, and XLayer, the Omnisig (`0x9ff471F9f98F42E5151C7855fD1b5aa906b1AF7e`) can grant roles to itself, disable, and revoke.
## Factories to Disable
### V1 Factories (Deprecated)
| Deployment Task | Contract |
|---|---|
| [`20250814-v3-weighted-pool-oracle`](https://github.com/balancer/balancer-deployments/blob/master/tasks/20250814-v3-weighted-pool-oracle) | `WeightedLPOracleFactory` |
| [`20250815-v3-stable-pool-oracle`](https://github.com/balancer/balancer-deployments/blob/master/tasks/20250815-v3-stable-pool-oracle) | `StableLPOracleFactory` |
### V2 Factories (Overwritten, no longer in deployments repo)
| Deployment Task | Contract |
|---|---|
| [`20260202-v3-weighted-pool-oracle-v2`](https://github.com/balancer/balancer-deployments/blob/9a29caf63cc6bfad564a84e33e8f912c180054b9/addresses/mainnet.json#L2064) | `WeightedLPOracleFactory` |
| [`20260203-v3-stable-pool-oracle-v2`](https://github.com/balancer/balancer-deployments/blob/9a29caf63cc6bfad564a84e33e8f912c180054b9/addresses/mainnet.json#L2078) | `StableLPOracleFactory` |
## Affected Networks and Factory Addresses
### Mainnet (Chain ID: 1)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x05503B3aDE04aCA81c8D6F88eCB73Ba156982D2B` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x83bf399FA3DC49Af8fb5c34031a50c7C93F56129` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0xDd10aDF05379D7C0Ee4bC9c72ecc5C01c40E25b8` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x99f2D91EBA577e4Bf7175E72B3Ef2B6dDb1FaBe3` |
### Arbitrum (Chain ID: 42161)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x7f4C133e44381D05129F9B81bAD8Fa9F3345D29B` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x816e90DC85bF016455017a76Bc09CC0451Eeb308` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0xA9AEeB57Efe61338C0d07f3e5Bb82519C4Ad1103` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0xa59F164d6cf6ee5d63580C0bcEA5CCB2e50b908c` |
### Optimism (Chain ID: 10)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x6eE18fbb1BBcC5CF700cD75ea1aef2bb21e3cB3F` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0xb96524227c4B5Ab908FC3d42005FE3B07abA40E9` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0xEB2BB012869255f8C622563Dc4C3AFA8619fe804` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0xC4c4940DC7c57DF46d3A217647dB1649721Cf468` |
### Gnosis (Chain ID: 100)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x8A8B9f35765899B3a0291700141470D79EA2eA88` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0xbF94192c652183c0f50056417f4D04810329f12c` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x332694Ef46D880DF6Ea9593e04CB8ABEE5F81D99` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x4eFcd8bcE8AC9b94bd76648e2c85bEf6c40F3228` |
### Avalanche (Chain ID: 43114)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x0E800D8d2E8b4694610AEdc385Aa6D763492B106` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x4eff2d77D9fFbAeFB4b141A3e494c085b3FF4Cb5` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x9958317b80ee5f10457017d54c2484D722059157` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x5939ab16fDf1991B0EF603c639B6b501A7841fAB` |
### Base (Chain ID: 8453)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x774cB66e2B2dB59A9daF175e9b2B7A142E17EB94` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0xb21A277466e7dB6934556a1Ce12eb3F032815c8A` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x9958317b80ee5f10457017d54c2484D722059157` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x5939ab16fDf1991B0EF603c639B6b501A7841fAB` |
### HyperEVM (Chain ID: 999)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0xf4743D026f3D07aF3747bb7d05BeD06D177241d7` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x0b11209B8c5E821b18dED147583b8978c3E63911` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0xBcA68cb9B794A4fb84855e003e4cF591F80A3Dc9` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x45fB5aF0a1aD80Ea16C803146eb81844D9972373` |
### Plasma (Chain ID: 9745)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0xD961E30156C2E0D0d925A0De45f931CB7815e970` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x86e67E115f96DF37239E0479441303De0de7bc2b` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x891EC9B34829276a9a8ef2F8A9cEAF2486017e0d` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x774cB66e2B2dB59A9daF175e9b2B7A142E17EB94` |
### Monad (Chain ID: 143)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x1311Fbc9F60359639174c1e7cC2032DbDb5Cc4d1` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0xaD89051bEd8d96f045E8912aE1672c6C0bF8a85E` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x4BB42f71CAB7Bd13e9f958dA4351B9fa2d3A42FF` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0xbC169a08cBdCDb218d91Cd945D29B59F78c96B77` |
### XLayer (Chain ID: 196)
| Factory | Address |
|---|---|
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v1 | `0x1311Fbc9F60359639174c1e7cC2032DbDb5Cc4d1` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v1 | `0xEB1eeaBF0126d813589C3D2CfeFFE410D9aE3863` |
| WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | `0x86705Ee19c0509Ff68F1118C55ee2ebdE383D122` |
| StableLPOracleFactory v2 | `0xEAedc32a51c510d35ebC11088fD5fF2b47aACF2E` |
## Technical Specification
For each factory on each network, the executing multisig (DAO multisig or Omnisig) performs a 3-step transaction pattern via the Authorizer:
1. **`grantRole(actionId, account)`** on the Authorizer -- grants the multisig the `disable()` role for the target factory
2. **`disable()`** on the factory -- permanently disables the factory, preventing new pool creation
3. **`revokeRole(actionId, account)`** on the Authorizer -- revokes the role so the multisig does not retain unnecessary permissions
Each network payload contains 12 transactions (4 factories x 3 steps).
### Executing Multisigs
| Network | Multisig | Address |
|---|---|---|
| Mainnet | DAO Multisig | `0x10A19e7eE7d7F8a52822f6817de8ea18204F2e4f` |
| Arbitrum | DAO Multisig | `0xaF23DC5983230E9eEAf93280e312e57539D098D0` |
| Optimism | DAO Multisig | `0x043f9687842771b3dF8852c1E9801DCAeED3f6bc` |
| Gnosis | DAO Multisig | `0x2a5AEcE0bb9EfFD7608213AE1745873385515c18` |
| Avalanche | DAO Multisig | `0x17b11FF13e2d7bAb2648182dFD1f1cfa0E4C7cf3` |
| Base | DAO Multisig | `0xC40DCFB13651e64C8551007aa57F9260827B6462` |
| HyperEVM, Plasma, Monad, XLayer | Omnisig | `0x9ff471F9f98F42E5151C7855fD1b5aa906b1AF7e` |
### Authorizer Addresses
| Network | Authorizer |
|---|---|
| Mainnet, Arbitrum, Optimism, Gnosis, Avalanche | `0xA331D84eC860Bf466b4CdCcFb4aC09a1B43F3aE6` |
| Base | `0x809B79b53F18E9bc08A961ED4678B901aC93213a` |
| HyperEVM | `0x85a80afee867aDf27B50BdB7b76DA70f1E853062` |
| Plasma, Monad, XLayer | `0xE39B5e3B6D74016b2F6A9673D7d7493B6DF549d5` |
### V2 Action IDs (disable())
V1 action IDs can be looked up from the [balancer-deployments action-ids](https://github.com/balancer/balancer-deployments/tree/master/action-ids). The overwritten v2 factory action IDs are no longer in the repo and were queried on-chain via `getActionId(bytes4)`:
| Network | WeightedLPOracleFactory v2 | StableLPOracleFactory v2 |
|---|---|---|
| Mainnet | `0xaad0e51c18069fb241bf8179dc6c7d583e506dd672ef9a85ef122dd000deba76` | `0xb3c9c0ec52436494a8f6527a835a3442d43fb2d4268c638d9e8f670a5546afe8` |
| Arbitrum | `0x32cfd519f4e04a2d3b88e1e667811368433ec3da01605dbc26d85a8d54dc834b` | `0x249bc3c0021e108ccf28b9f7934b423928be80b8c823bab8254edba17b359ea4` |
| Optimism | `0x92b93830f0497ce935614ceb53508d12d772244a34a0bbbeab832a4c824f0b90` | `0xfc212a18b66df1a184af12c3a698e2f1b55a002fa96e4ad2e37ddd708f99723a` |
| Gnosis | `0x5a2389555953f58e8746cb8c3171904d268fce2d55fa1aac3f20343ccd04cb0b` | `0x315b841cfaf795ea83cbe267847195f6fdba4a7a9f5ed870c28d9e4d4b145e28` |
| Avalanche | `0x0f19a8e265e66504de04b28811bb8fba950087dc6ab21a23e5d757937d4c38c8` | `0xd6ef2cdea6236fe8b350fe1371523aade37cb3ec44de40e46a13ac44ab467e9e` |
| Base | `0x0f19a8e265e66504de04b28811bb8fba950087dc6ab21a23e5d757937d4c38c8` | `0xd6ef2cdea6236fe8b350fe1371523aade37cb3ec44de40e46a13ac44ab467e9e` |
| HyperEVM | `0x6ccb8983444db720b828ab14455ffd0d3d219cfd63180ee7e384e218810ef779` | `0xd9ad8a66a0dd971dc6fe438297bcae5d731b41bacd8c65809e765141d1986bdb` |
| Plasma | `0x7576f83c39a4f75ece8e6da99676712301067f196442916c688500f9320af5fb` | `0x416d92d817cb23a3d644810c79c3e5d9cd991b729c260819b570abd632e3a90a` |
| Monad | `0x2cb59d35a7a1b89d4ca6e466034d4d7bba7efe0e0dbb3bbe125e78def0cbdac1` | `0xe52f27de16ccc09f36da9a1dc8bbb043041a422d6430226a1e148560fa23c165` |
| XLayer | `0xaa602686217d84795dac828d7e9c133b7507febe7d68d7f642b1e3b506ce3309` | `0x34f66ef5706b2abf916d3f719040884c962d3a419b90ec8af8fb2c1f6ea4e313` | | 0x0360e57e0a2ac3bca2117a7ac81fcf71e551360c0d810017acdec9a23b402135 | aurafinance.eth | Aura Finance | 1 | weighted | active | 1 | 1,773,298,066 | 2026-03-12 06:47:46 | 1,773,428,400 | 2026-03-13 19:00:00 | 1,773,716,400 | 2026-03-17 03:00:00 | 0x021C5536bd60bCe9f15FB0E32746e332E3fbFAF4 |
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Questions? Join us on Telegram: t.me/SakerDAO | Start Here — How to Join & Claim Your Free SAKER Token | Welcome to SakerDAO — where every human synapse and AI circuit unite to create and implement zero-CO₂ cement technology, marine habitat restoration, and the fight to halt global warming. Your membership vote matters.
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**Step 1 — Follow this space**
Click the Follow button at the top of this page. You will need a Solana wallet. If you don't have one, download Phantom for free at phantom.app — it takes 2 minutes.
**Step 2 — Get your Gitcoin Passport score to 25 or higher**
Go to passport.gitcoin.co and connect the same wallet. Add identity stamps (Google, GitHub, Twitter, etc.) until your score reaches 25. This confirms you are a unique human member.
**Step 3 — Claim your free SAKER token**
Go to sakerdao.com/claim, connect your wallet, and 1 SAKER token will be sent to you automatically.
---
Questions? Join us on Telegram: t.me/SakerDAO | 0x8fcb8d4de9a5893a24634863c63d353fc2f588a3a14a2e030e95ce559e82010b | sakerdao.eth | SakerDAO | 1 | basic | pending | 0 | 1,773,294,613 | 2026-03-12 05:50:13 | 1,773,640,140 | 2026-03-16 05:49:00 | 1,774,072,140 | 2026-03-21 05:49:00 | 0x32690CDFA4cd851513259C4D8F2cec5788b1bC19 |
Justin Sun Transparency
This Poll seeks to determine whether the XCN community supports an Official explanation of the previously passed OIP to give Justin Sun 500M XCN and what it means to the community.
There have been multiple accounts of people bringing this up and the DAO shuts it down. A select group of people who are heavily invested in this project would like to understand the dates of unlocks, connection with XCN, and importance of this passed OIP.
Vote FOR if you would like an Official explanation of the correlation, connection and impact to this project long term.
Vote AGAINST if you are comfortable with the explanation provided by the DAO and need no further information. | Justin Sun Transparency | This Poll seeks to determine whether the XCN community supports an Official explanation of the previously passed OIP to give Justin Sun 500M XCN and what it means to the community.
There have been multiple accounts of people bringing this up and the DAO shuts it down. A select group of people who are heavily invested in this project would like to understand the dates of unlocks, connection with XCN, and importance of this passed OIP.
Vote FOR if you would like an Official explanation of the correlation, connection and impact to this project long term.
Vote AGAINST if you are comfortable with the explanation provided by the DAO and need no further information. | 0x38ae6d988f16b11464c50c7f08060890fe922c3f255b0e3a8ccfde32211351c8 | chaingov.eth | Onyx XCN DAO | 1 | basic | closed | 23 | 1,773,288,181 | 2026-03-12 04:03:01 | 1,773,288,241 | 2026-03-12 04:04:01 | 1,773,461,041 | 2026-03-14 04:04:01 | 0x1F294c93c3BB57a7f084df366f8e7F4713156980 |
Membership Application: Daniel
## Applicant Information
- **Name:** Daniel N.
- **Email:** m**l@daannoo.info
- **Location:** Germany
- **Time Availability:** It varies
- **Languages:** English, German
## Motivation
shared values / principles / dream / intention and an excitement towards the thought of shared collaboration
## Contribution
with my mind, creativity, etc. :D open to explore different ways of contributing
## Experience Areas
Ecology / permaculture / regenerative agriculture,Facilitation / conflict resolution,Software engineering,UX / UI / design,Education / teaching,Health / wellness / emotional support,Community building / project management,Art / culture / storytelling
## Proud Project
my times in the artist collective https://www.randomkingdom.eu/ , i don't really resonate with a feeling people refer to as "proud" but mostly positive memories appear when I think about this project (:
## Values
Ecological living,Community,Resilience
## Resonance
Everything, i think we share the same vision, ponder similar thoughts, and all ! A shared love for the amplification of the emergence of nature connected communities, because i believe it will be tapping into the potential of the human experience and unpack lots of stuff, that currently can't be lived fully due to the way modern civilization has "deployed their blueprints of culture"
## Nature & Community Meaning
it means to me to have shared understanding, principles, and values of the space that is co-created, to have a connection to the land, the plants and beings, to each other, to know who you life next to, know their fears and dreams, their characters and stories, and not just "on the surface", to have depths , to explore connection more real then usually possible, to slow down, to eat organic food, to have long talks at fireplaces, do art, dance, and all that
---
*Submitted: 07/03/2026, 21:04:57* | Membership Application: Daniel | ## Applicant Information
- **Name:** Daniel N.
- **Email:** m**l@daannoo.info
- **Location:** Germany
- **Time Availability:** It varies
- **Languages:** English, German
## Motivation
shared values / principles / dream / intention and an excitement towards the thought of shared collaboration
## Contribution
with my mind, creativity, etc. :D open to explore different ways of contributing
## Experience Areas
Ecology / permaculture / regenerative agriculture,Facilitation / conflict resolution,Software engineering,UX / UI / design,Education / teaching,Health / wellness / emotional support,Community building / project management,Art / culture / storytelling
## Proud Project
my times in the artist collective https://www.randomkingdom.eu/ , i don't really resonate with a feeling people refer to as "proud" but mostly positive memories appear when I think about this project (:
## Values
Ecological living,Community,Resilience
## Resonance
Everything, i think we share the same vision, ponder similar thoughts, and all ! A shared love for the amplification of the emergence of nature connected communities, because i believe it will be tapping into the potential of the human experience and unpack lots of stuff, that currently can't be lived fully due to the way modern civilization has "deployed their blueprints of culture"
## Nature & Community Meaning
it means to me to have shared understanding, principles, and values of the space that is co-created, to have a connection to the land, the plants and beings, to each other, to know who you life next to, know their fears and dreams, their characters and stories, and not just "on the surface", to have depths , to explore connection more real then usually possible, to slow down, to eat organic food, to have long talks at fireplaces, do art, dance, and all that
---
*Submitted: 07/03/2026, 21:04:57* | 0xe35b7fd38d2836e1effcdd2d7f20a429219d2eaccbaa2af2b0418530f2891e2a | ecohubs.eth | ecohubs | 1 | single-choice | active | 1 | 1,773,278,101 | 2026-03-12 01:15:01 | 1,773,278,101 | 2026-03-12 01:15:01 | 1,773,537,301 | 2026-03-15 01:15:01 | 0x06d07206746dbb23F7f321Bbbf87B94ce283E855 |
SCP-212: Engineering Workstream Renewal: April 1, 2026 – September 30, 2026
## Abstract
This proposal seeks continued funding for the Engineering Workstream for six months (April 1, 2026 through September 30, 2026).
In line with the DAO's transition to a lean operating model, the Engineering team has been significantly restructured — reducing headcount from five full-time engineers to one full-time engineer and one fractional contributor (~15% capacity).
The primary objective is to provide the DAO with sufficient engineering capacity to maintain its existing products and ensure current revenue streams remain unaffected. Where capacity permits, the team will continue to drive product development so the DAO's products can continue to evolve.
This proposal represents an approximately 73% reduction in total engineering spend compared to the previous period ($770,250 over six months).
**tl;dr** Kev (full-time) manages infrastructure, addresses production issues, handles prioritized bug fixes, and drives forward product development. Apotheosis (fractional, ~15% capacity) serves as the primary point of contact for Engineering, handles account administration (service configuration, API key management, access controls), manages vendor relationships, and handles bill payments.
## Motivation
The DAO's existing products currently generate approximately $35,000 per month in revenue. Continued engineering support is essential to protect this revenue stream — without it, production issues would go unresolved, infrastructure would go unmanaged, and revenue-generating products would degrade. This proposal ensures continuity of operations with a lean team at a fraction of the previous cost, while preserving capacity for forward progress on the product roadmap.
## Specification
### Team
* [Apotheosis](https://github.com/0xApotheosis) — Workstream Leader & Senior Engineer (fractional, ~15% of previous capacity). Primary point of contact for Engineering. Responsible for account administration including service configuration, API key management, and access controls. Manages vendor relationships and bill payments. Coordinates with other workstreams and external contributors on engineering matters. Available for critical engineering support as needed.
* [kaladinlight](https://github.com/kaladinlight) — Senior Engineer (full-time). Manages infrastructure, addresses production issues, and handles prioritized bug fixes and product development.
The two contributors operate across significantly different time zones, providing broader coverage for critical engineering support and reducing the window during which no engineer is available to respond to production issues.
### Mandate
No changes to the previous mandate, restated below for reference:
> This proposal seeks to have the Engineering Workstream be the sole maintainers with discretion over CODEOWNERS, permissions and administrative rights of the ShapeShift GitHub namespace.
>
>
>
> This is to ensure the DAO maintains a high standard of code quality, velocity, reduced regressions, and has a single core team acting as maintainers responsible for the codebase.
>
>
>
> The Engineering Workstream will work with external contributors to ensure contributions can be made expeditiously while not compromising quality, patterns or stability.
## Budget
The details below expand upon [the budget spreadsheet](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1NHHTY2mp7YgwtaVlPIKzI3vgNqIZNoiFlAnWRvOIQFQ/edit?usp=sharing).
* **Monthly labor**: **$20,188 USDC**
* **Monthly infrastructure**: **$15,000 USDC**
### Recurring Costs
#### Labor
This proposal reduces headcount from five full-time engineers to one full-time (Kev) and one fractional contributor at approximately 15% of previous capacity (Apotheosis).
#### Infrastructure
Over the past 12 months, the Engineering team has absorbed most ongoing infrastructure expenses from the Foundation. The previous proposal allocated $20,000/month for node expenses; we have since reduced these costs to approximately $11,500/month, with plans to achieve a further 20–30% reduction through strategic vendor agreements expected to be in production by end of April 2026.
In addition to node providers (Liquify and Moralis), the Engineering Workstream now manages the following services: Railway, Sentry, Vercel, GitHub, Alchemy, Helius, Zerion, Pinata, and Exchange Rate Host. The combined cost of these ancillary services is variable but totalled $1,523.50 for the most recent billing cycle.
This proposal includes a line item for up to **$15,000 USDC per month** to cover ongoing infrastructure costs. All unspent funds from this line item will be returned to the DAO.
### Non-Recurring Costs
#### Miscellaneous
The budget includes a **$5,000 USDC** discretionary allocation, available for use at Engineering's discretion for unforeseen needs. Any unspent funds will be returned to the DAO.
#### Contingency
Present in all previous Engineering Workstream proposals, the contingency line item has been removed in this proposal.
#### Variance
Unused funds from any budget category will be returned to the DAO at the end of the budget cycle. In the event that the Engineering Workstream requires additional funds, a separate governance proposal will be raised.
## Benefits
* Maintains and stabilizes the existing product suite, protecting approximately $35,000/month in revenue
* Retains capacity for product development where bandwidth permits
* Funds the infrastructure required to keep ShapeShift's products operational
* Distributed time zones between contributors provide broader coverage for critical engineering support
* Represents an approximately 73% reduction in engineering spend compared to the previous period while retaining critical capabilities
## Drawbacks
* Reduced team capacity will result in slower roadmap progression
* Reduced capacity to sustain parallel workstreams
* Single points of failure with only two contributors | SCP-212: Engineering Workstream Renewal: April 1, 2026 – September 30, 2026 | ## Abstract
This proposal seeks continued funding for the Engineering Workstream for six months (April 1, 2026 through September 30, 2026).
In line with the DAO's transition to a lean operating model, the Engineering team has been significantly restructured — reducing headcount from five full-time engineers to one full-time engineer and one fractional contributor (~15% capacity).
The primary objective is to provide the DAO with sufficient engineering capacity to maintain its existing products and ensure current revenue streams remain unaffected. Where capacity permits, the team will continue to drive product development so the DAO's products can continue to evolve.
This proposal represents an approximately 73% reduction in total engineering spend compared to the previous period ($770,250 over six months).
**tl;dr** Kev (full-time) manages infrastructure, addresses production issues, handles prioritized bug fixes, and drives forward product development. Apotheosis (fractional, ~15% capacity) serves as the primary point of contact for Engineering, handles account administration (service configuration, API key management, access controls), manages vendor relationships, and handles bill payments.
## Motivation
The DAO's existing products currently generate approximately $35,000 per month in revenue. Continued engineering support is essential to protect this revenue stream — without it, production issues would go unresolved, infrastructure would go unmanaged, and revenue-generating products would degrade. This proposal ensures continuity of operations with a lean team at a fraction of the previous cost, while preserving capacity for forward progress on the product roadmap.
## Specification
### Team
* [Apotheosis](https://github.com/0xApotheosis) — Workstream Leader & Senior Engineer (fractional, ~15% of previous capacity). Primary point of contact for Engineering. Responsible for account administration including service configuration, API key management, and access controls. Manages vendor relationships and bill payments. Coordinates with other workstreams and external contributors on engineering matters. Available for critical engineering support as needed.
* [kaladinlight](https://github.com/kaladinlight) — Senior Engineer (full-time). Manages infrastructure, addresses production issues, and handles prioritized bug fixes and product development.
The two contributors operate across significantly different time zones, providing broader coverage for critical engineering support and reducing the window during which no engineer is available to respond to production issues.
### Mandate
No changes to the previous mandate, restated below for reference:
> This proposal seeks to have the Engineering Workstream be the sole maintainers with discretion over CODEOWNERS, permissions and administrative rights of the ShapeShift GitHub namespace.
>
>
>
> This is to ensure the DAO maintains a high standard of code quality, velocity, reduced regressions, and has a single core team acting as maintainers responsible for the codebase.
>
>
>
> The Engineering Workstream will work with external contributors to ensure contributions can be made expeditiously while not compromising quality, patterns or stability.
## Budget
The details below expand upon [the budget spreadsheet](https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1NHHTY2mp7YgwtaVlPIKzI3vgNqIZNoiFlAnWRvOIQFQ/edit?usp=sharing).
* **Monthly labor**: **$20,188 USDC**
* **Monthly infrastructure**: **$15,000 USDC**
### Recurring Costs
#### Labor
This proposal reduces headcount from five full-time engineers to one full-time (Kev) and one fractional contributor at approximately 15% of previous capacity (Apotheosis).
#### Infrastructure
Over the past 12 months, the Engineering team has absorbed most ongoing infrastructure expenses from the Foundation. The previous proposal allocated $20,000/month for node expenses; we have since reduced these costs to approximately $11,500/month, with plans to achieve a further 20–30% reduction through strategic vendor agreements expected to be in production by end of April 2026.
In addition to node providers (Liquify and Moralis), the Engineering Workstream now manages the following services: Railway, Sentry, Vercel, GitHub, Alchemy, Helius, Zerion, Pinata, and Exchange Rate Host. The combined cost of these ancillary services is variable but totalled $1,523.50 for the most recent billing cycle.
This proposal includes a line item for up to **$15,000 USDC per month** to cover ongoing infrastructure costs. All unspent funds from this line item will be returned to the DAO.
### Non-Recurring Costs
#### Miscellaneous
The budget includes a **$5,000 USDC** discretionary allocation, available for use at Engineering's discretion for unforeseen needs. Any unspent funds will be returned to the DAO.
#### Contingency
Present in all previous Engineering Workstream proposals, the contingency line item has been removed in this proposal.
#### Variance
Unused funds from any budget category will be returned to the DAO at the end of the budget cycle. In the event that the Engineering Workstream requires additional funds, a separate governance proposal will be raised.
## Benefits
* Maintains and stabilizes the existing product suite, protecting approximately $35,000/month in revenue
* Retains capacity for product development where bandwidth permits
* Funds the infrastructure required to keep ShapeShift's products operational
* Distributed time zones between contributors provide broader coverage for critical engineering support
* Represents an approximately 73% reduction in engineering spend compared to the previous period while retaining critical capabilities
## Drawbacks
* Reduced team capacity will result in slower roadmap progression
* Reduced capacity to sustain parallel workstreams
* Single points of failure with only two contributors | 0x4e192140dd356a7c3b388f4d9bf5751a894c0f298427d1689bbb90bdb4d10fbc | ideation.shapeshiftdao.eth | ShapeShift Ideation | 1 | single-choice | active | 5 | 1,773,276,983 | 2026-03-12 00:56:23 | 1,773,276,983 | 2026-03-12 00:56:23 | 1,773,881,700 | 2026-03-19 00:55:00 | 0x96E2cD42DBa2fe7102aca8887A663a0A1F18d293 |
1:1 Points Rewards
This poll seeks to determine if the community approves of simple and straight forward rewards.
For every point acquired in Season 2, 1 XCN Token will be provided at a 1:1 ratio.
1 point directly equals real XCN value, easy to understand, no confusion from formulas or thresholds.
Every point you earn in Season 2 = exactly 1 real XCN token.
No formulas. No caps. No diminishing returns. No thresholds.
You earn points → you get the same number of XCN tokens automatically at the end.
For the whole ecosystem
• More people stake XCN → network gets way more secure.
• More people vote in governance → DAO becomes stronger and more decentralized.
• More activity on ledger / bridges → fees go up → more XCN gets burned → price support.
This simple structure shall void/override the previous poll:
https://polls.onyx.org/#/proposal/0x0614e4a7f8642ce7c9fd0a3b135769a9c38fb5204c2303f3be07ab399eca2036
All tokens will be distributed automatically when the season concludes.
• For — Approve this simple and motivating reward structure and void past poll.
• Against — Continue with cap/diminishing curve. | 1:1 Points Rewards | This poll seeks to determine if the community approves of simple and straight forward rewards.
For every point acquired in Season 2, 1 XCN Token will be provided at a 1:1 ratio.
1 point directly equals real XCN value, easy to understand, no confusion from formulas or thresholds.
Every point you earn in Season 2 = exactly 1 real XCN token.
No formulas. No caps. No diminishing returns. No thresholds.
You earn points → you get the same number of XCN tokens automatically at the end.
For the whole ecosystem
• More people stake XCN → network gets way more secure.
• More people vote in governance → DAO becomes stronger and more decentralized.
• More activity on ledger / bridges → fees go up → more XCN gets burned → price support.
This simple structure shall void/override the previous poll:
https://polls.onyx.org/#/proposal/0x0614e4a7f8642ce7c9fd0a3b135769a9c38fb5204c2303f3be07ab399eca2036
All tokens will be distributed automatically when the season concludes.
• For — Approve this simple and motivating reward structure and void past poll.
• Against — Continue with cap/diminishing curve. | 0xd0317c31737c381690c8dafad3295029393c5e5b7eb092a4cfcc84e97354fd24 | chaingov.eth | Onyx XCN DAO | 1 | basic | closed | 27 | 1,773,275,995 | 2026-03-12 00:39:55 | 1,773,276,055 | 2026-03-12 00:40:55 | 1,773,448,855 | 2026-03-14 00:40:55 | 0x2BE747263FA1871d2F8bb98449C8d5d504B3dFfC |
Gauge Weight for Week of 12th Mar 2026
Curve and Frax Gauge Vote for the week of 12th Mar 2026.
Please read the gauge voting rules for Curve and Frax gauges before voting.
Curve voting rules: https://docs.convexfinance.com/convexfinance/general-information/why-convex/voting-and-gauge-weights
Frax voting rules: https://docs.convexfinance.com/convexfinance/general-information/convex-for-frax-finance/voting-and-gauge-weights
Be sure to check out our friends at Votium for possible voting incentives. https://votium.app/
As well as our friends at Llama Airforce, as they have valuable insights on voting incentives. https://llama.airforce/#/incentives/rounds | Gauge Weight for Week of 12th Mar 2026 | Curve and Frax Gauge Vote for the week of 12th Mar 2026.
Please read the gauge voting rules for Curve and Frax gauges before voting.
Curve voting rules: https://docs.convexfinance.com/convexfinance/general-information/why-convex/voting-and-gauge-weights
Frax voting rules: https://docs.convexfinance.com/convexfinance/general-information/convex-for-frax-finance/voting-and-gauge-weights
Be sure to check out our friends at Votium for possible voting incentives. https://votium.app/
As well as our friends at Llama Airforce, as they have valuable insights on voting incentives. https://llama.airforce/#/incentives/rounds | 0x5940f9cb281bb890cbcd2902fb3dc76db27da794b112b057d758b281887dec3c | cvx.eth | Convex Finance | 1 | weighted | active | 40 | 1,773,273,643 | 2026-03-12 00:00:43 | 1,773,273,600 | 2026-03-12 00:00:00 | 1,773,705,600 | 2026-03-17 00:00:00 | 0x724061efDFef4a421e8be05133ad24922D07b5Bf |
[sdCRV] Add a gauge for the following pool: tGBP-frxUSD on Polygon
Quorum: 10% asdCRV
View more on https://curve.finance/dao/#/ethereum/proposals/1360-OWNERSHIP | [sdCRV] Add a gauge for the following pool: tGBP-frxUSD on Polygon | Quorum: 10% asdCRV
View more on https://curve.finance/dao/#/ethereum/proposals/1360-OWNERSHIP | 0x7dcf065624e306f35ac1c9a392c000e2417d9dafd41303558062d66c94a393b6 | concentratordao.eth | Concentrator | 1 | single-choice | active | 0 | 1,773,267,140 | 2026-03-11 22:12:20 | 1,773,266,015 | 2026-03-11 21:53:35 | 1,773,518,015 | 2026-03-14 19:53:35 | 0x192F0fc41d78B15a84Dfeb2C8704FC99DdAf10e1 |
Add a gauge for the following pool: tGBP-frxUSD on Polygon
View more on https://curve.finance/dao/#/ethereum/proposals/1360-OWNERSHIP | Add a gauge for the following pool: tGBP-frxUSD on Polygon | View more on https://curve.finance/dao/#/ethereum/proposals/1360-OWNERSHIP | 0x421522aea03e40dc866a4e1a0e6e0563724af73193747a6dc0ca44d44884133e | sdcrv-gov.eth | sdCRV-Governance | 1 | single-choice | active | 2 | 1,773,267,114 | 2026-03-11 22:11:54 | 1,773,266,015 | 2026-03-11 21:53:35 | 1,773,525,215 | 2026-03-14 21:53:35 | 0xb4542526AfeE2FdA1D584213D1521272a398B42a |
[Curve] Ownership DAO Vote ID: 1360
Quorum: 10% veCLEV
Add a gauge for the following pool: tGBP-frxUSD on Polygon
Action 1
----------
To: Curve Gauge Controller
Function: AddGauge
Gauge: 0x0C1359bc78ab7F71b607500053cb73b21d60e191 (https://etherscan.io/address/0x0C1359bc78ab7F71b607500053cb73b21d60e191)
Type: Ethereum Chain
Weight: 0
Is official gauge? ✅Yes!✅ | [Curve] Ownership DAO Vote ID: 1360 | Quorum: 10% veCLEV
Add a gauge for the following pool: tGBP-frxUSD on Polygon
Action 1
----------
To: Curve Gauge Controller
Function: AddGauge
Gauge: 0x0C1359bc78ab7F71b607500053cb73b21d60e191 (https://etherscan.io/address/0x0C1359bc78ab7F71b607500053cb73b21d60e191)
Type: Ethereum Chain
Weight: 0
Is official gauge? ✅Yes!✅ | 0x4c9138fe071b716ae7c7af2aa39bdbf73634349a2e52291e0494ab9aa5756b66 | aladdindao.eth | AladdinDAO | 1 | single-choice | active | 0 | 1,773,266,044 | 2026-03-11 21:54:04 | 1,773,266,020 | 2026-03-11 21:53:40 | 1,773,518,020 | 2026-03-14 19:53:40 | 0x3538C75bE8bA1d308685f5D3Ba461C861B421a92 |
[Curve] Ownership DAO Vote ID: 1360
Quorum: 10% veCLEV
Add a gauge for the following pool: tGBP-frxUSD on Polygon
Action 1
----------
To: Curve Gauge Controller
Function: AddGauge
Gauge: 0x0C1359bc78ab7F71b607500053cb73b21d60e191 (https://etherscan.io/address/0x0C1359bc78ab7F71b607500053cb73b21d60e191)
Type: Ethereum Chain
Weight: 0
Is official gauge? ✅Yes!✅ | [Curve] Ownership DAO Vote ID: 1360 | Quorum: 10% veCLEV
Add a gauge for the following pool: tGBP-frxUSD on Polygon
Action 1
----------
To: Curve Gauge Controller
Function: AddGauge
Gauge: 0x0C1359bc78ab7F71b607500053cb73b21d60e191 (https://etherscan.io/address/0x0C1359bc78ab7F71b607500053cb73b21d60e191)
Type: Ethereum Chain
Weight: 0
Is official gauge? ✅Yes!✅ | 0xbda4c7eb8c44eb140f4522f5910759bf21fbceb38bae4d2783a0f16e28a0cc05 | veclev.eth | CLever | 1 | single-choice | active | 3 | 1,773,266,029 | 2026-03-11 21:53:49 | 1,773,266,020 | 2026-03-11 21:53:40 | 1,773,521,620 | 2026-03-14 20:53:40 | 0x3538C75bE8bA1d308685f5D3Ba461C861B421a92 |
[Curve] Ownership DAO Vote ID: 1360
Quorum: 6.78m CVX
Add a gauge for the following pool: tGBP-frxUSD on Polygon
Action 1
----------
To: Curve Gauge Controller
Function: AddGauge
Gauge: 0x0C1359bc78ab7F71b607500053cb73b21d60e191 (https://etherscan.io/address/0x0C1359bc78ab7F71b607500053cb73b21d60e191)
Type: Ethereum Chain
Weight: 0
Is official gauge? ✅Yes!✅ | [Curve] Ownership DAO Vote ID: 1360 | Quorum: 6.78m CVX
Add a gauge for the following pool: tGBP-frxUSD on Polygon
Action 1
----------
To: Curve Gauge Controller
Function: AddGauge
Gauge: 0x0C1359bc78ab7F71b607500053cb73b21d60e191 (https://etherscan.io/address/0x0C1359bc78ab7F71b607500053cb73b21d60e191)
Type: Ethereum Chain
Weight: 0
Is official gauge? ✅Yes!✅ | 0x51b26817d10a5c83dfd24cef467f19dee2f7dff49e0be1e50525198a103c88ce | cvx.eth | Convex Finance | 1 | single-choice | active | 11 | 1,773,266,023 | 2026-03-11 21:53:43 | 1,773,266,020 | 2026-03-11 21:53:40 | 1,773,525,220 | 2026-03-14 21:53:40 | 0x724061efDFef4a421e8be05133ad24922D07b5Bf |
[KIP-2] The Kult Kollection: A dynamic $KULT-aligned NFT collection
The Kult Kollection is a $KULT-aligned, AI-powered NFT avatar collection designed to be fun, updatable, and affordable, with every avatar completely unique.
