| ==Phrack Magazine== |
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| Volume Four, Issue Forty-Four, File 5 of 27 |
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| **************************************************************************** |
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| Computer Cop Prophile |
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| by The Grimmace |
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| The following file is something I thought of and did |
| a LOT of research on before writing. It's something that |
| I haven't seen in PHRACK and I've been a devout fan of |
| this zine since the beginning. |
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| The "PHRACK PROPHILES" on hackers and phreakers give |
| readers an insight into the movers and shakers of the P/H |
| world, but how about a profile or profiles on the |
| anti-hacker/phreaker establishment that seems to be |
| growing by leaps and bounds lately? |
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| In the past years we've seen cops and feds who know |
| nothing about computers and/or telephone systems bungle their |
| way through search warrants and arrests and have had some good |
| laughs at their expense. But now it seems that the "computer |
| cops", the feds especially, are putting a big push on training |
| agents in the "tricks of the trade" and their conviction rate |
| is getting better. |
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| The primary source of this training is the Federal Law |
| Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia, where they're |
| teaching computer seizure and analysis techniques, |
| computer-targeted search warrants, and telecommunications fraud |
| investigations. (They're very accommodating about giving out |
| information on the phone as long as you tell them you're a |
| cop). The FBI Academy in Quantico also has a computer crimes |
| course. |
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| On the technical side of things, there's an organization |
| called IACIS which stands for the International Association |
| of Computer Investigative Specialists based in Portland, |
| Oregon, and which consists of members of both local law |
| enforcement agencies nationwide as well as various and |
| sundry federal agencies. This group teaches and certifies |
| cops in how to get evidence from computer systems that can't be |
| attacked in court (Of course, anything CAN be attacked, but |
| getting the evidence squashed is not always a sure thing unless |
| the judge is a computerphobe). |
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| As much satisfaction as we've gained at the expense of |
| the US Secret Service from the Steve Jackson Games case, it's |
| widely publicized problems may prove to be a double-edged sword |
| hanging over our heads. Law enforcement learned a LOT of lessons |
| from mistakes made in that investigation. |
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| Like most of you, I've spent a lot of years |
| exploring computer systems (usually those belonging to others) |
| and personally feel that I've done nothing wrong (know the |
| feeling?). I'm sure others across the country also can |
| conduct a little socially-engineered reconnaissance and |
| get the lowdown on some of the people we NEVER want to see |
| knocking on our doors with a sledge hammer in the middle of the |
| night. |
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| This profile contains information on the ONLY computer |
| crime cop I could identify in the Louisville/Jefferson County |
| area after calling all the major departments posing as a writer |
| for a law enforcement magazine doing a survey. Information |
| about him was obtained not only from his department, but from |
| sources in the local and federal court systems, Ma Bell |
| Security, and the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. Lt. |
| Baker is *not* a potential donor to the CPSR or EFF to say the |
| least. |
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| I'm currently compiling similar information on other |
| law enforcement types in the Secret Service, Columbus Ohio PD, |
| Dallas PD, Georgia Bureau of Investigation and members of Ma |
| Bell's Data Security Group in Atlanta. Baker was just the |
| closest to me so I started with him. If I can get the |
| information I've requested, then future submissions will |
| also include lesson plans furnished by FLETC on their training |
| courses and analysis protocols suggested by the USSS...heh...heh. |
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| Yours, |
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| The Grimmace |
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| *-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-* |
| COMPUTER-COP PROFILE I |
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| LT. BILL BAKER |
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| JEFFERSON COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT |
| LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY |
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| INFORMATION COMPILED BY: |
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| ** THE GRIMMACE ** |
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| *-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-*-* |
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| NAME: Bill Baker |
| RANK: Lieutenant |
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| AGENCY: Jefferson County Police Department |
| 768 Barret Ave. |
| Louisville, Kentucky 40204 |
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| AGE: 43 |
| YEARS OF COMPUTER EXP: 13 |
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| YEARS AS A COP: 18 |
| YEARS IN COMPUTER/ |
| TELECOM CRIME: 8 |
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| TRAINING: Federal Law Enforcement Training Ctr. |
