| ==Phrack Magazine== |
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| Volume Four, Issue Forty-Four, File 4 of 27 |
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| PART II |
| ****************************************************************************** |
|
|
| <Retyped From an Actual SWBT Handout> |
|
|
| SOUTHWESTERN BELL TELEPHONE |
|
|
| Computer |
| Security |
| Guidelines |
|
|
| Computer Security is YOUR Responsibility. |
|
|
| These guidelines are designed to help you know and meet your corporate |
| obligation. |
|
|
| Prepared by: Information Systems |
| Computer Security Administration |
| One Bell Center 22-H-8 |
| St. Louis, MO 63101 |
|
|
| For Users |
| --------- |
|
|
| Keep your logon and password information private. |
| Do not write down passwords, but if you must, keep them in a locked place. |
| Do not store your password in the computer. |
| Make sure no on sees you enter your passwords. |
| Pick non-obvious, non-guessable passwords. |
| Do not share your logons or passwords. |
| Change passwords periodically, at least every thirty days. |
| Open new computer logons for computer resources only when you have a |
| real need. |
| Close computer logons you no longer need. |
| Make sure you have proper protection settings on sensitive computer files. |
| Do not send confidential information through electronic mail or computer |
| news systems. |
| If you suspect security violations, tell management immediately. |
| Be sure that use of computing resources is for company approved purposes |
| only. |
| Do not access any information that your management has not authorized you |
| to have. When in doubt, ask! |
| Logoff when you leave your terminal. |
| If you dialed in, disconnect when you are finished working. |
|
|
| For Managers of Computing Facilities |
| ------------------------------------ |
|
|
| Provide procedures to control access to computing resources. |
| Provide facilities to let users protect proprietary information from |
| disclosure to unauthorized persons. |
| Be sure that connection of a computer to any network does not diminish |
| the control a user has over programs and data. |
| Provide appropriate security facilities and procedures to protect |
| computing hardware against damage. |
| Provide facilities to protect user's data and programs from undesired |
| changes or destruction. |
| Ensure that computing resource use has been authorized by a member of |
| supervision. |
| Make sure that computing resource use can be tracked to individuals. |
| Report to managers regularly on the extent of computing resource use. |
| Provide appropriate backup facilities for data and programs. |
| Provide audit trails which identify violations and security breaches |
| and examine them regularly. |
| For assistance in coordinating computer security activities, contact the |
| Computer Security Administrator. |
|
|
| For Managers |
| ------------ |
|
|
| Make sure you authorize all use of computing resources and that you require |
| separate logons for each individual. |
| Make sure that the user of computer resources understands responsibilities |
| with respect to proper use and security consciousness. |
| Review computing resource usage reports and the security practices of the |
| users for which you are responsible. |
| When a user's employment or need for access ends or changes, make sure |
| access to computer resources is promptly changed by notifying your |
| System Administrator. |
| Report security violations to the General Security Manager and to the |
| Computer Security Administration Group. |
|
|
| For Information |
| --------------- |
|
|
| The Information Systems Organization provides security and disaster recovery |
| services to establish, monitor, and audit computer security standards. |
| If you have any comments or questions regarding computer security, please |
| contact the Computer Security Administration. |
|
|
| ******************************************************************************* |
|
|
| RBOC ORGANIZATIONAL ARCHITECTURE |
|
|
| Compiled By |
|
|
| Phrack Magazine |
|
|
|
|
| In an effort to assist the hacking world in their understanding of the |
| organizational mess created by our fabulous friends at the RBOCs, we have |
| compiled a list of the various organizations, what their functions are, |