- **$KULT-aligned.** Holding $KULT grants free avatars, increases the chance of revealing rarer ones, and unlocks additional rare traits. All profits from the collection will be used to buy back and burn $KULT.
- **Unique.** Thousands of possible traits. Billions upon billions of unique avatars. And each avatar can be declined into thousands of variations.
- **Dynamic.** The collection is a living one: owners can modify and update their avatars, and the avatars will benefit from the latest technologies.
- **Inexpensive.** Prices range from just $0.99 to $9.99, and $KULT holders receive free mints. The Kult is for everyone!
- **Licensed.** Owning an avatar NFT grants a perpetual commercial license, allowing you to distribute, adapt, and build upon it in any medium or format, as long as attribution is given to the Kitty Kult DAO.
The full proposal can be accessed here:
[https://ipfs.io/ipfs/bafkreieba4y43ujoprsftsakwxs76n3spmm2xbetmhxncxzkqmuhil5h6m](https://ipfs.io/ipfs/bafkreieba4y43ujoprsftsakwxs76n3spmm2xbetmhxncxzkqmuhil5h6m)
Do you support the proposal as presented in the linked document?
For any questions or discussions, please engage in the Ж DAO Discord server. | [KIP-2] The Kult Kollection: A dynamic $KULT-aligned NFT collection | The Kult Kollection is a $KULT-aligned, AI-powered NFT avatar collection designed to be fun, updatable, and affordable, with every avatar completely unique.
- **$KULT-aligned.** Holding $KULT grants free avatars, increases the chance of revealing rarer ones, and unlocks additional rare traits. All profits from the collection will be used to buy back and burn $KULT.
- **Unique.** Thousands of possible traits. Billions upon billions of unique avatars. And each avatar can be declined into thousands of variations.
- **Dynamic.** The collection is a living one: owners can modify and update their avatars, and the avatars will benefit from the latest technologies.
- **Inexpensive.** Prices range from just $0.99 to $9.99, and $KULT holders receive free mints. The Kult is for everyone!
- **Licensed.** Owning an avatar NFT grants a perpetual commercial license, allowing you to distribute, adapt, and build upon it in any medium or format, as long as attribution is given to the Kitty Kult DAO.
The full proposal can be accessed here:
[https://ipfs.io/ipfs/bafkreieba4y43ujoprsftsakwxs76n3spmm2xbetmhxncxzkqmuhil5h6m](https://ipfs.io/ipfs/bafkreieba4y43ujoprsftsakwxs76n3spmm2xbetmhxncxzkqmuhil5h6m)
Do you support the proposal as presented in the linked document?
For any questions or discussions, please engage in the Ж DAO Discord server. | 0xcf7ecbe54f109f154cf47faf00c7f8a3eb85a9c23e423a31d84fce3474aecde1 | kittykult.eth | Ж | 8453 | basic | active | 19 | 1,773,247,512 | 2026-03-11 16:45:12 | 1,773,248,400 | 2026-03-11 17:00:00 | 1,773,680,400 | 2026-03-16 17:00:00 | 0xa08686d171c3286FF3b7CD6005EE3C43D756d106 |
Membership Application: Vaipunu
## Applicant Information
- **Name:** Vaipunu I. T.
- **Email:** i*n@sunriselabs.io
- **Location:** Mauke, Cook Islands
- **Time Availability:** 3–6 hours
- **Languages:** English
## Motivation
im living this vision myself. so im very invested in the regen+tech+community space.
## Contribution
i think i can contribute code and community.
but ultimately i want to help grow the movement and help build the systems and tools that help scale other peoples regen community dreams
## Experience Areas
DAO / governance / Web3,Software engineering,UX / UI / design,Education / teaching,Facilitation / conflict resolution
## Proud Project
galaxymaps.io
taicollective.nz
sunriselabs.io
projectsunrise.io
## Values
Resilience,Innovation,Collaboration
## Resonance
I like that EcoHubs is building regenerative tech. As a technologist and community vision holder and builder this mission resonates with me
## Nature & Community Meaning
the dream for me is to be fully self-sustaining. abundance of food, energy, and housing, and with basic human needs met you are freed up to pursue work that is fulfilling and impacting to your community and to the world
---
*Submitted: 07/03/2026, 14:23:24* | Membership Application: Vaipunu | ## Applicant Information
- **Name:** Vaipunu I. T.
- **Email:** i*n@sunriselabs.io
- **Location:** Mauke, Cook Islands
- **Time Availability:** 3–6 hours
- **Languages:** English
## Motivation
im living this vision myself. so im very invested in the regen+tech+community space.
## Contribution
i think i can contribute code and community.
but ultimately i want to help grow the movement and help build the systems and tools that help scale other peoples regen community dreams
## Experience Areas
DAO / governance / Web3,Software engineering,UX / UI / design,Education / teaching,Facilitation / conflict resolution
## Proud Project
galaxymaps.io
taicollective.nz
sunriselabs.io
projectsunrise.io
## Values
Resilience,Innovation,Collaboration
## Resonance
I like that EcoHubs is building regenerative tech. As a technologist and community vision holder and builder this mission resonates with me
## Nature & Community Meaning
the dream for me is to be fully self-sustaining. abundance of food, energy, and housing, and with basic human needs met you are freed up to pursue work that is fulfilling and impacting to your community and to the world
---
*Submitted: 07/03/2026, 14:23:24* | 0x16493ea35e04107ceab666c60d85691c7e56ee878d25c622cfe4b754eaeb14b9 | ecohubs.eth | ecohubs | 1 | single-choice | closed | 1 | 1,773,246,293 | 2026-03-11 16:24:53 | 1,773,246,293 | 2026-03-11 16:24:53 | 1,773,505,493 | 2026-03-14 16:24:53 | 0x06d07206746dbb23F7f321Bbbf87B94ce283E855 |
TFIP-41: TrueFi Reconstitution and Transition to Brila
# Summary
TFIP-41 proposes the formal reconstitution of TrueFi into Brila, a streamlined and restructured organization designed for sustainable capital deployment across three operating pillars: NFT finance, real-world asset vaults, and treasury management solutions.
This proposal outlines the wind-down of the TrueFi Foundation in the British Virgin Islands, the formation of a new Panama-based Brila structure of entities, the migration process from TRU to BRLA, the allocation framework for the new token, and the transition in governance. It is intended to be the final TFIP under the TrueFi banner.
# Context and Recap
Over the past year, TrueFi has undergone a deliberate restructuring process. The organization has been streamlined, operational overhead has been reduced, the balance sheet has been strengthened, and governance inefficiencies have been addressed. Capital allocation has been reoriented toward productive, revenue-generating verticals.
Today, the project is anchored by three core pillars. The first is NFT finance through Cyan, which provides infrastructure enabling NFT-based financing and liquidity access. The second is real-world asset vaults, which facilitate institutional credit extension to vetted borrowers, with yield derived from interest income rather than token incentives. The third is treasury management solutions through Elara, a dollar-referenced treasury asset designed to preserve capital while generating controlled yield and serving as a base liquidity layer across the ecosystem.
These verticals represent the economic engine of the reconstituted project. The restructuring phase is complete. We’re into the execution phase now.
# Why Reconstitution Is Necessary
Despite meaningful operational progress, the legacy TrueFi structure imposes structural constraints. The historical token supply creates overhang. Governance design reflects an earlier stage of the protocol’s life. Prior loan history and reputational complexity introduce friction. Over time, these factors limit flexibility and strategic optionality.
While significant effort has gone into repairing and stabilizing the protocol, sustainable forward growth requires a clean capital structure and a refreshed governance architecture. TFIP-41 formally separates the future operating platform from the historical constraints of the prior structure.
# Proposal Overview
Upon approval of this proposal, the existing TrueFi Foundation entity in the British Virgin Islands will be formally wound down in accordance with applicable legal procedures. The governance forum will remain accessible for creditor-related matters, including ongoing discussions related to Archblock and similar legacy items.
A new Brila-related structure of entities will be established in Panama. These entities will issue the BRLA token and serve as the legal and operational steward of the ecosystem going forward. It will govern capital allocation, treasury strategy, and execution across the three pillars. This structure provides a clean and flexible operational base aligned with the long-term direction of the project.
# Token Migration: TRU to BRLA
35% percent of the total BRLA supply will be reserved for existing TRU holders. The remaining 65% will be allocated toward ecosystem development, operational sustainability, balance sheet strength, and strategic growth initiatives.
A migration portal will be available in the coming weeks, where TRU holders may deposit their TRU for a 30-DAY migration window (from launch). Upon deposit, holders will mint BRLA tokens. The conversion ratio between BRLA and TRU will be determined based on the total amount of TRU deposited into the portal relative to the fixed forty percent allocation reserved for TRU holders.
This structure ensures that the full allocation reserved for TRU holders is distributed transparently and proportionally based on participation. If more TRU participates in migration, the per-TRU BRLA allocation will adjust accordingly. If less TRU participates, the conversion ratio will reflect that lower participation. TRU not deposited during the migration window will not convert after the window closes. Detailed technical specifications and timing will be provided prior to the launch of the migration portal.
# Economic Model and Value Accrual
Brila is structured around three operating pillars: NFT finance through Cyan, real-world asset lending through the legacy vault architecture, and treasury management solutions through Elara. Each of these verticals is designed to stand on its own economically. They are not dependent on token incentives to manufacture activity. They generate revenue through financing spreads, structured credit, and treasury yield strategies. Cyan and treasury management solutions in particular offer meaningful economic spread potential, while the lending vaults provide disciplined, interest-based yield derived from real borrowers.
The objective with BRLA is fundamentally different from earlier crypto token models. The project will not rely on emissions to incentivize activity or bootstrap artificial liquidity. There will be no programmatic inflation designed to stimulate short-term engagement at the expense of long-term dilution. Instead, the operating businesses are expected to generate revenue independently. Protocol revenues will accrue to the Foundation treasury and may be deployed by governance to support the long-term sustainability of the ecosystem, including grants, liquidity initiatives, partnerships, and other strategic treasury operations.
A key principle of the reconstitution is emission discipline. The historical TRU structure carried significant token overhang relative to the economic output of the protocol. BRLA is being introduced with the intention that token supply growth remains tightly controlled and aligned with the long-term sustainability of the ecosystem.
Any future emissions will be carefully evaluated by governance in the context of the protocol’s development and overall supply dynamics. Governance may from time to time determine adjustments to token supply or treasury operations intended to support the stability and resilience of the ecosystem, which could include discretionary market operations involving BRLA.
The objective is to ensure that protocol activity is supported by sustainable participation and real usage of the network rather than by token issuance designed to artificially stimulate short-term engagement.
BRLA is intended to function as a governance and coordination mechanism within the ecosystem and does not represent any ownership interest, claim on assets, or entitlement to revenues generated by the protocol or the Foundation.
This shift addresses one of the structural imbalances of the legacy system. TRU’s circulating supply expanded materially during periods when underlying protocol activity remained limited. The reconstitution aims to realign token supply dynamics with the sustainable development of the ecosystem.
BRLA is introduced with a focus on responsible supply management and long-term network coordination, avoiding structural overhang from historical emissions and reducing reliance on token issuance to stimulate participation.
# Ecosystem and Launch Venue
BRLA will launch on the HyperEVM and position its economic hub within the Hyperliquid ecosystem. While the project will remain cross-chain in product deployment, the primary token and liquidity center will sit on HyperEVM.
This represents a deliberate strategic shift. Centralized exchange listings are operationally costly, structurally restrictive, and often misaligned with smaller, capital-disciplined projects. The legacy TRU footprint on centralized exchanges served a purpose in an earlier phase of the market. For Brila, competing on product quality and economic fundamentals is more important than maintaining expensive exchange relationships.
The Hyperliquid ecosystem offers a more aligned environment: on-chain liquidity, transparent market structure, and lower structural overhead. By anchoring BRLA within HyperEVM, the project aligns itself with an ecosystem that reflects the current direction of market infrastructure while preserving the flexibility to operate across chains.
# Governance Transition
Upon completion of the migration process, TRU governance will formally sunset. A new governance framework under BRLA will be introduced by the Panama-based entity. The new governance architecture will be designed to enable clearer capital allocation authority, operational agility, reduced structural deadlock, and stronger long-term economic alignment.
A separate governance framework document will be introduced to detail the mechanics of BRLA governance.
# Treatment of Legacy Matters
The reconstitution does not extinguish or ignore legacy matters. However, the loans and defaults being administered by Archblock are not the responsibility of TrueFi (nor have they been since the DAO was first formed). The existing forum will remain accessible for creditor communications. Archblock and related recovery processes will continue independently. Historical obligations are not erased by this proposal.
The objective is to separate forward-facing operations from structural complexity and historical governance while maintaining transparency and continuity where required.
# Rationale
TFIP-41 resets the capital structure, removes historical token overhang, eliminates governance inefficiencies, strengthens balance sheet flexibility, and aligns token supply with productive, revenue-generating verticals. The reconstitution enables the project to operate as an economically sustainable platform rather than as a legacy governance shell constrained by its past structure.
[Continue on Forum post] | TFIP-41: TrueFi Reconstitution and Transition to Brila | # Summary
TFIP-41 proposes the formal reconstitution of TrueFi into Brila, a streamlined and restructured organization designed for sustainable capital deployment across three operating pillars: NFT finance, real-world asset vaults, and treasury management solutions.
This proposal outlines the wind-down of the TrueFi Foundation in the British Virgin Islands, the formation of a new Panama-based Brila structure of entities, the migration process from TRU to BRLA, the allocation framework for the new token, and the transition in governance. It is intended to be the final TFIP under the TrueFi banner.
# Context and Recap
Over the past year, TrueFi has undergone a deliberate restructuring process. The organization has been streamlined, operational overhead has been reduced, the balance sheet has been strengthened, and governance inefficiencies have been addressed. Capital allocation has been reoriented toward productive, revenue-generating verticals.
Today, the project is anchored by three core pillars. The first is NFT finance through Cyan, which provides infrastructure enabling NFT-based financing and liquidity access. The second is real-world asset vaults, which facilitate institutional credit extension to vetted borrowers, with yield derived from interest income rather than token incentives. The third is treasury management solutions through Elara, a dollar-referenced treasury asset designed to preserve capital while generating controlled yield and serving as a base liquidity layer across the ecosystem.
These verticals represent the economic engine of the reconstituted project. The restructuring phase is complete. We’re into the execution phase now.
# Why Reconstitution Is Necessary
Despite meaningful operational progress, the legacy TrueFi structure imposes structural constraints. The historical token supply creates overhang. Governance design reflects an earlier stage of the protocol’s life. Prior loan history and reputational complexity introduce friction. Over time, these factors limit flexibility and strategic optionality.
While significant effort has gone into repairing and stabilizing the protocol, sustainable forward growth requires a clean capital structure and a refreshed governance architecture. TFIP-41 formally separates the future operating platform from the historical constraints of the prior structure.
# Proposal Overview
Upon approval of this proposal, the existing TrueFi Foundation entity in the British Virgin Islands will be formally wound down in accordance with applicable legal procedures. The governance forum will remain accessible for creditor-related matters, including ongoing discussions related to Archblock and similar legacy items.
A new Brila-related structure of entities will be established in Panama. These entities will issue the BRLA token and serve as the legal and operational steward of the ecosystem going forward. It will govern capital allocation, treasury strategy, and execution across the three pillars. This structure provides a clean and flexible operational base aligned with the long-term direction of the project.
# Token Migration: TRU to BRLA
35% percent of the total BRLA supply will be reserved for existing TRU holders. The remaining 65% will be allocated toward ecosystem development, operational sustainability, balance sheet strength, and strategic growth initiatives.
A migration portal will be available in the coming weeks, where TRU holders may deposit their TRU for a 30-DAY migration window (from launch). Upon deposit, holders will mint BRLA tokens. The conversion ratio between BRLA and TRU will be determined based on the total amount of TRU deposited into the portal relative to the fixed forty percent allocation reserved for TRU holders.
This structure ensures that the full allocation reserved for TRU holders is distributed transparently and proportionally based on participation. If more TRU participates in migration, the per-TRU BRLA allocation will adjust accordingly. If less TRU participates, the conversion ratio will reflect that lower participation. TRU not deposited during the migration window will not convert after the window closes. Detailed technical specifications and timing will be provided prior to the launch of the migration portal.
# Economic Model and Value Accrual
Brila is structured around three operating pillars: NFT finance through Cyan, real-world asset lending through the legacy vault architecture, and treasury management solutions through Elara. Each of these verticals is designed to stand on its own economically. They are not dependent on token incentives to manufacture activity. They generate revenue through financing spreads, structured credit, and treasury yield strategies. Cyan and treasury management solutions in particular offer meaningful economic spread potential, while the lending vaults provide disciplined, interest-based yield derived from real borrowers.
The objective with BRLA is fundamentally different from earlier crypto token models. The project will not rely on emissions to incentivize activity or bootstrap artificial liquidity. There will be no programmatic inflation designed to stimulate short-term engagement at the expense of long-term dilution. Instead, the operating businesses are expected to generate revenue independently. Protocol revenues will accrue to the Foundation treasury and may be deployed by governance to support the long-term sustainability of the ecosystem, including grants, liquidity initiatives, partnerships, and other strategic treasury operations.
A key principle of the reconstitution is emission discipline. The historical TRU structure carried significant token overhang relative to the economic output of the protocol. BRLA is being introduced with the intention that token supply growth remains tightly controlled and aligned with the long-term sustainability of the ecosystem.
Any future emissions will be carefully evaluated by governance in the context of the protocol’s development and overall supply dynamics. Governance may from time to time determine adjustments to token supply or treasury operations intended to support the stability and resilience of the ecosystem, which could include discretionary market operations involving BRLA.
The objective is to ensure that protocol activity is supported by sustainable participation and real usage of the network rather than by token issuance designed to artificially stimulate short-term engagement.
BRLA is intended to function as a governance and coordination mechanism within the ecosystem and does not represent any ownership interest, claim on assets, or entitlement to revenues generated by the protocol or the Foundation.
This shift addresses one of the structural imbalances of the legacy system. TRU’s circulating supply expanded materially during periods when underlying protocol activity remained limited. The reconstitution aims to realign token supply dynamics with the sustainable development of the ecosystem.
BRLA is introduced with a focus on responsible supply management and long-term network coordination, avoiding structural overhang from historical emissions and reducing reliance on token issuance to stimulate participation.
# Ecosystem and Launch Venue
BRLA will launch on the HyperEVM and position its economic hub within the Hyperliquid ecosystem. While the project will remain cross-chain in product deployment, the primary token and liquidity center will sit on HyperEVM.
This represents a deliberate strategic shift. Centralized exchange listings are operationally costly, structurally restrictive, and often misaligned with smaller, capital-disciplined projects. The legacy TRU footprint on centralized exchanges served a purpose in an earlier phase of the market. For Brila, competing on product quality and economic fundamentals is more important than maintaining expensive exchange relationships.
The Hyperliquid ecosystem offers a more aligned environment: on-chain liquidity, transparent market structure, and lower structural overhead. By anchoring BRLA within HyperEVM, the project aligns itself with an ecosystem that reflects the current direction of market infrastructure while preserving the flexibility to operate across chains.
# Governance Transition
Upon completion of the migration process, TRU governance will formally sunset. A new governance framework under BRLA will be introduced by the Panama-based entity. The new governance architecture will be designed to enable clearer capital allocation authority, operational agility, reduced structural deadlock, and stronger long-term economic alignment.
A separate governance framework document will be introduced to detail the mechanics of BRLA governance.
# Treatment of Legacy Matters
The reconstitution does not extinguish or ignore legacy matters. However, the loans and defaults being administered by Archblock are not the responsibility of TrueFi (nor have they been since the DAO was first formed). The existing forum will remain accessible for creditor communications. Archblock and related recovery processes will continue independently. Historical obligations are not erased by this proposal.
The objective is to separate forward-facing operations from structural complexity and historical governance while maintaining transparency and continuity where required.
# Rationale
TFIP-41 resets the capital structure, removes historical token overhang, eliminates governance inefficiencies, strengthens balance sheet flexibility, and aligns token supply with productive, revenue-generating verticals. The reconstitution enables the project to operate as an economically sustainable platform rather than as a legacy governance shell constrained by its past structure.
[Continue on Forum post] | 0x15b07adf8a90b6e1b1f4f1af175f1a5d2d1d48998711956bac0ff7b604ffb0c6 | truefi-dao.eth | TrueFi DAO | 1 | basic | closed | 3 | 1,773,240,580 | 2026-03-11 14:49:40 | 1,773,240,580 | 2026-03-11 14:49:40 | 1,773,499,780 | 2026-03-14 14:49:40 | 0x5D545DE6e81da180dBbb57926a0e49be7c868Fb7 |
[ARFC] Buyback Program - Budget Adjustment
---
title: [ARFC] Buyback Program - Budget Adjustment
author: @TokenLogic
created: 2026-03-04
---
# Summary
This publication proposes reducing the annual AAVE buyback budget from approximately $50M to $30M ad outlined in the [Aave DAO Funding Insights](https://governance.aave.com/t/aave-dao-funding-insights/24192) forum post.
# Motivation
As outlined in the [Aave DAO Funding Insights](https://governance.aave.com/t/aave-dao-funding-insights/24192) publication, the DAO's borrow fee revenue has declined approximately 25% from its peak, with January 2026 revenue of $7.95M, down from $13.5M in January 2025. At the same time, the optimistic 2026 operational budget is estimated at $190M, resulting in a structural deficit relative to 2025's annual revenue of $142M. Recalibrating the buyback program is a necessary step to ensure operational sustainability.
Since its inception in April 2025, the buyback program has successfully acquired over 205,000 AAVE (1.28% of total supply), demonstrating the protocol's strong net acquisition posture. At a reduced $30M annual budget, the DAO would still acquire an estimated 292 AAVE per day, sustaining meaningful accumulation while preserving stablecoin reserves for operations and growth initiatives.
The transition to include volatile assets, such as ETH, in stablecoin-funded buybacks is supported by the DAO's treasury composition. Across all of the wallets, the treasury holds approximately $40M in ETH-correlated assets. Given the strong historical relative correlation between AAVE and ETH, swapping between these assets is a relative-value trade with significantly lower volatility risk than converting from USD-denominated assets. This approach preserves the DAO's stablecoin reserve, critical for funding service providers, growth programs, and operational runway, while utilising assets that are naturally aligned with AAVE's price movements.
The [MainnetSwapSteward](https://governance.aave.com/t/arfc-steward-deployment-mainnetswapsteward-and-rewardssteward/23070) already supports ETH-to-AAVE swap routes, enabling this transition without additional infrastructure.
# Specification
| Parameter | Current | Proposed | Delta |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Annual Budget | ~$50M | ~$30M | -$20M |
| Primary Funding Source | Stablecoins | ETH / Volatile Assets | — |
| Est. Daily Acquisition | ~487 AAVE/day | ~292 AAVE/day | -195 |
| Est. Annual Acquisition | ~177,855 AAVE | ~106,580 AAVE | -71,275 |
The MainnetSwapSteward will be configured to prioritise ETH and ETH-correlated assets (wETH, wstETH) as the primary input for AAVE acquisitions. Stablecoin-funded buybacks will continue on a secondary basis as needed to meet the target budget, but the majority of acquisition volume will shift to volatile assets.
The reduced budget maintains the DAO's position as a net acquirer of AAVE while freeing approximately $20M annually in stablecoin reserves for operational needs.
## Forward Looking Statement
TokenLogic will continue to monitor buyback execution, AAVE acquisition rates, and treasury composition following this adjustment. As the Aave DAO’s revenue and growth spending commitments are met, the buyback program will be revised to direct capital to the areas that generate the highest returns for token holders.
This proposal is part of the broader set of recommendations outlined in the [Aave DAO Funding Insights](https://governance.aave.com/t/aave-dao-funding-insights/24192) publication, which also covers Safety Module emission reductions, GHO liquidity strategy, and treasury management priorities for 2026.
# Disclosure
TokenLogic is an active service provider to the Aave DAO, the beneficiary of stream 100072 and the KPI as outlined in this [publication](https://governance.aave.com/t/arfc-service-provider-compensation-reform-for-v4-alignment/23246). The scope of this engagement is available via this forum [proposal](https://governance.aave.com/t/arfc-tokenlogic-phase-ii/23223).
TokenLogic supports and maintains an independent [delegate voting platform](https://governance.aave.com/t/tokenlogic-delegate-platform/12516) within the Aave community.
TokenLogic and associated entities have no undisclosed material conflicts of interest at the time of submission.
# Next Steps
1. Gather feedback from the community.
2. If consensus is reached on this ARFC, escalate this proposal to the Snapshot stage.
3. If the snapshot outcome is YAE, escalate this proposal to the AIP stage.
# Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). | [ARFC] Buyback Program - Budget Adjustment | ---
title: [ARFC] Buyback Program - Budget Adjustment
author: @TokenLogic
created: 2026-03-04
---
# Summary
This publication proposes reducing the annual AAVE buyback budget from approximately $50M to $30M ad outlined in the [Aave DAO Funding Insights](https://governance.aave.com/t/aave-dao-funding-insights/24192) forum post.
# Motivation
As outlined in the [Aave DAO Funding Insights](https://governance.aave.com/t/aave-dao-funding-insights/24192) publication, the DAO's borrow fee revenue has declined approximately 25% from its peak, with January 2026 revenue of $7.95M, down from $13.5M in January 2025. At the same time, the optimistic 2026 operational budget is estimated at $190M, resulting in a structural deficit relative to 2025's annual revenue of $142M. Recalibrating the buyback program is a necessary step to ensure operational sustainability.
Since its inception in April 2025, the buyback program has successfully acquired over 205,000 AAVE (1.28% of total supply), demonstrating the protocol's strong net acquisition posture. At a reduced $30M annual budget, the DAO would still acquire an estimated 292 AAVE per day, sustaining meaningful accumulation while preserving stablecoin reserves for operations and growth initiatives.
The transition to include volatile assets, such as ETH, in stablecoin-funded buybacks is supported by the DAO's treasury composition. Across all of the wallets, the treasury holds approximately $40M in ETH-correlated assets. Given the strong historical relative correlation between AAVE and ETH, swapping between these assets is a relative-value trade with significantly lower volatility risk than converting from USD-denominated assets. This approach preserves the DAO's stablecoin reserve, critical for funding service providers, growth programs, and operational runway, while utilising assets that are naturally aligned with AAVE's price movements.
The [MainnetSwapSteward](https://governance.aave.com/t/arfc-steward-deployment-mainnetswapsteward-and-rewardssteward/23070) already supports ETH-to-AAVE swap routes, enabling this transition without additional infrastructure.
# Specification
| Parameter | Current | Proposed | Delta |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Annual Budget | ~$50M | ~$30M | -$20M |
| Primary Funding Source | Stablecoins | ETH / Volatile Assets | — |
| Est. Daily Acquisition | ~487 AAVE/day | ~292 AAVE/day | -195 |
| Est. Annual Acquisition | ~177,855 AAVE | ~106,580 AAVE | -71,275 |
The MainnetSwapSteward will be configured to prioritise ETH and ETH-correlated assets (wETH, wstETH) as the primary input for AAVE acquisitions. Stablecoin-funded buybacks will continue on a secondary basis as needed to meet the target budget, but the majority of acquisition volume will shift to volatile assets.
The reduced budget maintains the DAO's position as a net acquirer of AAVE while freeing approximately $20M annually in stablecoin reserves for operational needs.
## Forward Looking Statement
TokenLogic will continue to monitor buyback execution, AAVE acquisition rates, and treasury composition following this adjustment. As the Aave DAO’s revenue and growth spending commitments are met, the buyback program will be revised to direct capital to the areas that generate the highest returns for token holders.
This proposal is part of the broader set of recommendations outlined in the [Aave DAO Funding Insights](https://governance.aave.com/t/aave-dao-funding-insights/24192) publication, which also covers Safety Module emission reductions, GHO liquidity strategy, and treasury management priorities for 2026.
# Disclosure
TokenLogic is an active service provider to the Aave DAO, the beneficiary of stream 100072 and the KPI as outlined in this [publication](https://governance.aave.com/t/arfc-service-provider-compensation-reform-for-v4-alignment/23246). The scope of this engagement is available via this forum [proposal](https://governance.aave.com/t/arfc-tokenlogic-phase-ii/23223).
TokenLogic supports and maintains an independent [delegate voting platform](https://governance.aave.com/t/tokenlogic-delegate-platform/12516) within the Aave community.
TokenLogic and associated entities have no undisclosed material conflicts of interest at the time of submission.
# Next Steps
1. Gather feedback from the community.
2. If consensus is reached on this ARFC, escalate this proposal to the Snapshot stage.
3. If the snapshot outcome is YAE, escalate this proposal to the AIP stage.
# Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). | 0xe1f47bd04001269432d2e74e76b79747e1458e90b0e3b2cdee7be6495d96e056 | aavedao.eth | Aave DAO | 1 | basic | active | 88 | 1,773,239,797 | 2026-03-11 14:36:37 | 1,773,326,197 | 2026-03-12 14:36:37 | 1,773,585,397 | 2026-03-15 14:36:37 | 0x2cc1ADE245020FC5AAE66Ad443e1F66e01c54Df1 |
Extend Ambire Rewards S2 or Close It
Author: Ambire Wallet
Date: March 11, 2026
---
Ambire Rewards Season 2 is set to end on **March 15, 2026**, and we need the community to decide how to close it.
Season 2 uses **Swap & Bridge volume** to trigger the rewards pool, as previously voted. The minimum target for a **$100,000 $WALLET rewards pool** is **$3M in Swap & Bridge volume**. Right now, we’re at **$1.07M**, which unfortunately came in below expectations (and current market conditions didn’t help). Now we need your help to decide what to do!
---
## Proposal overview
This governance proposal asks the community how we should end **Ambire Rewards Season 2**, since the season did not meet the **$3M Swap & Bridge volume threshold**.
There are three paths:
- **Extend** the season by 1 month with **a new target and a bigger rewards pool**, or
- **End** the season now with **no payout**, or
- **End** the season now with **a partial payout (20% of the reward pool)**
---
**Question:**
**Should we extend Season 2 or close it now?**
## Voting options
- **Extend by 1mo. with new target**
- **End now with no rewards payout**
- **End now with a 20% pool payout**
If you vote to extend, **Season 2 runs for one more month**, with a new milestone: hit **$2M in Swap & Bridge volume**, and the season pays out **$150k in $WALLET**. If we still don’t reach $2M, we’ll come back to the DAO with another vote on what to do next.
If you vote to end now, the season closes immediately, and we either distribute **nothing** or **$20,000 worth of $WALLET (20% of the original $100k pool)**, depending on which option wins.
---
## Motivation
We’re proposing these options to keep the process **fair, transparent, and aligned with what Ambire Rewards is meant to do: reward real usage.**
- **Market reality, clear decision:** We didn’t reach the $3M trigger, so we need a clean, community-led way to wrap up the season.
- **“One more push” option:** Extending gives the community a realistic second chance to drive meaningful volume, with a stronger incentive attached.
- **Fair close-out options:** Ending now with either no payout or a partial payout lets the DAO choose how strict it wants to be about targets versus recognizing participation.
- **Keeps momentum in the ecosystem:** A clear outcome helps users decide whether to keep using Swap & Bridge now, or focus on other ways to earn in Rewards.
