| ==Phrack Magazine== |
|
|
| Volume Six, Issue Forty-Seven, File 21 of 22 |
|
|
| **************************************************************************** |
|
|
| International Scenes |
|
|
| There was once a time when hackers were basically isolated. It was |
| almost unheard of to run into hackers from countries other than the |
| United States. Then in the mid 1980's thanks largely to the |
| existence of chat systems accessible through X.25 networks like |
| Altger, tchh and QSD, hackers world-wide began to run into each other. |
| They began to talk, trade information, and learn from each other. |
| Separate and diverse subcultures began to merge into one collective |
| scene and has brought us the hacking subculture we know today. A |
| subculture that knows no borders, one whose denizens share the common goal |
| of liberating information from its corporate shackles. |
|
|
| With the incredible proliferation of the Internet around the globe, this |
| group is growing by leaps and bounds. With this in mind, we want to help |
| further unite the communities in various countries by shedding light |
| onto the hacking scenes that exist there. If you want to contribute a |
| file about the hacking scene in your country, please send it to us |
| at phrack@well.com. |
|
|
| This month we have files about the scenes in Norway, France, Italy and an |
| update from Denmark. |
|
|
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
|
| =-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- |
| dfp-1 An orientation on the Norwegian hacking/phreaking scene dfp-1 |
|
|
| Written by the Digital Freedom Phanatic (dfp@powertech.no) |
| Brought to you in January, 1995 |
| - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - |
|
|
| PROLOGUE: It's 1995 and little has been mentioned about Norwegian |
| hackers in the media lately. I thought this would be a nice opportunity |
| to summarize some of the things that have happened on the scene in |
| Norway during the last 5 or so years. For those of you in the Norwegian |
| audience not recognizing my name; you shouldn't. I am more or less an |
| acquaintance of many of you guys, but I feel that in order to get |
| something done on the Norwegian scene right now (it's been fairly quiet |
| for a while, nicht wahr?) I cannot reveal my true identity. Hell, let's |
| see if I get any responses to this article. Now for the good stuff... |
|
|
| Unfortunately I entered the scene as late as around 1990, so I'm not |
| quite up-to-date on stuff that happened before that. I've been trying |
| to gather old articles from newspapers and books. What I have been |
| able to come up with is more or less some articles about a couple of |
| hackers who managed to get into a local newspaper's computer. Also, |
| I have gotten in touch with some of the _real old Norwegian hackers_ |
| dating back to the '70s. Needless to say, those people today work in |
| the telecommunications industry. |
|
|
| AREAS OF INTEREST FOR HACKERS: First, a little introduction to Norway. |
| We are a very, very rich country, mainly due to the enormous amount of |
| oil resources which we are pumping from the North Sea. As a result of |
| this wealth (I guess), our people are well educated and we have a blooming |
| industry. Well, in some cases. Nevermind. Keywords: large corporations, |
| very large and respected telecommunications semi-monopoly, expensive |
| communications. |
|
|
| So in theory, there should be a lot of corporate hacking taking place in |
| Norway. Well, either the people doing this are doing it real well, or |
| nobody is doing it. I don't think anybody is. As I have come to |
| understand, most hacking in Norway has really been Internet related. |
| Norway was actually one of the first countries apart from USA getting |
| connected to the Internet; way back in 1982. |
|
|
| STATUS OF INTERNET CONNECTIVITY: The universities have been hooked up |
| since the dawn of time, and today these are the centers of the Internet |
| community and high-speed telecom equipment in general use in Norway. |
| Actually, we have four universities and at least three of them are |
| currently networked with each other at a speed of 34Mbps. The |
| university network's (Uninett) international Internet connection is |
| through NORDUnet and has a bandwidth of 2Mbps. Until a couple of |
| years ago, one could not gain legitimate access to the Internet except |
| by obtaining an account on one of the Uninett connected machines. This |
| was impossible, at least for a majority of the hacker community, so |
| Uninett, or rather the computers at the University of Oslo, became a Mecca |
| for the scene. The big people had accounts there, or borrowed one. |
| However, security is pretty stiff there and I fear that there was little |
| actual _hacking_ going on, people were merely borrowing legitimate |
| accounts through friends. |
|
|
| What's fun about the University of Oslo computer network is that it |