| which centers they are made up of, and which computer systems they use. |
|
|
| ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
|
| Planning and Engineering |
|
|
| Defines network resources available for assignment |
|
|
| Functions: |
|
|
| Long range and current planning for outside plant, wire centers, |
| interoffice network, special services, interexchange access |
| services, and message trunks |
| Exchange network design |
| Coordination of activities connected with installation and/or modification |
| of exchange network components |
|
|
| Centers: |
|
|
| DSPC |
| SCPC |
| WCFPC |
| CAC |
| IFFPC |
| IFCPC |
| TEC |
| MEC |
| DSDC |
| EEC |
| CSEC |
|
|
| Systems: |
|
|
| LEIS |
| NPS |
| FEPS |
| LSRP |
| INPLANS |
| INFORMS |
| DFDS |
| SSFS |
| PICS |
| LATIS |
| CAMIS |
| CUCRIT |
|
|
| ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
|
| Service Provisioning |
|
|
| Allocates assignable existing network resources |
|
|
| Functions: |
|
|
| Circuit design and routing |
| Verification and assignment of network elements |
| Controlling and tracking orders during assignment process |
|
|
| Centers: |
|
|
| CPC - Circuit Provisioning Center |
| LAC - Loop Assignment Center |
|
|
| Systems: |
|
|
| TIRKS |
| SOAC |
| SWITCH |
| COSMOS |
| WM |
| LFACS |
| LOMS |
|
|
| ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
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| Network Operations |
|
|
| Controls installation, maintenance and testing of circuits |
|
|
| Functions: |
|
|
| Coordination and performance of the activities required to provide service |
| Surveillance and control of network equipment and facilities |
| Analysis, sectionalization, and repair of switching and transmission |
| facilities |
| Status reporting on service order and/or service restoration activities |
|
|
| Centers: |
|
|
| CRSAB |
| ICC |
| MC |
| NAC |
| RCMAC |
| SEAC |
| SSC |
| FMAC |
| STC |
| DNCC |
| FCC |
| SCC |
|
|
| Systems: |
|
|
| McTE |
| GDS |
| LMOS |
| EADAS |
| TAN |
| RSA |
| CRAS |
| CIMAP |
| NDS |
| SEAS |
| MAS |
| MIZAR |
| SARTS |
| TCAS |
| CAROT |
| NMA |
| NMPS |
| SCCS |
|
|
| ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
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| Customer Services |
|
|
| Direct company contact with customers |
|
|
| Functions: |
|
|
| Service negotiation with customers |
| Creating and routing associated service orders |
| Creating and maintaining customer records |
| Reporting the provisioning status to customers |
| Initiating billing and collection processes |
| Handling billing and general service inquiries |
|
|
| Centers: |
|
|
| RSC - Residence Service Center |
| BSC - Business Service Center |
| ICSC - Interexchange Carrier Service Center |
|
|
| Systems: |
|
|
| BOFADS - Business Office Force Administration Data System |
| PREMIS - Premises Information System |
| SOP - Service Order Processor |
| CABS - Carrier Access Billing System |
| BOSS - Billing and Order Support System |
| CRIS - Customer Records Information System |
| BRIS - Business Revenue Information System |
| CLAIMS |
|
|
| ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
|
| Quick Breakdown |
|
|
| Process Center System |
| ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
|
| Planning & Engineering |
|
|
| IOF IFCPC IFFPC IOF/EDC FEPS NPS-F |
|
|
| Switch SCPC WCPC EEC LSD&F LSRP NDS |
| TNDS/EQ NPS-W |
|
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| Distribution DSPC DSDC LATIS LEIS NPS-D |
|
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| Service Provisioning |
|
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| IOF CAC TIRKS |
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| Switch LAC COSMOS |
|
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| Distribution LAC LFACS |
|
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| Network Operations |
|
|
| IOF FMAC CAROT CIMAP TCAS |
| TNDS/TK |
|
|
| Switch NAC RCMAC SCC EADAS NDS MAS MIZAR |
| TASC CIMAP NMA NMPS |
| SCCS |
|
|
| Distribution ICC MC GDS CRAS LMOS/MLT |
| PREDICTOR TAN |
|
|
| ******************************************************************************* |
|
|
| -IS- Blue Boxing Dead? |
|
|
| Australia Direct 800-682-2878 |
| Austria Direct 800-624-0043 |
| Belgium Direct 800-472-0032 |
| Belize Direct 800-235-1154 |