---
## Voting requirements
- Hold **$WALLET** or **$stkWALLET** before the snapshot.
- Note that the **voting power of $WALLET tokens is half (0.5 points)** that of **$stkWALLET tokens**.
- Any token changes after the snapshot will not affect the voting power. For example, staking your $WALLET tokens after the snapshot will not double their voting power.
---
## Useful Links
[Ambire Governance Votes](https://blog.ambire.com/tag/governance/)
[Website](https://www.ambire.com/)
[GitHub](https://github.com/AmbireTech/)
[X](https://twitter.com/AmbireWallet)
[Discord](https://www.ambire.com/discord)
[Telegram](https://telegram.me/AmbireOfficial) | Extend Ambire Rewards S2 or Close It | Author: Ambire Wallet
Date: March 11, 2026
---
Ambire Rewards Season 2 is set to end on **March 15, 2026**, and we need the community to decide how to close it.
Season 2 uses **Swap & Bridge volume** to trigger the rewards pool, as previously voted. The minimum target for a **$100,000 $WALLET rewards pool** is **$3M in Swap & Bridge volume**. Right now, we’re at **$1.07M**, which unfortunately came in below expectations (and current market conditions didn’t help). Now we need your help to decide what to do!
---
## Proposal overview
This governance proposal asks the community how we should end **Ambire Rewards Season 2**, since the season did not meet the **$3M Swap & Bridge volume threshold**.
There are three paths:
- **Extend** the season by 1 month with **a new target and a bigger rewards pool**, or
- **End** the season now with **no payout**, or
- **End** the season now with **a partial payout (20% of the reward pool)**
---
**Question:**
**Should we extend Season 2 or close it now?**
## Voting options
- **Extend by 1mo. with new target**
- **End now with no rewards payout**
- **End now with a 20% pool payout**
If you vote to extend, **Season 2 runs for one more month**, with a new milestone: hit **$2M in Swap & Bridge volume**, and the season pays out **$150k in $WALLET**. If we still don’t reach $2M, we’ll come back to the DAO with another vote on what to do next.
If you vote to end now, the season closes immediately, and we either distribute **nothing** or **$20,000 worth of $WALLET (20% of the original $100k pool)**, depending on which option wins.
---
## Motivation
We’re proposing these options to keep the process **fair, transparent, and aligned with what Ambire Rewards is meant to do: reward real usage.**
- **Market reality, clear decision:** We didn’t reach the $3M trigger, so we need a clean, community-led way to wrap up the season.
- **“One more push” option:** Extending gives the community a realistic second chance to drive meaningful volume, with a stronger incentive attached.
- **Fair close-out options:** Ending now with either no payout or a partial payout lets the DAO choose how strict it wants to be about targets versus recognizing participation.
- **Keeps momentum in the ecosystem:** A clear outcome helps users decide whether to keep using Swap & Bridge now, or focus on other ways to earn in Rewards.
---
## Voting requirements
- Hold **$WALLET** or **$stkWALLET** before the snapshot.
- Note that the **voting power of $WALLET tokens is half (0.5 points)** that of **$stkWALLET tokens**.
- Any token changes after the snapshot will not affect the voting power. For example, staking your $WALLET tokens after the snapshot will not double their voting power.
---
## Useful Links
[Ambire Governance Votes](https://blog.ambire.com/tag/governance/)
[Website](https://www.ambire.com/)
[GitHub](https://github.com/AmbireTech/)
[X](https://twitter.com/AmbireWallet)
[Discord](https://www.ambire.com/discord)
[Telegram](https://telegram.me/AmbireOfficial) | 0xca83b551bcb59adb0b4dfd3e187df82f9566d48b620f56c7b3328652705651be | ambire.eth | Ambire Wallet | 1 | single-choice | active | 57 | 1,773,237,751 | 2026-03-11 14:02:31 | 1,773,241,200 | 2026-03-11 15:00:00 | 1,773,586,800 | 2026-03-15 15:00:00 | 0xC2E6dFcc2C6722866aD65F211D5757e1D2879337 |
Beets Sonic gauge vote (Round 31)
This vote decides the distribution of 420000 BEETS to gauge emissions for the period of March 18th 2026 to March 31st 2026.
To vote, distribute your voting power among pools. You can vote for as many or as few gauges as you wish. You can also vote as many times as you like, overwriting your previous vote with a new vote. The aggregate distribution of responses will be used to calculate the reward distribution.
Pools may have voting incentives provided by Beets and/or other protocols, please check Beets discord for details. | Beets Sonic gauge vote (Round 31) | This vote decides the distribution of 420000 BEETS to gauge emissions for the period of March 18th 2026 to March 31st 2026.
To vote, distribute your voting power among pools. You can vote for as many or as few gauges as you wish. You can also vote as many times as you like, overwriting your previous vote with a new vote. The aggregate distribution of responses will be used to calculate the reward distribution.
Pools may have voting incentives provided by Beets and/or other protocols, please check Beets discord for details. | 0x17031ebec6ede948c4a8336a21d82ab29499ecd5d6a3a532d1f422bc3906fcf1 | beets-gauges.eth | Beets Gauge Votes | 146 | weighted | active | 27 | 1,773,236,424 | 2026-03-11 13:40:24 | 1,773,302,400 | 2026-03-12 08:00:00 | 1,773,691,200 | 2026-03-16 20:00:00 | 0xD526e52160C871bCf8eCa47c143b379989764C94 |
Allow customize avatar color name for registered users
> by 0x598f8af1565003ae7456dac280a18ee826df7a2c (pablo)
Due to recent changes, right now Godot, Unity and Bevy shows avatar name tags with different colors, what I propose is to allow citizens to customize name color, then they will look the same in all clients.
This can help also to differentiate impersonators not matter the explorer/platform being used, if you know Yemel is red, if you see YemeI (I use "i" char here) with other color, you realise he is other person.
Specs:
* Users owning a Decentraland Name can customize the color of the name tag; the default color, if not customizeed should be the result of a shared algorithm between all explorers or better if just given by the catalyst.
* Users not owning a name and Guests will look grey.
- YES
- NO
- Invalid question/options
**[This proposal is summarized due to technical limitations. To view it complete and vote on it, visit the DCL DAO Governance dApp](https://decentraland.org/governance/proposal/?id=2d7e26ec-0114-4438-bbf6-040e42af2d69)** | Allow customize avatar color name for registered users | > by 0x598f8af1565003ae7456dac280a18ee826df7a2c (pablo)
Due to recent changes, right now Godot, Unity and Bevy shows avatar name tags with different colors, what I propose is to allow citizens to customize name color, then they will look the same in all clients.
This can help also to differentiate impersonators not matter the explorer/platform being used, if you know Yemel is red, if you see YemeI (I use "i" char here) with other color, you realise he is other person.
Specs:
* Users owning a Decentraland Name can customize the color of the name tag; the default color, if not customizeed should be the result of a shared algorithm between all explorers or better if just given by the catalyst.
* Users not owning a name and Guests will look grey.
- YES
- NO
- Invalid question/options
**[This proposal is summarized due to technical limitations. To view it complete and vote on it, visit the DCL DAO Governance dApp](https://decentraland.org/governance/proposal/?id=2d7e26ec-0114-4438-bbf6-040e42af2d69)** | 0x485c3602d739209456eaefc2cf9fd81458d2e119ae83e68de80f73274c5b455b | snapshot.dcl.eth | Decentraland | 1 | single-choice | active | 12 | 1,773,221,209 | 2026-03-11 09:26:49 | 1,773,221,160 | 2026-03-11 09:26:00 | 1,773,653,160 | 2026-03-16 09:26:00 | 0xBB7B59Afa3A0E5Be143b8fE9C641F00c1ecB9d69 |
S5-10 组织专员二月份述职报告
# 运营专员
**第2个月（2月）：完善与固化，线上协同、梳理沉淀**
**核心目标：**
1. 将制度“考试化”，形成共识门槛。
2. 持续迭代制度，消除歧义。
3. 系统梳理资源，完成年度总结与季度计划。
[无标题](https://www.notion.so/31fffc80e3608076af88c1e2b885c6eb?pvs=21)
| 项目 | 金额（月） | 说明 |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **组长薪资** | 2600 RMB + 2600 NT | 基础1500 RMB（核心职责）<br>+ 成果激励1100 RMB（与月末评议） |
| **助理薪资** | 500 RMB +500NT | 对应里程执行工作，（与月末评议） |
| **任务赏金池** | 0 NT/月 | 用于激励成员参与治理组发起的专项任务（文件修订、资源图谱编纂等）未分发。 |
# 生活专员
南塘 DAO 合作社 住宿
一、价格档位
基础档：30 nt / 晚
所有入住者默认价格，无参与要求。
一档优惠：25 nt / 晚
条件：
连续住满 7 天
参与过 至少 1 次大扫除
维持：每月至少参与 1 次大扫除，否则退回 30 nt。
二档优惠：20 nt / 晚
条件：
连续住满 30 天
期间每次大扫除都参与
维持：必须参与每次大扫除，缺席 1 次退回 25 nt；1 个月无记录退回 30 nt。
二、离开与续住规则
离开后 3 个月内 回来：按离开时的价格续住。
离开超过 3 个月：重新按 30 nt / 晚 入住。
三、在地生活组组长
职责：每周组织一次大扫除、签到、记录、价格核对
薪资：1200 元+ 1200 nt
# 媒体运营专员
月度基础要求：进行22次外宣活动。
时间跨度：2月1日-2月28日
小红书发布：2条
直播：3次
推特发布：46条
为推动商业化转型，向外寻求合作方，形成了一份组织介绍文档（未经提案投票），此部分暂不作激励。
2月份激励申请：原基础薪资160U+1000NT，U部分不发放，NT部分照常发放。推特部分英语运营由跳跳独立完成，故为跳跳申请500RMB+500NT激励。 | S5-10 组织专员二月份述职报告 | # 运营专员
**第2个月（2月）：完善与固化，线上协同、梳理沉淀**
**核心目标：**
1. 将制度“考试化”，形成共识门槛。
2. 持续迭代制度，消除歧义。
3. 系统梳理资源，完成年度总结与季度计划。
[无标题](https://www.notion.so/31fffc80e3608076af88c1e2b885c6eb?pvs=21)
| 项目 | 金额（月） | 说明 |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **组长薪资** | 2600 RMB + 2600 NT | 基础1500 RMB（核心职责）<br>+ 成果激励1100 RMB（与月末评议） |
| **助理薪资** | 500 RMB +500NT | 对应里程执行工作，（与月末评议） |
| **任务赏金池** | 0 NT/月 | 用于激励成员参与治理组发起的专项任务（文件修订、资源图谱编纂等）未分发。 |
# 生活专员
南塘 DAO 合作社 住宿
一、价格档位
基础档：30 nt / 晚
所有入住者默认价格，无参与要求。
一档优惠：25 nt / 晚
条件：
连续住满 7 天
参与过 至少 1 次大扫除
维持：每月至少参与 1 次大扫除，否则退回 30 nt。
二档优惠：20 nt / 晚
条件：
连续住满 30 天
期间每次大扫除都参与
维持：必须参与每次大扫除，缺席 1 次退回 25 nt；1 个月无记录退回 30 nt。
二、离开与续住规则
离开后 3 个月内 回来：按离开时的价格续住。
离开超过 3 个月：重新按 30 nt / 晚 入住。
三、在地生活组组长
职责：每周组织一次大扫除、签到、记录、价格核对
薪资：1200 元+ 1200 nt
# 媒体运营专员
月度基础要求：进行22次外宣活动。
时间跨度：2月1日-2月28日
小红书发布：2条
直播：3次
推特发布：46条
为推动商业化转型，向外寻求合作方，形成了一份组织介绍文档（未经提案投票），此部分暂不作激励。
2月份激励申请：原基础薪资160U+1000NT，U部分不发放，NT部分照常发放。推特部分英语运营由跳跳独立完成，故为跳跳申请500RMB+500NT激励。 | 0x8a655b08ed1039294816e49e1c3e0e95370cd2456daf26c2f4d1ce1c9ff3c298 | ntdao.eth | 南塘DAO | 10 | basic | closed | 2 | 1,773,216,574 | 2026-03-11 08:09:34 | 1,773,216,574 | 2026-03-11 08:09:34 | 1,773,475,774 | 2026-03-14 08:09:34 | 0x4640e76cfB16F769D7d08F883c32924060B51c2C |
S5-11 第二期南塘艺术共创营结项报告
- 报告提交人：共创营项目组
(砚仁、小白、跳、朝林、淅淅、小洪、世佳、亭真、超子、刘宇等)
- 报告日期：2026年2月13日
---
### **1. 项目前言**
南塘艺术共创营作为南塘DAO探索社区活化、文化价值转化与经济内循环的核心实验，已成功完成首期验证。首期活动在建立品牌认知、吸引青年群体、产出文化资产及初步测试“艺术+社区+积分”模式上取得了超预期的成功，但也暴露出NT经济系统、课程节奏与运营管理等方面的问题。
基于深度复盘与社区共识，第二期共创营于2026年1月15日至2月4日举办。本期活动在延续核心实验精神的基础上，明确提出“模式迭代、深度叙事与价值闭环”的进阶目标，聚焦“南塘人物志”主题，旨在通过更系统的工笔人物画教学、更精细的NT经济设计、更深度的社区融合，构建一个更具可持续性与可复制性的品牌项目，并为南塘的社区资产数字化探索可行路径。
---
### **2. 项目目标**
本期项目设定以下量化与定性目标体系，作为执行与评估的基准：
- *核心产出目标：**完成20-24幅高质量《南塘人物志》主题工笔画，人均刻制1枚姓名章、2枚闲章；100%作品完成NFT化数字存档。
- *模式迭代目标：**验证“基础收费+NT激励”混合模型；成功运行“NT实景游戏”；产出标准化运营手册2.0。
- *社区与传播目标：**深度访谈记录15位以上村民故事；举办一场线下参观成果展与拍卖会；建立涵盖两期共创人的活跃校友网络。
- *财务与效率目标：**控制现金支出在预算内并力争节约5%；实现NT系统零重大信用争议；核心课程出勤率与活动满意度均达90%以上。
---
### **3. 项目完成情况**
### **3.1 目标达成度总览**
本期活动在全体工作人员、实习生、村民及20位共创人的共同努力下，**在量化指标上全面达成并部分超越了预设目标**。然而，在更深层次的**创作质量、参与者体验与组织效能**上，暴露出亟待解决的重要问题。
| **目标类别** | **预设目标** | **实际达成** | **达成状态** | **暴露的核心问题** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **核心产出** | 20-24幅画作 | **23幅**完整装裱画作 | **数量超额** | **质量不均**：部分画作因后期时间仓促，上色等工艺未完成，需导师补救，影响了整体的艺术完成度与收藏价值。复盘会中明确指出，许多共创人在画展前两天仍在画线稿，进度严重滞后。 |
| | 人均刻制1枚姓名章、2枚闲章 | **30枚**印章 | **部分达成** | 实际刻制30枚，未达到人均3枚（60枚）的目标，部分参与者未能完成个人印章。 |
| | 20幅作品NFT化 | **23幅**作品全部NFT化 | **达成** | **过程记录失范**：部分作品的创作过程记录不完整、不严谨，NFT的数字资产价值根基不牢。 |
| **模式迭代** | NT系统稳定运行 | 建立动态任务板，完成实景游戏 | **流程达成** | **激励导向偏差**：NT发放与“出勤”而非“学习成果/创作质量”强关联，导致部分共创人动力错位。共创人反馈因已付材料费，对作业与最终产出的重视程度不足，缺乏有效激励。 |
| | 验证收费模式 | 费用100%收取 | **达成** | **定位出现摇摆**：在“深度艺术创作营”与“氛围体验营”之间产生模糊，影响了核心群体的筛选与投入度。 |
| **社区影响** | 记录15+人物故事 | 深度访谈**20位**村民 | **超额完成** | — |
| | 展览与拍卖会 | 吸引大量访客，线上拍品首次以U成交 | **超额完成** | — |
| **组织效能** | 参与度>90% | 核心课程出勤率**92%** | **达成** | **协调机制失灵**：协调员角色定位模糊、职责不清，未能有效进行过程管理、冲突干预与质量把控。复盘会中多次讨论协调员职责、招募方式及与共创人身份的隔阂问题。 |
| | 满意度>4.5分 | 满意度平均分**4.7/5** | **达成** | **个体体验分化**：在整体高满意度下，因人数较多、个体期待差异及内部沟通矛盾，导致部分参与者体验不佳。如“橘子事件”、饺子宴劳动定价纠纷、拍卖会视频播放争议等，暴露了沟通与规则应用的不足。 |
### **3.2 往期对比：进步与新增挑战**
| **对比维度** | **第一期 (探索期)** | **第二期 (迭代期)** | **关键进步与新增挑战** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **组织规划** | 节奏摸索，问题突发。 | 日程系统，但**时长（22天）设计过长**，反而导致前期松懈与后期仓促，未能提升质量。 | **新认知**：并非时间越长效果越好，**强度、节奏与期限压力**的平衡是关键。共创人反思课程前期分解教学时间过长，社区活动与课程衔接不畅。 |
| **人员规模** | 20人，探索上限。 | 维持20人，丰富了展览但**稀释了个体关注度**，暴露了在现有支撑体系下的人数管理瓶颈。 | **新挑战**：需在“规模效应”与“深度体验”间做出更精准的权衡，并配套相应的组织能力。 |
| **角色分工** | 核心团队职责模糊。 | 设立了“协调员”等新角色，但**职责、权力、工作流极度模糊**，导致岗位空转，未能赋能反而增加混乱。 | **核心教训**：**组织创新必须先于角色创新**。新角色的设立必须伴随清晰的职责定义、培训与考核机制。复盘会共识：未来应明确协调员职责、公开招募流程，并加强岗前沟通。 |
| **质量把控** | 完成即胜利。 | 提出了更高质量要求，但**缺乏贯穿全程的、刚性的质量节点评审与验收机制**，最终质量依赖个人自觉与导师补救。 | **迭代关键**：必须建立从构思、草稿、正稿到成品的**阶段性质量闸口**，并将NT激励等资源与之绑定。建议设立“草稿评审会”、“白描验收”等节点。 |
---
### **4. 资源使用情况**
- **财务决算：**
**现金收支**：总收入4**0,073元**（包括项目原有资产1,700元、参与者收费5,400元、拍卖会现金收入2,973元、与刘兵哥兑换ETH所得30,000元）。
现金总支出36520**元**，结余3553**元**。
**NT收支**：总收入12**1,180 NT**（含南塘DAO金库拨付40,000 NT、众筹集49,054 NT、拍卖会收入32,126 NT）。
NT总支出119763.6 **NT，（nt系统89763，给**刘兵**30000nt）**，结余1416.4 **NT**。本期活动共计新增发行NT 40000 NT，总流通量约119763.6 **NT**。
详细决算表见附录一。
- 人力投入：核心团队7人全程投入，4名实习生提供有力支持，超过30位村民以各种形式（模特、导师、后勤）参与共创，形成了高密度、高质量的协作网络。
| 支出项 | 计算标准 | RMB数额 | NT数额 | 支付状态 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 人力支出 | 5个工作组+其他公共岗位 | 25900 | 28940 | 未支付 |
| 非在地劳务支出 | 一位篆刻老师3节篆刻课程 | 900 | 0 | 已支付 |
| 生活组支出 | 经由生活组负责人出纳 | 11796.85 | 1190 | 已支付 |
| 宣发组支出 | 已由运维组负责人出纳 | 0 | 50 | 已支付 |
| 运维组支出 | 经由运维组出纳 | 18986.79 | 56928.6 | 已支付 |
| 课程组支出 | 经由课程组出纳 | 4870.54 | 30000 | 已支付 |
收支明细及全部凭证
[任务,费用,收支 (4).xlsx](attachment:58cd3e86-9dbd-41db-ab72-c8534155a6fc:任务费用收支_(4).xlsx)
[第二期共创营工资明细](https://www.notion.so/31fffc80e360800dafb8dcf78a42a719?pvs=21)
---
### **5. 成果转化**
本期活动产生了多维度的可转化成果：
1. *实体文化资产：**23幅《南塘人物志》工笔原作及30枚印章，已成为南塘社区珍贵的物理文化藏品。
2. *数字资产与IP：**全部作品的NFT及其创作过程数字档案，构成了南塘首个可确权、可追溯、可演进的数字艺术IP库。相关素材已用于生成首批AI文创设计稿（T恤、明信片等）。其中一件作品在线上直播拍卖中以500+元成交，成为第一笔以U（USDT）成交的拍品。
3. *品牌内容与传播资产：**产出纪录片1部、小组Vlog 4部、专题文章12篇、高质量活动图片逾2000张，极大丰富了南塘对外叙事的素材库。
4. **核心知识资产：**《南塘艺术共创营运营手册2.0》及配套的《NT经济系统白皮书1.0》，内含细分的任务拆解及预算表，为项目标准化复制与对外合作提供了核心文档。
5. *人才与关系资产：**两期共创人（共42人）组成的“南塘共建者”社群已具雏形，其中5位一期参与者深度转化为二期共建者，7位二期参与者加入南塘DAO一级组织。此外，已链接多位共创人，计划与一二期参与者合办同系列活动（已在筹备中）。
6. 本期共创营向一级组织交付的核心成果，并非单次活动的产出，而是一套经过现实检验的**治理判例库**。
过去，组织决策多依赖口头共识，执行过程中容易出现解释权模糊的问题。本期通过结构化会议与程序化决策，将关键争议转化为可追溯文本，使治理逻辑从“隐性经验”转变为“显性规则”。
以营期中的激励分配争议为例，项目组并未通过情绪调停解决问题，而是借助正式动议明确了两条关键边界：
- 项目预算不可突破，形成治理红线
- 共创人可在额度内提出分配方案，保留自治空间
这一决策不仅解决了当下问题，也为未来涉及劳动定价与资源配置的情境提供了参考范式。
**成果转化的价值主要体现在：**
- 将一次性冲突沉淀为长期可调用的治理模块
- 降低后续项目的制度设计成本
- 提高组织面对复杂协作时的确定性
| **阶段** | **会议特征** | **议事核心争点** | **治理经验萃取** | **组织心理特徵** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **筹备期** | 规则共创，定例会为主 | 权责界定、资源分配原则 | 建立“规则先行”的协作协议 | 初始不确定性导致的抵触与观望 |
| **营期间** | 动态调整，高频闪电会 | 冲突处理、饺子宴激励分配 | 将“情绪张力”转化为“制度优化” | 压力环境下对公平性的高度敏感 |
| **结项期** | 程序正义，成果结项会 | 成果评价、判例入库 | 强化分配过程的透明与公正 | 任务结束后的松弛与归属感构建 |
| **复盘会** | 深度反思，逻辑萃取会 | 制度失效点分析、迭代方向 | 识别僵化惯性，将冲突转化为燃料 | 对规则价值的深度认同与内化 |
由此，本期真正交付给组织的，是一种能够被复用的协作结构，而不仅是阶段性成果。
---
### **6. 经验总结**
- **成功经验（可复制的“南塘方法”）：**
1. **游戏化社区融合**：“NT实景游戏”有效提升探索与互动的主动性，是优秀的破冰与链接工具。其设计逻辑（量化计分表、任务发布、流通与发放逻辑）及链上化备注（与开发者社区协同完成bai开发）为后续活动沉淀了可复用的框架。
2. **主题聚焦叙事**：“人物志”主题成功引导创作深度，证明了**内容主题是凝聚共创能量的核心**。
3. **数字资产同步**：坚持创作与数字化存档同步，为后续价值衍生积累了宝贵资产。
4. **议事规则**：第二期最具启发性的经验在于，冲突未必意味着组织失序，反而可能是治理开始发挥作用的信号。当成员将“感到不公平”的情绪转译为规则修订的提案时，问题不再指向个体，而转向机制本身。这一转化有效降低了组织内部的情绪消耗，并避免对立关系的固化。
实践证明，议事规则不仅是沟通工具，更是一种结构性的“防火墙”：
- 保护提案者免受人身压力
- 将争议限制在议题之内
- 引导组织从对抗走向制度优化
对未来第三期而言，最值得延续的经验并不是某次会议如何展开，而是：
**让问题停留在机制层，而不是沉积在人际关系中。**
一个健康的组织无需回避冲突，但必须拥有承载冲突的制度容器。
- **核心教训与待改进之处：**
1. **营期节奏失衡与过程管理缺位**：22天营期导致“拖延症”普遍，**创作压力未能均匀分布**。未来需科学压缩核心创作周期，并设立更严格的中间评审节点。应要求协调员或筹备组定期组织小组会议监督进度，明确各阶段时间节点与责任。
2. **激励系统设计错位与失效**：NT发放与“出勤”挂钩是本轮最大设计失误之一，直接导致部分成员学习行为表面化。**激励必须精准指向我们希望发生的行为与成果**（如作业质量、创作阶段完成度）。关键在于NT未能与最终产出价值强关联，参与者缺乏“狼性竞争”或深度投入的经济动力。
3. **角色设计与赋能机制失败**：“协调员”岗位因缺乏清晰的职责、权力、培训和考核机制而近乎失效。这警示我们，**任何新岗位的设立，都必须配套完整的“角色说明书”和赋能工具包**。未来需明确其“信息桥梁”与“柔性支持”的核心职责，并考虑以“共创人”身份融入，减少身份隔阂。
4. **质量管控流程缺失**：对最终作品质量有要求，但**缺乏过程中的刚性管控流程**。应建立“草稿评审会”、“白描验收”、“色彩方案审核”等质量闸口，未通过则无法进入下一阶段，并与资源支持挂钩。
5. **冲突预判与干预机制缺位**：对共创人内部的矛盾与沟通问题，组织方采取了被动回避态度。未来需建立**轻量、前置的冲突调解机制**，例如制作《入营说明书》明确常见问题处理流程，或设立“中间人”角色在冲突发生时及时召集会议澄清立场，引导各方使用议事规则理性表达。
---
### **7. 模式验证与迭代价值**
本期活动在验证某些模式的同时，更深刻地揭示了成功所必需的前提条件：
1. **验证了“轻度收费”的可行性，但明确了“精准筛选”与“产品定位”的必要性**：收费模型可行（在维持20人规模下100%收取），但必须配套更严格的面试筛选机制，并明确将项目定位为**“精品艺术深度创作营”**，以吸引真正以**深度创作**为目的的参与者，确保社群基调与目标一致。
2. **验证了“游戏化激励”的效力，但揭示了“激励锚点”与经济系统设计的决定性作用**：游戏化设计能有效提升参与度，但激励的“锚点”（奖励什么行为）必须与终极目标（高质量创作）高度对齐。NT发放类似“中央银行”调控，影响整个社区经济生态，其发放机制（如是否与质量挂钩、如何流通）是需要专题深入研究的核心课题。
3. **揭示了“组织清晰度”与“规则适应性”是规模化的基石**：在从0到1的探索期后，从1到10的迭代期**核心挑战是组织与管理能力的升级**。明确的角色、流程、规则与质量控制，其重要性已超越单纯的课程或活动设计。同时，在短期营期中，需平衡“自由探索”与“规则引导”，让议事规则等组织工具在真实冲突中被感知和运用，而非机械培训。
4. **验证了“数字存档”的流程，但提示了“过程参与”与“权益归属”的核心地位**：数字资产化流程可行，但共创人对过程的敷衍态度表明，必须将**最终作品的部分所有权或长期收益权**明确且公平地归还给创作者，并加强过程记录的质量要求与激励，才能从根本上激发其对全流程的重视。
5. **两期回顾与验证：从理想自治到有边界的协作结构**
两期对比呈现出清晰的治理轨迹：
- **第一期：**理念先于结构，协作较多依赖个体与人情
- **第二期：**规则逐步进入运行，组织开始从“人治”走向“结构治理”
其中一个极具解释力的观察是：
成员对规则的“阻抗”与“需求”往往同时存在。
在顺畅情境中，人们倾向减少程序；而当资源分配或权责边界出现模糊时，对秩序的需求便迅速上升。
一个具有象征意义的细节是：即便在非正式聚会场景中，成员仍自发提出“一个一个说、把话听完”。这表明规则已不再只是外部要求，而逐渐转化为组织的“肌肉记忆”。
这一变化指向一个重要判断：
成熟的规则，应作为底层安全网存在——平时隐形，但在关键时刻提供支撑。
| **治理事项** | **第一期模式（探索版）** | **第二期模式（精进版）** | **验证的核心假设** | **迭代逻辑** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **提案机制** | 非正式口头提议 | 标准化提案，判例化审核 | 程序正义能吸收组织内部冲突 | 从“随机决策”转向“判例决策” |
| **冲突解决** | 依赖元老调解 | 建立公开质询与仲裁机制 | “情绪熵”需通过结构化程序释放 | 从“人情调停”转向“规则容器” |
| **资源调配** | 弹性较大，易发争议 | 明确预算法则与动态结余 | 规则“阻抗”与“需求”的动态平衡 | 从“模糊管理”转向“契约管理” |
| **协同模式** | 理想先于结构 | iMeeting 工具 + 顾问辅导 | 治理能力需从冲突中迭代升级 | 从“感性协作”转向“理性共创” |
因此，DAO治理不必追求持续性的高强度管控，而更应构建稳定结构，在其中保留自治空间。
---
### **8. 社区影响与可持续发展建议**
- **dao组织影响：规则作为跨社群协作的通用语言**
南塘DAO同时连接着两类差异显著的群体：
- 重视传统关系与经验的在地社区
- 强调自主与流动性的外来青年
实践显示，议事规则在两者之间发挥了“治理翻译器”的作用。当项目组以清晰的权责框架与合作社讨论资源问题时，这种契约式沟通反而增强了对方的安全感与可预期性。
这提示我们：
规则不仅是组织内部的秩序工具，也是一种跨社群协作的通用语言。
从长期视角看，南塘不必只是项目发生地，更可能成为“治理能力的输出节点”。若能将这种城乡协作经验进一步结构化，南塘有潜力为更多青年进入乡村实践提供稳定接口。
这种模式既有助于地方发展，也为更广泛的乡村建设探索出一种不依赖权威、而依赖规则的协作路径。
- **社区影响：**
**正面**：持续增强了社区文化自信与外部影响力，巩固了核心支持者网络。与村民深入链接，初步实现村庄原有消费场所接受NT兑换；通过展览在村民中产生知名度，并首次有经当地团委介绍的参与者加入，争取到官方支持。生活组与村民在应对后勤挑战中展现了“共同承担”的协作精神。
**反思**：活动对社区内部精力的消耗与扰动需要更精细的评估与管理。同时，大量小型活动（如桌游、“人生非卖品拍卖会”等虽丰富了内容，但与主线任务的平衡需重新审视，确保活动聚焦核心目标，避免分散精力。
- **可持续发展建议：**
**启动“组织能力筑基”计划，形成三大模块**：
**模块一：机制与角色优化**
- 制定《共创营全流程SOP手册》，明确各阶段关键任务、产出标准与决策节点。
- 编写《关键岗位职责说明书》（如总控、主教、协调员/助教、NT经济官），并公开招募，加强培训。
- 建立轻量级**冲突协调与信息同步机制**（如定期站会、争议快速响应流程）。
**模块二：课程与运营优化**
- **重新规划营期节奏**，压缩松散期，强化核心创作周期的紧凑感与节点压力。
- **建立“质量管控流程”**，设立创作阶段评审闸口，并将通过情况与NT激励、资源支持强绑定。
- **优化课程设计**，合理设定人物画创作难度预期，将部分有意义的“小型工作坊”（如诗会、剪纸）系统化纳入课程辅助体系。
**模块三：激励与权益优化**
- **重构NT激励模型**：确保50%以上奖励与**通过质量评审的创作阶段成果**挂钩，并探索更具激励性的发放形式。
- **探索“成果权益共享”模型**：试点提高作品销售收益中原创作者的分成比例（如增至40%），或设计清晰的版权衍生收益方案。
- **建立“校友网络”分级运营体系**，设计差异化的参与、赋能与回馈机制。
---
### **9. 结语**
综合第二期实践，可以看到一条逐渐清晰的逻辑：细腻的议事规则，是支撑复杂组织运作的最小颗粒。治理并不只存在于宏观制度之中，而存在于每一次被结构化的沟通与协商里。
本期实践至少推动了三项关键能力的生成：
**制度记忆：**关键决策被记录，使组织不再从零学习。
**情绪承载能力：**规则为分歧提供出口，而非让其撕裂结构。
**协作可复制性：**项目经验被模块化，为未来提供路径。由此可以形成一个更具普遍性的判断：
组织的长期稳定，并不依赖强权威，而依赖透明且可复用的规则结构。当规则逐渐嵌入日常运作，它会像空气一样不被察觉，却持续支撑组织前行。
南塘的探索提示我们：
真正重要的，不是避免分歧，而是让分歧能够在结构中。
第二期共创营是一次从“浪漫实验”迈向“理性建构”的关键阵痛期。我们收获了更丰富的作品与故事，也遭遇了更复杂的组织挑战与人性协调课题。
这些暴露的问题并非失败，而是成长必须经历的、宝贵的“成长痛”。复盘会中坦诚的交流与反思，正是社区韧性与生命力的体现。
它清晰地为我们指明了下一阶段的方向：**南塘艺术共创营未来的竞争力，将不仅来源于独特的社区资源与艺术主题，更来源于我们能否共同构建并持续迭代一套专业、清晰、公平且充满韧性的协作系统与文化**。我们将带着这些由全体参与者共同诊断出的“药方”，迈向更加坚实、高效、充满创造力的第三期。
### **附录**
（此部分列表完整，无需修改）
● 附录一：项目现金收支决算明细表
● 附录二：《南塘人物志》作品及NFT目录
[作品.zip](attachment:828708d4-e8f0-4afe-881b-c933b1614344:作品.zip) | S5-11 第二期南塘艺术共创营结项报告 | - 报告提交人：共创营项目组
(砚仁、小白、跳、朝林、淅淅、小洪、世佳、亭真、超子、刘宇等)
- 报告日期：2026年2月13日
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### **1. 项目前言**
南塘艺术共创营作为南塘DAO探索社区活化、文化价值转化与经济内循环的核心实验，已成功完成首期验证。首期活动在建立品牌认知、吸引青年群体、产出文化资产及初步测试“艺术+社区+积分”模式上取得了超预期的成功，但也暴露出NT经济系统、课程节奏与运营管理等方面的问题。
基于深度复盘与社区共识，第二期共创营于2026年1月15日至2月4日举办。本期活动在延续核心实验精神的基础上，明确提出“模式迭代、深度叙事与价值闭环”的进阶目标，聚焦“南塘人物志”主题，旨在通过更系统的工笔人物画教学、更精细的NT经济设计、更深度的社区融合，构建一个更具可持续性与可复制性的品牌项目，并为南塘的社区资产数字化探索可行路径。
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### **2. 项目目标**
本期项目设定以下量化与定性目标体系，作为执行与评估的基准：
- *核心产出目标：**完成20-24幅高质量《南塘人物志》主题工笔画，人均刻制1枚姓名章、2枚闲章；100%作品完成NFT化数字存档。
- *模式迭代目标：**验证“基础收费+NT激励”混合模型；成功运行“NT实景游戏”；产出标准化运营手册2.0。
- *社区与传播目标：**深度访谈记录15位以上村民故事；举办一场线下参观成果展与拍卖会；建立涵盖两期共创人的活跃校友网络。
- *财务与效率目标：**控制现金支出在预算内并力争节约5%；实现NT系统零重大信用争议；核心课程出勤率与活动满意度均达90%以上。
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### **3. 项目完成情况**
### **3.1 目标达成度总览**
本期活动在全体工作人员、实习生、村民及20位共创人的共同努力下，**在量化指标上全面达成并部分超越了预设目标**。然而，在更深层次的**创作质量、参与者体验与组织效能**上，暴露出亟待解决的重要问题。
| **目标类别** | **预设目标** | **实际达成** | **达成状态** | **暴露的核心问题** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **核心产出** | 20-24幅画作 | **23幅**完整装裱画作 | **数量超额** | **质量不均**：部分画作因后期时间仓促，上色等工艺未完成，需导师补救，影响了整体的艺术完成度与收藏价值。复盘会中明确指出，许多共创人在画展前两天仍在画线稿，进度严重滞后。 |
| | 人均刻制1枚姓名章、2枚闲章 | **30枚**印章 | **部分达成** | 实际刻制30枚，未达到人均3枚（60枚）的目标，部分参与者未能完成个人印章。 |
| | 20幅作品NFT化 | **23幅**作品全部NFT化 | **达成** | **过程记录失范**：部分作品的创作过程记录不完整、不严谨，NFT的数字资产价值根基不牢。 |