| until recently could be used for dialling out with speeds up to |
| 14.4kbps. Actually, some of their dialup terminal servers were |
| configured to let you connect into them and dial out. Try CONNECT |
| USEk.15 after logging in to Net/ONE (the University LAN). I don't think |
| this works anymore, nor do I know if this was a "feature" introduced |
| when the terminal servers were installed. It could be that some hacker |
| reconfigured them. In that case, please let me know! Dialled 820s |
| as well (The 900 numbers of Norway). |
|
|
| Today the Internet situation is very different. We have had an |
| extravagant boost in the number of Internet access providers lately: |
| Oslonett, PowerTech, EUnet, Vestnett, BigBlue, MoNet, NordNet and PMDData |
| are those I can think of right now. Also, a number of companies are |
| providing leased-line access: TelePost, EUnet and Datametrix. PowerTech |
| is starting to do this soon now (they say), presumably with competitive |
| prices, but they are real bad on bandwidth. (Well, they've been the |
| cheapest for me so far.) At least we're not far from getting Internet |
| trial accounts shovelled up our asses here. Let's hope some souls will |
| soon pour some actual value into the net; more information, more |
| services. I've seen little of that. |
|
|
| Until we get more Norwegian fun services on the Net, we might as well |
| exploit the services of Norwegian companies with no clue whatsoever when |
| it comes to security. Take, for instance, Cinet AS (cinet.no) which has |
| a world NFS mountable root disk (rw). BigBlue Systems AS (bigblue.no) uses |
| a Linux server which you can log to using accounts named node1, node2 or |
| node3. Full shell user access. Or you could try logging in as "-froot" |
| to obtain root access. Hm, I think they plugged that. :) Well, ach so. |
| There's more out there. Just get hacking. And feel free to tell me what |
| you find! |
|
|
| WHAT WERE THE HACKERS DOING: There used to be a blooming hacking scene |
| in Norway earlier. Well, one might not say blooming with bright ideas |
| and happenings, but at least there were many people doing the right |
| stuff. Using X.25 NUIs to get to QSD, Password spoofing at the local |
| DataPak PAD using Pad2Pad, Social Engineering, Hacking calling cards to |
| get to the states, finding AT&T Alliance backdoors so as to keep people |
| up all night long when there was school the day after.. The good old |
| days. We could even do easy blueboxing. 1980s-1992. |
|
|
| I must admit, though, that QSD isn't much anymore. I liked it better |
| when there were a hundred people logged in simultaneously, and when |
| there were alliances being held with people from the States, Norway, |
| Denmark, Israel, all over the place. Then came the busts. It was |
| around October 1992 when the first busts started taking place. We have |
| a very interesting timeline there. First, the police teamed up with a |
| couple of computer software retailers (BJ Electronics, sounds familiar |
| huh?) and busted ten or so of the warez type board sysops. People to |
| remember: Gizmo, Enemy :-). |
|
|
| Soon after that, bigger names were taken down. Mario, Graham Two |
| (Vishnu), Edison, RamJet, Peter, Leikarnes etc. Kevin was never busted. |
| I wonder who he was. These guys were taken for more serious stuff like |
| carding, datapak (x.25), AT&T Alliance conferences, boxing, and general |
| abuse of the telephone system. A couple of shorter raid periods followed |
| in 1993, and the scene was pretty much dead - except for the k-rad warez |
| kids. |
|
|
| AT&T and the other big guys we used to bluebox off of have all gone for |
| CCIS/CCITT #7 so there is little to be done boxing in Norway now. Well, |
| as a matter of fact I haven't checked that out lately. An interesting |
| thing, though, is that you can temporarily disconnect the complete |
| international trunk set between Norway and Iceland by breaking (24+26 |
| 250ms 26 100ms) on the Iceland Direct line. Everybody trying to |
| _legitimately_ dial an Icelandic number from Norway for a while after |
| that just gets a busy signal. Ha ha. Poor man's fun. Wish I could do |
| that with the States... :) |
|
|
| WHAT'S AHEAD FOR THE NORWEGIAN SCENE: I think we should get organized. I |
| have a few projects in mind. There are a lot of security flaws and |
| weaknesses yet to be discovered in Norwegian systems and services. We |
| need to get all of Norway scanned for automated answering services and |
| carriers. We need to get into some Central Offices to check out the |
| labels on the modems connected to their Ericsson boxes. We need to get |
| trashing. We need to start talking hacking and phreaking at The |
| Gathering. We need to find data numbers for C.O.s, banks, corporate |
| computers, the local McDonalds', we need to get root access at an Internet |
| provider and we need to be able to listen in to phone conversations. We |
| will. Get in touch with me if you'd like to join. |
|
|