| Bermuda Direct 800-232-2067 |
| Brazil Direct 800-344-1055 |
| British VI Direct 800-248-6585 |
| Cayman Direct 800-852-3653 |
| Chile Direct 800-552-0056 |
| China Direct 800-532-4462 |
| Costa Rica Direct 800-252-5114 |
| Denmark Direct 800-762-0045 |
| El Salvador Direct 800-422-2425 |
| Finland Direct 800-232-0358 |
| France Direct 800-537-2623 |
| Germany Direct 800-292-0049 |
| Greece Direct 800-443-5527 |
| Guam Direct 800-367-4826 |
| HK Direct 800-992-2323 |
| Hungary Direct 800-352-9469 |
| Indonesia Direct 800-242-4757 |
| Ireland Direct 800-562-6262 |
| Italy Direct 800-543-7662 |
| Japan Direct 800-543-0051 |
| Korea Direct 800-822-8256 |
| Macau Direct 800-622-2821 |
| Malasia Direct 800-772-7369 |
| Netherlands Direct 800-432-0031 |
| Norway Direct 800-292-0047 |
| New Zealand Direct 800-248-0064 |
| Portugal Direct 800-822-2776 |
| Panama Direct 800-872-6106 |
| Philippines Direct 800-336-7445 |
| Singapore Direct 800-822-6588 |
| Spain Direct 800-247-7246 |
| Sweden Direct 800-345-0046 |
| Taiwan Direct 800-626-0979 |
| Thailand Direct 800-342-0066 |
| Turkey Direct 800-828-2646 |
| UK Direct 800-445-5667 |
| Uruguay Direct 800-245-8411 |
| Yugoslavia Direct 800-367-9841 / 9842 |
|
|
| This file brought to you by The Phone Company |
|
|
| ******************************************************************************* |
|
|
| ***************************************** |
| * Step-by-step Programming Instructions * |
| * For the EO Cellular Module * |
| ***************************************** |
|
|
| 1. Unbox and attach the EO Cellular Module to the EO Personal |
| Communicator 440/880. |
|
|
| 2. Once the EO Cellular Module is attached turn on the EO Personal |
| Communicator 440/880. |
|
|
| 3. Open EO Phone. |
|
|
| 4. Tap "Options." |
|
|
| 5. Tap "Authorized Dealer." |
|
|
| 6. Write Dealer Code in space provided. Dealer code is *12345678#. To edit |
| mistakes, draw a small circle around 2 or 3 of the numbers entered. |
| This will bring up an edit box and allow easier entry of the number. |
| Once you have made your corrections, tap "OK." |
|
|
| 7. Tap "OK" on the "Authorized Dealer Code" pop-up. |
|
|
| 8. Wait approx. 30 seconds and programming screen will appear (The "busy |
| clock" will appear on screen). |
|
|
| 9. If invalid code entry screen appears, the programming screen will be |
| blank and the "Apply" and "Apply and Close" buttons at the bottom |
| will be greyed out. Close the programming screen by tapping on the |
| upper left blacked out corner of the screen. Re-do steps 4 through 7 |
| (refer to the TIP below for a guaranteed method of accurate entry). |
| A common problem is to enter an "l" instead of a "1" because they appear |
| to be very similar. To make sure that you have entered a one, check to |
| see that the character is the same height as the other numbers. The |
| letter "l" will be slightly taller. |
|
|
| TIP: To insure that you have entered the correct digits (one versus letter |
| "l" problem above) you can use the accessories keyboard. To use the |
| keyboard for the Dealer Code entry do the following (replaces steps |
| 4, 5, and 6 above): |
|
|
| a. Tap Accessories in the lower bookshelf. |
| b. Tap Keyboard. This will bring up the pop-up keyboard. |
| c. Tap Options at the top of the EO Phone window. |
| d. Tap Authorized Dealer. This will bring up the Dealer Code pop-up. |
| e. Tap on the line in the Dealer Code box. A dot (or character) will |
| appear and now entry from the keyboard will appear in the Dealer |
| Code box. |
| f. Now use the keyboard to delete the dot (or character). The Delete |
| key is the upper right most key on the keyboard. |
| g. Now use the keyboard to enter the dealer code - *12345678# |
| (the * and the # keys can be found by tapping the shift |
| (up arrow) keys.) |
| h. GO TO STEP 7 and continue. |
|
|
| NOTE: When programming the following entries always use the circle gesture |
| to change the entry. In other words, circle the existing entry |
| to bring up the edit combs. Then correct each digit by writing over |
| the existing digit. This will insure that the number of digits for |
| each entry is correct. If an entry has an incorrect length then |
| none of the programed entries will be accepted. |
|
|
| 10. Enter the assigned telephone number in the first field. Use the |