| **模式迭代** | NT系统稳定运行 | 建立动态任务板，完成实景游戏 | **流程达成** | **激励导向偏差**：NT发放与“出勤”而非“学习成果/创作质量”强关联，导致部分共创人动力错位。共创人反馈因已付材料费，对作业与最终产出的重视程度不足，缺乏有效激励。 |
| | 验证收费模式 | 费用100%收取 | **达成** | **定位出现摇摆**：在“深度艺术创作营”与“氛围体验营”之间产生模糊，影响了核心群体的筛选与投入度。 |
| **社区影响** | 记录15+人物故事 | 深度访谈**20位**村民 | **超额完成** | — |
| | 展览与拍卖会 | 吸引大量访客，线上拍品首次以U成交 | **超额完成** | — |
| **组织效能** | 参与度>90% | 核心课程出勤率**92%** | **达成** | **协调机制失灵**：协调员角色定位模糊、职责不清，未能有效进行过程管理、冲突干预与质量把控。复盘会中多次讨论协调员职责、招募方式及与共创人身份的隔阂问题。 |
| | 满意度>4.5分 | 满意度平均分**4.7/5** | **达成** | **个体体验分化**：在整体高满意度下，因人数较多、个体期待差异及内部沟通矛盾，导致部分参与者体验不佳。如“橘子事件”、饺子宴劳动定价纠纷、拍卖会视频播放争议等，暴露了沟通与规则应用的不足。 |
### **3.2 往期对比：进步与新增挑战**
| **对比维度** | **第一期 (探索期)** | **第二期 (迭代期)** | **关键进步与新增挑战** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **组织规划** | 节奏摸索，问题突发。 | 日程系统，但**时长（22天）设计过长**，反而导致前期松懈与后期仓促，未能提升质量。 | **新认知**：并非时间越长效果越好，**强度、节奏与期限压力**的平衡是关键。共创人反思课程前期分解教学时间过长，社区活动与课程衔接不畅。 |
| **人员规模** | 20人，探索上限。 | 维持20人，丰富了展览但**稀释了个体关注度**，暴露了在现有支撑体系下的人数管理瓶颈。 | **新挑战**：需在“规模效应”与“深度体验”间做出更精准的权衡，并配套相应的组织能力。 |
| **角色分工** | 核心团队职责模糊。 | 设立了“协调员”等新角色，但**职责、权力、工作流极度模糊**，导致岗位空转，未能赋能反而增加混乱。 | **核心教训**：**组织创新必须先于角色创新**。新角色的设立必须伴随清晰的职责定义、培训与考核机制。复盘会共识：未来应明确协调员职责、公开招募流程，并加强岗前沟通。 |
| **质量把控** | 完成即胜利。 | 提出了更高质量要求，但**缺乏贯穿全程的、刚性的质量节点评审与验收机制**，最终质量依赖个人自觉与导师补救。 | **迭代关键**：必须建立从构思、草稿、正稿到成品的**阶段性质量闸口**，并将NT激励等资源与之绑定。建议设立“草稿评审会”、“白描验收”等节点。 |
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### **4. 资源使用情况**
- **财务决算：**
**现金收支**：总收入4**0,073元**（包括项目原有资产1,700元、参与者收费5,400元、拍卖会现金收入2,973元、与刘兵哥兑换ETH所得30,000元）。
现金总支出36520**元**，结余3553**元**。
**NT收支**：总收入12**1,180 NT**（含南塘DAO金库拨付40,000 NT、众筹集49,054 NT、拍卖会收入32,126 NT）。
NT总支出119763.6 **NT，（nt系统89763，给**刘兵**30000nt）**，结余1416.4 **NT**。本期活动共计新增发行NT 40000 NT，总流通量约119763.6 **NT**。
详细决算表见附录一。
- 人力投入：核心团队7人全程投入，4名实习生提供有力支持，超过30位村民以各种形式（模特、导师、后勤）参与共创，形成了高密度、高质量的协作网络。
| 支出项 | 计算标准 | RMB数额 | NT数额 | 支付状态 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 人力支出 | 5个工作组+其他公共岗位 | 25900 | 28940 | 未支付 |
| 非在地劳务支出 | 一位篆刻老师3节篆刻课程 | 900 | 0 | 已支付 |
| 生活组支出 | 经由生活组负责人出纳 | 11796.85 | 1190 | 已支付 |
| 宣发组支出 | 已由运维组负责人出纳 | 0 | 50 | 已支付 |
| 运维组支出 | 经由运维组出纳 | 18986.79 | 56928.6 | 已支付 |
| 课程组支出 | 经由课程组出纳 | 4870.54 | 30000 | 已支付 |
收支明细及全部凭证
[任务,费用,收支 (4).xlsx](attachment:58cd3e86-9dbd-41db-ab72-c8534155a6fc:任务费用收支_(4).xlsx)
[第二期共创营工资明细](https://www.notion.so/31fffc80e360800dafb8dcf78a42a719?pvs=21)
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### **5. 成果转化**
本期活动产生了多维度的可转化成果：
1. *实体文化资产：**23幅《南塘人物志》工笔原作及30枚印章，已成为南塘社区珍贵的物理文化藏品。
2. *数字资产与IP：**全部作品的NFT及其创作过程数字档案，构成了南塘首个可确权、可追溯、可演进的数字艺术IP库。相关素材已用于生成首批AI文创设计稿（T恤、明信片等）。其中一件作品在线上直播拍卖中以500+元成交，成为第一笔以U（USDT）成交的拍品。
3. *品牌内容与传播资产：**产出纪录片1部、小组Vlog 4部、专题文章12篇、高质量活动图片逾2000张，极大丰富了南塘对外叙事的素材库。
4. **核心知识资产：**《南塘艺术共创营运营手册2.0》及配套的《NT经济系统白皮书1.0》，内含细分的任务拆解及预算表，为项目标准化复制与对外合作提供了核心文档。
5. *人才与关系资产：**两期共创人（共42人）组成的“南塘共建者”社群已具雏形，其中5位一期参与者深度转化为二期共建者，7位二期参与者加入南塘DAO一级组织。此外，已链接多位共创人，计划与一二期参与者合办同系列活动（已在筹备中）。
6. 本期共创营向一级组织交付的核心成果，并非单次活动的产出，而是一套经过现实检验的**治理判例库**。
过去，组织决策多依赖口头共识，执行过程中容易出现解释权模糊的问题。本期通过结构化会议与程序化决策，将关键争议转化为可追溯文本，使治理逻辑从“隐性经验”转变为“显性规则”。
以营期中的激励分配争议为例，项目组并未通过情绪调停解决问题，而是借助正式动议明确了两条关键边界：
- 项目预算不可突破，形成治理红线
- 共创人可在额度内提出分配方案，保留自治空间
这一决策不仅解决了当下问题，也为未来涉及劳动定价与资源配置的情境提供了参考范式。
**成果转化的价值主要体现在：**
- 将一次性冲突沉淀为长期可调用的治理模块
- 降低后续项目的制度设计成本
- 提高组织面对复杂协作时的确定性
| **阶段** | **会议特征** | **议事核心争点** | **治理经验萃取** | **组织心理特徵** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **筹备期** | 规则共创，定例会为主 | 权责界定、资源分配原则 | 建立“规则先行”的协作协议 | 初始不确定性导致的抵触与观望 |
| **营期间** | 动态调整，高频闪电会 | 冲突处理、饺子宴激励分配 | 将“情绪张力”转化为“制度优化” | 压力环境下对公平性的高度敏感 |
| **结项期** | 程序正义，成果结项会 | 成果评价、判例入库 | 强化分配过程的透明与公正 | 任务结束后的松弛与归属感构建 |
| **复盘会** | 深度反思，逻辑萃取会 | 制度失效点分析、迭代方向 | 识别僵化惯性，将冲突转化为燃料 | 对规则价值的深度认同与内化 |
由此，本期真正交付给组织的，是一种能够被复用的协作结构，而不仅是阶段性成果。
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### **6. 经验总结**
- **成功经验（可复制的“南塘方法”）：**
1. **游戏化社区融合**：“NT实景游戏”有效提升探索与互动的主动性，是优秀的破冰与链接工具。其设计逻辑（量化计分表、任务发布、流通与发放逻辑）及链上化备注（与开发者社区协同完成bai开发）为后续活动沉淀了可复用的框架。
2. **主题聚焦叙事**：“人物志”主题成功引导创作深度，证明了**内容主题是凝聚共创能量的核心**。
3. **数字资产同步**：坚持创作与数字化存档同步，为后续价值衍生积累了宝贵资产。
4. **议事规则**：第二期最具启发性的经验在于，冲突未必意味着组织失序，反而可能是治理开始发挥作用的信号。当成员将“感到不公平”的情绪转译为规则修订的提案时，问题不再指向个体，而转向机制本身。这一转化有效降低了组织内部的情绪消耗，并避免对立关系的固化。
实践证明，议事规则不仅是沟通工具，更是一种结构性的“防火墙”：
- 保护提案者免受人身压力
- 将争议限制在议题之内
- 引导组织从对抗走向制度优化
对未来第三期而言，最值得延续的经验并不是某次会议如何展开，而是：
**让问题停留在机制层，而不是沉积在人际关系中。**
一个健康的组织无需回避冲突，但必须拥有承载冲突的制度容器。
- **核心教训与待改进之处：**
1. **营期节奏失衡与过程管理缺位**：22天营期导致“拖延症”普遍，**创作压力未能均匀分布**。未来需科学压缩核心创作周期，并设立更严格的中间评审节点。应要求协调员或筹备组定期组织小组会议监督进度，明确各阶段时间节点与责任。
2. **激励系统设计错位与失效**：NT发放与“出勤”挂钩是本轮最大设计失误之一，直接导致部分成员学习行为表面化。**激励必须精准指向我们希望发生的行为与成果**（如作业质量、创作阶段完成度）。关键在于NT未能与最终产出价值强关联，参与者缺乏“狼性竞争”或深度投入的经济动力。
3. **角色设计与赋能机制失败**：“协调员”岗位因缺乏清晰的职责、权力、培训和考核机制而近乎失效。这警示我们，**任何新岗位的设立，都必须配套完整的“角色说明书”和赋能工具包**。未来需明确其“信息桥梁”与“柔性支持”的核心职责，并考虑以“共创人”身份融入，减少身份隔阂。
4. **质量管控流程缺失**：对最终作品质量有要求，但**缺乏过程中的刚性管控流程**。应建立“草稿评审会”、“白描验收”、“色彩方案审核”等质量闸口，未通过则无法进入下一阶段，并与资源支持挂钩。
5. **冲突预判与干预机制缺位**：对共创人内部的矛盾与沟通问题，组织方采取了被动回避态度。未来需建立**轻量、前置的冲突调解机制**，例如制作《入营说明书》明确常见问题处理流程，或设立“中间人”角色在冲突发生时及时召集会议澄清立场，引导各方使用议事规则理性表达。
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### **7. 模式验证与迭代价值**
本期活动在验证某些模式的同时，更深刻地揭示了成功所必需的前提条件：
1. **验证了“轻度收费”的可行性，但明确了“精准筛选”与“产品定位”的必要性**：收费模型可行（在维持20人规模下100%收取），但必须配套更严格的面试筛选机制，并明确将项目定位为**“精品艺术深度创作营”**，以吸引真正以**深度创作**为目的的参与者，确保社群基调与目标一致。
2. **验证了“游戏化激励”的效力，但揭示了“激励锚点”与经济系统设计的决定性作用**：游戏化设计能有效提升参与度，但激励的“锚点”（奖励什么行为）必须与终极目标（高质量创作）高度对齐。NT发放类似“中央银行”调控，影响整个社区经济生态，其发放机制（如是否与质量挂钩、如何流通）是需要专题深入研究的核心课题。
3. **揭示了“组织清晰度”与“规则适应性”是规模化的基石**：在从0到1的探索期后，从1到10的迭代期**核心挑战是组织与管理能力的升级**。明确的角色、流程、规则与质量控制，其重要性已超越单纯的课程或活动设计。同时，在短期营期中，需平衡“自由探索”与“规则引导”，让议事规则等组织工具在真实冲突中被感知和运用，而非机械培训。
4. **验证了“数字存档”的流程，但提示了“过程参与”与“权益归属”的核心地位**：数字资产化流程可行，但共创人对过程的敷衍态度表明，必须将**最终作品的部分所有权或长期收益权**明确且公平地归还给创作者，并加强过程记录的质量要求与激励，才能从根本上激发其对全流程的重视。
5. **两期回顾与验证：从理想自治到有边界的协作结构**
两期对比呈现出清晰的治理轨迹：
- **第一期：**理念先于结构，协作较多依赖个体与人情
- **第二期：**规则逐步进入运行，组织开始从“人治”走向“结构治理”
其中一个极具解释力的观察是：
成员对规则的“阻抗”与“需求”往往同时存在。
在顺畅情境中，人们倾向减少程序；而当资源分配或权责边界出现模糊时，对秩序的需求便迅速上升。
一个具有象征意义的细节是：即便在非正式聚会场景中，成员仍自发提出“一个一个说、把话听完”。这表明规则已不再只是外部要求，而逐渐转化为组织的“肌肉记忆”。
这一变化指向一个重要判断：
成熟的规则，应作为底层安全网存在——平时隐形，但在关键时刻提供支撑。
| **治理事项** | **第一期模式（探索版）** | **第二期模式（精进版）** | **验证的核心假设** | **迭代逻辑** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **提案机制** | 非正式口头提议 | 标准化提案，判例化审核 | 程序正义能吸收组织内部冲突 | 从“随机决策”转向“判例决策” |
| **冲突解决** | 依赖元老调解 | 建立公开质询与仲裁机制 | “情绪熵”需通过结构化程序释放 | 从“人情调停”转向“规则容器” |
| **资源调配** | 弹性较大，易发争议 | 明确预算法则与动态结余 | 规则“阻抗”与“需求”的动态平衡 | 从“模糊管理”转向“契约管理” |
| **协同模式** | 理想先于结构 | iMeeting 工具 + 顾问辅导 | 治理能力需从冲突中迭代升级 | 从“感性协作”转向“理性共创” |
因此，DAO治理不必追求持续性的高强度管控，而更应构建稳定结构，在其中保留自治空间。
---
### **8. 社区影响与可持续发展建议**
- **dao组织影响：规则作为跨社群协作的通用语言**
南塘DAO同时连接着两类差异显著的群体：
- 重视传统关系与经验的在地社区
- 强调自主与流动性的外来青年
实践显示，议事规则在两者之间发挥了“治理翻译器”的作用。当项目组以清晰的权责框架与合作社讨论资源问题时，这种契约式沟通反而增强了对方的安全感与可预期性。
这提示我们：
规则不仅是组织内部的秩序工具，也是一种跨社群协作的通用语言。
从长期视角看，南塘不必只是项目发生地，更可能成为“治理能力的输出节点”。若能将这种城乡协作经验进一步结构化，南塘有潜力为更多青年进入乡村实践提供稳定接口。
这种模式既有助于地方发展，也为更广泛的乡村建设探索出一种不依赖权威、而依赖规则的协作路径。
- **社区影响：**
**正面**：持续增强了社区文化自信与外部影响力，巩固了核心支持者网络。与村民深入链接，初步实现村庄原有消费场所接受NT兑换；通过展览在村民中产生知名度，并首次有经当地团委介绍的参与者加入，争取到官方支持。生活组与村民在应对后勤挑战中展现了“共同承担”的协作精神。
**反思**：活动对社区内部精力的消耗与扰动需要更精细的评估与管理。同时，大量小型活动（如桌游、“人生非卖品拍卖会”等虽丰富了内容，但与主线任务的平衡需重新审视，确保活动聚焦核心目标，避免分散精力。
- **可持续发展建议：**
**启动“组织能力筑基”计划，形成三大模块**：
**模块一：机制与角色优化**
- 制定《共创营全流程SOP手册》，明确各阶段关键任务、产出标准与决策节点。
- 编写《关键岗位职责说明书》（如总控、主教、协调员/助教、NT经济官），并公开招募，加强培训。
- 建立轻量级**冲突协调与信息同步机制**（如定期站会、争议快速响应流程）。
**模块二：课程与运营优化**
- **重新规划营期节奏**，压缩松散期，强化核心创作周期的紧凑感与节点压力。
- **建立“质量管控流程”**，设立创作阶段评审闸口，并将通过情况与NT激励、资源支持强绑定。
- **优化课程设计**，合理设定人物画创作难度预期，将部分有意义的“小型工作坊”（如诗会、剪纸）系统化纳入课程辅助体系。
**模块三：激励与权益优化**
- **重构NT激励模型**：确保50%以上奖励与**通过质量评审的创作阶段成果**挂钩，并探索更具激励性的发放形式。
- **探索“成果权益共享”模型**：试点提高作品销售收益中原创作者的分成比例（如增至40%），或设计清晰的版权衍生收益方案。
- **建立“校友网络”分级运营体系**，设计差异化的参与、赋能与回馈机制。
---
### **9. 结语**
综合第二期实践，可以看到一条逐渐清晰的逻辑：细腻的议事规则，是支撑复杂组织运作的最小颗粒。治理并不只存在于宏观制度之中，而存在于每一次被结构化的沟通与协商里。
本期实践至少推动了三项关键能力的生成：
**制度记忆：**关键决策被记录，使组织不再从零学习。
**情绪承载能力：**规则为分歧提供出口，而非让其撕裂结构。
**协作可复制性：**项目经验被模块化，为未来提供路径。由此可以形成一个更具普遍性的判断：
组织的长期稳定，并不依赖强权威，而依赖透明且可复用的规则结构。当规则逐渐嵌入日常运作，它会像空气一样不被察觉，却持续支撑组织前行。
南塘的探索提示我们：
真正重要的，不是避免分歧，而是让分歧能够在结构中。
第二期共创营是一次从“浪漫实验”迈向“理性建构”的关键阵痛期。我们收获了更丰富的作品与故事，也遭遇了更复杂的组织挑战与人性协调课题。
这些暴露的问题并非失败，而是成长必须经历的、宝贵的“成长痛”。复盘会中坦诚的交流与反思，正是社区韧性与生命力的体现。
它清晰地为我们指明了下一阶段的方向：**南塘艺术共创营未来的竞争力，将不仅来源于独特的社区资源与艺术主题，更来源于我们能否共同构建并持续迭代一套专业、清晰、公平且充满韧性的协作系统与文化**。我们将带着这些由全体参与者共同诊断出的“药方”，迈向更加坚实、高效、充满创造力的第三期。
### **附录**
（此部分列表完整，无需修改）
● 附录一：项目现金收支决算明细表
● 附录二：《南塘人物志》作品及NFT目录
[作品.zip](attachment:828708d4-e8f0-4afe-881b-c933b1614344:作品.zip) | 0xbf3e040d83ae70858fea0b5f66190afbaf57e01b41a166905fb9c8c2b4c4383b | ntdao.eth | 南塘DAO | 10 | basic | closed | 2 | 1,773,215,405 | 2026-03-11 07:50:05 | 1,773,215,405 | 2026-03-11 07:50:05 | 1,773,474,605 | 2026-03-14 07:50:05 | 0x4640e76cfB16F769D7d08F883c32924060B51c2C |
DIP079 - Adjust USX Risk Parameters and Decommission sUSX Savings Rate
## Summary
This proposal recommends several adjustments to the **USX stablecoin** to strengthen protocol risk management.
Proposed changes:
1. **Disable the USX Savings Rate (sUSX)**.
2. **Set LTV of USX and sUSX to 0** across all markets.
3. **Disable USX minting from Vaults** on all supported chains.
---
# Motivation
Following the approval of [**DIP076**](https://snapshot.org/#/s:dforcenet.eth/proposal/0xed2a28e9da44445e9c0be1919d6fa4f009742bc5400fdf3a6f0fad124297a5b4), which proposes to sunset **USX and sUSX on Unitus Finance**, this proposal takes the next step toward gradually winding down their roles within the **dForce ecosystem**.
Specifically, the proposed adjustments aim to:
- **Reduce protocol liabilities** associated with maintaining the USX savings rate.
- **Strengthen risk management** by preventing potential circular leverage involving USX and sUSX.
- **Disable underutilized minting pathways**, such as Vaults.
Together, these changes represent a prudent step toward **de-risking the protocol and streamlining the product architecture** as the ecosystem evolves.
---
# Proposed Changes
### 1. Disable USX Savings Rate (sUSX)
- Stop accrual of the **USX savings rate**.
- No new yield will be generated for sUSX.
- Users will still be able to **redeem sUSX for USX**.
---
### 2. Set LTV of USX and sUSX to 0 on Unitus Finance
| Modules | Status | Actions |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Gradually disable USX as collateral on Unitus Finance | 85% | 60%, 30%, 0% weekly |
| Gradually disable sUSX as collateral on Unitus Finance | 85% | 60%, 30%, 0% weekly |
Implications:
- USX and sUSX can **no longer be used as collateral for borrowing**.
- Existing users should adjust positions if necessary.
---
### 3. Disable USX Minting via all Vaults
- **Pause USX minting from Vaults** across all supported chains.
- Users can **repay debt and withdraw collateral normally**.
---
# Implementation
Upon governance approval, the following changes will be executed:
- Disable sUSX savings rate module
- Set **USX LTV → 0**
- Set **sUSX LTV → 0**
- Disable **USX minting via vaults** | DIP079 - Adjust USX Risk Parameters and Decommission sUSX Savings Rate | ## Summary
This proposal recommends several adjustments to the **USX stablecoin** to strengthen protocol risk management.
Proposed changes:
1. **Disable the USX Savings Rate (sUSX)**.
2. **Set LTV of USX and sUSX to 0** across all markets.
3. **Disable USX minting from Vaults** on all supported chains.
---
# Motivation
Following the approval of [**DIP076**](https://snapshot.org/#/s:dforcenet.eth/proposal/0xed2a28e9da44445e9c0be1919d6fa4f009742bc5400fdf3a6f0fad124297a5b4), which proposes to sunset **USX and sUSX on Unitus Finance**, this proposal takes the next step toward gradually winding down their roles within the **dForce ecosystem**.
Specifically, the proposed adjustments aim to:
- **Reduce protocol liabilities** associated with maintaining the USX savings rate.
- **Strengthen risk management** by preventing potential circular leverage involving USX and sUSX.
- **Disable underutilized minting pathways**, such as Vaults.
Together, these changes represent a prudent step toward **de-risking the protocol and streamlining the product architecture** as the ecosystem evolves.
---
# Proposed Changes
### 1. Disable USX Savings Rate (sUSX)
- Stop accrual of the **USX savings rate**.
- No new yield will be generated for sUSX.
- Users will still be able to **redeem sUSX for USX**.
---
### 2. Set LTV of USX and sUSX to 0 on Unitus Finance
| Modules | Status | Actions |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Gradually disable USX as collateral on Unitus Finance | 85% | 60%, 30%, 0% weekly |
| Gradually disable sUSX as collateral on Unitus Finance | 85% | 60%, 30%, 0% weekly |
Implications:
- USX and sUSX can **no longer be used as collateral for borrowing**.
- Existing users should adjust positions if necessary.
---
### 3. Disable USX Minting via all Vaults
- **Pause USX minting from Vaults** across all supported chains.
- Users can **repay debt and withdraw collateral normally**.
---
# Implementation
Upon governance approval, the following changes will be executed:
- Disable sUSX savings rate module
- Set **USX LTV → 0**
- Set **sUSX LTV → 0**
- Disable **USX minting via vaults** | 0x74b65a80e978de700bba1845669772c16963ecb44075b1699c37fecd19eeecb6 | dforcenet.eth | dForce | 1 | basic | closed | 9 | 1,773,199,484 | 2026-03-11 03:24:44 | 1,773,199,484 | 2026-03-11 03:24:44 | 1,773,458,684 | 2026-03-14 03:24:44 | 0x83A771769D1A344deED9Ea24aB58071e9Db2D90A |
Ballot 3 - to elect seven Multi-Sig Signers (part of Aavegotchi DAO Core Proposal to elect 9 Multi-Sig-Signers)
Ballot 3 - to elect seven Multi-Sig Signers (part of Aavegotchi DAO Core Proposal)
Author: Nestor (5583)
Vote Duration: 7 days (ends March 17, 2026)
Summary:
This binding "Ballot 3" is part of the simultanously running AavegotchiDAO Core Proposal to elect 9 Multi-Sig-Signers.
Ballot 1 and 2 have decided on two signers already. Ten of the initial twelve nominees remain.
This Ballot 3 will feature the 10 nominees and decide on seven signers of the Mulit-Sig-Wallet.
The CoreProp itself which is running in parallel decides through a Yes/No vote about the affirmation of the details and processes.
Election - Ballot 3, lasting 7 days, weighted voting
The list features the ten nominees (with mentions/tags where provided) in the order in which they nominated themselves:
Ballot 3:
- Fase
- Kokusho
- Musashi13
- Maxicrouton (Treasurer)
- Z_tef
- Zaunzi
- Crazy Crypto
- Nestor (Director)
- Totogotchu
- VR Dev (CryptoGotchi)
The seven names with the most votes on Ballot 3 will be Multi-Sig-Signers. This will make the number of 9 signers complete.
Thank you for voting!
Ballot 3 is open 7 days to March 17, you are electing Signers of the Multi-Sig-Wallet!
If not already, please vote on the Aavegotchi DAO Core Proposal to validate the Ballots! | Ballot 3 - to elect seven Multi-Sig Signers (part of Aavegotchi DAO Core Proposal to elect 9 Multi-Sig-Signers) | Ballot 3 - to elect seven Multi-Sig Signers (part of Aavegotchi DAO Core Proposal)
Author: Nestor (5583)
Vote Duration: 7 days (ends March 17, 2026)
Summary:
This binding "Ballot 3" is part of the simultanously running AavegotchiDAO Core Proposal to elect 9 Multi-Sig-Signers.
Ballot 1 and 2 have decided on two signers already. Ten of the initial twelve nominees remain.
This Ballot 3 will feature the 10 nominees and decide on seven signers of the Mulit-Sig-Wallet.
The CoreProp itself which is running in parallel decides through a Yes/No vote about the affirmation of the details and processes.
Election - Ballot 3, lasting 7 days, weighted voting
The list features the ten nominees (with mentions/tags where provided) in the order in which they nominated themselves:
Ballot 3:
- Fase
- Kokusho
- Musashi13
- Maxicrouton (Treasurer)
- Z_tef
- Zaunzi
- Crazy Crypto
- Nestor (Director)
- Totogotchu
- VR Dev (CryptoGotchi)
The seven names with the most votes on Ballot 3 will be Multi-Sig-Signers. This will make the number of 9 signers complete.
Thank you for voting!
Ballot 3 is open 7 days to March 17, you are electing Signers of the Multi-Sig-Wallet!
If not already, please vote on the Aavegotchi DAO Core Proposal to validate the Ballots! | 0x5eac8c97b24c19dd70939dc39321482492d07f4db62e0eaac1194bfb150ef75d | aavegotchi.eth | Aavegotchi | 8453 | weighted | active | 112 | 1,773,168,474 | 2026-03-10 18:47:54 | 1,773,168,474 | 2026-03-10 18:47:54 | 1,773,739,200 | 2026-03-17 09:20:00 | 0x4eDb4161D16c89b71Aec027930a943c3d4cf0777 |
ZenIP 42408: Authorization of $ZEN Allocation for a Phased, Alignment-First ZEN Staking Program
# ZenIP 42408: Authorization of $ZEN Allocation for a Phased, Alignment-First ZEN Staking Program
## Abstract
This ZenIP proposes authorizing a limited, time-bounded allocation of $ZEN from the DAO ecosystem budget to fund a phased relaunch of ZEN staking, beginning with a conservative Phase 1 focused on long-term alignment and ecosystem bootstrapping.
The proposal seeks explicit community authorization for the first year of staking incentives, alongside a high-level four-year vision, with each subsequent year subject to renewed DAO approval.
This ZenIP does not propose specific implementation details or vendor contracts. Those will be handled separately under approved vendor requirements.
## Motivation
Horizen is now operating in a new context: as a Layer 3 on Base, with the ambition of becoming the leading privacy execution layer within the Base ecosystem, and a home for applications that require privacy, compliance-aware design, and sustainable onchain economics.
In this context, staking serves a different role than in many Layer 1 networks. It is not required for validator security, should not exist solely to manufacture rewards, and must be sustainable, credible, and aligned with real ecosystem growth.
The primary objectives of relaunching ZEN staking are:
- **Bootstrapping aligned participation:** Create a committed base of long-term ZEN holders aligned with Horizen's roadmap.
- **Supporting the Horizen L3 ecosystem:** Provide a foundation for liquidity, distribution, and incentives that benefit projects launching on Horizen.
- **Establishing an alignment layer for future governance:** Create the conditions for credible governance participation without prematurely introducing complex mechanics.
- **Leveraging existing and emerging ecosystem value flows:** Supplement DAO-funded incentives with sustainable economics generated by the ecosystem itself. The goal is to replace the DAO-funded incentives with sustainable ecosystem-generated rewards as quickly as possible.
## Specification
### Scope of Community Authorization
**What This ZenIP Asks the DAO to Approve:**
- Authorization of a Year-1 $ZEN allocation for staking incentives
- Acknowledgement of a four-year indicative staking vision
- Agreement that each future year's allocation requires renewed DAO approval
- Confirmation that staking incentives are funded from the DAO ecosystem budget
**What This ZenIP Does Not Ask the DAO to Approve:**
- Specific vendors or contracts
- Liquid staking tokens
- Governance mechanics
- Cross-chain staking assets
### Proposed $ZEN Allocation
Staking incentives would be funded from the DAO ecosystem incentives allocation defined under Horizen 2.0 tokenomics.
**Year-1 Authorization (Requested):**
- 50,000 ZEN
- Time-bounded to 12 months
- Distributed according to the approved staking framework
| Year | Indicative Allocation (ZEN) | Notes |
|--------|-----------------------------|------------------------|
| Year 1 | 50,000 | Conservative launch |
| Year 2 | ~65,000 | Subject to DAO renewal |
| Year 3 | ~55,000 | Subject to DAO renewal |
| Year 4 | ~45,000 | Subject to DAO renewal |
| Total | ~215,000 | ~29% of ecosystem pool |
### High-Level Staking Framework
Phase 1 staking is designed around the following principles:
- Direct ZEN staking on Horizen L3
- Optional duration-weighted rewards
- Modest base ZEN rewards
- Additive ecosystem reward streams where available
- No liquid staking token in Phase 1
Implementation details will be handled through vendor requirements and do not require DAO approval at this stage.
### Leveraging Ecosystem Value Flows
In addition to the initial $ZEN allocation authorized by the DAO, the staking program is designed to incorporate sustainable, recurring rewards from across the Horizen ecosystem, reducing reliance on fixed emissions over time.
Concrete commitments include:
- **DAO Liquidity Provisioning Activities:** The DAO intends to allocate up to 50% of net earnings generated from DAO-managed liquidity provisioning activities to the ZEN staking program, subject to ongoing review and the DAO's long-term financial health.
- **zkVerify Validator Rewards:** The Horizen Foundation commits to routing 50% of $VFY earned from its zkVerify validator operations into the ZEN staking program as an additive reward stream.
These contributions are discretionary, subject to operational and regulatory considerations, and may be modified or discontinued as circumstances require.