| Glynco, Ga. |
| - Telecommunications Crime |
| Telecom Fraud |
| Cellular Fraud |
| PBX Fraud |
| - Computer Crime |
| Illegal Access Crimes |
| Computer Crime Inves. |
| Seized System Analysis |
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| FBI Academy |
| Quantico, Va. |
| - Computers in Narcotics Investigations |
| - Computer Crime Investigations |
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| National Intelligence Academy |
| Ft. Lauderdale, Fl. |
| - Supervising Intelligence Operations |
| Surveillance Techniques |
| Electronic Tracking |
| Electronic Eavesdroping |
| Video Evidence Techniques |
| - Telephone Systems |
| Wiretaps |
| Dialed Number Recorders |
| Pager/Fax Intercepts |
| Technical Telephony Course |
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| PREVIOUS ASSIGNMENTS: Patrol |
| Criminal Investigations/Burglary |
| Criminal Investigations/Homicide |
| Crime Prevention |
| Special Investigations/Vice-Intel |
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| MEMBER: Communications Fraud Control Association |
| Washington, D.C. |
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| PUBLICATIONS: Various computer/telecommunications |
| crime oriented articles for assorted |
| law enforcement and computer industry |
| magazines (i.e., POLICE CHIEF, DATA TODAY) |
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|
| Posing as a freelance writer from the "Law Enforcement |
| Journal", I made calls to local police agencies all over this |
| area asking about their Computer Crime Units and received |
| replies ranging from "What are you talking about?" to "Maybe |
| FRAUD handles that...hey, Charlie...do the FRAUD guys do |
| anything with compoooters?". So much for the Louisville |
| Division of Police...no fear there, right? |
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|
| But I decided to push on since Louisville, though not a |
| hotbed of phreakers/hackers, IS the latest home of TAP MAGAZINE |
| (a la Blitzkrieg BBS and the Predat0r) and has a smattering of |
| "hometown" folks engaged in less than legal activities through |
| the local phone lines. |
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| The call made to the Jefferson County Police got me a |
| solid response of "You'll have to talk to Lt. Bill Baker. Hey, |
| Charlie, where's Lt. Baker working now?" (This guy is so low |
| key his own department doesn't even know where he works!) They |
| finally decide he's someplace called "Adam Station" and |
| through "various" contacts and a friendly local attorney who |
| rarely pays for telephone calls himself, I managed to obtain |
| quite a bit of information about Lt. Baker and his obviously |
| misguided quest. |
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| Lt. Baker is fairly typical of the "new breed" of |
| high-tech investigator currently being churned out by the |
| various federal training schools. He's aggressive and, from |
| talking to other members of his department, thought of as a |
| "computer weenie" who was probably a hacker himself before he |
| embraced the "dark side" of "the FORCE". (I personally believe |
| that this may be more fact than fantasy after talking to him on |
| the phone since he seems to know more about phreaking and |
| hacking than one would think would be taught in the |
| aforementioned federal institutes of higher learning.) |
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| I finally managed to speak with Lt. Baker on the phone |
| and gave him my "writing about computer crime" rap which he |
| bought with little suspicion. The following are excerpts from |
| the recording I made of the conversation [comments in brackets |
| are mine]: |
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| TG: How would you rate the progress of computer and |
| telecommunications crime investigations in this area? |
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| Baker: There have been some good cases made here, but there's |
| still a long way to go. The main problem is that there |
| hasn't been a push from local businesses in this area to combat |
| these types of crimes. Most of'em don't want to admit they've |
| been hit from the outside. If there's no complaints, |
| then the departments aren't likely to want to spend the money |
| to dig up additional crime, right? |
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| TG: Of the hackers you've worked on, what kind of capabilities |
| do they have and how good do you think they are? |
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| Baker: Well, hackers and phreaks are like any other cross-section |
| of a criminal group...there are some that are very good |
| and some that are pitiful. The best thing you can say |
| about working hacker/phreaker cases is that a lot of them |
| catch themselves. They have huge egos and tend to brag |
| a good deal about what they've done and how they did it. |
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| TG: Does that mean that you don't think a computer crime |
| investigator has to be as good as the criminals |
| he chases...I mean, because a lot of these people leave |
| so many clues behind? How would you rate your ability |
| in this field? |
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| Baker: Nope...not at all. I think that as technology gets better |
| so will the crooks. Let's keep the record straight here. |
| Sure, there are bozos out there who read a how-to file in |
| an old PHRACK and decide that they have the knowledge |
| they need to nuke the phone company or ride a VAX like |
| a Hell's Angel rides a Harley. Those are the easy ones. |
| The ones who -write- [author's emphasis] the technical |
| articles in PHRACK are the ones to worry about. There |
| are some stomp-down [??] incredibly knowledgeable |
| individuals in circulation blasting away with their modems |