| circle gesture to bring up the edit combs to edit the existing |
| telephone number. Change each digit by writing over it in the edit |
| combs. When complete tap "OK." |
|
|
| 11. Use the same procedure in step 10 to enter the appropriate SID |
| in the second field. |
|
|
| 12. Use the same procedure in step 10 to enter the corresponding IPCH |
| (0333 for the non-Wireline or A side provider; 0334 for the Wireline |
| or B side provider) in the third field. |
|
|
| 13. Leave the remaining fields intact as already programed from the |
| factory unless instructed to change them by the cellular service |
| provider. Use the circle/edit method to change any necessary |
| entries. The factory defaults are: |
|
|
| Field Title Default Value |
| ----------- ------------- |
| ACCOLC 00 |
| Group ID 15 |
| Lock Code 1234 |
| SCM 1010 |
| Security Code 123456 |
| Emergency Code 911 |
|
|
| 14. Tap the "Apply" button on the bottom of the screen. The programming |
| information you have entered is now being saved in the EO Cellular |
| Module. This will take approximately 20 seconds. |
|
|
| 15. Close the programming screen by tapping the blackened area in the upper |
| left hand corner of the programming screen. |
|
|
| 16. Now set the approximate Roaming Option. |
|
|
| 17. Tap Options. |
|
|
| 18. Tap Roaming. |
|
|
| 19. Enter Security Code. Default is 123456. |
|
|
| 20. Tap "OK." |
|
|
| 21. Tap next to appropriate roaming option. A check mark will appear. |
|
|
| 22. Tap "Apply" button. |
|
|
| 23. Close window. |
|
|
| 24. Check status line in EO Phone for appropriate indications. |
|
|
| 25. Tap "Keypad" tab on right side of EO Phone window. This will bring |
| up a keypad display which can be used to place a voice call. |
|
|
| 26. Make sure that the Cellular Icon is boxed (as opposed to the Phone |
| Icon in the lower left hand of EO Phone.) |
|
|
| 27. Tap the keypad buttons to enter the number to be dialed. The digits will |
| appear in the dial box at the middle bottom of the EO Phone window. |
|
|
| 28. Pick up the handset and tap "DIAL" button in the lower right hand |
| corner of the screen. This button is just like hitting SEND button |
| on a cellular phone. This will place a voice call using the number |
| in the dial box. |
|
|
| 29. When call is complete tap "Hang-up" (the DIAL button to "Hang-up" after |
| the call is connected to the network.) This is just like pressing END |
| on a cellular phone. |
|
|
| 30. Close EO Phone. |
|
|
| 31. Programming and testing is now complete. |
|
|
| Helpful Information |
|
|
| The EO Cellular Module contains an OKI 910 cellular phone housed in |
| specially designed, plated plastics with custom connections into the |
| proprietary port on the phone. |
|
|
| All programming of this module is done via the EO Personal Communicator |
| 440 or 880. All programming/configuration information for the phone is |
| stored in the EO Cellular Module and not in the Personal Communicator. |
| This means that once the EO Cellular Module is programed it can be removed |
| from the EO Personal Communicator and reattached to any other EO Personal |
| Communicator without re-programming. |
|
|
| The ESN for the EO Cellular Module can be derived from the Serial number |
| in the window on the bottom of the module. The cellular module ESN is 129 |
| followed by the last eight digits of the serial number in the window. These |
| eight digits will usually begin with 013. This eleven digit number should |
| be provided to the people that will actually assign the telephone number |
| and activate the EO Cellular Module on the cellular network. |
|
|
| ******************************************************************************* |
|
|
| THE HACKER CHRONICLES CD-ROM |
|
|
| Well, he said he was going to do it, and he did. |
|
|
| Scan Man put out a CD-ROM of info collected from the |
| underground. I had kind of forgotten he was going to |
| do it, but once I heard rumors of such a thing, I knew he |
| had. |
|
|
| At HoHo Con last year, Bootleg was very excited about |
| compiling data from the community for the project he |
| and Scan Man were working on. As things progressed |
| however, Bootleg would soon find out that Scan Man |
| had no intention of working with him, and cut him out of |
| the project. |
|
|
| This is how it was explained to me. I hope that it is |