Ecosystem projects building on Horizen are encouraged to contribute to this program by sharing a portion of their protocol economics or token distributions with ZEN stakers.
### Phased Approach
**Phase 1 — Alignment Foundation**
- Direct ZEN staking
- Duration-based reward weighting
- Ecosystem reward streams
- Focus on participation, retention, and simplicity
**Phase 2 — Governance Exploration (Future)**
- Potential linkage between staking and DAO participation
- Identity or reputation considerations
- Separate community proposals required
**Phase 3 — Capital Efficiency (Future)**
- Optional exploration of liquid staking or composability
- Only if justified by ecosystem maturity
- Requires separate ZenIPs
## Rationale
The community has seen examples across the industry where staking programs failed to create durable value — most notably programs perceived as token giveaways with no productive linkage, leading to sell pressure and erosion of trust.
This proposal incorporates explicit guardrails informed by those lessons:
- **Modest, capped emissions:** Staking incentives are intentionally limited and time-bounded.
- **Annual DAO renewal:** Each year of funding must be explicitly reauthorized by the DAO based on observed outcomes.
- **Clear separation between alignment and capital efficiency:** Phase 1 prioritizes long-term commitment over liquidity optimization.
- **Avoidance of premature complexity:** Features such as liquid staking, restaking, or cross-chain composability are deliberately deferred for future community decision.
- **Progressive introduction of sustainable economics:** While the program is initially bootstrapped with DAO-allocated $ZEN, it is explicitly designed to layer in value from ecosystem projects and community financing activities over time.
## Success Criteria
The DAO should evaluate the program based on:
- Percentage of circulating ZEN staked
- Distribution across duration-based tiers
- Stake retention over time
- Participation by ecosystem projects
- Sustainability of reward funding sources
Failure to meet objectives should result in non-renewal or redesign.
## Security and Privacy Considerations
This ZenIP does not introduce new security or privacy surfaces. Implementation details, including vendor selection and technical architecture, will be addressed in subsequent proposals. All staking mechanics will be subject to standard security review prior to deployment.
## Disclaimer
This proposal reflects current intent and is subject to technical, operational, and regulatory considerations. Nothing in this proposal should be interpreted as a guarantee of returns or future incentives.
## Voting
**For:** Support the authorization of a Year-1 $ZEN allocation of 50,000 ZEN for a phased, alignment-first ZEN staking program as outlined in this proposal.
**Against:** Do not support the authorization of this $ZEN allocation for a ZEN staking program. | ZenIP 42408: Authorization of $ZEN Allocation for a Phased, Alignment-First ZEN Staking Program | # ZenIP 42408: Authorization of $ZEN Allocation for a Phased, Alignment-First ZEN Staking Program
## Abstract
This ZenIP proposes authorizing a limited, time-bounded allocation of $ZEN from the DAO ecosystem budget to fund a phased relaunch of ZEN staking, beginning with a conservative Phase 1 focused on long-term alignment and ecosystem bootstrapping.
The proposal seeks explicit community authorization for the first year of staking incentives, alongside a high-level four-year vision, with each subsequent year subject to renewed DAO approval.
This ZenIP does not propose specific implementation details or vendor contracts. Those will be handled separately under approved vendor requirements.
## Motivation
Horizen is now operating in a new context: as a Layer 3 on Base, with the ambition of becoming the leading privacy execution layer within the Base ecosystem, and a home for applications that require privacy, compliance-aware design, and sustainable onchain economics.
In this context, staking serves a different role than in many Layer 1 networks. It is not required for validator security, should not exist solely to manufacture rewards, and must be sustainable, credible, and aligned with real ecosystem growth.
The primary objectives of relaunching ZEN staking are:
- **Bootstrapping aligned participation:** Create a committed base of long-term ZEN holders aligned with Horizen's roadmap.
- **Supporting the Horizen L3 ecosystem:** Provide a foundation for liquidity, distribution, and incentives that benefit projects launching on Horizen.
- **Establishing an alignment layer for future governance:** Create the conditions for credible governance participation without prematurely introducing complex mechanics.
- **Leveraging existing and emerging ecosystem value flows:** Supplement DAO-funded incentives with sustainable economics generated by the ecosystem itself. The goal is to replace the DAO-funded incentives with sustainable ecosystem-generated rewards as quickly as possible.
## Specification
### Scope of Community Authorization
**What This ZenIP Asks the DAO to Approve:**
- Authorization of a Year-1 $ZEN allocation for staking incentives
- Acknowledgement of a four-year indicative staking vision
- Agreement that each future year's allocation requires renewed DAO approval
- Confirmation that staking incentives are funded from the DAO ecosystem budget
**What This ZenIP Does Not Ask the DAO to Approve:**
- Specific vendors or contracts
- Liquid staking tokens
- Governance mechanics
- Cross-chain staking assets
### Proposed $ZEN Allocation
Staking incentives would be funded from the DAO ecosystem incentives allocation defined under Horizen 2.0 tokenomics.
**Year-1 Authorization (Requested):**
- 50,000 ZEN
- Time-bounded to 12 months
- Distributed according to the approved staking framework
| Year | Indicative Allocation (ZEN) | Notes |
|--------|-----------------------------|------------------------|
| Year 1 | 50,000 | Conservative launch |
| Year 2 | ~65,000 | Subject to DAO renewal |
| Year 3 | ~55,000 | Subject to DAO renewal |
| Year 4 | ~45,000 | Subject to DAO renewal |
| Total | ~215,000 | ~29% of ecosystem pool |
### High-Level Staking Framework
Phase 1 staking is designed around the following principles:
- Direct ZEN staking on Horizen L3
- Optional duration-weighted rewards
- Modest base ZEN rewards
- Additive ecosystem reward streams where available
- No liquid staking token in Phase 1
Implementation details will be handled through vendor requirements and do not require DAO approval at this stage.
### Leveraging Ecosystem Value Flows
In addition to the initial $ZEN allocation authorized by the DAO, the staking program is designed to incorporate sustainable, recurring rewards from across the Horizen ecosystem, reducing reliance on fixed emissions over time.
Concrete commitments include:
- **DAO Liquidity Provisioning Activities:** The DAO intends to allocate up to 50% of net earnings generated from DAO-managed liquidity provisioning activities to the ZEN staking program, subject to ongoing review and the DAO's long-term financial health.
- **zkVerify Validator Rewards:** The Horizen Foundation commits to routing 50% of $VFY earned from its zkVerify validator operations into the ZEN staking program as an additive reward stream.
These contributions are discretionary, subject to operational and regulatory considerations, and may be modified or discontinued as circumstances require.
Ecosystem projects building on Horizen are encouraged to contribute to this program by sharing a portion of their protocol economics or token distributions with ZEN stakers.
### Phased Approach
**Phase 1 — Alignment Foundation**
- Direct ZEN staking
- Duration-based reward weighting
- Ecosystem reward streams
- Focus on participation, retention, and simplicity
**Phase 2 — Governance Exploration (Future)**
- Potential linkage between staking and DAO participation
- Identity or reputation considerations
- Separate community proposals required
**Phase 3 — Capital Efficiency (Future)**
- Optional exploration of liquid staking or composability
- Only if justified by ecosystem maturity
- Requires separate ZenIPs
## Rationale
The community has seen examples across the industry where staking programs failed to create durable value — most notably programs perceived as token giveaways with no productive linkage, leading to sell pressure and erosion of trust.
This proposal incorporates explicit guardrails informed by those lessons:
- **Modest, capped emissions:** Staking incentives are intentionally limited and time-bounded.
- **Annual DAO renewal:** Each year of funding must be explicitly reauthorized by the DAO based on observed outcomes.
- **Clear separation between alignment and capital efficiency:** Phase 1 prioritizes long-term commitment over liquidity optimization.
- **Avoidance of premature complexity:** Features such as liquid staking, restaking, or cross-chain composability are deliberately deferred for future community decision.
- **Progressive introduction of sustainable economics:** While the program is initially bootstrapped with DAO-allocated $ZEN, it is explicitly designed to layer in value from ecosystem projects and community financing activities over time.
## Success Criteria
The DAO should evaluate the program based on:
- Percentage of circulating ZEN staked
- Distribution across duration-based tiers
- Stake retention over time
- Participation by ecosystem projects
- Sustainability of reward funding sources
Failure to meet objectives should result in non-renewal or redesign.
## Security and Privacy Considerations
This ZenIP does not introduce new security or privacy surfaces. Implementation details, including vendor selection and technical architecture, will be addressed in subsequent proposals. All staking mechanics will be subject to standard security review prior to deployment.
## Disclaimer
This proposal reflects current intent and is subject to technical, operational, and regulatory considerations. Nothing in this proposal should be interpreted as a guarantee of returns or future incentives.
## Voting
**For:** Support the authorization of a Year-1 $ZEN allocation of 50,000 ZEN for a phased, alignment-first ZEN staking program as outlined in this proposal.
**Against:** Do not support the authorization of this $ZEN allocation for a ZEN staking program. | 0x42044af02bd15a2dda1984c0e035601be083e608b14e1c8a1f4f956f9477aa24 | horizenfoundationnontechnical.eth | Horizen Non-Technical | 8453 | basic | active | 160 | 1,773,161,832 | 2026-03-10 16:57:12 | 1,773,161,832 | 2026-03-10 16:57:12 | 1,773,766,632 | 2026-03-17 16:57:12 | 0x7Fc0237D6a933CB0718222794682CbcB28402C5f |
[BIP-046] Staking Vault Optimization – Deactivation of Non-Profitable Vaults & Addition of New Yield Pools
Author: @LP17 – @BIMLabs
**Summary of the Proposal:**
This proposal aims to optimize the BIM Exchange staking ecosystem by:
- Deactivating vaults that no longer generate yield
- Adding new higher-yield liquidity pools
- Improving protocol profitability
- Increasing DAO revenue
Preparing the staking infrastructure for the next phase of the BIM 2026 roadmap
Several current vaults no longer generate rewards or compounding yield, meaning they no longer create value for users or the DAO treasury.
If approved, these inactive vaults will be disabled and replaced with more productive liquidity strategies.
**Context:**
The original BIM staking strategies were designed to compound rewards generated from external protocols. However, some vaults now:
- Have no rewards remaining
- Generate no compounding yield
- Provide no revenue for the DAO
- Maintaining these vaults increases protocol complexity without providing benefits to users.
At the same time, new opportunities within the Base ecosystem, particularly on Aerodrome, offer significantly higher yield opportunities.
**Proposal Details:**
This proposal aims to redirect liquidity toward productive strategies and improve capital efficiency.
Specification
Vaults Proposed for Deactivation :
Compound Vaults
- compound base usdc
- compound op usdt
- compound op eth
- compound op usdc
Morpho (Seamless) Vaults
- morpho base usdc
- morpho base weth
- morpho base cbbtc
Vaults to Disable on March 31
The following vaults will remain active until the Zealy campaign ends, then be disabled on March 31:
- compound base aero
- compound base usds
New Liquidity Pools Proposed
To replace inactive strategies, the following pools will be integrated into new vault strategies.
- WETH / msETH Estimated yield: ~9.15%
- msUSD / USDC Estimated yield: ~11.41%
These pools provide stronger yield opportunities and enable more efficient compounding strategies.
Strategic Direction
This proposal also represents a strategic shift from single-asset lending strategies toward dual-asset liquidity pools. Current vaults relying on single-asset lending (USDC, USDT, etc.) often generate limited yield on external lending platforms. Dual-asset liquidity pools allow the protocol to:
- Generate higher yields
- Increase DAO revenue
- Offer more attractive opportunities for users
- Improve capital efficiency
Alignment with the BIM 2026 Roadmap
The BIM 2026 roadmap includes the development of two native lending platforms:
- A crypto lending/borrowing platform
- A Real World Asset (RWA) lending platform
Once these platforms are live, single-asset lending strategies will become more useful within the BIM ecosystem itself, rather than relying on external protocols.
This proposal is therefore part of a progressive transition toward the future architecture of the BIM ecosystem.
Development Cost
Estimated implementation cost: $800
- Development will be carried out by Noé Rouméas.
- The funds will be sourced from the wallet, generated from BIM sales on ApeBond.
- The cost will be included in the DAO treasury report.
User Impact
If approved:
- Disabled vaults will no longer appear in the staking interface
- Users with deposits will still see the vaults in their dashboard
- Funds remain withdrawable at any time
- No funds will be locked or affected
Implementation
If the proposal passes:
- Target vaults will be disabled
- New liquidity pool strategies will be deployed
- The staking interface will be updated
- Treasury accounting will include the development cost
**Voting Options:**
✅ For — Approve BIP046
❌ Against — Reject the proposal
⚪ Abstain — No position
**Voting Instructions:**
- Connect to the voting platform using your wallet.
- Select the proposal regarding the opening of vote submissions.
- Choose the option that you believe best aligns with the vision and strategic objectives of BIM Protocol
- Confirm your vote.
**Voting Period:**
Voting will begin on [11/03/2026] and conclude on [14/03/2026]
We encourage every member of the BIM Protocol community to participate in this crucial vote. Your voice will guide the future of our platform and strengthen our position in the blockchain
ecosystem.
Discussion (optional): https://governance.bim.finance/t/staking-vault-optimization-deactivation-of-non-profitable-vaults-addition-of-new-yield-pools-temp-check/38 | [BIP-046] Staking Vault Optimization – Deactivation of Non-Profitable Vaults & Addition of New Yield Pools | Author: @LP17 – @BIMLabs
**Summary of the Proposal:**
This proposal aims to optimize the BIM Exchange staking ecosystem by:
- Deactivating vaults that no longer generate yield
- Adding new higher-yield liquidity pools
- Improving protocol profitability
- Increasing DAO revenue
Preparing the staking infrastructure for the next phase of the BIM 2026 roadmap
Several current vaults no longer generate rewards or compounding yield, meaning they no longer create value for users or the DAO treasury.
If approved, these inactive vaults will be disabled and replaced with more productive liquidity strategies.
**Context:**
The original BIM staking strategies were designed to compound rewards generated from external protocols. However, some vaults now:
- Have no rewards remaining
- Generate no compounding yield
- Provide no revenue for the DAO
- Maintaining these vaults increases protocol complexity without providing benefits to users.
At the same time, new opportunities within the Base ecosystem, particularly on Aerodrome, offer significantly higher yield opportunities.
**Proposal Details:**
This proposal aims to redirect liquidity toward productive strategies and improve capital efficiency.
Specification
Vaults Proposed for Deactivation :
Compound Vaults
- compound base usdc
- compound op usdt
- compound op eth
- compound op usdc
Morpho (Seamless) Vaults
- morpho base usdc
- morpho base weth
- morpho base cbbtc
Vaults to Disable on March 31
The following vaults will remain active until the Zealy campaign ends, then be disabled on March 31:
- compound base aero
- compound base usds
New Liquidity Pools Proposed
To replace inactive strategies, the following pools will be integrated into new vault strategies.
- WETH / msETH Estimated yield: ~9.15%
- msUSD / USDC Estimated yield: ~11.41%
These pools provide stronger yield opportunities and enable more efficient compounding strategies.
Strategic Direction
This proposal also represents a strategic shift from single-asset lending strategies toward dual-asset liquidity pools. Current vaults relying on single-asset lending (USDC, USDT, etc.) often generate limited yield on external lending platforms. Dual-asset liquidity pools allow the protocol to:
- Generate higher yields
- Increase DAO revenue
- Offer more attractive opportunities for users
- Improve capital efficiency
Alignment with the BIM 2026 Roadmap
The BIM 2026 roadmap includes the development of two native lending platforms:
- A crypto lending/borrowing platform
- A Real World Asset (RWA) lending platform
Once these platforms are live, single-asset lending strategies will become more useful within the BIM ecosystem itself, rather than relying on external protocols.
This proposal is therefore part of a progressive transition toward the future architecture of the BIM ecosystem.
Development Cost
Estimated implementation cost: $800
- Development will be carried out by Noé Rouméas.
- The funds will be sourced from the wallet, generated from BIM sales on ApeBond.
- The cost will be included in the DAO treasury report.
User Impact
If approved:
- Disabled vaults will no longer appear in the staking interface
- Users with deposits will still see the vaults in their dashboard
- Funds remain withdrawable at any time
- No funds will be locked or affected
Implementation
If the proposal passes:
- Target vaults will be disabled
- New liquidity pool strategies will be deployed
- The staking interface will be updated
- Treasury accounting will include the development cost
**Voting Options:**
✅ For — Approve BIP046
❌ Against — Reject the proposal
⚪ Abstain — No position
**Voting Instructions:**
- Connect to the voting platform using your wallet.
- Select the proposal regarding the opening of vote submissions.
- Choose the option that you believe best aligns with the vision and strategic objectives of BIM Protocol
- Confirm your vote.
**Voting Period:**
Voting will begin on [11/03/2026] and conclude on [14/03/2026]
We encourage every member of the BIM Protocol community to participate in this crucial vote. Your voice will guide the future of our platform and strengthen our position in the blockchain
ecosystem.
Discussion (optional): https://governance.bim.finance/t/staking-vault-optimization-deactivation-of-non-profitable-vaults-addition-of-new-yield-pools-temp-check/38 | 0x7632fc485f76c8ef855206235c089689fbc051406b798d79db91c1c9434a22d0 | daobim.eth | BIM | 8453 | basic | closed | 3 | 1,773,160,830 | 2026-03-10 16:40:30 | 1,773,247,230 | 2026-03-11 16:40:30 | 1,773,506,430 | 2026-03-14 16:40:30 | 0xAC9f5Dd1c3B58b70db20B08Ec5A81121BE4a8e61 |
P5 - WalletConnect Pay Rewards Budget
## Abstract
This proposal introduces a **WCT rewards budget for use and distribution of WalletConnect Pay** by allocating **50M WCT in 2026** to accelerate consumer usage, wallet adoption, and payment volume via WalletConnect Pay.
## Summary
This proposal establishes a **WalletConnect Pay Rewards Budget**, to incentivize both:
- **Consumers**, for making eligible retail purchases via WalletConnect Pay, and
- **Wallets**, for onboarding users and driving WalletConnect Pay usage through their wallet.
Rewards are **denominated and distributed in WCT tokens** and are designed to **align incentives across users, wallets, merchants, and the WCT ecosystem**.
WalletConnect Network will allocate **50M WCT in 2026** as a dedicated rewards budget for WalletConnect Pay to execute and evolve its rewards program. The program is expected to prioritize simplicity, predictability, and long-term sustainability, while allowing parameters such as rates and caps to evolve over time based on ecosystem feedback and performance evaluation.
## Background
WalletConnect Pay operates in a retail environment where adoption and scale depend on **user incentives**, **distribution**, and **developer participation**.
### Consumer Rewards
Traditional payment systems rely heavily on **cashback and consumer rewards** to drive usage, habit formation, and retention. These programs are typically funded through interchange, marketing budgets, or merchant subsidies and have become a standard growth lever across global payment networks.
### Wallet Rewards
In parallel, traditional payment networks rely on **interchange fees** to incentivize issuers and payment apps to distribute, promote, and support specific payment methods. Wallets play an analogous role in the WalletConnect ecosystem: they are the primary distribution channel for WalletConnect Pay and are responsible for onboarding users and enabling payment options.
### WCT Alignment
Allocating **WCT** to reward both **consumers** and **wallets** based on eligible payment activity mirrors the economic role of interchange and directly aligns incentives with network growth and payment adoption.
This approach supports:
- Expanding WCT utility in real-world commerce
- Rewarding both usage and distribution
- Aligning users, wallets, merchants, and partners around WalletConnect Pay
- Establishing sustainable growth loops for the WalletConnect Network
## Proposal
This proposal will allocate **WCT rewards budget** to users of and wallets distributing WalletConnect Pay, covering both **consumers** and **wallets** rewards throughout the 2026 calendar year.
### WalletConnect Pay Rewards
This rewards budget may apply reward mechanisms designed for simplicity, predictability, and ease of implementation. These may include flat reward rates, caps, and eligibility criteria, which can evolve over time based on ecosystem feedback and performance metrics.
WCT tokens rewards are envisioned for both consumers, as cashback-style rewards for eligible purchases, and wallets, based on WalletConnect Pay usage through their wallets.
### WCT Budget Allocation
Both **consumer rewards** and **wallet rewards** will be funded through the proposed **50M WCT** allocation from the WCT rewards budget, supplemented by revenue-driven WCT acquisitions on the open market and, optionally, future partner or merchant subsidies.
This proposal does **not introduce new token minting** and is funded partially from the WCT rewards allocation defined in the original WalletConnect Whitepaper.
Any portion of the allocated WCT that remains unused by the end of the 2026 calendar year will be reconciled and returned to the control of WalletConnect Network governance for reallocation through a subsequent governance process.
## Implementation Considerations
WalletConnect Foundation may periodically share high-level information about WCT budget regarding rewards distribution and remaining allocation. This is intended to provide ecosystem visibility and alignment with the WCT ecosystem.
## Call to Action
We invite the community to review the proposed WalletConnect Pay rewards allocation, evaluate its strategic relevance, sustainability, and incentive alignment, and share feedback from the perspectives of wallets, merchants, developers, and consumers.
## Next Steps
1. Community discussion and onchain vote to allocate WCT budget
2. Activation 2026 rewards allocation for WalletConnect Pay
3. Launch a closely monitored pilot phase for payment rewards
## References
1. WalletConnect Whitepaper: https://whitepaper.walletconnect.network/
2. Interchange Definition: https://www.financialprofessionals.org/training-resources/resources/articles/Details/interchange-fees-explained-what-they-are-and-how-they-work
3. Cashback Definition: https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/wealth-management/cashback/
4. WalletConnect Pay Rewards Announcement: https://walletconnect.com/blog/walletconnect-introduces-wct-rewards-for-walletconnect-pay-consumers | P5 - WalletConnect Pay Rewards Budget | ## Abstract
This proposal introduces a **WCT rewards budget for use and distribution of WalletConnect Pay** by allocating **50M WCT in 2026** to accelerate consumer usage, wallet adoption, and payment volume via WalletConnect Pay.
## Summary
This proposal establishes a **WalletConnect Pay Rewards Budget**, to incentivize both:
- **Consumers**, for making eligible retail purchases via WalletConnect Pay, and
- **Wallets**, for onboarding users and driving WalletConnect Pay usage through their wallet.
Rewards are **denominated and distributed in WCT tokens** and are designed to **align incentives across users, wallets, merchants, and the WCT ecosystem**.
WalletConnect Network will allocate **50M WCT in 2026** as a dedicated rewards budget for WalletConnect Pay to execute and evolve its rewards program. The program is expected to prioritize simplicity, predictability, and long-term sustainability, while allowing parameters such as rates and caps to evolve over time based on ecosystem feedback and performance evaluation.
## Background
WalletConnect Pay operates in a retail environment where adoption and scale depend on **user incentives**, **distribution**, and **developer participation**.
### Consumer Rewards
Traditional payment systems rely heavily on **cashback and consumer rewards** to drive usage, habit formation, and retention. These programs are typically funded through interchange, marketing budgets, or merchant subsidies and have become a standard growth lever across global payment networks.
### Wallet Rewards
In parallel, traditional payment networks rely on **interchange fees** to incentivize issuers and payment apps to distribute, promote, and support specific payment methods. Wallets play an analogous role in the WalletConnect ecosystem: they are the primary distribution channel for WalletConnect Pay and are responsible for onboarding users and enabling payment options.
### WCT Alignment
Allocating **WCT** to reward both **consumers** and **wallets** based on eligible payment activity mirrors the economic role of interchange and directly aligns incentives with network growth and payment adoption.
This approach supports:
- Expanding WCT utility in real-world commerce
- Rewarding both usage and distribution
- Aligning users, wallets, merchants, and partners around WalletConnect Pay
- Establishing sustainable growth loops for the WalletConnect Network
## Proposal
This proposal will allocate **WCT rewards budget** to users of and wallets distributing WalletConnect Pay, covering both **consumers** and **wallets** rewards throughout the 2026 calendar year.
### WalletConnect Pay Rewards
This rewards budget may apply reward mechanisms designed for simplicity, predictability, and ease of implementation. These may include flat reward rates, caps, and eligibility criteria, which can evolve over time based on ecosystem feedback and performance metrics.
WCT tokens rewards are envisioned for both consumers, as cashback-style rewards for eligible purchases, and wallets, based on WalletConnect Pay usage through their wallets.
### WCT Budget Allocation
Both **consumer rewards** and **wallet rewards** will be funded through the proposed **50M WCT** allocation from the WCT rewards budget, supplemented by revenue-driven WCT acquisitions on the open market and, optionally, future partner or merchant subsidies.
This proposal does **not introduce new token minting** and is funded partially from the WCT rewards allocation defined in the original WalletConnect Whitepaper.
Any portion of the allocated WCT that remains unused by the end of the 2026 calendar year will be reconciled and returned to the control of WalletConnect Network governance for reallocation through a subsequent governance process.
## Implementation Considerations
WalletConnect Foundation may periodically share high-level information about WCT budget regarding rewards distribution and remaining allocation. This is intended to provide ecosystem visibility and alignment with the WCT ecosystem.
## Call to Action
We invite the community to review the proposed WalletConnect Pay rewards allocation, evaluate its strategic relevance, sustainability, and incentive alignment, and share feedback from the perspectives of wallets, merchants, developers, and consumers.
## Next Steps
1. Community discussion and onchain vote to allocate WCT budget
2. Activation 2026 rewards allocation for WalletConnect Pay
3. Launch a closely monitored pilot phase for payment rewards
## References
1. WalletConnect Whitepaper: https://whitepaper.walletconnect.network/
2. Interchange Definition: https://www.financialprofessionals.org/training-resources/resources/articles/Details/interchange-fees-explained-what-they-are-and-how-they-work
3. Cashback Definition: https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/wealth-management/cashback/
4. WalletConnect Pay Rewards Announcement: https://walletconnect.com/blog/walletconnect-introduces-wct-rewards-for-walletconnect-pay-consumers | 0x3d6b84e2456d7e1248f83b6c60fbb37fbef9f04a0db0ae50cfc23e2cf530b1e5 | walletconnect.eth | WalletConnect Network | 10 | basic | active | 1,544 | 1,773,160,304 | 2026-03-10 16:31:44 | 1,773,187,140 | 2026-03-10 23:59:00 | 1,773,791,940 | 2026-03-17 23:59:00 | 0xcBec15583A21C3ddAD5fab658be5b4FE85Df730b |
Best DeFi Protocols of 2026
## Best DeFi Protocols of 2026
Vote for the DeFi protocols you believe are the most impactful, innovative, and well-governed.
### Criteria
- Innovation & technical excellence
- Security track record
- Governance quality
- Community impact
- TVL & adoption | Best DeFi Protocols of 2026 | ## Best DeFi Protocols of 2026
Vote for the DeFi protocols you believe are the most impactful, innovative, and well-governed.
### Criteria
- Innovation & technical excellence
- Security track record
- Governance quality
- Community impact
- TVL & adoption | 0xb9ac2e9eaae0628b7d077a3ea4527af5c8e6f3a0aa3f1880df59e101ef817fd2 | fabien.eth | Fabien | 1 | basic | active | 2 | 1,773,155,496 | 2026-03-10 15:11:36 | 1,773,165,600 | 2026-03-10 18:00:00 | 1,773,770,400 | 2026-03-17 18:00:00 | 0xeF8305E140ac520225DAf050e2f71d5fBcC543e7 |
[TEMP CHECK] Aave V4 Bug Bounty Program on Sherlock
## **Summary**
Aave Labs proposes launching a dedicated Aave V4 bug bounty program on the Sherlock platform. The objective is to add an always-on security reporting channel for Aave V4, with a triage setup designed to reduce spam and route high-severity reports with high urgency.
## **Motivation**
Aave V4 introduces new architecture and new attack surfaces. In addition to audits, formal verification, and other security review tracks, an ongoing bug bounty provides a complementary path for independent researchers to report issues during late-stage testing, launch, and post-launch.
### **Why Sherlock**
Sherlock positions its bug bounty platform around three operational goals: (i) strong visibility to experienced researchers, (ii) low spam volumes, and (iii) actionable triage with clear routing.
Sherlock has previously supported security work with Aave contributors across Aave V3 and in early Aave V4 efforts, which builds shared context on reporting standards, triage expectations, and escalation paths. Sherlock notes that its broader platform combines audit competitions with a bug bounty program, and that the bounty platform is designed to keep response workflows lightweight for core contributors while still surfacing high-severity reports quickly.
### **Spam resistance and operational focus**
A practical challenge for prominent programs is high volumes of low-quality submissions (including AI-generated reports), which can consume significant contributor time and degrade signal-to-noise. Sherlock’s model uses stake-gated submission rules for High/Critical reports while keeping Medium/Low submissions open to everyone, paired with a defined triage workflow and periodic summaries.
## **Specification**
This Temp Check proposes approving the creation of a dedicated Aave V4 bug bounty program hosted on [Sherlock](https://audits.sherlock.xyz/bug-bounties), with the commercial and operational structure summarized below.
### **Program scope**
* Aave V4: separate bug bounty program, scoped to the Aave V4 in-scope repositories and deployed contracts (final scope list to be published in the ARFC, alongside the payout table and severity criteria).
* This Temp Check is limited to the Aave V4 program; any broader consolidation or migration of other programs (if applicable) would be discussed separately.
### **Submission model (stake-to-submit for High/Critical)**
Sherlock’s proposed submission rules:
* **High/Critical submissions:** require a **250 USDC stake** to submit.
* If valid, the stake is returned alongside the bounty payout.
* If invalid, the stake is forfeited and applied toward triage costs.
* **Medium/Low submissions:** free to submit.
* These submissions **cannot be upgraded** into High/Critical payout tiers after submission, incentivizing accurate severity classification at time of filing.
### **Triage and routing**
Sherlock’s proposed workflow:
* **High/Critical:** immediate notification to Aave’s designated responders via agreed channels (e.g., Slack/email/Telegram), triggered when the stake is posted; then rapid validity triage by assigned security researchers across time zones for 24/7 coverage.
* **Medium/Low:** handled through a Sherlock workflow combining AI-assisted prioritization with human triage; a weekly summary is provided linking Medium/Low items and surfacing higher-quality reports (including those ultimately deemed invalid/out-of-scope but potentially useful).
* Aave retains dashboard visibility into submissions and conclusions.
### **Program management and integrations**
* Self-service controls for program configuration (scope, severity criteria, payout amounts, notification routing, and related settings).
* Standard and custom notification routing (Slack, email, Telegram, and custom workflows as needed).
### **Pricing options**
Sherlock proposed two options for the DAO to consider:
1. $24,000 fixed annual cost for hosting \+ triage, or
2. No fixed hosting/triage cost, with a 5% fee on bounty payouts.
The ARFC would present a single recommended option, along with implementation and payment details.
### **Risk considerations**
* **Stake gating tradeoff:** a stake requirement can reduce noise but may deter some researchers from submitting High/Critical reports. The intended mitigation is preserving free Medium/Low submissions and maintaining high visibility to experienced researchers through platform positioning and invitations.
* **Severity downgrade constraint:** prohibiting Medium/Low upgrades to High/Critical tiers can reduce “severity inflation,” but also penalizes misclassified submissions. Clear severity guidance and scope documentation would be part of the program launch materials.
* **Operational dependency:** triage and platform operations depend on a third-party provider; this is addressed via explicit routing, defined SLAs/expectations in the commercial agreement, and DAO visibility into outcomes.
## **Disclaimer**
* This Temp Check is posted by Aave Labs in its capacity as a contributor proposing an approach for Aave V4 security operations. Decisions and approvals belong to the DAO via the standard governance process.
* Sherlock is a third-party service provider. Final commercial terms and execution details would be presented in an ARFC and, if progressed, implemented via an AIP.
## **Next Steps**
1. Engage with the community and service providers to refine the detailed proposal
2. If consensus is reached on this TEMP, escalate this proposal to the Snapshot stage
3. If the TEMP snapshot outcome is YAE, incorporate stakeholder feedback and move proposal to ARFC stage
## **Copyright**
Copyright and related rights waived via[CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). | [TEMP CHECK] Aave V4 Bug Bounty Program on Sherlock | ## **Summary**
Aave Labs proposes launching a dedicated Aave V4 bug bounty program on the Sherlock platform. The objective is to add an always-on security reporting channel for Aave V4, with a triage setup designed to reduce spam and route high-severity reports with high urgency.
## **Motivation**
Aave V4 introduces new architecture and new attack surfaces. In addition to audits, formal verification, and other security review tracks, an ongoing bug bounty provides a complementary path for independent researchers to report issues during late-stage testing, launch, and post-launch.
### **Why Sherlock**
Sherlock positions its bug bounty platform around three operational goals: (i) strong visibility to experienced researchers, (ii) low spam volumes, and (iii) actionable triage with clear routing.
Sherlock has previously supported security work with Aave contributors across Aave V3 and in early Aave V4 efforts, which builds shared context on reporting standards, triage expectations, and escalation paths. Sherlock notes that its broader platform combines audit competitions with a bug bounty program, and that the bounty platform is designed to keep response workflows lightweight for core contributors while still surfacing high-severity reports quickly.
### **Spam resistance and operational focus**
A practical challenge for prominent programs is high volumes of low-quality submissions (including AI-generated reports), which can consume significant contributor time and degrade signal-to-noise. Sherlock’s model uses stake-gated submission rules for High/Critical reports while keeping Medium/Low submissions open to everyone, paired with a defined triage workflow and periodic summaries.
## **Specification**
This Temp Check proposes approving the creation of a dedicated Aave V4 bug bounty program hosted on [Sherlock](https://audits.sherlock.xyz/bug-bounties), with the commercial and operational structure summarized below.
### **Program scope**
* Aave V4: separate bug bounty program, scoped to the Aave V4 in-scope repositories and deployed contracts (final scope list to be published in the ARFC, alongside the payout table and severity criteria).
* This Temp Check is limited to the Aave V4 program; any broader consolidation or migration of other programs (if applicable) would be discussed separately.
### **Submission model (stake-to-submit for High/Critical)**
Sherlock’s proposed submission rules:
* **High/Critical submissions:** require a **250 USDC stake** to submit.