| These were just a couple of thoughts of mine that I wanted to share with |
| you fellow hackers out there. Hope you've enjoyed them. And for heaven's |
| sake, feel free to give me some feedback (via internet: dfp@powertech.no). |
|
|
| FUN FACTS: Many companies have unconfigured PBXes that you can obtain |
| outside dialtone on. There is no flat rate telephony. A 28k8 modem |
| goes for a little less than $400. All phone calls are logged, logs are |
| erased after a couple of months (presumably). Only ISDN customers can |
| get Caller ID. There are three cellular operator companies. All the |
| Norway Direct operators are situated in Kongens gate 21, OSLO, Norway. |
| The NMT-900 Cellular network doesn't allow calls to Pakistan. All |
| Norwegian babes are young, slim and blonde...not :) |
|
|
| I'll be releasing a couple of files on Norwegian hacking/phreaking areas |
| and techniques in the months to come. Here's a list of those I am |
| planning, haven't written anything yet but I think I will. If there's |
| anything in particular you'd like to add or to get hurried up, or if you |
| have information which should be included in these files, then get in |
| touch with me. |
|
|
| (*) COCOTs and Monopoly operated Pay Phones in Norway |
| (*) MBBS, the Norwegian BBS System; Backdoors and Security |
| (*) Norwegian Telecom; TeleNor. Organization and computer systems. |
| (*) The Norwegian State Libraries; BibSys network security |
| (*) Telephone Monopoly; current status, what will happen, when? |
|
|
| Sincerely Yours, |
| Digital Freedom Phanatic |
|
|
| Yola's to (unsorted, people I know or would like to know): |
| Gizmo, Enemy, Mario, Graham Two (Vishnu), Edison, Roger RamJet, Peter, |
| Gekko, Ozelot, Sicko, Flesaker, Karstad, Arild Leikarnes, Frode1 og |
| Frode2 :-), The Dealer, Saron, Digital Phanatic, SCSI (BayernPower!), |
| SevenUp (damiano?), UrbanMatrix, OnkelD. Where ARE you guys hiding? |
| ;-) |
|
|
|
|
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
|
|
|
| >-=-=-=-=-=-< |
| <French Scene> |
| >-=-=-=-=-=-< |
|
|
| By NeurAlien |
|
|
| The French scene has always been portrayed as weak by both French and |
| foreign people. There's a paradox here: France was one of the first |
| countries to develop a modern network (in 1981) YET there have been |
| few _good hackers_. How is that explained? I DUNNO ! |
|
|
| In fact, stating that France is underdeveloped at a hacker level is |
| partly false. In France, hackers have always been isolated or hidden |
| in little isolated groups. Whenever a good group formed, everyone was |
| quickly busted by DST (the agency in charge of computer fraud). Moreover, |
| this agency (DST) is somewhat effective and hacking has been illegal here |
| since 1988. The risks when you are caught are VERY HEAVY and the trial |
| lasts forever! Usually, it takes 3 years to go to trial and the material |
| is ALWAYS seized even if you're not charged with anything!. |
|
|
| The Videotex initiative that provided France such a breakthrough |
| in technology is now an handicap because it can't follow the evolution of |
| modems and isn't well adapted for networking with the Internet. |
|
|
| I- The Videotex aka Minitel |
| ------------------------ |
|
|
| Minitel has been developed in 1981 by France Telecom. It was excellent at |
| the time but it hasn't evolved very much. Let's see what hacking has |
| been like in the Minitel world. |
|
|
| To explain a little what "Minitel hacking" was, I must detail |
| a little how Teletel (the network that supports Minitel) works. |
| Teletel is based on X25 and provides multiple price levels: |
|
|
| Teletel 0 (T0) is free for the user, costs a lot for the server. |
| Teletel 1 (T1) costs a local call to the user, the price of the X25 |
| collect connection to the server. |
| Teletel 2 (T2) costs the price of a local call + X25 communication |
| (6+ cents per minute) to the user.) |
| Teletel 3 (T3) costs T2 + a charge that is reversed to the server |
| (costs 20 cents to $1 per minute to the user.) |
|
|
| A lot of servers are accessible only in T3 for the users. |
| The principle of hacking Teletel was to find a the X25 number corresponding |
| to the T3 CODE in order to log on the T3 server from T2 level. |
| Eventually, there could be a password on the T2 access. |
|
|
| Actually, it's very basic and very dumb hacking since you can only do |
| some scanning to find the x25 number of the servers. |
|
|
| T1 was used for more professional type servers and the hackers |
| that used to hack T1 were better than T2 hackers. |
|
|
| T2 K0d3z were very popular among wannabe hackers, some Special Interest |
| Groups about T2 were formed on a lot of servers and there was even a server |
| dedicated to T2 codes. The quality of information has always been extremely |
| low in this kind of club. Moreover, the kind of k0dez kidz on these SIGs and |
| servers were particularly dumb (sorry for them). It got really bad in 1991 |