| not true, since Bootleg is back in jail and wouldn't |
| have the ability to fly out to West Virginia and throttle |
| Scan Man about the head and neck. |
|
|
| [Description from the Jewel Box] |
|
|
| WARNING! |
|
|
| This material is controversial in nature and may be offensive |
| to some viewers. Not that the information in and of itself is |
| not illegal. Quite often the usage of certain information is |
| illegal. The Hacker Chronicles is for informative and educational |
| purposes only. All documents and programs in this compilation were |
| legally available to the public prior to his publication. None of |
| these criminal acts described on this disc are in any way |
| condoned or should be attempted. |
|
|
| Over 12 YEARS in the making - this software package contains stories |
| of how they did it, actual break-ins, arrests, and prosecutions. Most |
| of the articles were written by the actual people who committed these |
| acts. Access articles and software with an easy-to-use menu system. |
|
|
| Areas of information include: PHONE PHREAKING (so called hobbyists |
| who are into telephone technology of all types, well known for their |
| ability to bypass telephone billing system), COMPUTER HACKERS |
| (sometimes referred to as cyberpunks, interested in access to any on |
| line computer system they can find), SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS |
| (hobbyists who sometimes employed test software designed for dealers |
| to defeat scrambling systems), "UNDERGROUND" GENERAL INFORMATION (many |
| subjects all very technical in nature and explained in detail, such as |
| ATM's, credit cards, voice mail, hypnotism, bugging, skip tracing, |
| phone taps, cellular phones, lock picking, social engineering, |
| virus's, chemical substances, explosives, editorials, legal issues, |
| alarm systems, spies, hardware, signal interception, private |
| investigations, security, computer ethics, underground BBS's, TV cable |
| piracy, boxing and much more! |
|
|
| ----- |
|
|
| Uh, that kinda says it all, don't it? CYBERPUNKS, VIRII, WAREZ & STUFF! |
| Uh, yeah. |
|
|
| Seriously, the disk itself has a shitload of files. This |
| is rather cool, since now EVERY bbs in the world can put |
| OVER 650 MEGS OF G-FILES! Heh. |
|
|
| The file on the disc that struck me the most was the |
| intro written by Scan Man. He went talked about |
| a lot of things he's done in the past with the scene, |
| telephone companies, etc. I know Scan Man from WAY back. |
| Pirate-80 was one of the first real Hacker BBSes I was |
| ever on. (Remember when it was only up certain hours of the day?) |
| Reading that file was pretty informing for me. It also |
| made me smile to see that he's still pissed off at Craig |
| for tearing him apart in a Phrack some years ago. |
|
|
| Remember, this is by no means a complete collection. |
| Thankfully, the CD does not have any issues of Phrack |
| magazine past issue 41 (or else, I would be enjoying |
| a piece of the revenue :) ). It also, oddly enough, |
| does not have any LOD-TJ other than 4. It DOES however |
| have a large collection of CUD, NIA & CDC. Go figure. |
|
|
| The files do represent a neat history of our community |
| and for the curious neophyte, the nostalgic old-timer, or |
| anyone with 39 bucks, it might be something worth picking |
| up just to say you have it. I mean, you never know when |
| you will need to find issue 12 of LOL, or plans for a |
| urine box. It will save you the trouble of downloading. |
|
|
| The Hacker Chronicles - A Tour of the Computer Underground |
| should be available from any outlet that carries CD-ROMS. |
| Or hell, call P-80. I'm sure Scan Man will sell you a copy: |
| 304-744-7322. |
|
|
| ******************************************************************************* |
|
|
| Packet Switched Data Networks |
| An Introduction and Overview |
| By: Cosmos |
|
|
|
|
| The abundance of networks both private and public has given the hacker |
| an almost infinite playground. A popular type of network is the |
| packet switched network like SprintNet (TELENET) that allows local |
| users to access non-local machines. These WAN's usually serve as |
| the backbone for many large corporations. Understanding the way |
| in which they operate can aid many aspects of the hacker's knowledge. |
|
|