* If valid, the stake is returned alongside the bounty payout.
* If invalid, the stake is forfeited and applied toward triage costs.
* **Medium/Low submissions:** free to submit.
* These submissions **cannot be upgraded** into High/Critical payout tiers after submission, incentivizing accurate severity classification at time of filing.
### **Triage and routing**
Sherlock’s proposed workflow:
* **High/Critical:** immediate notification to Aave’s designated responders via agreed channels (e.g., Slack/email/Telegram), triggered when the stake is posted; then rapid validity triage by assigned security researchers across time zones for 24/7 coverage.
* **Medium/Low:** handled through a Sherlock workflow combining AI-assisted prioritization with human triage; a weekly summary is provided linking Medium/Low items and surfacing higher-quality reports (including those ultimately deemed invalid/out-of-scope but potentially useful).
* Aave retains dashboard visibility into submissions and conclusions.
### **Program management and integrations**
* Self-service controls for program configuration (scope, severity criteria, payout amounts, notification routing, and related settings).
* Standard and custom notification routing (Slack, email, Telegram, and custom workflows as needed).
### **Pricing options**
Sherlock proposed two options for the DAO to consider:
1. $24,000 fixed annual cost for hosting \+ triage, or
2. No fixed hosting/triage cost, with a 5% fee on bounty payouts.
The ARFC would present a single recommended option, along with implementation and payment details.
### **Risk considerations**
* **Stake gating tradeoff:** a stake requirement can reduce noise but may deter some researchers from submitting High/Critical reports. The intended mitigation is preserving free Medium/Low submissions and maintaining high visibility to experienced researchers through platform positioning and invitations.
* **Severity downgrade constraint:** prohibiting Medium/Low upgrades to High/Critical tiers can reduce “severity inflation,” but also penalizes misclassified submissions. Clear severity guidance and scope documentation would be part of the program launch materials.
* **Operational dependency:** triage and platform operations depend on a third-party provider; this is addressed via explicit routing, defined SLAs/expectations in the commercial agreement, and DAO visibility into outcomes.
## **Disclaimer**
* This Temp Check is posted by Aave Labs in its capacity as a contributor proposing an approach for Aave V4 security operations. Decisions and approvals belong to the DAO via the standard governance process.
* Sherlock is a third-party service provider. Final commercial terms and execution details would be presented in an ARFC and, if progressed, implemented via an AIP.
## **Next Steps**
1. Engage with the community and service providers to refine the detailed proposal
2. If consensus is reached on this TEMP, escalate this proposal to the Snapshot stage
3. If the TEMP snapshot outcome is YAE, incorporate stakeholder feedback and move proposal to ARFC stage
## **Copyright**
Copyright and related rights waived via[CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). | 0x44d4562d2c0800343a791d42dadc9b025a541f69cbce69e64af5de26fb35f74b | aavedao.eth | Aave DAO | 1 | basic | closed | 96 | 1,773,153,531 | 2026-03-10 14:38:51 | 1,773,239,931 | 2026-03-11 14:38:51 | 1,773,499,131 | 2026-03-14 14:38:51 | 0x66a28531E6f390A8CD44aB0C57a0F1aeb7E673FF |
[1IP-94] Renewal of Engagement of MME as External Counsel to the 1inch DAO
## **Summary**
The Legal Working Group (LWG) proposes that the 1inch DAO renew its engagement of MME as external legal counsel through a new **USD 15,000 retainer**, to be used on an “as-needed” basis. This Proposal provides a report on MME’s work under the prior mandate (approved in 1IP-72), including dispute-resolution analysis, compliance and sanctions assessments, governance research, and grant-framework development. The retainer from 1IP-72 has been fully utilized, all invoices have been accepted, and MME’s continued involvement is recommended to ensure continuity of legal risk management for the DAO.
## **1. Background and Purpose**
In 1IP-72, the DAO approved the engagement of MME as external counsel to support the Legal Working Group in addressing legal, compliance, and governance questions requiring professional legal analysis.
The previous retainer is now fully utilized. MME’s contributions have provided meaningful clarity and improved governance safeguards for the DAO.
This Proposal:
1. summarises the work completed under the previous engagement, and
2. requests renewal of the engagement via a new USD 15,000 retainer.
## **2. Work Completed by MME Under the Previous Retainer**
### **2.1. HW Dispute — Forum, Jurisdiction, and DAO Personality Issues**
MME worked closely with the LWG to evaluate how the DAO could pursue its claim in the HW matter. The analysis included:
* whether the DAO has legal personality or standing to initiate proceedings;
* identification of potentially competent jurisdictions;
* how to initiate a claim given the absence of a predetermined dispute-resolution mechanism;
* risks related to representation, enforcement, and counterparty identification.
**Outcome:**
After careful consideration it was concluded that arbitration is the most viable and defensible route for this dispute, resolving jurisdictional ambiguity and avoiding the most problematic procedural issues. The DAO was informed accordingly in [1IP-77.](https://gov.1inch.network/t/1ip-77-fast-track-authorize-1inch-foundation-to-represent-1inch-dao-in-hardware-wallet-dispute/797)
### **2.2. Development of the DAO Grant Form (Proposal Template \+ Grant Terms)**
To prevent repeats of the HW situation, the LWG—supported by MME—developed a standardized **[Grant Proposal Template](https://file.notion.so/f/f/2941985b-c151-8196-8765-0003a32b4582/cfb73a5d-afaf-4367-84cd-058137c68c28/1inch_DAO_Grant_Form.pdf?table=block&id=31a1985b-c151-807f-a349-cffdcff985a6&spaceId=2941985b-c151-8196-8765-0003a32b4582&expirationTimestamp=1772841600000&signature=UTuMTZGZ7MrfeiZjp8HPzFUr70toDxojWX3NCKwQL7I&downloadName=1inch+DAO+Grant+Form.pdf)** and **[Grant Terms](https://file.notion.so/f/f/2941985b-c151-8196-8765-0003a32b4582/01be4978-2898-499e-8696-e07321435136/1inch_DAO_Grant_Terms.docx.pdf?table=block&id=31a1985b-c151-8013-adb7-ddb6d0736944&spaceId=2941985b-c151-8196-8765-0003a32b4582&expirationTimestamp=1772841600000&signature=OocwrLjasPe_R8mSgV7XWckjpJ0CnE1h50V66m7V968&downloadName=1inch+DAO+Grant+Terms.pdf)**.
The **Grant Terms** set out the legal and operational framework under which the DAO provides funding. They define the rights and obligations of grantees, the conditions for receiving and using the grant amount, reporting requirements, compliance expectations, and the DAO’s ability to revoke or modify funding.
The **Grant Proposal Template** is a standardized form that grantees complete to provide all information needed for the DAO to evaluate a funding request. It captures project details, team information, deliverables, milestones, budgets, wallet addresses, and other relevant disclosures, ensuring the DAO has a complete and comparable dataset to assess proposals.The purpose of the Grant Proposal
Together, these documents establish:
* clear deliverables,
* accountability and reporting requirements,
* milestone-based disbursement,
* enforceability and recourse,
* dispute-resolution mechanisms.
**Purpose:**
The developed framework strengthens DAO governance by ensuring that any grantee relationship is structured, documented, and enforceable. The documents are attached for DAO review and potential adoption.
### **2.3. Evaluation of DAO Legal Wrapper Options & Comparison to Current Structure**
MME performed an in-depth analysis of legal wrappers used by comparable DAOs and assessed whether adding an additional legal entity would materially improve the DAO’s legal posture, including a cost–benefit analysis of any such changes.
The analysis included:
* comparison of relationship models (social signalling, principal-agent model, wrapper)
* comparison of possible entity types, including the Cayman Island foundation company, the Swiss association (full wrapper and partial wrapper), the Swiss foundation, and various DAO LLCs;
* comparison of administrative and tax burdens;
* governance complexity and reporting requirements;
* whether any structure would provide meaningful enforcement advantages or regulatory clarity.
**Outcome:**
The LWG concluded that no existing model offers a materially better balance of risk mitigation, cost, and feasibility than the current system where the 1inch Foundation serves as the DAO’s off-chain representative.
The analysis remains useful baseline work for any future revisiting of the topic.
### **2.4. Ad Hoc Compliance & Regulatory Reasonableness Reviews**
MME also handled several proposal-driven ad hoc compliance questions, helping ensure that DAO activity remained reasonable from a sanctions, AML, and regulatory-risk perspective.
These reviews included:
* evaluating sanctions exposure for grantees in high-risk jurisdictions;
* assessing whether certain jurisdictions or team structures could create regulatory issues;
* reviewing potential revenue-sharing or fee-on-swap mechanics (e.g., ZMX alternative front-end proposal) for risk of classifying the DAO as a service provider;
* considering AML/CTF implications of high-risk proposals;
* advising on whether DAO involvement in certain interfaces could unintentionally constitute regulated activity.
In all matters, MME’s conclusions were **incorporated into LWG deliberations and communicated back to proposers** to help safeguard the DAO’s risk posture.
## **3. Financial Report**
* The previous **USD 50,000 retainer** approved under 1IP-72 has been fully utilized.
* All invoices were received by LWG members.
* The volume and complexity of issues raised across the DAO justify maintaining ongoing access to external counsel.
* The LWG conducted the replenishment review mechanism established in 1IP-72 and determined that additional retainer funding is necessary.
## **4. Payment Structure and Administrative Process**
To maintain continuity and transparency, the payment and reporting structure mirrors the terms approved in 1IP-72.
The engagement process requires the DAO’s approval of advance payments, which MME will invoice against for its services. This approach ensures clear financial arrangements with MME and promoting transparent and accountable use of resources. Funds will be allocated to the 1inch DAO Operations Multisig 0x45e84e10e8E85c583C002A40007D10629EF80fAF, then transferred to MME.
### **4.1. Advance Payment (Retainer)**
A new **USD 15,000** advance payment (in ETH or USDC) will be transferred to MME as a retainer. In the event of termination of this mandate, MME will return any remaining advance payments to the blockchain address from which the initial payment was received.
### **4.2. Invoicing & Billing**
The services will be invoiced on an hourly fee basis. At the end of each calendar month, MME will provide invoices for its services rendered to 1inch DAO. The invoices will be detailed and itemized, clearly outlining the services provided, corresponding hourly rates fees, and any applicable taxes or disbursements. All invoices sent by MME will be reviewed and approved by the LCWG. Upon such approval, the invoiced amounts will be deducted from the advance payments.
### **4.3. Retainer Replenishment Review (per 1IP-72)**
1IP-72 established that the LWG must periodically review the need to replenish the advance payment. The LWG has conducted this review and determined that an additional retainer is required.
Going forward:
* The LWG will continue monitoring the remaining balance,
* Additional replenishments, if required, will only occur through separate DAO governance proposals,
* No automatic or discretionary increases will occur without DAO approval.
### **4.4. Expense Tracking & Reporting**
The LWG will maintain complete records of: all invoices, payments, retainer usage, remaining balance. This information will be included in LWG reporting cycles for transparency. Any questions from DAO members will be handled by the LWG, with escalation to MME as needed.
## **5. Summary**
Through the previous mandate, MME provided substantive and high-value legal support across dispute resolution, governance, sanctions compliance, and proposal-driven risk reviews. The LWG therefore recommends renewing the engagement with a USD 15,000 retainer, under the same transparent invoicing, approval, and reporting mechanisms used before. This renewal will ensure that the DAO remains properly supported as new governance, compliance, and dispute-related issues arise. | [1IP-94] Renewal of Engagement of MME as External Counsel to the 1inch DAO | ## **Summary**
The Legal Working Group (LWG) proposes that the 1inch DAO renew its engagement of MME as external legal counsel through a new **USD 15,000 retainer**, to be used on an “as-needed” basis. This Proposal provides a report on MME’s work under the prior mandate (approved in 1IP-72), including dispute-resolution analysis, compliance and sanctions assessments, governance research, and grant-framework development. The retainer from 1IP-72 has been fully utilized, all invoices have been accepted, and MME’s continued involvement is recommended to ensure continuity of legal risk management for the DAO.
## **1. Background and Purpose**
In 1IP-72, the DAO approved the engagement of MME as external counsel to support the Legal Working Group in addressing legal, compliance, and governance questions requiring professional legal analysis.
The previous retainer is now fully utilized. MME’s contributions have provided meaningful clarity and improved governance safeguards for the DAO.
This Proposal:
1. summarises the work completed under the previous engagement, and
2. requests renewal of the engagement via a new USD 15,000 retainer.
## **2. Work Completed by MME Under the Previous Retainer**
### **2.1. HW Dispute — Forum, Jurisdiction, and DAO Personality Issues**
MME worked closely with the LWG to evaluate how the DAO could pursue its claim in the HW matter. The analysis included:
* whether the DAO has legal personality or standing to initiate proceedings;
* identification of potentially competent jurisdictions;
* how to initiate a claim given the absence of a predetermined dispute-resolution mechanism;
* risks related to representation, enforcement, and counterparty identification.
**Outcome:**
After careful consideration it was concluded that arbitration is the most viable and defensible route for this dispute, resolving jurisdictional ambiguity and avoiding the most problematic procedural issues. The DAO was informed accordingly in [1IP-77.](https://gov.1inch.network/t/1ip-77-fast-track-authorize-1inch-foundation-to-represent-1inch-dao-in-hardware-wallet-dispute/797)
### **2.2. Development of the DAO Grant Form (Proposal Template \+ Grant Terms)**
To prevent repeats of the HW situation, the LWG—supported by MME—developed a standardized **[Grant Proposal Template](https://file.notion.so/f/f/2941985b-c151-8196-8765-0003a32b4582/cfb73a5d-afaf-4367-84cd-058137c68c28/1inch_DAO_Grant_Form.pdf?table=block&id=31a1985b-c151-807f-a349-cffdcff985a6&spaceId=2941985b-c151-8196-8765-0003a32b4582&expirationTimestamp=1772841600000&signature=UTuMTZGZ7MrfeiZjp8HPzFUr70toDxojWX3NCKwQL7I&downloadName=1inch+DAO+Grant+Form.pdf)** and **[Grant Terms](https://file.notion.so/f/f/2941985b-c151-8196-8765-0003a32b4582/01be4978-2898-499e-8696-e07321435136/1inch_DAO_Grant_Terms.docx.pdf?table=block&id=31a1985b-c151-8013-adb7-ddb6d0736944&spaceId=2941985b-c151-8196-8765-0003a32b4582&expirationTimestamp=1772841600000&signature=OocwrLjasPe_R8mSgV7XWckjpJ0CnE1h50V66m7V968&downloadName=1inch+DAO+Grant+Terms.pdf)**.
The **Grant Terms** set out the legal and operational framework under which the DAO provides funding. They define the rights and obligations of grantees, the conditions for receiving and using the grant amount, reporting requirements, compliance expectations, and the DAO’s ability to revoke or modify funding.
The **Grant Proposal Template** is a standardized form that grantees complete to provide all information needed for the DAO to evaluate a funding request. It captures project details, team information, deliverables, milestones, budgets, wallet addresses, and other relevant disclosures, ensuring the DAO has a complete and comparable dataset to assess proposals.The purpose of the Grant Proposal
Together, these documents establish:
* clear deliverables,
* accountability and reporting requirements,
* milestone-based disbursement,
* enforceability and recourse,
* dispute-resolution mechanisms.
**Purpose:**
The developed framework strengthens DAO governance by ensuring that any grantee relationship is structured, documented, and enforceable. The documents are attached for DAO review and potential adoption.
### **2.3. Evaluation of DAO Legal Wrapper Options & Comparison to Current Structure**
MME performed an in-depth analysis of legal wrappers used by comparable DAOs and assessed whether adding an additional legal entity would materially improve the DAO’s legal posture, including a cost–benefit analysis of any such changes.
The analysis included:
* comparison of relationship models (social signalling, principal-agent model, wrapper)
* comparison of possible entity types, including the Cayman Island foundation company, the Swiss association (full wrapper and partial wrapper), the Swiss foundation, and various DAO LLCs;
* comparison of administrative and tax burdens;
* governance complexity and reporting requirements;
* whether any structure would provide meaningful enforcement advantages or regulatory clarity.
**Outcome:**
The LWG concluded that no existing model offers a materially better balance of risk mitigation, cost, and feasibility than the current system where the 1inch Foundation serves as the DAO’s off-chain representative.
The analysis remains useful baseline work for any future revisiting of the topic.
### **2.4. Ad Hoc Compliance & Regulatory Reasonableness Reviews**
MME also handled several proposal-driven ad hoc compliance questions, helping ensure that DAO activity remained reasonable from a sanctions, AML, and regulatory-risk perspective.
These reviews included:
* evaluating sanctions exposure for grantees in high-risk jurisdictions;
* assessing whether certain jurisdictions or team structures could create regulatory issues;
* reviewing potential revenue-sharing or fee-on-swap mechanics (e.g., ZMX alternative front-end proposal) for risk of classifying the DAO as a service provider;
* considering AML/CTF implications of high-risk proposals;
* advising on whether DAO involvement in certain interfaces could unintentionally constitute regulated activity.
In all matters, MME’s conclusions were **incorporated into LWG deliberations and communicated back to proposers** to help safeguard the DAO’s risk posture.
## **3. Financial Report**
* The previous **USD 50,000 retainer** approved under 1IP-72 has been fully utilized.
* All invoices were received by LWG members.
* The volume and complexity of issues raised across the DAO justify maintaining ongoing access to external counsel.
* The LWG conducted the replenishment review mechanism established in 1IP-72 and determined that additional retainer funding is necessary.
## **4. Payment Structure and Administrative Process**
To maintain continuity and transparency, the payment and reporting structure mirrors the terms approved in 1IP-72.
The engagement process requires the DAO’s approval of advance payments, which MME will invoice against for its services. This approach ensures clear financial arrangements with MME and promoting transparent and accountable use of resources. Funds will be allocated to the 1inch DAO Operations Multisig 0x45e84e10e8E85c583C002A40007D10629EF80fAF, then transferred to MME.
### **4.1. Advance Payment (Retainer)**
A new **USD 15,000** advance payment (in ETH or USDC) will be transferred to MME as a retainer. In the event of termination of this mandate, MME will return any remaining advance payments to the blockchain address from which the initial payment was received.
### **4.2. Invoicing & Billing**
The services will be invoiced on an hourly fee basis. At the end of each calendar month, MME will provide invoices for its services rendered to 1inch DAO. The invoices will be detailed and itemized, clearly outlining the services provided, corresponding hourly rates fees, and any applicable taxes or disbursements. All invoices sent by MME will be reviewed and approved by the LCWG. Upon such approval, the invoiced amounts will be deducted from the advance payments.
### **4.3. Retainer Replenishment Review (per 1IP-72)**
1IP-72 established that the LWG must periodically review the need to replenish the advance payment. The LWG has conducted this review and determined that an additional retainer is required.
Going forward:
* The LWG will continue monitoring the remaining balance,
* Additional replenishments, if required, will only occur through separate DAO governance proposals,
* No automatic or discretionary increases will occur without DAO approval.
### **4.4. Expense Tracking & Reporting**
The LWG will maintain complete records of: all invoices, payments, retainer usage, remaining balance. This information will be included in LWG reporting cycles for transparency. Any questions from DAO members will be handled by the LWG, with escalation to MME as needed.
## **5. Summary**
Through the previous mandate, MME provided substantive and high-value legal support across dispute resolution, governance, sanctions compliance, and proposal-driven risk reviews. The LWG therefore recommends renewing the engagement with a USD 15,000 retainer, under the same transparent invoicing, approval, and reporting mechanisms used before. This renewal will ensure that the DAO remains properly supported as new governance, compliance, and dispute-related issues arise. | 0xc8f01fafb3a658701eb39be0bc25140e69a4742b94e935d2ce2b20992fb4bf98 | 1inch.eth | 1inch Network | 1 | single-choice | active | 20 | 1,773,153,001 | 2026-03-10 14:30:01 | 1,773,156,601 | 2026-03-10 15:30:01 | 1,773,588,601 | 2026-03-15 15:30:01 | 0x824732D3F4Eb94a20254cca9DE10485Ce445Bb40 |
Reallocate BSR Reserves + LP Node Emissions to Liquidity Incentives
This is the first of two proposals going to SODAX holders to enable Liquidity Rewards for the aSODA and xSODA pool.
**What this proposal covers**
There are two sources of ICX being proposed for reallocation to liquidity incentives:
1. The 482,003.96 ICX already minted and sitting in the Balance Savings Rate (BSR) contract this will be redirected to liquidity provisioning for the SODA/xSODA pool this is around .
2. The LP node emissions that accumulated between when rewards were turned off and when emissions end (towards end of March). We won't have the exact figure until emissions close, but rough estimates put this at around 11-12k ICX/day — so approximately 150to 160k ICX over a 14 day window. That also gets converted and allocated to the liquidity pool.
**What the target looks like**
The goal is to maintain 5–15% APR in the aSODA/xSODA pool to attract meaningful liquidity. The exact daily distribution rate will be determined on an ad hoc basis depending on how much liquidity is actually in the pool there's no point distributing more than needed to hit that range.
If the math holds, the BSR reserves should sustain this for a couple of months. At that point, we revisit.
**The second proposal**
Once we have a better picture of how much is actually needed to sustain the 5–15% target and whether it's needed at all a second proposal will go up to formalise the longer-term approach to liquidity incentives.
For now, this first proposal is about unlocking the existing reserves and getting liquidity incentives live. | Reallocate BSR Reserves + LP Node Emissions to Liquidity Incentives | This is the first of two proposals going to SODAX holders to enable Liquidity Rewards for the aSODA and xSODA pool.
**What this proposal covers**
There are two sources of ICX being proposed for reallocation to liquidity incentives:
1. The 482,003.96 ICX already minted and sitting in the Balance Savings Rate (BSR) contract this will be redirected to liquidity provisioning for the SODA/xSODA pool this is around .
2. The LP node emissions that accumulated between when rewards were turned off and when emissions end (towards end of March). We won't have the exact figure until emissions close, but rough estimates put this at around 11-12k ICX/day — so approximately 150to 160k ICX over a 14 day window. That also gets converted and allocated to the liquidity pool.
**What the target looks like**
The goal is to maintain 5–15% APR in the aSODA/xSODA pool to attract meaningful liquidity. The exact daily distribution rate will be determined on an ad hoc basis depending on how much liquidity is actually in the pool there's no point distributing more than needed to hit that range.
If the math holds, the BSR reserves should sustain this for a couple of months. At that point, we revisit.
**The second proposal**
Once we have a better picture of how much is actually needed to sustain the 5–15% target and whether it's needed at all a second proposal will go up to formalise the longer-term approach to liquidity incentives.
For now, this first proposal is about unlocking the existing reserves and getting liquidity incentives live. | 0xac269cacf00b248a50a6f4ae85c6a7d6862053a1ba7f3eeedcc48fbee5992dbe | sodaxcouncil.eth | Sodax | 146 | basic | active | 11 | 1,773,138,236 | 2026-03-10 10:23:56 | 1,773,224,636 | 2026-03-11 10:23:56 | 1,773,829,436 | 2026-03-18 10:23:56 | 0x9920c45570dC76ACb48b215308B7D3791E3518ce |
Create and Fund 'Project Caribou'
This vote is to approve or reject the creation of ‘Project Caribou' and the initial funding of phase 1 of the project charter.
If approved, an amendment to AIP-007 would be made to add ‘Project Caribou’ to the list of projects. Its current status would be listed as ACTIVE along with relevant information such as project lead, funding status, spending caps, start and expiration dates.
Technical requirements are reduced here due to Snapshot character limit. See Arrow DAO forum for details.
---
## **1. Project Summary**
**Project Caribou** is a heavy-lift hexacopter initiative. The goal is to develop a platform capable of lifting around **100kg**. To achieve this cost-effectively, Caribou will focus on a mixed Steel, Aluminum, CF frame. Based on recent feedback, we will also explore scalable electronic architectures and frames that utilize less welding (e.g. CF tubes with 3D printed aluminum or stainless steel connectors). This makes the drone rugged, easily repairable in the field, and accessible to manufacture. The main operating fields will be Heavy Cargo Logistics (~100kg payload capacity) and Precision Agriculture (High-volume spraying).
## **2. Regulatory Strategy & Certification**
Designing a 200kg+ MTOW aircraft places us in the “Specific Category” (EU) or requires heavy exemptions (US). **Scope Limitation:** This project lays the technical groundwork for flight permits on an individual basis. We are NOT pursuing a general “Type Certificate” in this phase, as the requirements for daily commercial operations vary significantly between regions:
- **EU (EASA):** Requires SORA (Specific Operations Risk Assessment) and LUC (Light UAS Operator Certificate) for scale.
- **US (FAA):** Requires Section 44807 Exemption and Part 137 for Agriculture.
Full commercial certification will only be assessed in a future project phase once specific partners are secured.
## **3.1. Phase 1: Proof of Concept & Electronics Integration**
- **Objective:** Validate the structural integrity of the core frame and the power architecture. Focus on developing the electronic system and integrating it into an existing test frame.
- **Test frame:** Steel tube inner structure with aluminum motor beams. Beams will be detachable (see [Design Reference](https://discord.com/channels/853833144037277726/1272470725558534155)).
- **Design Studies:** Alongside the test drone, create CAD studies for scalable frames that require less welding, utilizing CF tubes and 3D printed aluminum/stainless steel connectors.
- **Milestone:** Successful construction, power-on tests, and a stable **tethered hover flight** demonstrating the power architecture’s ability to handle the target loads. Phase 1 ends with a general test of the electronic system and a successful flight with the test drone.
## **3.2. Phase 2: Scalable Design Overhaul**
- **Objective:** Transform the test frame into a deployable prototype. This phase kicks off with a DAO review of the new scalable frame concepts to reach a consensus on the best structural path forward, as well as exploring specific business targets for the prototypes (e.g., cargo, winch operations, agricultural dispensing, or firefighting).
- **Tasks:** Based on the DAO consensus, we will easily scale the system and potentially build two frames in parallel (e.g., 50kg and 100kg payload variants). The construction of a second prototype in the USA will be pursued (e.g. for Javelina) to gather more flight hours and obtain feedback on manufacturing.
- **Design Improvements:** Implementation of foldable motor beams, optimized battery placement, and electronics improvements.
- **Payload Integration:** Development of payload bay prototypes for cargo and liquids or other specific use cases.
- **Milestone:** Successful **tethered hover flights** carrying and operating:
- **Liquid Config:** Incremental load testing (40 / 60 / 80 Liters of water).
- **Cargo Config:** Demonstration of loading/unloading mechanics with multiple packages (e.g., 8 packages of 10kg each).
## **3.3. Phase 3: Field Readiness**
- **Objective:** Refine the user experience and conduct initial real-world mission simulations.
- **Tasks:**
- Minor structural improvements for weight reduction.
- User-experience upgrades regarding the payload operation.
- **Milestone:** Production of 2 “Beta” units for testing with partners in real-world scenarios.
## **3.4. Phase 4: Documentation**
- **Objective:** Finalize technical documentation to ensure a seamless transition to the next project steps (e.g., certification or commercialization).
- **Tasks:**
- Create documents for flight logs and stress-test data.
- Finalize Bill of Materials (BOM), assembly guides, operating manual.
- **Milestone:** Publication of the full Caribou Engineering Report.
## **4. Project Timeline**
Target official project start date: **April 1, 2026.**
- **Phase 1: Proof of Concept (Months 1-4)**
- **Phase 2: Design Overhaul (Months 5-10)**
- **Phase 3: Field Readiness (Months 11-16)**
- **Phase 4: Documentation (Month 17-18)**
## **5. Budget Cap**
Project Caribou operates in the heavy-industrial sector, requiring larger motors and high-capacity batteries.
- **Labor Costs:** $25,000/month
- **Hardware Costs:** $5,000/month
- **Total Monthly Cap:** **$30,000/month**.
- _Note: Unspent funds do not roll over._
A multisig wallet will be established after approval to receive funds. The seats on the multisig will be; Project Lead (Julius) and GBC.
## **6. Governance** **Project Charter:**
A GitHub repository will be established upon approval to host the project data. **AIP-007 Amendment:** Upon approval, Project Caribou will be added to AIP-007 as an ACTIVE project. After each project phase a public vote will take place to proceed to the next phase. These votes will also offer the opportunity to adjust the budget, timeline or deliverables.
## **7. Project Lead**
I, Julius, will serve as the Project Lead. My responsibilities include architectural decisions, safety protocols for heavy-lift operations, and managing the development team.
## **8. Project Team**
I, Julius, will assemble the project team under the approved project budget.
## **9. Deliverables**
- **Prototype UAVs:** Development and refinement of UAV prototypes through each project phase.
- **Engineering Reports:** Prepared for each major milestone, clearly outlining technical specifications, decisions, and current project status.
- **Design Files:** CAD models, PCB layouts, and software repositories accessible for community collaboration.
- **User Guide / Flight Manual:** Comprehensive manuals detailing UAV operation, maintenance, and troubleshooting.
- **Manufacturing Guides:** Up-to-date instructions & bill of materials enabling community-built prototypes.
- **Meeting Summaries:** Documentation of meeting attendance, key decisions, and action items recorded and shared via GitHub.
- **Structured Documentation:** Documents assigned unique identifiers for transparency, consistency, and version control.
_Concept presentation_ | Create and Fund 'Project Caribou' | This vote is to approve or reject the creation of ‘Project Caribou' and the initial funding of phase 1 of the project charter.
If approved, an amendment to AIP-007 would be made to add ‘Project Caribou’ to the list of projects. Its current status would be listed as ACTIVE along with relevant information such as project lead, funding status, spending caps, start and expiration dates.
Technical requirements are reduced here due to Snapshot character limit. See Arrow DAO forum for details.
---
## **1. Project Summary**
**Project Caribou** is a heavy-lift hexacopter initiative. The goal is to develop a platform capable of lifting around **100kg**. To achieve this cost-effectively, Caribou will focus on a mixed Steel, Aluminum, CF frame. Based on recent feedback, we will also explore scalable electronic architectures and frames that utilize less welding (e.g. CF tubes with 3D printed aluminum or stainless steel connectors). This makes the drone rugged, easily repairable in the field, and accessible to manufacture. The main operating fields will be Heavy Cargo Logistics (~100kg payload capacity) and Precision Agriculture (High-volume spraying).
## **2. Regulatory Strategy & Certification**
Designing a 200kg+ MTOW aircraft places us in the “Specific Category” (EU) or requires heavy exemptions (US). **Scope Limitation:** This project lays the technical groundwork for flight permits on an individual basis. We are NOT pursuing a general “Type Certificate” in this phase, as the requirements for daily commercial operations vary significantly between regions:
- **EU (EASA):** Requires SORA (Specific Operations Risk Assessment) and LUC (Light UAS Operator Certificate) for scale.
- **US (FAA):** Requires Section 44807 Exemption and Part 137 for Agriculture.
Full commercial certification will only be assessed in a future project phase once specific partners are secured.
## **3.1. Phase 1: Proof of Concept & Electronics Integration**
- **Objective:** Validate the structural integrity of the core frame and the power architecture. Focus on developing the electronic system and integrating it into an existing test frame.
- **Test frame:** Steel tube inner structure with aluminum motor beams. Beams will be detachable (see [Design Reference](https://discord.com/channels/853833144037277726/1272470725558534155)).
- **Design Studies:** Alongside the test drone, create CAD studies for scalable frames that require less welding, utilizing CF tubes and 3D printed aluminum/stainless steel connectors.
- **Milestone:** Successful construction, power-on tests, and a stable **tethered hover flight** demonstrating the power architecture’s ability to handle the target loads. Phase 1 ends with a general test of the electronic system and a successful flight with the test drone.
## **3.2. Phase 2: Scalable Design Overhaul**
- **Objective:** Transform the test frame into a deployable prototype. This phase kicks off with a DAO review of the new scalable frame concepts to reach a consensus on the best structural path forward, as well as exploring specific business targets for the prototypes (e.g., cargo, winch operations, agricultural dispensing, or firefighting).
- **Tasks:** Based on the DAO consensus, we will easily scale the system and potentially build two frames in parallel (e.g., 50kg and 100kg payload variants). The construction of a second prototype in the USA will be pursued (e.g. for Javelina) to gather more flight hours and obtain feedback on manufacturing.
- **Design Improvements:** Implementation of foldable motor beams, optimized battery placement, and electronics improvements.
- **Payload Integration:** Development of payload bay prototypes for cargo and liquids or other specific use cases.
- **Milestone:** Successful **tethered hover flights** carrying and operating:
- **Liquid Config:** Incremental load testing (40 / 60 / 80 Liters of water).
- **Cargo Config:** Demonstration of loading/unloading mechanics with multiple packages (e.g., 8 packages of 10kg each).
## **3.3. Phase 3: Field Readiness**
- **Objective:** Refine the user experience and conduct initial real-world mission simulations.
- **Tasks:**
- Minor structural improvements for weight reduction.
- User-experience upgrades regarding the payload operation.
- **Milestone:** Production of 2 “Beta” units for testing with partners in real-world scenarios.
## **3.4. Phase 4: Documentation**
- **Objective:** Finalize technical documentation to ensure a seamless transition to the next project steps (e.g., certification or commercialization).
- **Tasks:**
- Create documents for flight logs and stress-test data.
- Finalize Bill of Materials (BOM), assembly guides, operating manual.
- **Milestone:** Publication of the full Caribou Engineering Report.
## **4. Project Timeline**
Target official project start date: **April 1, 2026.**
- **Phase 1: Proof of Concept (Months 1-4)**
- **Phase 2: Design Overhaul (Months 5-10)**
- **Phase 3: Field Readiness (Months 11-16)**
- **Phase 4: Documentation (Month 17-18)**
## **5. Budget Cap**
Project Caribou operates in the heavy-industrial sector, requiring larger motors and high-capacity batteries.
- **Labor Costs:** $25,000/month
- **Hardware Costs:** $5,000/month
- **Total Monthly Cap:** **$30,000/month**.
