| ---[ Phrack Magazine Volume 8, Issue 52 January 26, 1998, article 14 of 20 |
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| -------------------------[ The International Crime Syndicate Association |
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| --------[ Dorathea Demming |
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| = ICSA = |
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| = International Computer Security Association = |
| = = |
| = or = |
| = = |
| = International Crime Syndicate Association? = |
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| = = |
| = by = |
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| = Dorathea Demming = |
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| = = |
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| = (c) Dorathea Demming, October, 1997 = |
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| =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= |
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| This is an article about computer criminals. I'm not talking about the fun |
| loving kids of the Farmers of Doom [FOD], the cool pranksters of the Legion of |
| Doom [LOD], or even the black-tie techno terrorists of The New Order [TNO]. |
| I'm talking about professional computer criminals. I'm talking about the |
| types of folks that go to work every day and make a living by ripping off |
| guileless corporations. I'm talking about the International Computer Security |
| Association [ICSA]. The ICSA has made more money off of computer fraud than |
| the other three organizations mentioned above combined. |
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| ICSA was previously known as National Computer Security Association [NCSA]. |
| It seems that they finally discovered that there are networks and gullible |
| corporations in countries other than the United States. |
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| In this article I will inform you of the cluelessness and greed of ICSA. |
| Instead of telling you, I will let them tell you in their own words. |
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| Lets look at what the NSCA has to say about it's history: |
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| "the company was founded in 1989 to provide independent and |
| objective services to a rapidly growing and often confusing |
| digital security marketplace through a market-driven, for-profit |
| consortium model." |
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| This is where the ICSA differs from real industry organizations like the IEEE. |
| Non-profit organizations like the IEEE can provide independent and objective |
| services, for-profit organizations like ICSA cannot be trusted to do so. |
| The goal of the NSCA is profit, nothing more and nothing less. |
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| Profit is a desirable goal in a business. However, the ICSA pretends to be |
| an industry association. This is a complete and total fabrication. ICSA is |
| not an industry association -- it is a for-profit enterprise that competes for |
| business directly with the companies it pretends to help. |
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| =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= |
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| Let's look at the ICSA's knowledge of computer security: |
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| "Early computer security issues focused on virus protection. " |
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| This is where the ICSA accidentally informs us if their true history. No one |
| with half of a clue would claim that "Early computer security issues focused |
| on virus protection." In reality, early computer security issues focused on |
| the protection of mainframe systems. Virus protection did not become a |
| concern until the 1980's. We can only conclude that no one at the ICSA has a |
| background in computer security outside of personal computer security. These |
| folks seem to be Unix illiterate -- not to speak of VM, MVS, OS/400, AOS/VS, |
| VMS or a host of other systems where corporations store vast amounts of data. |
| Focusing primarily on PC security will not benefit the overall security |
| posture of your organization. |
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| =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= |
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| Let's look at another baseless claim of the ISCA: |
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| "ICSA consortia facilitate an open exchange of information among |
| security industry product developers and security service |
| providers within narrow, but well defined segments of the |
| computer security industry." |
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| According to the "security industry product developers and security service |
| providers" that I have spoken with, this is complete hogwash. The word on the |
| street is that the ICSA folks collect information and then give nothing useful |
| in return. My response is "How could they?" No one at ICSA has any |
| information to offer. You would do as well to ask your 12 year old daughter |
| for information about computer security -- and you might even do better, if |
| your daughter reads Phrack. |
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| =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= |
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| Let's look at what the ICSA has to say about their Web Certification program: |
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| "The ICSA Web Certification materially reduces web site risks |
| and liability for both operator and visitor by providing, |
| verifying and improving the use of logical, physical and |
| operational baseline security standards and practices." |
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| "Comprised of a detailed certification field guide, on-site |
| evaluation, remote test, random spot checks, and an evolving set |
| of endorsed best practices, ICSA certification uniquely |
| demonstrates management's efforts to assure site availability, |
| information protection, and data integrity as well as enhanced |
| user confidence and trust." |
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| What really happens is that ICSA sends out a reseller to your site. The |
| reseller then asks you if you have set up your site correctly. You tell the |
| reseller that you have, and then the reseller tells ICSA that you have set up |