| Packet switching is a data networking technology in which user data is |
| segmented into small units (packets) and transmitted from the sending |
| user to the receiving user over shared communications channels. Each |
| individual packet also holds additional information that allows the |
| network to correctly route the packet to the correct destination. The |
| size of the packet is limited to a maximum number of characters set by |
| the individual sender. Packets are measured in octets, which are 8-bit |
| bytes. User data that exceeds this amount is divided into multiple |
| packets. |
|
|
| The difference between packet switching and circuit switching |
| (regular telephone lines) lies in the use of virtual circuits. |
| These circuits are given the term "virtual" because: |
|
|
| 1) they are made up of bandwidth allocated on demand from |
| a pool of shared circuits |
|
|
| 2) no direct physical connection is made on a packet network |
|
|
| 3) the connection is a logical one |
|
|
| Due to these facts, packet networks are commonly denoted as connectionless |
| networks. There are three types of packet networks: public, private, and |
| hybrid (a combo of the two previous ones). |
|
|
| A packet switched data network (PSDN) has five major components: |
|
|
| 1) local access components (LAC) |
| 2) packet assemblers/disassemblers (PAD) |
| 3) packet switching nodes (PN) |
| 4) network links (NL) |
| 5) a network managment system (NMS) |
|
|
| LOCAL ACCESS COMPONENTS |
|
|
| To transmit data through a PSDN, the data must first move from the |
| end-user to a packet assembler/dissasembler (PAD) or to a packet |
| switching node with a built-in PAD function. In order to achieve |
| this, three local access components are required. First is the |
| end-user data terminal, or more plainly, your computer. Secondly, |
| an end-user transmission device such as a modem. Thirdly, a |
| local access facility or physical line (Telephone Line). There are |
| three types of physical lines: switched analog lines (dial up), leased |
| analog channels (private lines), and leased digital channels (DDS circuits). |
|
|
| PACKET ASSEMBLERS/DISASSEMBLERS |
|
|
| All data travelling through the PSDN must be routed through a |
| Packet Assembler/Disassembler (PAD). The PAD's primary function |
| is to translate user data into network packet format and conversely to |
| convert network packets into user data. Basically, a PAD serves |
| as the network translator between the user and the PSDN. Other functions |
| performed by the PAD include: physical line concentration, call setup |
| and clearing functions, protocol conversion, code conversion, protocol |
| emulation, local switching functions, and local call billing functions. |
|
|
| PACKET SWITCHING NODES |
|
|
| The primary component of a packet switching network is the packet |
| switching node (PN). The packet switching node ensures that each |
| packet is routed properly through the network. Commonly, PN |
| configurations are installed in a redundant configuration. This |
| provides for a convenient backup for network traffic. Other functions |
| include: call billing, internal network diagnostics, support of |
| direct host computer access., and inter-network gateway connections. |
|
|
| NETWORK LINKS |
|
|
| Network links are the physical components that connect packet switching |
| nodes together. Several transmission technologies can be employed |
| in network linking, including: analog circuits, digital circuits, |
| microwave systems, and satellite systems. The most common network |
| link technologies used are Digital Dataphone and other similar |
| interexchange carrier services, and point to point analog private |
| lines. Speeds on network links range from 9.6 Kbps to 56/64 Kbps. |
| Network links are commonly denoted as the "backbone layer" or |
| the backbone packet network. The local PAD's are termed the |
| "access layer" or access network. |
|
|
| NETWORK MANAGEMENT SYSTEM |
|
|
| Basically, the network management system (NMS) controls and monitors |
| the PSDN. It primarily stores and performs maintenance on the |
| network database. This database is the master copy of all the software |
| and configurations in each network node. If a node fails or is |
| not functioning properly, the NMS can download backup information through |