- _Note: Unspent funds do not roll over._
A multisig wallet will be established after approval to receive funds. The seats on the multisig will be; Project Lead (Julius) and GBC.
## **6. Governance** **Project Charter:**
A GitHub repository will be established upon approval to host the project data. **AIP-007 Amendment:** Upon approval, Project Caribou will be added to AIP-007 as an ACTIVE project. After each project phase a public vote will take place to proceed to the next phase. These votes will also offer the opportunity to adjust the budget, timeline or deliverables.
## **7. Project Lead**
I, Julius, will serve as the Project Lead. My responsibilities include architectural decisions, safety protocols for heavy-lift operations, and managing the development team.
## **8. Project Team**
I, Julius, will assemble the project team under the approved project budget.
## **9. Deliverables**
- **Prototype UAVs:** Development and refinement of UAV prototypes through each project phase.
- **Engineering Reports:** Prepared for each major milestone, clearly outlining technical specifications, decisions, and current project status.
- **Design Files:** CAD models, PCB layouts, and software repositories accessible for community collaboration.
- **User Guide / Flight Manual:** Comprehensive manuals detailing UAV operation, maintenance, and troubleshooting.
- **Manufacturing Guides:** Up-to-date instructions & bill of materials enabling community-built prototypes.
- **Meeting Summaries:** Documentation of meeting attendance, key decisions, and action items recorded and shared via GitHub.
- **Structured Documentation:** Documents assigned unique identifiers for transparency, consistency, and version control.
_Concept presentation_ | 0xe0e89a2110946195ae27348b3331de0f945a059d1fbaaf7242b43cb322021f09 | arrowair.eth | Arrow Air | 1 | basic | active | 6 | 1,773,130,640 | 2026-03-10 08:17:20 | 1,773,217,040 | 2026-03-11 08:17:20 | 1,773,821,840 | 2026-03-18 08:17:20 | 0xf00f1B31C033fBc15Aba7846EC001D55c274b798 |
On-Chain Accountability Standards for Leadership
The Principle: Accountability in decentralized systems is enforced by cryptographic proof and on-chain transparency — not by personal identity disclosure. Doxxing leadership is not a decentralization standard. It endangers individuals, creates centralized attack surfaces, and was already rejected by this community (Poll #67: doxx multisig signers — FAILED).
Required for all Leadership roles:
• Primary DAO wallet address publicly linked to their role on-chain
• All governance votes, treasury interactions, and role-related transactions publicly viewable
• Consistent pseudonymous identity with verifiable on-chain track record
• Any financial relationships with service providers or competing protocols disclosed on-chain
• No Leadership wallet may unilaterally authorize treasury transactions — all actions require minimum 3-of-5 independent co-signatures
NOT Required: Real name, photograph, government ID, KYC, LinkedIn, or any disclosure that could endanger individuals.
Applies to: Head of DAO, Head of BD, Community Manager, Ambassador Leader, and any wallet with MultiSig or treasury access.
Implementation: 30-day compliance window for wallet and profile disclosure. Non-compliant individuals must step down or relinquish treasury access.
For — Approve the leadership accountability principle
Against — Do not approve this principle at this time. | On-Chain Accountability Standards for Leadership | The Principle: Accountability in decentralized systems is enforced by cryptographic proof and on-chain transparency — not by personal identity disclosure. Doxxing leadership is not a decentralization standard. It endangers individuals, creates centralized attack surfaces, and was already rejected by this community (Poll #67: doxx multisig signers — FAILED).
Required for all Leadership roles:
• Primary DAO wallet address publicly linked to their role on-chain
• All governance votes, treasury interactions, and role-related transactions publicly viewable
• Consistent pseudonymous identity with verifiable on-chain track record
• Any financial relationships with service providers or competing protocols disclosed on-chain
• No Leadership wallet may unilaterally authorize treasury transactions — all actions require minimum 3-of-5 independent co-signatures
NOT Required: Real name, photograph, government ID, KYC, LinkedIn, or any disclosure that could endanger individuals.
Applies to: Head of DAO, Head of BD, Community Manager, Ambassador Leader, and any wallet with MultiSig or treasury access.
Implementation: 30-day compliance window for wallet and profile disclosure. Non-compliant individuals must step down or relinquish treasury access.
For — Approve the leadership accountability principle
Against — Do not approve this principle at this time. | 0xfef8d0684deee72d58f2a631a19fc27879747e8eb26c6cf98b568e1aea542039 | chaingov.eth | Onyx XCN DAO | 1 | basic | closed | 20 | 1,773,118,339 | 2026-03-10 04:52:19 | 1,773,118,399 | 2026-03-10 04:53:19 | 1,773,291,199 | 2026-03-12 04:53:19 | 0x2BE747263FA1871d2F8bb98449C8d5d504B3dFfC |
Ambassador Compensation & Growth Requirements
The Problem: Ambassador pay is currently set by leadership discretion with no community approval, little published criteria, and limited performance accountability.
Proposed Structure:
Base Pay: $500/month (all ambassadors, all regions) — paid in XCN at 30-day average market rate.
American and European Pay: 800$/Month — paid in XCN at 30-day average market rate.
Once Goliath Main-Net launches this payment will be provided through Goliath Main-Net {sXCN} (Liquid Staked XCN)
Requirements:
• 4+ hrs documented weekly activity / 4+ hrs support interactions/week
• Must have self evident growth and outreach; there must be an increase in content interaction
• 75%+ governance vote participation.
All posts must first be approved by an appointed community member (Currently unassigned/unnamed) which will be approved through polling to insure the quality of education.
Outreach:
• Each ambassador must have a specific Onyx accounts for X, Instagram, Tik-Tok and YouTube etc. which must be excursively for the onyx program
(Presence on all platforms is not required)
• Growth and outreach of these accounts must be self evident to the community, there must be a clear increase in content interaction
The reason for this poll is to provide the community with better quality content and more informative posts.
Budget: Base only: ~$50K/year. Full max: ~$102K/year. Realistic blended: ~$60K/year.
For — Approve the proposed ambassador structure
Against — Do not approve this structure at this time. | Ambassador Compensation & Growth Requirements | The Problem: Ambassador pay is currently set by leadership discretion with no community approval, little published criteria, and limited performance accountability.
Proposed Structure:
Base Pay: $500/month (all ambassadors, all regions) — paid in XCN at 30-day average market rate.
American and European Pay: 800$/Month — paid in XCN at 30-day average market rate.
Once Goliath Main-Net launches this payment will be provided through Goliath Main-Net {sXCN} (Liquid Staked XCN)
Requirements:
• 4+ hrs documented weekly activity / 4+ hrs support interactions/week
• Must have self evident growth and outreach; there must be an increase in content interaction
• 75%+ governance vote participation.
All posts must first be approved by an appointed community member (Currently unassigned/unnamed) which will be approved through polling to insure the quality of education.
Outreach:
• Each ambassador must have a specific Onyx accounts for X, Instagram, Tik-Tok and YouTube etc. which must be excursively for the onyx program
(Presence on all platforms is not required)
• Growth and outreach of these accounts must be self evident to the community, there must be a clear increase in content interaction
The reason for this poll is to provide the community with better quality content and more informative posts.
Budget: Base only: ~$50K/year. Full max: ~$102K/year. Realistic blended: ~$60K/year.
For — Approve the proposed ambassador structure
Against — Do not approve this structure at this time. | 0xb9d917b8c9350a616105c95cce23436c9c8991bddb65f82287e8a513e3e6eff0 | chaingov.eth | Onyx XCN DAO | 1 | basic | closed | 23 | 1,773,118,316 | 2026-03-10 04:51:56 | 1,773,118,376 | 2026-03-10 04:52:56 | 1,773,291,176 | 2026-03-12 04:52:56 | 0x2BE747263FA1871d2F8bb98449C8d5d504B3dFfC |
Point Rewards
For every point acquired in Season 2, 1 XCN Token will be provided at a 1:1 ratio (Not to exceed 5,000,000 Points) at the end of the season.
r(x) =
```
x if x ≤ 5e6
5e6 + 0.5(x - 5e6) if 5e6 < x ≤ 7.5e6
6.25e6 + 0.25(x - 7.5e6) if 7.5e6 < x ≤ 10e6
6.875e6 + 0.125(x - 10e6) if 10e6 < x ≤ 15e6
7.1875e6 + 0.075(x - 15e6) if x > 15e6
```
(Where 5e6 = 5,000,000 etc.)
Exceeding 5,000,000 Points its reduced to``` .5 XCN per point ```
Exceeding 7,500,000+ reduced to``` .25 XCN per point ```
Exceeding 10,000,000+ reduced to``` .125 XCN per point ```
Exceeding 15,000,000+ reduced to``` .075 XCN per point```
Quick examples:
4,000,000 points → ```4,000,000 XCN ```
6,000,000 points → ```5M + 0.5×1M = 5,500,000 XCN ```
9,000,000 points → ```5M + 2.5M×0.5 + 1.5M×0.25 = 5M + 1.25M + 0.375M = 6,625,000 XCN ```
20,000,000 points → ```7.1875M + 0.075×5M = 7.1875M + 0.375M = 7,562,500 XCN```
All tokens will be distributed automatically.
For — Approve the Season 2 points reward curve
Against — Do not approve this reward curve at this time. | Point Rewards | For every point acquired in Season 2, 1 XCN Token will be provided at a 1:1 ratio (Not to exceed 5,000,000 Points) at the end of the season.
r(x) =
```
x if x ≤ 5e6
5e6 + 0.5(x - 5e6) if 5e6 < x ≤ 7.5e6
6.25e6 + 0.25(x - 7.5e6) if 7.5e6 < x ≤ 10e6
6.875e6 + 0.125(x - 10e6) if 10e6 < x ≤ 15e6
7.1875e6 + 0.075(x - 15e6) if x > 15e6
```
(Where 5e6 = 5,000,000 etc.)
Exceeding 5,000,000 Points its reduced to``` .5 XCN per point ```
Exceeding 7,500,000+ reduced to``` .25 XCN per point ```
Exceeding 10,000,000+ reduced to``` .125 XCN per point ```
Exceeding 15,000,000+ reduced to``` .075 XCN per point```
Quick examples:
4,000,000 points → ```4,000,000 XCN ```
6,000,000 points → ```5M + 0.5×1M = 5,500,000 XCN ```
9,000,000 points → ```5M + 2.5M×0.5 + 1.5M×0.25 = 5M + 1.25M + 0.375M = 6,625,000 XCN ```
20,000,000 points → ```7.1875M + 0.075×5M = 7.1875M + 0.375M = 7,562,500 XCN```
All tokens will be distributed automatically.
For — Approve the Season 2 points reward curve
Against — Do not approve this reward curve at this time. | 0x0614e4a7f8642ce7c9fd0a3b135769a9c38fb5204c2303f3be07ab399eca2036 | chaingov.eth | Onyx XCN DAO | 1 | basic | closed | 28 | 1,773,118,301 | 2026-03-10 04:51:41 | 1,773,118,361 | 2026-03-10 04:52:41 | 1,773,291,161 | 2026-03-12 04:52:41 | 0x2BE747263FA1871d2F8bb98449C8d5d504B3dFfC |
948: Nouns Artist Residency — 6 Month Extension
**View proposal:** https://lilnouns.wtf/vote/nouns/948 | 948: Nouns Artist Residency — 6 Month Extension | **View proposal:** https://lilnouns.wtf/vote/nouns/948 | 0x18cf7647c19541ac529a4a26b261376722aef0746ec7df072d7641ba866d2940 | leagueoflils.eth | League of Lils | 1 | single-choice | active | 7 | 1,773,112,080 | 2026-03-10 03:08:00 | 1,773,112,080 | 2026-03-10 03:08:00 | 1,773,544,080 | 2026-03-15 03:08:00 | 0x906F1AF505ab02faa27342D2882E4cCba0C04bD3 |
[COMPOUND] Rewards Contract Top-Up for Arbitrum, Base, and Unichain
# Rewards Contract Top-Up for Arbitrum, Base, and Unichain
# Simple Summary
Gauntlet recommends adding additional COMP to the Compound v3 rewards contracts on **Arbitrum, Base, and Unichain** to ensure sufficient incentives are available to claim following recent changes to the L2 incentive cuts.
| Chain | Recommended Reward Top-up (COMP) |
| -------- | -------------------------------- |
| Arbitrum | 784 |
| Base | 828 |
| Unichain | 352 |
# Motivation
Proposal [547](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/compound/proposal/547?govId=eip155:1:0x309a862bbC1A00e45506cB8A802D1ff10004c8C0), which has cut incentive emissions on L2 markets, has altered user claiming behaviour. As a result, a significant portion of the COMP previously held in the **CometRewards contracts** on several L2 networks has been claimed by users.
To ensure that rewards remain claimable and that the incentive claiming process continues to operate smoothly, Gauntlet recommends topping up the rewards contracts with additional COMP.
Further analysis and discussion can be found here:
[https://www.comp.xyz/t/gauntlet-rewards-contract-top-up-for-arbitrum-base-and-unichain-2026-02-10/7621](https://www.comp.xyz/t/gauntlet-rewards-contract-top-up-for-arbitrum-base-and-unichain-2026-02-10/7621)
# Specification
This proposal transfers COMP to the **CometRewards contracts** on the following networks:
* **Arbitrum:** 784 COMP
* **Base:** 828 COMP
* **Unichain:** 352 COMP
These funds will be used exclusively to replenish the reward contracts from which users can claim COMP incentives.
https://tally.xyz/gov/compound/proposal/551 | [COMPOUND] Rewards Contract Top-Up for Arbitrum, Base, and Unichain | # Rewards Contract Top-Up for Arbitrum, Base, and Unichain
# Simple Summary
Gauntlet recommends adding additional COMP to the Compound v3 rewards contracts on **Arbitrum, Base, and Unichain** to ensure sufficient incentives are available to claim following recent changes to the L2 incentive cuts.
| Chain | Recommended Reward Top-up (COMP) |
| -------- | -------------------------------- |
| Arbitrum | 784 |
| Base | 828 |
| Unichain | 352 |
# Motivation
Proposal [547](https://www.tally.xyz/gov/compound/proposal/547?govId=eip155:1:0x309a862bbC1A00e45506cB8A802D1ff10004c8C0), which has cut incentive emissions on L2 markets, has altered user claiming behaviour. As a result, a significant portion of the COMP previously held in the **CometRewards contracts** on several L2 networks has been claimed by users.
To ensure that rewards remain claimable and that the incentive claiming process continues to operate smoothly, Gauntlet recommends topping up the rewards contracts with additional COMP.
Further analysis and discussion can be found here:
[https://www.comp.xyz/t/gauntlet-rewards-contract-top-up-for-arbitrum-base-and-unichain-2026-02-10/7621](https://www.comp.xyz/t/gauntlet-rewards-contract-top-up-for-arbitrum-base-and-unichain-2026-02-10/7621)
# Specification
This proposal transfers COMP to the **CometRewards contracts** on the following networks:
* **Arbitrum:** 784 COMP
* **Base:** 828 COMP
* **Unichain:** 352 COMP
These funds will be used exclusively to replenish the reward contracts from which users can claim COMP incentives.
https://tally.xyz/gov/compound/proposal/551 | 0x0106e3bbb0fd643aa0fbe3b5bcb1486c6330c8770640b8165f9bf0766ff82a65 | hvax.eth | Event Horizon | 1 | single-choice | closed | 0 | 1,773,093,570 | 2026-03-09 21:59:30 | 1,773,247,619 | 2026-03-11 16:46:59 | 1,773,334,019 | 2026-03-12 16:46:59 | 0xFAD69Bd739c64cC8e3f1C3bb3B60fe4f160174Cc |
[COMPOUND] Supply cap adjustments for USDe on Mainnet USDC and USDT Comets
# Supply cap adjustments for USDe on Mainnet USDC and USDT Comets
## Simple Summary
Gauntlet recommends the following supply cap adjustments to the protocol:
## Supply Caps
| Status | Comet | Collateral | Supply Cap |
| ------------ | ---------------- | ---------- | -------------- |
| Current | Mainnet USDC | USDe | 30,000,000 |
| **Proposed** | **Mainnet USDC** | **USDe** | **15,000,000** |
| Current | Mainnet USDT | USDe | 30,000,000 |
| **Proposed** | **Mainnet USDT** | **USDe** | **15,000,000** |
## Motivation
Since the initial listing parameter recommendations, the liquidity profile of USDe has changed on Mainnet. Onchain liquidity has declined over the last month with the main DEX pool (Fluid USDe/USDT) reducing by ~$30M.
Full details about these changes can be found below
[https://www.comp.xyz/t/gauntlet-supply-cap-recommendation-for-usde-on-mainnet-usdc-usdt-comets-2026-02-26/7662](https://www.comp.xyz/t/gauntlet-supply-cap-recommendation-for-usde-on-mainnet-usdc-usdt-comets-2026-02-26/7662)
https://tally.xyz/gov/compound/proposal/550 | [COMPOUND] Supply cap adjustments for USDe on Mainnet USDC and USDT Comets | # Supply cap adjustments for USDe on Mainnet USDC and USDT Comets
## Simple Summary
Gauntlet recommends the following supply cap adjustments to the protocol:
## Supply Caps
| Status | Comet | Collateral | Supply Cap |
| ------------ | ---------------- | ---------- | -------------- |
| Current | Mainnet USDC | USDe | 30,000,000 |
| **Proposed** | **Mainnet USDC** | **USDe** | **15,000,000** |
| Current | Mainnet USDT | USDe | 30,000,000 |
| **Proposed** | **Mainnet USDT** | **USDe** | **15,000,000** |
## Motivation
Since the initial listing parameter recommendations, the liquidity profile of USDe has changed on Mainnet. Onchain liquidity has declined over the last month with the main DEX pool (Fluid USDe/USDT) reducing by ~$30M.
Full details about these changes can be found below
[https://www.comp.xyz/t/gauntlet-supply-cap-recommendation-for-usde-on-mainnet-usdc-usdt-comets-2026-02-26/7662](https://www.comp.xyz/t/gauntlet-supply-cap-recommendation-for-usde-on-mainnet-usdc-usdt-comets-2026-02-26/7662)
https://tally.xyz/gov/compound/proposal/550 | 0xe33ac99084e04bb6eca8af088fe44cef4f51531620034b4c82f09ad1b105b496 | hvax.eth | Event Horizon | 1 | single-choice | closed | 0 | 1,773,089,980 | 2026-03-09 20:59:40 | 1,773,246,695 | 2026-03-11 16:31:35 | 1,773,333,095 | 2026-03-12 16:31:35 | 0xFAD69Bd739c64cC8e3f1C3bb3B60fe4f160174Cc |
Next Stage Proposal for Transaction Limitation (Anti Whale Protection)
We're opening a DAO vote to decide the next phase for NGP.
Once the LP pool on PancakeSwap reaches $6,000,000 in liquidity, increase the daily transaction limit to one of the following options as listed below.
Please cast your vote by the end of March 2026. | Next Stage Proposal for Transaction Limitation (Anti Whale Protection) | We're opening a DAO vote to decide the next phase for NGP.
Once the LP pool on PancakeSwap reaches $6,000,000 in liquidity, increase the daily transaction limit to one of the following options as listed below.
Please cast your vote by the end of March 2026. | 0x540dff68ec6bd048fd446dda8fca0b6477a083aaef13b0dfadc0e67cddc4b4c4 | newgoldprotocol.eth | NGP DAO | 56 | single-choice | active | 260 | 1,773,088,081 | 2026-03-09 20:28:01 | 1,773,088,081 | 2026-03-09 20:28:01 | 1,775,023,140 | 2026-04-01 05:59:00 | 0x016Cb4E38C7D36971E83bA0011e6C0C50597CfA1 |
[UNISWAP] Extension of Uniswap Incentive Campaign Infrastructure (UniV3 + UniV4 Merkle Router Oracles)
## Summary
With reference to the[ Unichain and Uniswap v4 Liquidity Incentive Proposal](https://vote.uniswapfoundation.org/proposals/82?utm_source=chatgpt.com) passed last year, this proposal requests approval to extend the infrastructure that powers the current Uniswap liquidity incentive programs.
The middleware contracts used to route and deploy incentives (Merkle Router Oracle contracts for UniV3 and UniV4) were originally deployed with a fixed end date of March 10, 2026, as the initial proposal was structured for a 12-month program.
Because these contracts have an immutable expiration timestamp, they cannot be extended. To continue running incentive campaigns beyond March 10, 2026, new versions of these middleware contracts have been deployed with a new expiration date of March 10, 2030.
This proposal requests governance approval to:
* Remove the expiring middleware contracts
* Register the newly deployed contracts
* Enable campaign creation through the new contracts
No other components of the system are being modified.
## What Is Changing (and What Is Not)
What is changing:
* The Merkle Router Oracle contracts used to route incentive campaigns will be replaced with newly deployed versions.
* Incentive routing will move from the old contracts to the new ones.
What is NOT changing:
* The Aera vault remains the same.
* The final incentive distribution contracts remain the same.
* Incentive budgets, token parameters, and governance structure, including DUNI’s ability to withdraw UNI from the Aera vault, remain unchanged.
* No new permissions are introduced.
This is a backend infrastructure update required due to the fixed expiration of the original middleware contracts.
## Why Governance Approval Is Required
The contracts being replaced are owned by the Uniswap timelock.
Because of this, updating them requires an on-chain governance proposal.
There is no way to modify the expiration date of the existing contracts. The only path forward is:
1. Deploy new middleware contracts with a later expiration date.
2. Have governance formally register them.
3. Transition campaign routing to the new contracts.
Without this approval, once the current contracts expire on March 10, 2026, it will no longer be possible to create new incentive campaigns.
## Next Steps
The proposal will follow the standard Uniswap governance process.
The proposed process is:
1. Collect feedback from the community on this forum post - done
2. Submit a Snapshot vote to signal community approval for registering the new middleware contracts - current
3. If the Snapshot vote passes, submit the corresponding on-chain governance proposal to execute the contract updates via the Uniswap timelock - next
Because the existing middleware contracts expire on **March 10, 2026** , and the governance process requires time to complete, there may be a brief period where new incentive campaigns cannot be created while the proposal progresses through Snapshot and the on-chain vote.
https://snapshot.org/#/uniswapgovernance.eth/proposal/0x82144ce7f597c4f23552420cbc36657299211f0049ac706624461c73a54445bc | [UNISWAP] Extension of Uniswap Incentive Campaign Infrastructure (UniV3 + UniV4 Merkle Router Oracles) | ## Summary
With reference to the[ Unichain and Uniswap v4 Liquidity Incentive Proposal](https://vote.uniswapfoundation.org/proposals/82?utm_source=chatgpt.com) passed last year, this proposal requests approval to extend the infrastructure that powers the current Uniswap liquidity incentive programs.
The middleware contracts used to route and deploy incentives (Merkle Router Oracle contracts for UniV3 and UniV4) were originally deployed with a fixed end date of March 10, 2026, as the initial proposal was structured for a 12-month program.
Because these contracts have an immutable expiration timestamp, they cannot be extended. To continue running incentive campaigns beyond March 10, 2026, new versions of these middleware contracts have been deployed with a new expiration date of March 10, 2030.
This proposal requests governance approval to:
* Remove the expiring middleware contracts
* Register the newly deployed contracts
* Enable campaign creation through the new contracts
No other components of the system are being modified.
## What Is Changing (and What Is Not)
What is changing:
* The Merkle Router Oracle contracts used to route incentive campaigns will be replaced with newly deployed versions.
* Incentive routing will move from the old contracts to the new ones.
What is NOT changing:
* The Aera vault remains the same.
* The final incentive distribution contracts remain the same.
* Incentive budgets, token parameters, and governance structure, including DUNI’s ability to withdraw UNI from the Aera vault, remain unchanged.
* No new permissions are introduced.
This is a backend infrastructure update required due to the fixed expiration of the original middleware contracts.
## Why Governance Approval Is Required
The contracts being replaced are owned by the Uniswap timelock.
Because of this, updating them requires an on-chain governance proposal.
There is no way to modify the expiration date of the existing contracts. The only path forward is:
1. Deploy new middleware contracts with a later expiration date.
2. Have governance formally register them.
3. Transition campaign routing to the new contracts.
Without this approval, once the current contracts expire on March 10, 2026, it will no longer be possible to create new incentive campaigns.
## Next Steps
The proposal will follow the standard Uniswap governance process.
The proposed process is:
1. Collect feedback from the community on this forum post - done
2. Submit a Snapshot vote to signal community approval for registering the new middleware contracts - current
3. If the Snapshot vote passes, submit the corresponding on-chain governance proposal to execute the contract updates via the Uniswap timelock - next
Because the existing middleware contracts expire on **March 10, 2026** , and the governance process requires time to complete, there may be a brief period where new incentive campaigns cannot be created while the proposal progresses through Snapshot and the on-chain vote.
https://snapshot.org/#/uniswapgovernance.eth/proposal/0x82144ce7f597c4f23552420cbc36657299211f0049ac706624461c73a54445bc | 0xbbaf870dbe24aaefbd89167d9e66d42d545d12653dffbc54155f41101b5ef086 | hvax.eth | Event Horizon | 1 | single-choice | closed | 0 | 1,773,086,376 | 2026-03-09 19:59:36 | 1,773,081,739 | 2026-03-09 18:42:19 | 1,773,427,339 | 2026-03-13 18:42:19 | 0xFAD69Bd739c64cC8e3f1C3bb3B60fe4f160174Cc |
Create and Fund 'Project Spearhead'
This vote is to approve or reject the creation and initial funding phase of the ‘Project Spearhead', as proposed here.
If approved, an amendment to AIP-007 would be made to add ‘Project Spearhead’ to the list of projects. Its current status would be listed as ACTIVE along with relevant information such as project lead, funding status, spending caps, start and expiration dates.
Technical requirements are reducted here due to Snapshot character limit. See Arrow DAO forum for details.
-------
# 1. Project Summary
Project Spearhead is a multi-purpose 25 kg MTOW hybrid fixed-wing VTOL unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) platform. The project aims to develop an aircraft platform equipped with electric motors for VTOL capability and a pusher internal combustion engine for cruise flight.
Spearhead will primarily target:
* Long-endurance rural surveillance missions
* Limited payload / emergency cargo missions
The core focus of the project is to develop and validate:
* Aircraft sizing & structural integrity
* Hybrid propulsion (internal combustion cruise + electric VTOL)
* Generator integration and energy management
* Transition flight control
* Internal combustion engine vibration mitigation
* Long-range telemetry, possibly beyond conventional RF limits
The aircraft will be fully usable for endurance missions and limited cargo operations, but it will not be optimized as a final commercial product. The intent is to build a capable platform and the internal know-how required for larger systems.
---
# 2. Project Scope
## 2.1 Hybrid Powertrain Development
Develop and validate:
* Gasoline engine integration
* Generator architecture
* Battery charging strategy in cruise
* Power distribution and monitoring
* Engine and generator failure handling
Special attention will be given to vibration isolation and avionics protection from engine-induced vibration.
## 2.2 Transition Flight Architecture
Design and test:
* Hover-to-cruise transition
* Cruise-to-landing transition
* Control logic and tuning
* Aerodynamic balance between stall speed and transition time
Trade-offs between wing size, stall speed, and battery mass will be studied.
## 2.3 Long-Range Telemetry
Investigate and test:
* Extended-range RF systems
* Potential satellite-based communication solutions (e.g., compact satellite terminals)
* Latency implications for BVLOS operations
The objective is to remove telemetry range as the primary operational limitation.
## 2.4 Platform Modularity
Spearhead will be designed as a platform that can support internal/external payload compartment.
## 2.5 Safety & Failure Modes
As the platform operates at significant distances and weights, the following safety options will be studied:
* Power System Redundancy: Evaluation of backup power delivery if the generator or internal combustion engine fails during cruise.
* Emergency Recovery Protocols: Options for autonomous flight termination or recovery procedures will be explored for high-latency or lost-link scenarios.
* Environment Awareness: Investigation into computer vision or sensor-based systems to identify safe areas for emergency maneuvers or landings.
---
# 3. Project Timeline
## Phase 1: Electric Flight Validation (March-June 2026)
Prototype 1 to test the structural integrity and system validation.
* **Platform:** Full airframe (cockpit, tail, wings).
* **Propulsion System:** Equipped only with electric VTOL motors.
* **Power:** High-discharge flight batteries (no internal combustion engine or generator).
* **Key Objectives:**
* Validate vertical takeoff and hover stability.
* Test control surface authority (ailerons, elevator, rudder) during forward flight.
* Verify airframe structural integrity under real flight loads.
* Test the wing detachment system.
## Phase 2: Hybrid Integration (July-October 2026)
Merging the propulsion systems and solving the mechanical noise.
* **Integration:** Installation of the internal combustion pusher engine, fuel system, and cooling system.
* **Ground Testing:** Static fire runs to:
* Verify internal combustion engine readiness.
* Measure engine temperature and evaluate cooling system effectiveness.
* Measure real-world vibration data using onboard IMUs.
* **Key Objectives:**
* Integrate internal combustion engine and related systems.
* Execute VTOL-cruise transition.
* Achieve cruise flight.
* Evaluate battery sizing.
* Tune the flight controller's notch filters to ignore engine-induced noise.
## Phase 3: Beyond Visual Line of Sight Flight (November 2026-January 2027)
Testing phase for VTOL-cruise transition. Breaking the telemetry limitation. Achieving BVLOS flight. Integrating obstacle avoidance system.
* **Hardware:** Integration of obstacle avoidance system. Integration of the long-range telemetry system. Evaluation of RF or satellite based options.
* **Flight Profile:** Transitioning from short-range testing to long-range linear paths.
* **Key Objectives:**
* Achieve consistency on flight mode transition.
* Measure latency and command-link reliability over long-range telemetry system.
* Evaluate autonomous "Link-Loss" protocols and recovery behaviors.
* Validate the "Environment Awareness" and obstacle avoidance systems.
## Phase 4: Operational Tailoring (February-March 2027)
Finalizing the platform for specific mission profiles.
* **Configurations:** Testing the modular "Cargo" vs. "Surveillance" pods.
* **Safety & Failure Modes:** Integration and validation of failure modes during cruise flight.
* **Key Objectives:**
* Finalize the "Performance Manual" for customers (max payload vs. max range).
* Formalize the transition of "Spearhead Know-How" into the larger 500 lb cargo project.
---
# 4. Budget Cap
The project requires a budget to compensate skilled engineers specialized in research and development, real-world hardware testing, prototype construction, and flight tests.
* **Labor Costs:** $28,000/month
* **Hardware Costs:** $7,000/month
* **Total:** $35,000/month
Labor and hardware-related expenses will vary from month to month; thus, the stated budget includes a margin. Note that this is the maximum spending cap, actual monthly expenses are expected to often be lower. The project will end at the end of March 2027.
A multisig wallet will be established after approval to receive funds. The seats on the multisig will be; Project Lead (alperenag) and GBC.
---
# 5. Governance
[Project Charter](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1DOqPlPPc52StjRc1PyLlVuj-gDqw3x1Mx-hZgKe2mw8/edit?tab=t.0#heading=h.kgs4b135kt5y)
This document will be presented in the GitHub repository upon project approval.
---
# 6. Project Lead
I, alperenag, will be responsible for leading the Project Spearhead team, overseeing the technical direction, coordinating development activities, and ensuring successful achievement of milestones and objectives.
---
# 7. Project Team
I, alperenag, will assemble the project team under the approved Project Spearhead budget upon project approval.
---
# 8. Deliverables
* **Prototype UAVs:** Development and refinement of UAV prototypes through each project phase.
* **Engineering Reports:** Prepared for each major milestone, clearly outlining technical specifications, decisions, and current project status.
* **Design Files:** CAD models, PCB layouts, and software repositories accessible for community collaboration.
* **The "Performance Manual":** Data-backed charts for different configurations.
* **Meeting Summaries:** Documentation of meeting attendance, key decisions, and action items recorded and shared via GitHub.
* **Structured Documentation:** Documents assigned unique identifiers for transparency, consistency, and version control for logging the know-how achieved during the project.
* **Operational UAV:** Development of a mission-capable, long-endurance hybrid fixed-wing VTOL platform ready for diverse operational scenarios.
--- | Create and Fund 'Project Spearhead' | This vote is to approve or reject the creation and initial funding phase of the ‘Project Spearhead', as proposed here.
If approved, an amendment to AIP-007 would be made to add ‘Project Spearhead’ to the list of projects. Its current status would be listed as ACTIVE along with relevant information such as project lead, funding status, spending caps, start and expiration dates.
Technical requirements are reducted here due to Snapshot character limit. See Arrow DAO forum for details.
-------
# 1. Project Summary
Project Spearhead is a multi-purpose 25 kg MTOW hybrid fixed-wing VTOL unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) platform. The project aims to develop an aircraft platform equipped with electric motors for VTOL capability and a pusher internal combustion engine for cruise flight.
Spearhead will primarily target:
* Long-endurance rural surveillance missions
* Limited payload / emergency cargo missions
The core focus of the project is to develop and validate:
* Aircraft sizing & structural integrity
* Hybrid propulsion (internal combustion cruise + electric VTOL)
* Generator integration and energy management
* Transition flight control
* Internal combustion engine vibration mitigation
* Long-range telemetry, possibly beyond conventional RF limits
The aircraft will be fully usable for endurance missions and limited cargo operations, but it will not be optimized as a final commercial product. The intent is to build a capable platform and the internal know-how required for larger systems.
---
# 2. Project Scope
## 2.1 Hybrid Powertrain Development
Develop and validate:
* Gasoline engine integration
* Generator architecture
* Battery charging strategy in cruise
* Power distribution and monitoring
* Engine and generator failure handling
Special attention will be given to vibration isolation and avionics protection from engine-induced vibration.
## 2.2 Transition Flight Architecture
Design and test:
* Hover-to-cruise transition
* Cruise-to-landing transition
* Control logic and tuning
* Aerodynamic balance between stall speed and transition time
Trade-offs between wing size, stall speed, and battery mass will be studied.
