| ---[ Phrack Magazine Volume 8, Issue 53 July 8, 1998, article 01 of 15 |
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| -------------------------[ P H R A C K 5 3 I N D E X |
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| --------[ Rumble in the Mumble |
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| More than 6 months have passed since our last offering. My most humble, |
| sincere and heartfelt apologies. At long last, here we are. Better late then |
| never, that's what I always say. Unless of course, the late version sucks, |
| then I just like to disavow it entirely. Well, here we go again. Another |
| Phrack issue to glorify behavior which would otherwise be classified as |
| sociopathic or frankly psychotic (according to Mich Kabay). More of what you |
| want, more of what you need. Technical articles on fanatically enticing |
| topics, lines and lines of glorious source, another gut-busting installment of |
| Loopback, and of course, the News. Mammas, don't let your babies grow up to |
| be hackers. Or hookers for that matter. |
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| Alright. Let's get down to business. Let's talk remote attack paradigms. |
| Remote attack paradigms can fall into one of two types, based off of the |
| standard client/server communication paradigm (we are glossing over any |
| extensions to the model like client to client or server to server stuff). The |
| two attack types are client to server (server-centric) and server to client |
| (client-centric). Server-centric attacks are well known, understand and |
| documented. Client-centric attacks are an area that is often overlooked, but |
| is definitely fertile ground for exploitation. Below we look at both. |
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| ----[ Server-Centricity |
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| Historically, the vast majority of remote attacks have been server-centric. |
| Server-centric, in this scope, refers to attacks that target server (or daemon) |
| programs. A common (and frequently reoccurring) example is sendmail. The |
| attack targets a server (the sendmail daemon) and approximates a client (the |
| exploit program). There are several reasons why this has been the trend: |
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| - Server programs typically run with elevated privileges. Server |
| programs usually require certain system resources or access to special |
| files that necessitate privilege elevation (of course we know this |
| doesn't have to be the case; have a look at POSIX 6). A successful |
| compromise could very well mean access to the target system at that |
| (higher) privilege level. |
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| - Discretion is the attacker's whim. The client/server message paradigm |
| specifies that a server provides a service that a client may request. |
| Servers exist to process clientele requests. As per this model, the |
| attacker (client) makes a request (attack) to any server offering |
| the service and may do so at any point. |
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| - Client codebase is usually simple. Dumb client, smart server. The |
| impact of this is two-fold. The fact that server code tends to be |
| more complex means that it is tougher to audit from a security |
| stand-point. The fact that client code is typically smaller and less |
| complex means that exploitation code development time is reduced. |
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| - Code reuse in exploitation programs. Client-based exploitation code |
| bases are often quite similar. Code such as packet generators and |
| buffer overflow eggs are often reused. This further cuts down on |
| development time and also reduces required sophistication on the part |
| of the exploit writer. |
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| All of these make server-centric attacks enticing. The ability to |
| selectively choose a program to attack running with elevated privileges and |
| quickly write up exploit code for it is a powerful combination. It is easy to |
| see why this paradigm has perpetuated itself so successfully. However, up |
| until recently it seems another potentially lucrative area of exploitation has |
| gone all but overlooked. |
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| ----[ Client-Centricity |
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| An often neglected area of exploitation is the exact reverse of the above: |
| client-centricity. Client-centric attacks target client programs (duh). The |
| types of programs in this category include: web browsers (which have seen more |
| then their share of vulnerabilities) remote access programs, DNS resolvers and |
| IRC clients (to name a few). The benefits of this attack model are as follows: |
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| - Automated (non-discretionary) attacks. We know that, under the |
| previous paradigm, the attacker has complete autonomy over who s/he |
| attacks. The benefit there is obvious. However, non-discretionary |
| attacking implies that the attacker doesn't even have to be around |
| when the attack takes place. The attacker can set up the server |
| containing the exploit and actually go do something useful (tm). |
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| - Wide dispersement. With client-centric attacks you can gain a wider |
| audience. If a server contains a popular service, people from all over |
| will seek it out. Popular websites are constantly bombarded with |