| the various network links to solve the problem. Thus, a unattended |
| network is formed. |
|
|
| This is all one needs to understand for a general knowledge of |
| a packet switched data network. Additional topics can be |
| pursued further for increased knowledge but are not essential. |
| You might want to research some info on the standard X.25 protocol, |
| and other OSI stuff. Anyways, I hope this brief intro article can |
| be of use in the general knowledge of computer networking. |
|
|
| Cosmos |
|
|
| ******************************************************************************* |
|
|
| Stacker Security. |
|
|
|
|
| How to Hack a Stacker disk that is password protected! |
|
|
| The 'Stacker' Software increases the space on your hard disk by using |
| on the fly compression on the data on the disk. It does this by creating |
| a file called Stacvol.dsk on the hard drive. All of the information that |
| is put on the disk is compressed and stored in the stacvol.dsk file. |
| When Stacker is installed on a hard drive, say C: all of the data on |
| the disk is compressed and stored in the stacvol.dsk file, which is |
| assigned as a virtual disk C:, the 'real' drive is then assigned D:. |
| The swapping taking place a boot time. |
|
|
| The Stacvol.dsk file is therefore stored on the D: drive and usually |
| takes up most of the drive. (ie: a 40M C: drive contains the stacvol.dsk |
| file of size around 5-39M the disks are swapped at boot time and |
| the C: drive that the user 'sees' is really the contents of the stacvol.dsk |
| file on the D drive assigned to C:, everything on the C drive (stacvol.dsk) |
| is compressed, thus obtaining an increased disk space.) |
|
|
| The point is this, at boot time the owner of the machine can set passwords |
| to allow the user to have no access, read/write or read-only access to |
| the C drive/stacvol.dsk file, if a wrong password is entered the stacvol |
| file is not mounted as the C drive and all a DIR will get you is a directory |
| of C:\ which will have a few files such as command.com etc, nothing |
| of any real interest. |
|
|
| So now for the interesting bit, how to get in without a password, |
| or getting read/write privs when you've only got read-only. |
|
|
| First, boot the computer and go through the password routine. |
| Get it wrong (you may as well try something like password though just in |
| case.) |
|
|
| The Stacvol.dsk file is hidden so change its file attributes so you |
| can edit it. (You'll need a floppy now with a utility such as Norton |
| diskedit on it) |
|
|
| Load in the diskeditor and get it so that you are editing the stackvol |
| file in a HEX mode. The first bit of Hex just contains the usual sort of |
| boot record type rubbish, not too interesting. |
|
|
| The interesting bit is the bit which starts at offset 74 |
|
|
| Now the information starting at 00040 is the interesting bit, |
| on a disk with a password set it will look like this.... |
|
|
| 00040 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 | 20 20 2D 2A 2D 0A 0A 1A |
| 00050 72 AA 91 9C 0F 66 9A ED | AB 18 6E 6D E2 C3 2B 8B |
| 00060 5E CD EF A9 37 1B 53 E2 | C6 F0 E8 9C A4 49 F6 9D |
| 00070 4C F0 AB 32 21 47 FC 91 | 7E 8C 58 D8 D9 D7 DB D3 |
|
|
| (All figures obviously in hex.) |
|
|
| The data from 0004B to 0004E is a flag to the device driver to tell |
| it that a password is required. |
|
|
| From 0004f to 0005F are the encrypted passwords. |
| (the rest just being data) |
|
|
| NOW, for an unpassworded file this looks like |
|
|
| 00040 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 | 20 20 20 20 20 0D 0A 1A |
| 00050 49 F6 9D 4E EC B1 26 3D | 0F 6B B2 24 41 07 7B 92 |
| 00060 XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX | XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX |
| 00070 XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX | XX XX XX XX XX XX XX XX |
|
|
| Now all you have to do is take a copy of the data in this section |
| on the stacvol.dsk file you are hacking so that you can return it back to |
| its original state! |
|
|
| Patch the code above into the corresponding positions into the |
| file you are hacking, leaving the code denoted by XX alone, this is version |
| code and depends on the machine so leave it alone! |
|
|
| Save the changes and reboot the machine, it will no longer ask for a |