| your site correctly. Very few items are actually verified by the reseller. |
| ICSA then runs ISS (Internet Security Scanner) against your web server. If ISS |
| cannot detect any security vulnerabilities remotely, you receive ICSA Web |
| Certification. |
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| For grilling your staff with a series of almost meaningless questions, the |
| reseller receives $2,975 US dollars. For running ISS against your web server, |
| ICSA receives $5,525. For $19. 95, you can buy a copy of Computer Security |
| Basics by Deborah Russell and G.T. Gangemi Sr. (ISBN:0-937175-71-4) and save |
| your company almost $8,500. |
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| Let's look at the ICSA's Reseller Training: |
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| ICSA states that every reseller that delivers their product is trained in |
| computer security. In practice, however, this training is actually _sales_ |
| training. The ICSA training course lasts for less than one day and is |
| supposed to be conducted by two trainers, one sales person and one technical |
| person. One recipient of this training told me that the technical person did |
| not bother to show up for his training, while another recipient of this |
| training told me that ICSA instead sent _two_ sales people and _no_ technical |
| people to his training. |
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| Let's look at what ICSA says about change in the "digital world" of |
| firewalls: |
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| "The digital world moves far too quickly to certify only a |
| particular version of a product or a particular incarnation of a |
| system. Therefore, ICSA certification criteria and processes are |
| designed so that once a product or system is certified, all |
| future versions of the product (or updates of the system) are |
| inherently certified." |
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| What does this mean to you? It means that ICSA is certifying firewalls |
| running code that they have never seen. It means that if you purchase a |
| firewall that has been ICSA certified -- you have no way of knowing if the |
| version of the firewall product that is protecting your organization has ever |
| been certified. |
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| Let's look at how ICSA defends itself from such allegations? ISCA has |
| three ready made defenses: |
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| "First, the ICSA gains a contractual commitment from the |
| product vendor or the organization that owns or runs the |
| certified system that the product or system will be maintained |
| at the current, published ICSA certification standards. " |
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| So that's how ICSA certification works, the firewall vendors promise to write |
| good code and ICSA gives them a sticker. This works fine with little children |
| in Sunday school, but I wouldn't trust the security of my business to such a |
| plan. |
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| "Secondly, ICSA or it's authorized partners normally perform |
| random spot checking of the current product (or system) against |
| current ICSA criteria for that certification category. " |
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| Except, of course, that an unnamed source within ICSA itself admitted that |
| these spot checks are not actually being done. That's right, these spot |
| checks exist only in the minds of the marketing staff of the ICSA. ICSA |
| cannot manage to cover the costs of spot checking in their exorbitant fee |
| structure. They must be spending the money instead on all of those free |
| televisions they are giving away to their resellers. |
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| "Thirdly, ICSA certification is renewed annually. At renewal |
| time, the full certification process is repeated for the current |
| production system or shipping products against the current |
| criteria. " |
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| Well here we have the final promise -- our systems will never out of |
| certification for more than 364 days. If our firewall vendor ships three new |
| releases a year -- at least one of them will go through the actual ICSA |
| certification process. Of course, all of them will have the ICSA certification |
| sticker. |
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| =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= |
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| Let's looks at what ICSA has to say about their procedures: |
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| "The certification criteria is not primarily based on |
| fundamental design or engineering principles or on an assessment |
| of underlying technology. In most cases, we strive to use a |
| black-box approach. " |
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| Listen to what they are really saying here. They are admitting that their |
| certification process does not deal with "fundamental design or engineering |
| principles" or on an "assessment of underlying technology". What else is left |
| to base a certification upon? Do they certify firewalls based upon the |
| firewall vendors marketing brochures? Upon the color of their product boxes? |
| Upon the friendliness of their sales staff? Or maybe they just certify anyone |
| who gives them money. |
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| When you are clueless, every computer system must look like a "black- |
| box" to you. |
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| Let's look at how the ICSA web certification process deals with CGI |
| vulnerabilities: |
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| "The Site Operator attest that CGIs have been reviewed by |
| qualified reviewers against design criteria that affect |
| security. " (sic) |
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| Let's take a close look at this. The #1 method of breaking into web servers |
| is to attack a vulnerable CGI program. And the full extent that the ICSA |
| certification deals with secure CGI programming is to have your staff attest |
| that they have done a good job. What sort of employee would respond "Oh no, |
| we haven't even looked at the security of those CGI bins?" The ICSA counts on |
| employees trying to save their jobs to speed the certification process along |
| to it's conclusion. |