## 2.3 Long-Range Telemetry
Investigate and test:
* Extended-range RF systems
* Potential satellite-based communication solutions (e.g., compact satellite terminals)
* Latency implications for BVLOS operations
The objective is to remove telemetry range as the primary operational limitation.
## 2.4 Platform Modularity
Spearhead will be designed as a platform that can support internal/external payload compartment.
## 2.5 Safety & Failure Modes
As the platform operates at significant distances and weights, the following safety options will be studied:
* Power System Redundancy: Evaluation of backup power delivery if the generator or internal combustion engine fails during cruise.
* Emergency Recovery Protocols: Options for autonomous flight termination or recovery procedures will be explored for high-latency or lost-link scenarios.
* Environment Awareness: Investigation into computer vision or sensor-based systems to identify safe areas for emergency maneuvers or landings.
---
# 3. Project Timeline
## Phase 1: Electric Flight Validation (March-June 2026)
Prototype 1 to test the structural integrity and system validation.
* **Platform:** Full airframe (cockpit, tail, wings).
* **Propulsion System:** Equipped only with electric VTOL motors.
* **Power:** High-discharge flight batteries (no internal combustion engine or generator).
* **Key Objectives:**
* Validate vertical takeoff and hover stability.
* Test control surface authority (ailerons, elevator, rudder) during forward flight.
* Verify airframe structural integrity under real flight loads.
* Test the wing detachment system.
## Phase 2: Hybrid Integration (July-October 2026)
Merging the propulsion systems and solving the mechanical noise.
* **Integration:** Installation of the internal combustion pusher engine, fuel system, and cooling system.
* **Ground Testing:** Static fire runs to:
* Verify internal combustion engine readiness.
* Measure engine temperature and evaluate cooling system effectiveness.
* Measure real-world vibration data using onboard IMUs.
* **Key Objectives:**
* Integrate internal combustion engine and related systems.
* Execute VTOL-cruise transition.
* Achieve cruise flight.
* Evaluate battery sizing.
* Tune the flight controller's notch filters to ignore engine-induced noise.
## Phase 3: Beyond Visual Line of Sight Flight (November 2026-January 2027)
Testing phase for VTOL-cruise transition. Breaking the telemetry limitation. Achieving BVLOS flight. Integrating obstacle avoidance system.
* **Hardware:** Integration of obstacle avoidance system. Integration of the long-range telemetry system. Evaluation of RF or satellite based options.
* **Flight Profile:** Transitioning from short-range testing to long-range linear paths.
* **Key Objectives:**
* Achieve consistency on flight mode transition.
* Measure latency and command-link reliability over long-range telemetry system.
* Evaluate autonomous "Link-Loss" protocols and recovery behaviors.
* Validate the "Environment Awareness" and obstacle avoidance systems.
## Phase 4: Operational Tailoring (February-March 2027)
Finalizing the platform for specific mission profiles.
* **Configurations:** Testing the modular "Cargo" vs. "Surveillance" pods.
* **Safety & Failure Modes:** Integration and validation of failure modes during cruise flight.
* **Key Objectives:**
* Finalize the "Performance Manual" for customers (max payload vs. max range).
* Formalize the transition of "Spearhead Know-How" into the larger 500 lb cargo project.
---
# 4. Budget Cap
The project requires a budget to compensate skilled engineers specialized in research and development, real-world hardware testing, prototype construction, and flight tests.
* **Labor Costs:** $28,000/month
* **Hardware Costs:** $7,000/month
* **Total:** $35,000/month
Labor and hardware-related expenses will vary from month to month; thus, the stated budget includes a margin. Note that this is the maximum spending cap, actual monthly expenses are expected to often be lower. The project will end at the end of March 2027.
A multisig wallet will be established after approval to receive funds. The seats on the multisig will be; Project Lead (alperenag) and GBC.
---
# 5. Governance
[Project Charter](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1DOqPlPPc52StjRc1PyLlVuj-gDqw3x1Mx-hZgKe2mw8/edit?tab=t.0#heading=h.kgs4b135kt5y)
This document will be presented in the GitHub repository upon project approval.
---
# 6. Project Lead
I, alperenag, will be responsible for leading the Project Spearhead team, overseeing the technical direction, coordinating development activities, and ensuring successful achievement of milestones and objectives.
---
# 7. Project Team
I, alperenag, will assemble the project team under the approved Project Spearhead budget upon project approval.
---
# 8. Deliverables
* **Prototype UAVs:** Development and refinement of UAV prototypes through each project phase.
* **Engineering Reports:** Prepared for each major milestone, clearly outlining technical specifications, decisions, and current project status.
* **Design Files:** CAD models, PCB layouts, and software repositories accessible for community collaboration.
* **The "Performance Manual":** Data-backed charts for different configurations.
* **Meeting Summaries:** Documentation of meeting attendance, key decisions, and action items recorded and shared via GitHub.
* **Structured Documentation:** Documents assigned unique identifiers for transparency, consistency, and version control for logging the know-how achieved during the project.
* **Operational UAV:** Development of a mission-capable, long-endurance hybrid fixed-wing VTOL platform ready for diverse operational scenarios.
--- | 0x6cbe94c000a2cd99f1f9afcf0f0c5bb32f7c6290771cee88ccbbb0da8c45014f | arrowair.eth | Arrow Air | 1 | basic | active | 6 | 1,773,085,924 | 2026-03-09 19:52:04 | 1,773,172,324 | 2026-03-10 19:52:04 | 1,773,777,124 | 2026-03-17 19:52:04 | 0x9744a5E83128708ef892D7162cdD904860A4E732 |
Contribution Requests (Period 136)
This is a poll to determine priority of contribution requests at the time of period 136 of Eden Fractal. It is part of stage 2 of [Synchronous Respect Tree V1 game](https://hackmd.io/@sim31/srt-1).
Spread your Respect-weighted votes among contribution requests according to your understanding of what contributions are the most important right now. This will help guide contributors on what work would be most valuable to the community.
## From Tadas | sim31
### CR: ORDAO
Recently I've received some requests for meetings regarding ORDAO. One request is for a walkthrough over main functions as a user, [one](https://t.me/edenfractal/5191/6369) is for a walkthrough over codebase and would probably be more developer oriented. I've been working on other contributions [community has been signalling the need for](https://ef-tree.frapps.xyz/) over the past weeks, so I was not able to meet this week. But we could maybe host ORDAO Fractal over the coming weeks to address at least one or both of the needs (if that format works for interested parties).
**I invite you to play **[SRT V1](https://hackmd.io/@sim31/srt-1)** within the scope of ORDAO Fractal to help figure out ORDAO specific priorities!** We can use [ORDAO telegram topic](https://t.me/edenfractal/6349) for making proposals and [ORDAO Snapshot space](https://snapshot.box/#/s:ordao.eth) for polls.
So use this sub-game:
⦁ If you want a discussion or would like answers for specific questions -> *create a topic;*
⦁ If you have some specific tasks in mind -> *create a contribution request;*
⦁ Vote on this contribution request in Eden Fractal SRT game if any of the above applies or if you think this is important or just think it's time for ORDAO Fractal;
## From Dan Singjoy
### CR: Eden Fractal Community Agreement
Eden Fractal needs a community agreement that establishes clear expectations and protections for participants. This has been an outstanding goal since our early days and is becoming increasingly important as we prepare to scale our processes.
Contributions can include researching prior agreement discussions and materials from Eden Fractal, Genesis Fractal, and related communities; drafting agreement terms covering video consent, governance participation, content rights, and the nature of Respect as an opinion token; exploring integration with tools like Hats Protocol for onchain agreement signing and role-based access; and helping to organize and curate all existing resources about this topic into one accessible place.
I'm currently working on resources to make coordination easier, and contributions to this effort are very welcome. You can see some of our prior discussions about agreements at [EdenCreators.com/agreement](https://edencreators.com/agreement).
### CR: Eden Fractal Intent Document
Eden Fractal needs an Intent Document — envisioned as an operating manual that defines how the Respect Game functions, how governance processes work, and how decisions are made. Following the model established by [Optimism Fractal's Intent Document](https://optimismfractal.com/details), this document would provide a clear reference for both current and future participants. Contributions can include researching what should be in scope, drafting sections based on our current operations, reviewing how other fractal communities have structured their intents, and helping organize the document for community review and approval through our consensus process. | Contribution Requests (Period 136) | This is a poll to determine priority of contribution requests at the time of period 136 of Eden Fractal. It is part of stage 2 of [Synchronous Respect Tree V1 game](https://hackmd.io/@sim31/srt-1).
Spread your Respect-weighted votes among contribution requests according to your understanding of what contributions are the most important right now. This will help guide contributors on what work would be most valuable to the community.
## From Tadas | sim31
### CR: ORDAO
Recently I've received some requests for meetings regarding ORDAO. One request is for a walkthrough over main functions as a user, [one](https://t.me/edenfractal/5191/6369) is for a walkthrough over codebase and would probably be more developer oriented. I've been working on other contributions [community has been signalling the need for](https://ef-tree.frapps.xyz/) over the past weeks, so I was not able to meet this week. But we could maybe host ORDAO Fractal over the coming weeks to address at least one or both of the needs (if that format works for interested parties).
**I invite you to play **[SRT V1](https://hackmd.io/@sim31/srt-1)** within the scope of ORDAO Fractal to help figure out ORDAO specific priorities!** We can use [ORDAO telegram topic](https://t.me/edenfractal/6349) for making proposals and [ORDAO Snapshot space](https://snapshot.box/#/s:ordao.eth) for polls.
So use this sub-game:
⦁ If you want a discussion or would like answers for specific questions -> *create a topic;*
⦁ If you have some specific tasks in mind -> *create a contribution request;*
⦁ Vote on this contribution request in Eden Fractal SRT game if any of the above applies or if you think this is important or just think it's time for ORDAO Fractal;
## From Dan Singjoy
### CR: Eden Fractal Community Agreement
Eden Fractal needs a community agreement that establishes clear expectations and protections for participants. This has been an outstanding goal since our early days and is becoming increasingly important as we prepare to scale our processes.
Contributions can include researching prior agreement discussions and materials from Eden Fractal, Genesis Fractal, and related communities; drafting agreement terms covering video consent, governance participation, content rights, and the nature of Respect as an opinion token; exploring integration with tools like Hats Protocol for onchain agreement signing and role-based access; and helping to organize and curate all existing resources about this topic into one accessible place.
I'm currently working on resources to make coordination easier, and contributions to this effort are very welcome. You can see some of our prior discussions about agreements at [EdenCreators.com/agreement](https://edencreators.com/agreement).
### CR: Eden Fractal Intent Document
Eden Fractal needs an Intent Document — envisioned as an operating manual that defines how the Respect Game functions, how governance processes work, and how decisions are made. Following the model established by [Optimism Fractal's Intent Document](https://optimismfractal.com/details), this document would provide a clear reference for both current and future participants. Contributions can include researching what should be in scope, drafting sections based on our current operations, reviewing how other fractal communities have structured their intents, and helping organize the document for community review and approval through our consensus process. | 0xc419e2c42c973e561407ffb3383e021963f51e188c2ecbd857002e6b1aceb04b | edenfractal.eth | Eden Fractal | 8453 | weighted | closed | 2 | 1,773,074,567 | 2026-03-09 16:42:47 | 1,773,074,567 | 2026-03-09 16:42:47 | 1,773,331,200 | 2026-03-12 16:00:00 | 0xAED620c450911c38714E666cd84137767e3D6286 |
Video Poker Integration – DAO Proposal
This proposal suggests integrating a Video Poker game into the GOATsino platform to expand our game library and strengthen player engagement. As one of the most recognizable and skill-influenced games in casino history, Video Poker blends decision-making and chance to deliver an engaging experience for a wide range of players.
Key Points:
Increased Engagement: Video Poker’s mix of strategy, risk assessment, and reward encourages players to stay engaged for longer sessions.
Simple UX: The gameplay is straightforward and easy to understand, making it accessible to both new players and experienced casino users.
Visual Branding: The Video Poker interface will be designed in GOATsino’s signature visual style to ensure brand consistency.
Next Steps:
If approved, development will begin immediately, aiming for a coordinated release alongside upcoming games. This addition will further diversify GOATsino’s offerings and enhance the platform’s competitive edge. | Video Poker Integration – DAO Proposal | This proposal suggests integrating a Video Poker game into the GOATsino platform to expand our game library and strengthen player engagement. As one of the most recognizable and skill-influenced games in casino history, Video Poker blends decision-making and chance to deliver an engaging experience for a wide range of players.
Key Points:
Increased Engagement: Video Poker’s mix of strategy, risk assessment, and reward encourages players to stay engaged for longer sessions.
Simple UX: The gameplay is straightforward and easy to understand, making it accessible to both new players and experienced casino users.
Visual Branding: The Video Poker interface will be designed in GOATsino’s signature visual style to ensure brand consistency.
Next Steps:
If approved, development will begin immediately, aiming for a coordinated release alongside upcoming games. This addition will further diversify GOATsino’s offerings and enhance the platform’s competitive edge. | 0xbe0a133d1225f8f5a452cc832dabf3ba39e8e8a4488c68b913b002ab15b961c6 | goatsino.eth | GOATsino | 43114 | basic | closed | 5 | 1,773,074,429 | 2026-03-09 16:40:29 | 1,773,247,229 | 2026-03-11 16:40:29 | 1,773,506,429 | 2026-03-14 16:40:29 | 0x0b49Ed6A975456fb8e5Af2a88Db17e0e312fA3F4 |
Topics (Period 136)
This is a poll to determine priority of topics at the time of period 136 of Eden Fractal. It is part of stage 2 of [Synchronous Respect Tree V1 game](https://hackmd.io/@sim31/srt-1).
Spread your Respect-weighted votes among topics according to your understanding of what topics are the most important to discuss right now. This will help determine our discussion topics for the upcoming town hall and the following week.
## From Dan Singjoy
### TP: Eden Fractal Spring Break Proposal
During the first 25 minutes of [Eden Town Hall #75](https://drive.google.com/drive/u/1/folders/1KQIdly8OS-uwA7rn_C67a_LBgeclNzCx), we discussed the draft proposal for a 4-week break from events and received positive feedback from the community. Tadas, Zaal, Rosmari, and Sebastian all expressed support, and we compared the 4-week option with shorter alternatives before forming consensus that 4 weeks makes sense. I'd encourage watching the discussion and Eden Town Hall 74 for more context.
I'm proposing that we approve the [4-week break proposal](https://www.notion.so/Proposal-for-Eden-Fractal-Spring-Break-4-Week-Break-31b074f5adac80d1b277d9fdc62eacff?pvs=21) at this week's event (March 12), following the Eden+Fractal council consensus process. The proposal is that we take a 4-week break from events after the 6th Respect Game on March 26, returning for the second half of Season 12 on April 30. The break provides focused time for infrastructure development, rest, and reflection — and the proposal includes full rationale and details on what will happen during the break.
One thing I realized after our discussion last week is that while we compared the 4-week break with shorter breaks and formed consensus that 4 weeks makes sense, we didn't really discuss whether it might make sense to take a longer break. I'm happy to go with the 4-week break as discussed, but I wanted to share that there are some important infrastructure developments I'm working on that could potentially benefit from more focused time.
I've written up some thoughts on how we might think about [using the flexibility clause](https://www.notion.so/Thinking-About-the-Flexibility-Clause-Break-Duration-and-the-Eden-Plus-Fractal-Process-31e074f5adac8028a8dec5f5c82edeac?pvs=21) we discussed — where the council retains the ability to adjust the return date during the break if needed. To be clear, I'm proposing we approve the 4-week break returning April 30th as previously discussed, and I'm sharing these additional thoughts for consideration during the break itself if the council decides it makes sense to extend.
### TP: Eden Fractal Community Agreement
Creating a community agreement has been one of our outstanding goals for years, and it's becoming increasingly important as we work toward scaling our processes in the new year. A clear agreement helps set expectations, protect the community, and provide a foundation for scaling — including making it clear that Respect tokens represent community opinions, establishing consent for video recording and content sharing, and defining governance participation expectations.
We've discussed this extensively over the years, including detailed conversations during [Eden Fractal events 37 and 38](https://edencreators.com/agreement) and in related communities. We now have a legislative consensus process through Eden+Fractal to formally approve such an agreement, which removes a key blocker. I'm working on resources to help us coordinate on this, and this is a great topic for the community to start discussing. The agreement could potentially be stored in Firmament on GitHub as a communally approved document. This is a topic worth discussing at our upcoming town hall as we consider scope, priorities, and next steps.
### TP: Eden Fractal Intent Document
Eden Fractal needs its own Intent Document, envisioned as an operating manual for community coordination that clearly defines technical specifications, governance processes, and community expectations. [Optimism Fractal's Intent Document](https://optimismfractal.com/details) provides a strong starting point — it covers Respect Game meeting structure, distribution amounts, the consensus process, council formation, the executive contract, and more, and has been updated multiple times through their community's own consensus process as the community evolved.
As a first step, we can use Optimism Fractal's document as a foundation and then decide what should be tailored to Eden Fractal's unique structure and Epoch 2 operations. The document would be drafted through community collaboration, approved via our consensus process, and include mechanisms for future modifications. This would be a valuable topic to discuss at our upcoming town hall as we consider the scope, structure, and approach.
### TP: Eden+Fractal Improvements
[Eden+Fractal](https://edenfractal.com/plus) is our legislative consensus process for choosing delegates, deliberating on decisions, and making community decisions. The process was first introduced around Eden Fractal's 20th event back in 2022, and we've been practicing it consistently for the past six months during Epoch 2. When we started adopting it for Epoch 2, I created an implementation plan to guide how we'd operate it, informed significantly by discussions with Tadas and the community back in August and September 2025.
It's been working well overall, but there are clear areas for improvement. Delegate attendance has been a challenge, and our current tooling is basically an article and a Google spreadsheet — there's no dedicated app, and it requires a lot of manual coordination to manage effectively. There are also aspects of the original implementation plan that we haven't fully implemented yet.
Recent discussions about Firmament and Respect Trees may also relate to potential improvements. At Eden Town Hall 75, we had an extended discussion about this that may be worth revisiting and further examining. This would be a good time to take stock of how the process is serving the community and consider what refinements would be most valuable heading into the second half of the season.
### TP: Exploring Matrix
I've been learning about [Matrix](https://matrix.org/) over the past weeks and wanted to share some of what I've found. Matrix is an open-source, decentralized communication protocol that can do similar things to Telegram or Discord, but it aligns more closely with Eden Fractal's values around openness, decentralization, and composability — meaning we can build with it and on top of it.
A few things that stand out: Matrix has a [spec-driven development process](https://spec.matrix.org/) with a governance and proposal system on GitHub that could serve as useful inspiration as we start using spec-driven development ourselves. They also have both a federated version and are building Matrix P2P, a non-federated peer-to-peer version that shares some of the same goals that Dan Larimer's team had with Clarion OS. The project has been in active development for over 10 years and continues to evolve.
I think there are potential opportunities for us to use their tools, learn from their processes, and possibly collaborate. I'd like to share what I've learned and have an interactive conversation about it. You can learn more about Matrix in this [video](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-Keu8aE8t08) showing their latest updates.
### TP: Recognizing Prior Contributions to Eden Fractal
*Author: Dan *https://t.me/edenfractal/5562/6283
Eden Fractal did not distribute Respect tokens between approximately events 63 and 120, which represents roughly a third to 40% of our total 135 events. This is a significant gap given that recognizing contributions is one of our core functions.
There are two distinct periods to consider. For events 63–83, Respect Games were played and consensus results were posted on EOS, but tokens were never distributed due to issues with the Eden Fractal MSIG. Records exist in video timestamps, consensus results posts, and onchain transaction history. For events 83–120, no Respect Games were played, but many people contributed significantly during this pivotal time for fractal governance development and received no Eden Fractal Respect.
Currently, the ORDAO account is controlled primarily by participants from Eden Fractal's first year and a half, with no recognition for contributions from approximately year 2 through year 3. One idea I'm exploring is using an AI agent to review the un-executed proposals on EOS, videos from events with no respect games, and generate attendance records to help inform retroactive Respect distribution proposals. I have some [draft notes](https://www.notion.so/Respect-Distribution-Considerations-for-Epoch-2-1fb074f5adac80a8aceccfa41773804d?pvs=21) about this and am working on a more detailed article.
While discussing contributions to Eden Fractal directly, we could also begin considering higher-order fractal considerations — how Eden Fractal might recognize contributions from communities like Genesis Fractal, Eden on EOS, Optimism Fractal, ZAO Fractal, and others who have supported our mission. The priority should be recognizing direct contributions to Eden Fractal first, and then considering how to best recognize contributions from other fractals.
I'd welcome any thoughts or feedback from delegates and community members on the best approach. | Topics (Period 136) | This is a poll to determine priority of topics at the time of period 136 of Eden Fractal. It is part of stage 2 of [Synchronous Respect Tree V1 game](https://hackmd.io/@sim31/srt-1).
Spread your Respect-weighted votes among topics according to your understanding of what topics are the most important to discuss right now. This will help determine our discussion topics for the upcoming town hall and the following week.
## From Dan Singjoy
### TP: Eden Fractal Spring Break Proposal
During the first 25 minutes of [Eden Town Hall #75](https://drive.google.com/drive/u/1/folders/1KQIdly8OS-uwA7rn_C67a_LBgeclNzCx), we discussed the draft proposal for a 4-week break from events and received positive feedback from the community. Tadas, Zaal, Rosmari, and Sebastian all expressed support, and we compared the 4-week option with shorter alternatives before forming consensus that 4 weeks makes sense. I'd encourage watching the discussion and Eden Town Hall 74 for more context.
I'm proposing that we approve the [4-week break proposal](https://www.notion.so/Proposal-for-Eden-Fractal-Spring-Break-4-Week-Break-31b074f5adac80d1b277d9fdc62eacff?pvs=21) at this week's event (March 12), following the Eden+Fractal council consensus process. The proposal is that we take a 4-week break from events after the 6th Respect Game on March 26, returning for the second half of Season 12 on April 30. The break provides focused time for infrastructure development, rest, and reflection — and the proposal includes full rationale and details on what will happen during the break.
One thing I realized after our discussion last week is that while we compared the 4-week break with shorter breaks and formed consensus that 4 weeks makes sense, we didn't really discuss whether it might make sense to take a longer break. I'm happy to go with the 4-week break as discussed, but I wanted to share that there are some important infrastructure developments I'm working on that could potentially benefit from more focused time.
I've written up some thoughts on how we might think about [using the flexibility clause](https://www.notion.so/Thinking-About-the-Flexibility-Clause-Break-Duration-and-the-Eden-Plus-Fractal-Process-31e074f5adac8028a8dec5f5c82edeac?pvs=21) we discussed — where the council retains the ability to adjust the return date during the break if needed. To be clear, I'm proposing we approve the 4-week break returning April 30th as previously discussed, and I'm sharing these additional thoughts for consideration during the break itself if the council decides it makes sense to extend.
### TP: Eden Fractal Community Agreement
Creating a community agreement has been one of our outstanding goals for years, and it's becoming increasingly important as we work toward scaling our processes in the new year. A clear agreement helps set expectations, protect the community, and provide a foundation for scaling — including making it clear that Respect tokens represent community opinions, establishing consent for video recording and content sharing, and defining governance participation expectations.
We've discussed this extensively over the years, including detailed conversations during [Eden Fractal events 37 and 38](https://edencreators.com/agreement) and in related communities. We now have a legislative consensus process through Eden+Fractal to formally approve such an agreement, which removes a key blocker. I'm working on resources to help us coordinate on this, and this is a great topic for the community to start discussing. The agreement could potentially be stored in Firmament on GitHub as a communally approved document. This is a topic worth discussing at our upcoming town hall as we consider scope, priorities, and next steps.
### TP: Eden Fractal Intent Document
Eden Fractal needs its own Intent Document, envisioned as an operating manual for community coordination that clearly defines technical specifications, governance processes, and community expectations. [Optimism Fractal's Intent Document](https://optimismfractal.com/details) provides a strong starting point — it covers Respect Game meeting structure, distribution amounts, the consensus process, council formation, the executive contract, and more, and has been updated multiple times through their community's own consensus process as the community evolved.
As a first step, we can use Optimism Fractal's document as a foundation and then decide what should be tailored to Eden Fractal's unique structure and Epoch 2 operations. The document would be drafted through community collaboration, approved via our consensus process, and include mechanisms for future modifications. This would be a valuable topic to discuss at our upcoming town hall as we consider the scope, structure, and approach.
### TP: Eden+Fractal Improvements
[Eden+Fractal](https://edenfractal.com/plus) is our legislative consensus process for choosing delegates, deliberating on decisions, and making community decisions. The process was first introduced around Eden Fractal's 20th event back in 2022, and we've been practicing it consistently for the past six months during Epoch 2. When we started adopting it for Epoch 2, I created an implementation plan to guide how we'd operate it, informed significantly by discussions with Tadas and the community back in August and September 2025.
It's been working well overall, but there are clear areas for improvement. Delegate attendance has been a challenge, and our current tooling is basically an article and a Google spreadsheet — there's no dedicated app, and it requires a lot of manual coordination to manage effectively. There are also aspects of the original implementation plan that we haven't fully implemented yet.
Recent discussions about Firmament and Respect Trees may also relate to potential improvements. At Eden Town Hall 75, we had an extended discussion about this that may be worth revisiting and further examining. This would be a good time to take stock of how the process is serving the community and consider what refinements would be most valuable heading into the second half of the season.
### TP: Exploring Matrix
I've been learning about [Matrix](https://matrix.org/) over the past weeks and wanted to share some of what I've found. Matrix is an open-source, decentralized communication protocol that can do similar things to Telegram or Discord, but it aligns more closely with Eden Fractal's values around openness, decentralization, and composability — meaning we can build with it and on top of it.
A few things that stand out: Matrix has a [spec-driven development process](https://spec.matrix.org/) with a governance and proposal system on GitHub that could serve as useful inspiration as we start using spec-driven development ourselves. They also have both a federated version and are building Matrix P2P, a non-federated peer-to-peer version that shares some of the same goals that Dan Larimer's team had with Clarion OS. The project has been in active development for over 10 years and continues to evolve.
I think there are potential opportunities for us to use their tools, learn from their processes, and possibly collaborate. I'd like to share what I've learned and have an interactive conversation about it. You can learn more about Matrix in this [video](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-Keu8aE8t08) showing their latest updates.
### TP: Recognizing Prior Contributions to Eden Fractal
*Author: Dan *https://t.me/edenfractal/5562/6283
Eden Fractal did not distribute Respect tokens between approximately events 63 and 120, which represents roughly a third to 40% of our total 135 events. This is a significant gap given that recognizing contributions is one of our core functions.
There are two distinct periods to consider. For events 63–83, Respect Games were played and consensus results were posted on EOS, but tokens were never distributed due to issues with the Eden Fractal MSIG. Records exist in video timestamps, consensus results posts, and onchain transaction history. For events 83–120, no Respect Games were played, but many people contributed significantly during this pivotal time for fractal governance development and received no Eden Fractal Respect.
Currently, the ORDAO account is controlled primarily by participants from Eden Fractal's first year and a half, with no recognition for contributions from approximately year 2 through year 3. One idea I'm exploring is using an AI agent to review the un-executed proposals on EOS, videos from events with no respect games, and generate attendance records to help inform retroactive Respect distribution proposals. I have some [draft notes](https://www.notion.so/Respect-Distribution-Considerations-for-Epoch-2-1fb074f5adac80a8aceccfa41773804d?pvs=21) about this and am working on a more detailed article.
While discussing contributions to Eden Fractal directly, we could also begin considering higher-order fractal considerations — how Eden Fractal might recognize contributions from communities like Genesis Fractal, Eden on EOS, Optimism Fractal, ZAO Fractal, and others who have supported our mission. The priority should be recognizing direct contributions to Eden Fractal first, and then considering how to best recognize contributions from other fractals.
I'd welcome any thoughts or feedback from delegates and community members on the best approach. | 0x18e7cbabe453689af10ee67209ac762800de06f3583dfec437d22fc0cf828baa | edenfractal.eth | Eden Fractal | 8453 | weighted | closed | 2 | 1,773,074,347 | 2026-03-09 16:39:07 | 1,773,074,347 | 2026-03-09 16:39:07 | 1,773,331,200 | 2026-03-12 16:00:00 | 0xAED620c450911c38714E666cd84137767e3D6286 |
Co-creating Our Identity: Mascot Proposal
"🎨 Co-creating Our Identity: The Network-First Mascot Proposal
At the Network First Manifesto, we believe that true power resides in connections, not hierarchies. In line with our commitment to being more human and inclusive leaders in 2026, we are proposing a journey of creative emergence to define our visual soul.
Imagine a mascot that symbolizes collaborative freedom and the power of living networks. 🧬✨
I am incredibly excited to share this initiative with all of you! I am confident that, by working together as a community, we will create an amazing mascot that truly represents our spirit.
🌟 Why this proposal matters:
* Representing our values: Giving a recognizable face to the principle of ""living networks"" at strategic events and conferences.
* Strengthening identity: Creating a shared visual language for our storytelling and social media.
* Practicing what we preach: The process itself is an act of participation, showing that creativity thrives through networks.
As we often advocate in transformative spaces like Sin Reglas, change happens when we inhabit the narrative collectively and authentically, adding value without competing, but rather endorsing the strength of the whole.
> ""The process is as valuable as the result: together, we propose to design what we are.""
""True leadership is not about being at the center, but about making the network shine.""" | Co-creating Our Identity: Mascot Proposal | "🎨 Co-creating Our Identity: The Network-First Mascot Proposal
At the Network First Manifesto, we believe that true power resides in connections, not hierarchies. In line with our commitment to being more human and inclusive leaders in 2026, we are proposing a journey of creative emergence to define our visual soul.
Imagine a mascot that symbolizes collaborative freedom and the power of living networks. 🧬✨
I am incredibly excited to share this initiative with all of you! I am confident that, by working together as a community, we will create an amazing mascot that truly represents our spirit.
🌟 Why this proposal matters:
* Representing our values: Giving a recognizable face to the principle of ""living networks"" at strategic events and conferences.
* Strengthening identity: Creating a shared visual language for our storytelling and social media.
* Practicing what we preach: The process itself is an act of participation, showing that creativity thrives through networks.
As we often advocate in transformative spaces like Sin Reglas, change happens when we inhabit the narrative collectively and authentically, adding value without competing, but rather endorsing the strength of the whole.
> ""The process is as valuable as the result: together, we propose to design what we are.""
""True leadership is not about being at the center, but about making the network shine.""" | 0x4441470849620654ce95610f5534d4715927c6f4b65e600c48aa331837edd39b | networkfirstcommunity.eth | Network First Community | 8453 | basic | active | 13 | 1,773,067,376 | 2026-03-09 14:42:56 | 1,773,067,376 | 2026-03-09 14:42:56 | 1,773,672,176 | 2026-03-16 14:42:56 | 0xaE76818Be01ed99933764525dCD2A923F5762986 |
Project Stewardship & Automatic Archival Protocol
"To maintain clarity and momentum within the Network-First Manifesto community, this proposal introduces a simple protocol for projects whose catalyst is no longer available to support them.
When a project catalyst explicitly indicates that they cannot continue stewarding the initiative, the project will automatically enter an archival state. The project channel will be archived and the initiative will be documented as a completed or paused experiment within the community’s knowledge base.
This mechanism serves several purposes:
• It preserves the contributions and insights generated by the project.
• It prevents inactive initiatives from creating confusion for new members.
• It keeps the community’s project landscape clear and current.
Archival does not permanently close the initiative. Any member of the community may later propose to reactivate the project by stepping in as a new catalyst and presenting the proposal again at a Network Convergence for ratification.
This protocol recognizes that catalysts play a key stewardship role while ensuring that the community ecosystem remains healthy, transparent, and easy to navigate." | Project Stewardship & Automatic Archival Protocol | "To maintain clarity and momentum within the Network-First Manifesto community, this proposal introduces a simple protocol for projects whose catalyst is no longer available to support them.
When a project catalyst explicitly indicates that they cannot continue stewarding the initiative, the project will automatically enter an archival state. The project channel will be archived and the initiative will be documented as a completed or paused experiment within the community’s knowledge base.
This mechanism serves several purposes:
• It preserves the contributions and insights generated by the project.
• It prevents inactive initiatives from creating confusion for new members.
• It keeps the community’s project landscape clear and current.
Archival does not permanently close the initiative. Any member of the community may later propose to reactivate the project by stepping in as a new catalyst and presenting the proposal again at a Network Convergence for ratification.
This protocol recognizes that catalysts play a key stewardship role while ensuring that the community ecosystem remains healthy, transparent, and easy to navigate." | 0x47d7032af1ff56d2d25e85ca21bf9c4cf795738f39a62c590107b832f925a25e | networkfirstcommunity.eth | Network First Community | 8453 | basic | active | 18 | 1,773,067,355 | 2026-03-09 14:42:35 | 1,773,067,355 | 2026-03-09 14:42:35 | 1,773,672,155 | 2026-03-16 14:42:35 | 0xaE76818Be01ed99933764525dCD2A923F5762986 |
Network First Atelier
Network-First Atelier is a collaborative studio within the Network-First Manifesto community dedicated to creating the tangible expressions of the movement. The Atelier develops brand assets, design templates, event materials, and community merchandise that bring Network-First ideas into the physical and digital world. | Network First Atelier | Network-First Atelier is a collaborative studio within the Network-First Manifesto community dedicated to creating the tangible expressions of the movement. The Atelier develops brand assets, design templates, event materials, and community merchandise that bring Network-First ideas into the physical and digital world. | 0x8ea33f414c1b1be954931a8a8475ea8b7ace0e39e0cb2c9a8637fb3b54e611b4 | networkfirstcommunity.eth | Network First Community | 8453 | basic | active | 11 | 1,773,067,323 | 2026-03-09 14:42:03 | 1,773,067,323 | 2026-03-09 14:42:03 | 1,773,672,123 | 2026-03-16 14:42:03 | 0xaE76818Be01ed99933764525dCD2A923F5762986 |
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