| when a lot of T2 guys started to flame each other, accusing them of leeching |
| some T2 codes from one server and posting them to another, saying that the |
| other guys were ripping everyone off etc... It may be continuing now but I'm |
| totally uninterested by these people so I completely left this scene. |
|
|
| The "good ones" of the T2 K0d3z k1dz stopped T2 (it's not free so it's |
| too expensive!). They usually started to Hack T0 which is totally free. |
| (it's like a 1-800 for Teletel). The servers of T0 are nearly all of the |
| "restricted access" kind. But they have weak protection schemes and can |
| be easily bypassed with some experience. The hackers of T0 servers don't |
| usually know each other and some of them may form a kind of little "islands". |
| (I'm calling them "islands" because it is always placed in an Information |
| System on T0, deep within the system. There are perhaps 10 or so "islands" |
| that have no connection with other hackers. A typical "island" consists of |
| 5 to 10 hackers. Some hackers may go on 2 or more "islands" but prefer to |
| keep the presence of both "islands" secret. Why? In order not to destroy |
| both if one of them is found and shut down! |
|
|
| One reason most never heard of these person is that there is nearly |
| no connection between the Teletel world and the Internet. The only way |
| to escape to Internet and Intl X25 is Teletel 1 (T1). |
|
|
| II- When Teletel goes professional |
| ------------------------------- |
|
|
| As I said, the T1 is the only way for a Teletel hacker to evolve |
| to hacking Internet or International & ASCII X25. On Teletel 1, you can |
| sometimes log on to some interesting Unixes, Vaxes etc. |
| T1 is also the only way on Teletel to use the International X25 network. |
| You have to get a Transpac NUI to call a foreign address from T1. |
| Until 1991, the Transpac NUIs were a 4 to 6 random alphanumeric |
| characters. A man called IER had made an NUI Scanner that allowed him to |
| find NUIs by scanning out every 4 character NUI. It WAS effective, |
| but Transpac changed to a 6 character NUI. (IER was busted and caught. |
| No news from him since that day!) |
|
|
| Many good hackers used T1 a lot to hack systems and to go on the Internet |
| and the Intl X25 networks. For example, you may have heard of people |
| like Netlink, Furax, Jansky or Synaps. They hacked X25 and Internet but |
| it seems that each of them was busted and caught. Some are still alive on |
| the Net, but some aren't!!! |
|
|
| Some French hackers were really good but it seems that no one can hide |
| very long from the DST. They are very effective, and with the help of |
| France Telecom, they trace back a lot of calls. |
|
|
| Places like QSD haven't been used very much by the French because of |
| their lack of technological knowledge. ahem... |
|
|
| Moreover, QSD/The Line is tapped by governmental agencies so g00d French |
| hackers don't like it. |
|
|
| IV- The groups |
| ---------- |
|
|
| Some groups have been formed in France but they've never lived long enough |
| to give new hackers the knowledge of the old hackers. Some groups were: |
| NICK, Hardcore Hackers, Piratel, TeKila Underground. Many of them |
| were hacking systems in Teletel 1. |
|
|
| A group called CCCF appeared in 1991. It was founded by Jean Bernard |
| Condat and in fact it was not really a group. This guy, JBC, is deft |
| at maneuvering people into doing what he wants. He organized fake contests |
| like "The price of the Chaos" to get more information and then act as |
| if he personally discovered the hacks that were given to him. |
|
|
| He recently started the Chaos newsletter where nothing originates from |
| him...it's taken from everywhere and from his personal contacts. |
|
|
| He has big power because he works for SVP which is a private |
| information company that has the goal of providing information to whoever |
| wants it, for a large amount of money. |
|
|
| Nobody knows what JBC really wants but he is definitely a threat to the |
| underground. Somebody, I don't recall who, already mentioned that in Phrack. |
|
|
| V- Phreaking in Phrance |
| -------------------- |
|
|
| Phone phreaking became really active in France in 1992 after the |
| massive release of a blue box that worked in France. Several months |
| later discovery of this caused the death of blue boxing from France. |
|
|
| The blue box program was running on ST and several people that used it |
| formed the TeKila Underground. As far as i know, this was an happy group |
| that had a lot of parties and liked smoking... :) |
|
|
| They weren't very effective: just into using the blue box. |
|
|
| Then came the movement of the "Horlogers", it was due to the credit you |
| could gain if you connected in Teletel 3 on some server. The "horlogers" were |
| staying HOURS and DAYS on a server with blue box just to have more credit |
| (counted in minute of connection) on those server. |
| They were staying connected on a place called "L'horloge" (the timer) that |