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| Let's look at what ICSA has to say about it's own thoroughness: |
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| "Because it is neither practical nor cost effective, ICSA does |
| not test and certify every possible combination of web sites on |
| a web server at various locations unless requested to, and |
| compensated for, by Customer. " |
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| We all know that security is breached at it's weakest link, not it's |
| strongest. If we choose to certify only some of our systems, we can only |
| assume that attackers will them simply move on and attack our unprotected |
| systems. Perhaps if ICSA did not attempt to extort $8,500 for a single web |
| server certification, more customers could have all of their web sites |
| certified. |
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| Let's look at how much faith ICSA puts in their own certifications: |
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| "Customer shall defend, indemnify, and hold ICSA harmless from |
| and against any and all claims or lawsuits of any third party |
| and resulting costs (including reasonable attorneys' fees), |
| damages, losses, awards, and judgements based on any claim that |
| a ICSA-certified server/site/system was insecure, failed to meet |
| any security specifications, or was otherwise unable to |
| withstand an actual or simulated penetration. |
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| In plain English, they are saying that if you get sued, you are on your own. |
| But wait, their faithlessness does not stop there: |
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| Let's look at how the ICSA sees it's legal relationship with it's |
| customers: |
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| "Customer, may, upon written notice and approval of ICSA, assume |
| the defense of any claim or legal proceeding using counsel of |
| it's choice. ICSA shall be entitled to participate in, but not |
| control, the defense of any such action, with it's own counsel |
| and at it's own expense: provided, that if ICSA, it its sole |
| discretion, determines that there exists a conflict of interest |
| between Customer and ICSA, ICSA shall have the right to engage |
| separate counsel, the reasonable costs of which shall be paid by |
| the customer. " |
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| What you, the customer, agree to when you sign up for ICSA certification is |
| that you cannot even legally defend yourself in court until you have "written |
| notice and approval of ICSA. " But it's even worse that that, ICSA then |
| reserves the right to hire lawyers and bill YOU for the expense if it feels |
| that you are not sufficiently protecting it's interests. Whose corporate |
| legal department is going to okay a provision like this? |
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| Let's look at how much the ICSA attempts to charge for this garbage: |
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| =========================================================== |
| | Web Certification | |
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| | 1 Server $8,500 | |
| | 2-4 Servers $7,650 | |
| | 5 or more Servers $6,800 | |
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| | 6-10 DNS $ 495 | |
| | 11 or more DNS $ 395 | |
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| | Perimeter Check | |
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| | up to 15 Devices $3,995 | |
| | additional groups of 10 Devices $1,500 | |
| | bi-monthly reports $1,000 | |
| | monthly reports $3,500 | |
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| | War Dial | |
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| | first 250 phone lines $1,000 | |
| | additional lines $3/line | |
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| | Per Diem | |
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| | Domestic $ 995 | |
| | International $1,995 | |
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| =========================================================== |
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| Certifying one web server will cost you $8,500. I have seen small web servers |
| purchased, installed, and designed for less than that amount. |
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| If you tell the ICSA that you have 15 network devices visible on the Internet |
| and they discover 16 devices, they will bill you an additional $1,500. This |
| is what you agree to when you sign a ICSA Perimeter Check contract. In |
| effect, when you sign up for an ICSA Perimeter Check, you are agreeing to pay |
| unspecified fees. |
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| To dial an entire prefix the ICSA will charge you $30,250. I wonder if these |
| folks are using ToneLoc. I wonder if these fools are even using modems... |
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| I will leave judgement on the per diem rates to the reader. How much would |
| you pay for a clown to entertain at your daughters birthday party? Would you |
| give the clown a daily per diem of $995? Why would you feel the ICSA clowns |
| might deserve better? How do you spend $995 a day and still manage to put in |
| some work hours? |
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| These are just a few excerpts from some ICSA documentation I managed to get my |
| hands on. I do not feel my assessment has been any more harsh than these |
| people deserve. I am certain that if I had more of their literature, there |
| would be even more flagrant examples of ignorance and greed. |
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| ICSA feeds on business people who are so ignorant as to fall for the ICSA |
| propaganda. By masquerading as a legitimate trade organization, they make |
| everyone in the data security industry look bad. By overcharging the |
| clientele, they drain money from computer security budgets that could better |
| be spent on securing systems and educating users. By selling certifications |
| with no actual technical validity behind them they fool Internet users into a |
| false sense of security when using e-commerce sites. |
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| ISCA is good for no one and it is good for nothing. |
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| Dorathea Demming |
| Mechanicsburg, PA |
| 10 Oct, 1997 |
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| ----[ EOF |
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