| at any target of opportunity. |
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| TG: You didn't mention your own ability for investigating |
| these people. |
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| Baker: (Laughs) Yeah, well...let's say I know enough to get by |
| and am smart enough to know that there are no absolute |
| experts. |
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| TG: How would you comment on the Steve Jackson Games case? |
| Do you think the Secret Service set a lot of bad |
| precedents? |
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| Baker: (Laughs) Noooooooo....sorry, pal. That's been jawed to death |
| in every phreak/hack mag, legal journal, and Internet |
| newsgroup in existence and I'm not about to stick my |
| neck out on that one, OK? I will say that everyone learned |
| a lot from that case and I seriously doubt if you'll see the |
| same set of problems reoccurring in future cases. Maybe |
| the CSPR or EFF hired guns can come up with a new group |
| of loopholes, in which case we'll have to find new ways |
| to circumvent those attacks. |
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| TG: You sound a little critical of the EFF and CSPR efforts |
| in their defense of so-called "computer criminals". |
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| Baker: Well, I'm sure that they believe in what they're doing. |
| They must to invest that much cash and energy. But I |
| think there has to be some middle ground agreed upon |
| rather than just whining about "all information should |
| be free" and "if I can get into your system then I should |
| be allowed to look around". I'm not going to launch into |
| a diatribe on organizations that I don't agree with. I'm |
| simply going to work harder at dotting every "i" and |
| crossing every "t" to make my cases more secure. Stealing |
| telephone service is a crime, defrauding businesses is a |
| crime, gaining unauthorized access into someone else's |
| computer system is, in most states, a crime, and even if |
| there's no law on the books making it a crime, it's |
| wrong. |
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| TG: Since by your own statement, you feel that high-tech |
| crime investigation is still in its infancy, what groups |
| or organizations would you say are in the lead in trying |
| to combat this type of crime? |
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| Baker: The most significant two I know are the Federal Law |
| Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia, and the |
| Communications Fraud Control Association based out of |
| Washington, D.C. FLETC [he pronounces it FLET-SEE] |
| probably has the finest computer crimes training program |
| in the country. They bring in acknowledged experts and |
| don't cut the students any slack as far as learning to |
| do things correctly and, most importantly, legally. The |
| CFCA is the leader in Telecommunications security and |
| provide training and assistance to telecom and computer |
| companies along with law enforcement agencies all over |
| the country. |
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| TG: Why do you think so few law enforcement agencies know |
| anything about computer crime investigations? Are they |
| going to leave the phreaks to the feds? |
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| Baker: Nah...I don't think you can simplify it that easily. |
| Most departments don't have dedicated computer crime units |
| because of lack of funds to support such a unit, lack of |
| trained personnel, lack of understanding of the magnitude |
| of the problem, fear of increasing their crime stats or |
| any combination of those reasons. When I first got into |
| this, there weren't any experts. John Maxfield and his |
| BOARDSCAN operation got a lot of talk in the hack/phreak |
| journals and there were a small handful of others, but |
| no real standout authorities. I talked to an awful lot |
| of people before I hooked up with Clo Fleming at SPRINT |
| Security who helped me a lot. |
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| TG: Do you still trade information with SPRINT? |
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| Baker: I have contacts with all the major telecom carriers. |
| The training I got at FLETC really helped make some valuable |
| contacts. But I guess SPRINT and Clo Fleming would be |
| my first choice simply because they were willing to help |
| me when no one else would. You can't operate in this |
| environment without contacts in the OCC's. It can't be |
| done and the OCC's [Other Common Carriers] are a lot |
| more willing to assist law enforcement now than they |
| were in 1985. Of course, the telecommunications industry |
| is taking a $4-5 billion hit a year from fraud and that |
| has a lot to do with it. |
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| TG: Do you subscribe to the hacker/phreaker magazines? |
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| Baker: Sure...I subscribe to 2600 and get copies of some |
| others. I think PHRACK's probably the best overall, |
| but I can't afford the subscription rate they've imposed |
| on government agencies since Craig Neidorf took the hit |
| for publishing the "golden" E911 document. I've learned |
| a ton of stuff over the years from PHRACK and wish it |
| were still free, but they have a right to their info |
| just like the people who own the systems attacked by |
| hackers. It'd be kind of hypocritical for me to rip off |
| PHRACK and then turn and prosecute some other guy for |
| ripping off information from another source, right? |
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| TG: What problems do you foresee in the future in computer |
| and telecom crime investigations? |
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| Baker: Jeez...why don't you ask me when we'll have world peace |