| enabled you not to be disconnected by the server when being idle for a long |
| time. |
|
|
| Blue boxing is now very hard in France. The Australian blue box |
| ceased to work and a lot of phreakers couldn't phreak anymore. |
|
|
| The real problem in France is that nobody (or almost nobody) knows how |
| the France Telecom phone network works so we can't really use any flaws |
| in this system. |
|
|
| Calling cards have been heavily used in France, placing the country |
| in the top ten consumers of stolen CC's. When AT&T & MCI saw that, |
| they contacted France Telecom and now each calling card from AT&T, MCI |
| can't call back to France. |
|
|
| Moreover, FT's CC called "Carte France Telecom" (CFT or CP) is traced and |
| recorded: I mean, when the person who owns the CFT receives the bill, |
| written on the bill is the number of the caller and of the called party. |
|
|
| HARD isn't it? |
|
|
| Recently, some busts were done on AT&T and MCI CC users. They are now |
| awaiting trial. |
|
|
| VI- Magazines |
| --------- |
|
|
| Back before 1990 a magazine was published twice and sent to every |
| single university in France. It was called "Hackito" from the |
| "Hackito ergo sum" motto. (I've never found an issue of it, but if you have |
| one, send me it to me in email.) |
|
|
| There is also this shitty zine called Chaos... |
|
|
|
|
| Now, a new zine is making the underground react in France: |
| It's called "N0 Way" and I'm the Editor. |
|
|
| This magazine is written entirely in French. The current issue is number 3. |
| Anyone wanting to submit something to "N0 Way" can send me a message in Email. |
|
|
| Today we are seeing a lot of people in France wanting to know more about |
| hacking. It seems to have taken off here but not as much as in Holland or |
| in the USA. |
|
|
| Email me to receive "N0 Way": an133729@anon.penet.fi |
|
|
| ++NeurAlien. |
|
|
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
|
| The Italian Scene |
| by |
| Zero Uno |
|
|
| Italy, as you know, is among the industrialized EEC powers. It deserves |
| this honor only to the work of talented people, not by its government, |
| which is utterly idiot and totally unable to fulfill the needs of the people. |
| This characteristic inevitably has conditioned the whole telecommunication |
| market, both phone and networks, which must make clever long term decisions, |
| something that Italian government is not able to do. The phone company is |
| owned by the government through Italy Telecom (IT), the new society formed by |
| the previous three state-owned firms involved in communications. In the |
| last five years IT has undoubtedly made good work, but the quality of phone |
| connections and service was so bad in the past, that many people feel very |
| upset when comes to talk to IT. |
|
|
| The Telephone System |
|
|
| Italy is divided in 220 telephone districts, each with its own unique |
| prefix: a zero followed by a number (up to three digits). In addition there |
| are a few special prefixes in order to access cellular phones (0335,0336) or |
| to reach some 'fake' locations (0769), like many tv programs that use the |
| telephone to reach people. (Like 555 in the USA) In this way IT protects |
| itself from line congestions when successful TV-progs are involved. All |
| kind of modern connections are availabl. This means that payphones, pagers, |
| cellulars (ETACS and GSM), radio (an old, now unsupported phone for cars in |
| 400 Mhz range) are present. Another strange beast is televoting (0869) a fake |
| prefix that holds the number of incoming calls for polls. It was used to |
| test some political decisions, but the hack here was so evident (the redial |
| button) that now televote is not so well thought of. |
|
|
| Standard Numbering |
|
|
| The numbers that begins with the digit '1' are reserved for special services. |
| This include all amenities like emergency numbers (113, roughly the equivalent |
| of American 911), 187 (an all-but-everything number for all requests to IT, |
| such ordering a new phone, installing a new line and so on) and toll free |
| numbers 167[0 or 8] xxxxx. As a reminder about IT's long term planning |
| capacity, the toll free numbers started as 1678-xxxxx, but were so successful |
| that IT was forced to add the 1670-xxxxx later |-(! All 1678-7xxxx are in |
| use by foreign phone companies, and heavily scanned |-). |
|
|
| Some pretty numbers: |
|
|
| 1678-72341 A promo for a XXX-rated line (in north or south america) |
| 1678-70152 See the following capture |
|
|
| ---------------------------------- CAPTURE ------------------------------------- |
|
|
| OFFICIAL USE ONLY |
| ͻ |
| FAMNET (sm) |
| |
| AFAS HQ |
| and |
| AF FSCs |
| |
| ͼ |
|
|
| This system is for the use of authorized users ONLY. Individuals using this |
| computer system without authority, or in access of their authority, are subject |
| to having all of their activities on this system monitored and recorded by |