| clientele. Another consideration: server programs often run in |
| filtered environments. It may not be possible for an attacker to |
| connect to a server. This is rarely the case in client-centric |
| attacks. |
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| - Client codebase not developed with security in mind. If you think |
| server code is bad, you should see some client code. Memory leaks and |
| stack overruns are all too common. |
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| - Largely an untapped resource. There are so many wonderful holes |
| waiting to be discovered. Judging at how successful people have been |
| in finding and exploiting holes in server code, it goes to figure that |
| the same success can be had in client code. In fact, if you take into |
| account the fact that the codebase is largely unaudited from a |
| security perspective, the yields should be high. |
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| For all the above reasons, people wanting to find security holes should |
| be definitely be looking at client programs. Now go break telnet. |
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| Enjoy the magazine. It is by and for the hacking community. Period. |
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|
| -- Editor in Chief ----------------[ route |
| -- Phrack World News --------------[ disorder |
| -- Phrack Publicity ---------------[ dangergirl |
| -- Phrack Librarian ---------------[ loadammo |
| -- Soother of Typographical Chaos -[ snocrash |
| -- Hi! I'm an idiot! -------------[ Carolyn P. Meinel |
| -- The Justice-less Files ---------[ Kevin D. Mitnick (www.kevinmitnick.com) |
| -------- Elite --------------------> Solar Designer |
| -- More money than God ------------[ The former SNI |
| -- Tom P. and Tim N. -------------[ Cool as ice, hot as lava. |
| -- Official Phrack Song -----------[ KMFDM/Megalomaniac |
| -- Official Phrack Tattoo artist --[ C. Nalla Smith |
| -- Shout Outs and Thank Yous ------[ haskell, mudge, loadammo, nihilis, daveg, |
| -----------------------------------| halflife, snocrash, apk, solar designer, |
| -----------------------------------| kore, alhambra, nihil, sluggo, Datastorm, |
| -----------------------------------| aleph1, drwho, silitek |
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| Phrack Magazine V. 8, #53, xx xx, 1998. ISSN 1068-1035 |
| Contents Copyright (c) 1998 Phrack Magazine. All Rights Reserved. Nothing |
| may be reproduced in whole or in part without written permission from the |
| editor in chief. Phrack Magazine is made available quarterly to the public, |
| free of charge. Go nuts people. |
|
|
| Contact Phrack Magazine |
| ----------------------- |
| Submissions: phrackedit@phrack.com |
| Commentary: loopback@phrack.com |
| Editor in Chief: route@phrack.com |
| Publicist: dangergrl@phrack.com |
| Phrack World News: disorder@phrack.com |
| Submissions to the above email address may be encrypted with the following key: |
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| phrack:~# head -20 /usr/include/std-disclaimer.h |
| /* |
| * All information in Phrack Magazine is, to the best of the ability of the |
| * editors and contributors, truthful and accurate. When possible, all facts |
| * are checked, all code is compiled. However, we are not omniscient (hell, |
| * we don't even get paid). It is entirely possible something contained |
| * within this publication is incorrect in some way. If this is the case, |
| * please drop us some email so that we can correct it in a future issue. |
| * |
| * |
| * Also, keep in mind that Phrack Magazine accepts no responsibility for the |
| * entirely stupid (or illegal) things people may do with the information |
| * contained here-in. Phrack is a compendium of knowledge, wisdom, wit, and |
| * sass. We neither advocate, condone nor participate in any sort of illicit |
| * behavior. But we will sit back and watch. |
| * |
| * |
| * Lastly, it bears mentioning that the opinions that may be expressed in the |
| * articles of Phrack Magazine are intellectual property of their authors. |
| * These opinions do not necessarily represent those of the Phrack Staff. |
| */ |
|
|
| -------------------------[ T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S |
|
|
| 1 Introduction Phrack Staff 11K |
| 2 Phrack Loopback Phrack Staff 33K |
| 3 Line Noise various 51K |
| 4 Phrack Prophile on Glyph Phrack Staff 18K |
| 5 An Overview of Internet Routing krnl 50K |
| 6 T/TCP Vulnerabilities route 17K |
| 7 A Stealthy Windows Keylogger markj8 25K |
| 8 Linux Trusted Path Execution redux K. Baranowski 23K |
| 9 Hacking in Forth mudge 15K |
| 10 Interface Promiscuity Obscurity apk 24K |
| 11 Watcher, NIDS for the masses hacklab 32K |
| 12 The Crumbling Tunnel Aleph1 52K |
| 13 Port Scan Detection Tools Solar Designer 25K |
| 14 Phrack World News Disorder 95K |
| 15 extract.c Phrack Staff 11K |
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| 482K |
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| ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
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| " The advent of information availability and a rise in the number people |
| for whom the net has always been 'the norm' is producing a class of users |
| who cannot think for themselves. As reliance upon scripted attacks |
| increases, the number of people who personally possess technical knowledge |
| decreases. " |
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| ----[ EOF |
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