| or something easy? OK, I think we'll probably see the |
| larger departments being forced to play catch-up with |
| the current trends and always being a little behind in |
| this area. I also think you'll see more officers losing |
| cases and being sued, a la SJG, until they get the |
| specific training required to handle these cases the |
| right way. Turning seized systems over to the local |
| "computer guy" in the department is going to cost'em in |
| the long run because every lawyer who gets one of these |
| cases is going to compare it bit by bit with the SJG |
| case to see if there's anything there he can use for |
| his client's defense. |
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| TG: There has been a lot of discussion about whether or not |
| computer systems should be seized rather than just |
| making copies of the data for evidence. What is your |
| policy on equipment seizures when working cases like |
| this? |
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| Baker: First of all, I don't go on fishing expeditions with |
| search warrants. If I have enough to convict a guy then |
| I get the warrant. I take everything that's there and |
| do the analysis. I've had cases where the defendant has |
| requested copies of data he needed for various reasons |
| and I've had no problems with furnishing them as long |
| as the request is reasonable. I ask for forfeiture of |
| the equipment if I can link it to the crime because the |
| law says I can. If I can't link the computers, then I |
| give them back...simple as that. I think it's kind of |
| interesting that most hackers or phreaks will refuse to |
| take a guilty plea for a reduced charge, even if I have |
| them stone cold and they're looking at a 99.999999% |
| chance of conviction in a jury trial, if it means |
| they'll lose their equipment in the deal. It makes good |
| leverage in certain situations. |
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| TG: Did you have any part in Operation Sun-Devil? |
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| Baker: Nope. Though I'd have liked to. I was on a lot of the |
| systems taken down in Sun-Devil. |
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| TG: You said you were on some of the systems busted in the |
| Sun-Devil operation, are you still on phreak/hack |
| boards and would you name any? |
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| Baker: (Laughs a lot) I think I'll pass on naming systems I'm |
| on, OK? That'd be cheating. (Laughs again) But I get |
| around enough to know what's going on. There are lots |
| of investigators out there calling the boards. |
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| TG: I appreciate your time, Lt. Baker, and would like to ask |
| one last question. What motivates you in these cases |
| since the alleged "theft" involves pretty intangible |
| property? |
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| Baker: Motivation? Hmmmm...I suppose you could say it's the |
| chase that motivates me more than the catch, though |
| the catch is pretty good, too. These cases tend to |
| be more one-on-one than some other types and the |
| adversaries can be very good at covering their tracks. |
| Hell, I probably have more in common with the people |
| I target than they'd like to believe. As for the |
| "intangibility" of the stolen goods, well, that's why |
| we have court systems, isn't it...to define those |
| little details. |
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| TG: A lot of computer crime investigators would rather stay |
| in the background, but you don't seem to have taken that |
| position. Why not? |
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| Baker: Well, like anyone involved in anything relatively new, |
| as opposed to the old standard type crimes like murder |
| and armed robbery, it's to my benefit to have anything |
| printed informing people of the problems created by |
| this type of activity. We all pay the price for telecom |
| fraud, credit card fraud, data loss due to illegal |
| access to computers and all the rest. But the people |
| involved in these crimes, for the most part, don't |
| exhibit the same profiles as the so-called "violent" |
| criminals. In fact, I've had some very friendly |
| conversations with a number of phreaks and hackers. |
| Investigators who have problems would probably have |
| them no matter what crimes they were investigating. |
| I never assume that I'm smarter than anyone I'm |
| chasing and I don't rub their noses in it when I make |
| a case. Just like I don't lose sleep when I just can't |
| seem to get that last piece of the puzzle and one gets |
| away. It's hide-and-seek in cyberspace. Pretty good |
| game, actually. |
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| For what it's worth, there it is. The interview printed here |
| doesn't contain a lot of the bullshit that was thrown back and |
| forth during our conversation, just the relevant details which |
| tend to give an insight into this guy. |
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| Frankly, I was impressed by the fact that he didn't seem |
| anything like I had expected after reading horror stories about |
| other agencies and investigators. This guy was personable and |
| maybe that's an indicator that he's dangerous. Never, ever |
| underestimate your opponents -- even if they do sound like |
| "good ole boys" and talk to you like you're the best friend |
| they ever had. Always remember that COPS INVENTED SOCIAL |
| ENGINEERING! |
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| My next "computer cop" profile will deal with a rising star in |
| the U.S. Secret Service and his connections to the Guidry |
| Group, a consulting organization working for the cellular phone |
| industry in combating cellular fraud. |
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