| system personnel. In the course of monitoring individuals improperly using |
| this system, or in the course of system maintenance, the activities of |
| authorized users may also be monitored. Anyone using the system expressly |
| consents to such monitoring and is advised that such monitoring reveals |
| possible evidence of criminal activity, system personnel may provide the |
| evidence of such monitoring to law enforcement officials. |
|
|
| Line trace initialized........................................... |
|
|
| We now have your phone number......WE TRACK HACKERS AND ADVISE AUTHORITIES. |
|
|
| ---------------------------- END OF CAPTURE -------------------------------- |
|
|
| Unfortunately IT does not support caller ID, so the last sentence is pure |
| crap. |
|
|
| The above numbers are (obviously) all public. These ones are 'reserved' |
| for internal use, though many many people play with 'em: |
|
|
| 135 BBS to record maintenance procedures |
| 138 BBS or human operator (depend on districts) |
| 1372 Ring-back |
| 1391 Human operator |
| 160 Security service (???) |
| 1414 A yet-to-be-implemented service, that enables a user |
| to use one phone and bill on their own phone the |
| subsequent call. Will be implemented |-)? |
|
|
| Not all districts support this, and since they are not public they can change |
| rapidly. Also present are the country direct numbers in the 1721xxx format. |
|
|
| Country Code |
| ----------------------------- |
| Argentina 054 |
| Brazil 055 |
| Chile 056 |
| AT&T 011 |
| MCI 022 |
| Sprint 877 |
|
|
| Services Offered |
|
|
| With the advent of digital COs, 'new' (new to the Italian market, anyway) |
| services were provided. The so called STS (additional telephone services) |
| allowing (obviously paying) the teleconference (three user talking |
| simultaneously), incoming call signal when you are talking with another |
| party, and finally calling transfer, useful when you are away from home. |
| The current pulses billed can be inquired (paying one pulse, obviously!). |
|
|
| The Packet Networks |
|
|
| There is only one packet network provider, ITAPAC (DNIC 2222). As with other |
| packet networks, the access is available with a PAD that accepts only NUI |
| accounts (non-reverse charging) and those who accept reverse-charge calls |
| (in ITAPAC lingo, the 'easy way'). These are heavily hacked because it is |
| the most widespread network in Italy (and the most unreliable, insecure, *bad*) |
| and also because some NUI users simply were not aware of the costs of this kind |
| of service, and they have payed all the phreakers' bills too! |
|
|
| Sometimes, for promotional sales, some NUIs were discharged to the public. |
| Other were disseminated by phreakers, collected by PAD (only a few NUIs are |
| valid across different PADs, most aren't). Until some time ago QSD France |
| was the most 'in' PAD site. Another common activity was surfing across |
| Packet Networks of different states. Now many common NUIs were deleted from |
| system, but some still survive. Many times the net is unusable because |
| has reached its maximum load or because of for system outages. Also, even |
| if the ports run at 2400 bps, is not uncommon to reach the same speed of a |
| 1200 bps connection. Use it if you don't pay or pay a limited fee for it. |
|
|
| The H/P/C/V Scene |
|
|
| Common folklore depicts Italians as adaptable to unfriendly environments in |
| a clever way. Although these rumors are not completely true, there is an |
| Italian way of H/P/C/V. Hacking in Italy is not a common activity. There |
| are several teens who spent lot of effort to learn some tricks, but they |
| are teens, with all pros and cons. Rarely do these individuals survive the |
| 20 years-old barrier, for one reason or another. Those who survive generally |
| self-limit their actions to a restricted area, and generally remain anonymous. |
| The few that remain are the brightest, with lot of know-how and abilities. |
| I only know two people at this top rank level. Hacking is focused on setting |
| up unauthorized fsp sites in university computers, removing licenses to pro |
| warez and gaining illicit access to some resources in internet or in ITAPAC. |
| ITAPAC is now no longer a key issue since ITAPAC (and Italy in general) has |
| very few computing resources, and ITAPAC has severe security problems, so it |
| is predated by hacker wannabees. Also Italy lacks of H/P groups like |
| LOD,MOD and the CCC. Apart from Omega Team, to my knowledge no other group |
| has existed. |
|
|
| Phreaking used to be fairly common, but now is much less so because of |
| new digital COs and stricter security. Blue boxing to USA was *very* common |
| until January 1, 1992. On this date, the software that controls the traffic |
| over North America was changed, and boxing to USA is no longer possible. |
| Carding now is the only phreak access, and is used mainly by warez board |
| sysops. Rumors said that the software update was imposed on ITALCABLE (that |
| manages international calls) by AT&T due to the *huge* illicit traffic between |
| Italy-USA. Basically, too many people, even non H/P ones ('friends of |
| friends') were using blue-boxes even without the faintest idea of how they |
| worked. Some hackers have sold boxes to normal people, and this probably was |
| the key to the blocking of illicit calls. Now, to my knowledge, is possible |
| to box only to Chile, Argentina and some other third-world countries. |
|
|
| True H/P BBS are few. One, Pier Group's BBS was the most famous, in part |
| because one member, MFB (short for MF the Best, basically the best Italian |
| phreaker in my opinion), has written a series of humorous stories about |
| hackers and lamerz, that had a phenomenal success. But since Pier (the |
| sysop) was also invloved in some other illegal activities apart phreaking |
| (stolen hardware, carding), and in this kind of activity too much advertising |
| equals certain arrest, the board went down. Most other BBS are |
| warez-oriented, with warez from THG, Razor 1911 and other USA crack groups. |
| Note however that unlike other nations, Italy has no group HQs: what counts |
| is money, not being part of a group. Many BBS are double-sided: one a ligit, |
| more or less lame, part of a legal net like FidoNET, the other accessible only |
| to subscribers, with warez. This has changed however since the Italian Hacker |
| Crackdown. This is not because the police raided the warez boardz (they are |
| too ignorant to do this) but because warez sysops, in fear of being caught, |
| have (temporarily) closed their BBSes. |
|
|
| Virusing has some players, though not very publicized, for obvious reasons. |
| One has recently become famous (Dr. Revenge) for his contributions to |
| Insane Reality, another H/P/V journal that published some 'secret' |
| telephone numbers for United Kingdom officials. |
|
|
| Nothing really new in Italy, as you can see. Newspapers are (as are most |
| people) too ignorant to correctly report these problems, with the result being |
| that the 'legal' portion of network fanatics fear other unjustified police |
| raids, and legislators are becoming very unfriendly when dealing with this |
| kind of communication. Several politicians and media moguls are proposing |
| laws that forbid anonymous access to the Net, and universities are very |
| concerned about these subjects. Two students were recently arrested because |
| they used illicit (but almost public) passwords to surf the net (*only* to |
| see things, *no* data damage). |
|
|
| Italy may one day become very unfriendly to net people, even if Italians are |
| generally considered very friendly. |
|
|
| Zero Uno |
| mc1671@mclink.it *only* using PGP, otherwise no response. |
|
|
| -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- |
| Version: 2.3 |
|
|
| mQCNAi7zXJ0AAAEEAM3SZQp0+By7fi7ey/oiTU6TT5CdMYdkYnkDeM8f2bZ75Pdp |
| 4mv9C0BTVRP0UrYgJO1I+8YrwvSjZK7+U3hty+c97RJ5lnSYQ0BbF7puSwhUxj4W |
| AyytlQZVP6j1r4H8ulse1arIVlD9h2+GceXOx09J5uEqqhRG/uo1W3A51ixFAAUR |
| tBtaZXJvIFVubyA8bWMxNjcxQG1jbGluay5pdD4= |
| =9GnS |
| -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- |
|
|
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
|
|
| THE DANISH SCENE BY LE CERVEAU |
|
|
| In the last issue of Phrack (46) I read an article about the Danish |
| Computer Underground. Though, I was pleased with the text, a lot of |
| stuff has happened since which I hope most of you have heard about. |
| Anyway, here's an update.. |
|
|
| In short, most (nearly all..) of the Inner Circle hackers in Denmark |
| have been busted. It all went down December 1993 where I, |
| Descore (Zephyr), Dixie (Nitecrawler) were busted at exactly the same |
| time. After the 3 busts several more followed: WedLock, Netrunner, |
| Darkman + some others. I had to spend 14 days in isolation while the |
| others were released (somewhat due to my own stupidity). |
|
|
| The busts were made because all of the universities in DK had been |
| more or less taken over by hackers and the FBI + CERT & ASSIST |
| worked together. The police told me that UNI*C was threatened to be |
| cut off the Internet if the hacking from Denmark didn't stop (don't |
| think that's the truth though. They bullshit alot..). |
|
|
| So, of course the Danish police had to do something and they asked |
| the infamous Joergen Bo Madsen for help. And they got it. And the |
| situation in DK was getting out of control too - the Phone Company |
| was hacked, DK's main research center hacked. No damage to ANYTHING |
| was done though, but naturally we had to be stopped. Actually, the |
| Phone Cmp. screwed up their own system trying to stop us - and now |
| they blame us! |
|
|
| Now we're all awaiting trial. It might take a while, since they |
| said they'd start 'breaking' the PGP-encrypted files with UNI*C's |
| computers ;).... I'd think if they did that, it'd be quite a while |
| before trials! |
|
|
| Busted in DK: Zephyr aka Descore, Dixie, WedLock, Netrunner, |
| Darkman, Lazarus, Jackal and me (LC).. + Joshua - |
| some idiot who might have helped the police a whole lot. |
|
|
| After the bust of Jackal the police says they can't handle anymore so |
| there won't be any. |
|
|
| ---------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
|
| BUSTED |
| BY LE CERVEAU |
|
|
| I've been busted. Why speak out loud? Why not? I'm screwed anyway. |
|
|
| I was stunned. About six-seven months before my bust I succeeded in |
| breaking into a Pentagon computer (pentagon-emh4.army.mil --> |
| otjag.army.mil). What actually launched my interest in this computer |
| was a file about UFOs where it was listed. Now I have realized that had |
| I found anything top secret about UFO cover-ups I probably wouldn't have |
| released it. It wants to be free - but the question is to what degree.. |
| I knew of course that it couldn't be one of their top secret computers |
| (actually, OTJAG=Office of The Judge Attorney General - AFAIR) but I |
| also knew that it would be the start of something big - one thing |
| always leads to another. |
|
|
| After a couple of weeks on the system, doing nothing but leeching |
| all the mail I could get my hands on I discovered that one of the |
| majors used an Air Force base-server (flite.jag.af.mil - AFAIR). As |
| I suspected, all I had to find was his login - the password was |
| exactly the same. And again this had to lead to more and it did. |
| I found some stupid sergeant who also was a user on TACOM |
| (Tank Automotive COMmand). Surely, even though stupid he wouldn't |
| use the same.. - yup, he did. Access to tacom-emh1.army.mil and |
| all their other machines granted. If you want one of the |
| largest lists of MilNet sites then grab /etc/hosts from TACOM. |
| After gaining SU-access on this machine interesting things started |
| happening. If, for example, an officer was to issue some order (of |
| course not any orders concerning war) it'd look something like |
| this: |
|
|
| You have to report at HQ Monday latest. Your travelling plans |
| for the international conference <blah> <blah> <blah>.. |
|
|
| // Signed // |
| Col. Joe Wilkins |
|
|
| and then some more approved signatures would follow by some |
| other persons. Of course I grabbed all the mail on TACOM. |
|
|
| After a month or so I was locked out of the Pentagon system - |
| and it changed it's address to otjag.army.mil. But I didn't |
| really care. I knew MilNet pretty good so why not I thought.. |
|
|
| I started thinking military-systems only - a dangerous thing |
| to do. I ended up using all my time on it and was therefore |
| also rewarded. Soon I would have access to more than 30 military |
| systems around the globe and I knew I was getting in over my head |
| but I had to keep going - I felt there was no way back. I could |
| have told myself that having to hide on all of these systems |
| would be almost impossible. But things seemed to be going just fine. |
| Just how idiotic can you get? |
|
|
| With access to some CM-5's and a CM-200 at Naval Research Labs |
| and all the wordfiles in the world no system stupid enough to |
| let their passwd-file get taken stood a chance - one account with |
| encrypted passwd was enough. All I had to do was start Crack on |
| the CM-200 and wait. |
|
|
| I took interest in some of the government machines - they weren't |
| as hard to hack as the mil's and I soon lost interest. Except in |
| NASA. I got in on one of their smaller machines (*.gsfc.nasa. |
| gov) and I knew I just had to wait and it would lead to something |
| more. |
|
|
| Now 'strange' things started happening. Imagine this: I log in |
| on TACOM. I log out. When I try to log in again it's impossible |
| from the same site; I have to use another - that's when I knew |
| that someone was watching my every step, trying to stop me. Later |
| it started happening to me no matter how I accessed the nets. That's |
| when I knew the end was near. A month later I was busted by |
| the FBI in Denmark - that's the way I feel even though it was the |
| Danish police. Actually, the trace was made through *.wwb.noaa.gov |
| which I was using a while for cracking. |
|
|
| That's my story - very shortened! If anyone is interested in details |
| mail me at Restricted Access # +45-36703060. |
|
|
| Last Words: Don't do it - don't do it.. It'll get you into all kinds of |
| shit.. Why bother the nice governments and their so trustworthy agencies? |
| On second thought: Just do it! |
|
|
| [Editors note: Along with this file I was sent a capture of one of |
| the aforementioned hacks (which I promptly deleted). It looked like |
| our Danish friends were in a host at the office of the Judge Advocate |
| General. Knowing how the JAG is going to handle cases isn't exactly |
| the kind of thing anyone in the military really wants floating around. |
| I guess they need better security, eh? ] |
|
|