| password and you now have full access. |
|
|
| Afterwards re-patch the original code that you noted and if you've used |
| your common sense then the owner will never know you were there. |
|
|
| (By common sense I mean don't forget to restore time/date stamps etc.) |
|
|
| D2A [D |
|
|
| ******************************************************************************* |
|
|
| UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS ONLY |
|
|
| Computers are becoming an integral part of our everyday existence. They are |
| used to store a multitude of information, from credit reports and bank |
| withdrawals to personal letters and highly sensitive military documents. |
| So how secure are our computer systems? |
|
|
| The computer hacker is an expert at infiltrating secured systems, such as |
| those at AT&T, TRW, NASA and the DMV. Most computer systems that have a |
| telephone connection have been under seige at one time or another, many |
| without their owner's knowledge. The really good hackers can re-route the |
| telephone system, obtain highly sensitive coporate and government documents, |
| download individuals credit reports, make free phone calls globally, read |
| private electronic mail and corporate bulletins and get away without ever |
| leaving a trace. |
|
|
| So who are these hackers? Just exactly WHAT do they DO, and WHY do they do |
| it? Are they really a threat? What do they do with the information |
| they obtain? Are hackers simply playing an intellectual game of chess or |
| are hackers using technology to effectively take control of corporate and |
| government systems that have previously appeared omnipotent? |
|
|
| Our group is in the course of filming "Unauthorized Access", a documentary |
| that will demistify the hype and propoganda surrounding the computer hacker. |
| We will expose the truths of this sub-culture focusing on the hackers |
| themselves. This will be a view from inside the global underground. |
| We intend to shoot in the United States, Holland and Germany. |
|
|
| This documentary will be of the highest broadcast quality and is |
| intended for international television, festival and theatrical distribution. |
|
|
| We are currently looking for additional financial backers interested in this |
| project. For more information about "Unauthorized Access" or if |
| you are intrested in providing any information or support, please contact |
| annaliza@netcom.com. |
|
|
| ******************************************************************************* |
|
|
| Mitnick's Soliloquy |
|
|
| Intruder, or not Intruder: that is the question: |
| Whether 'tis more likely the system suffers |
| The misuses and malfeasances of outrageous crackers |
| Or that some user behaves anomalously |
| And, by so doing, causes false alarms. To alert, to audit; |
| No more; and by an audit to say we find the attack, |
| And the thousand failed login attempts |
| That are seen on the network, 'tis a consummation |
| Devoutly to be decrypted. To alert, to audit. |
| To audit, perchance to detect, ay, there's the rub. |
| For in that detection of attack what false alarms may come; |
| When we have dumped a million packets |
| Must give us pause, the analysis |
| That makes use of long CPU hours and many gigabytes |
| For who would bear the whips and scorns of time |
| The analysis by hand, the tired SSOs eyes sore, |
| The pangs of innocent users, the law's delay, |
| The insolence of phreaks, and the spurns |
| That patient merit of unworthy takes |
| When he himself might his quietus make |
| By a disconnected ethernet? who would fardles bear |
| To grunt and sweat under C2 standards |
| But that the dread of worm after worm |
| The undiscovered bug from whose bourn |
| No Vandal turns, puzzles the testers, |
| And makes us rather ebar those ills we have |
| That crash the system and erase the hard drive? |
| Thus intrusion detection makes abusers of us all, |
| And thus the native hue of normal use |
| Is sicklied over with the red light of intruder, |
| and jobs of great size and duration |
| With this regard their patterns out of normal parameters, |
| and lose the name of legal system policy. |
|
|
| After Hamlet's Soliloquy, |
| By JJ |
|
|
| ******************************************************************************* |
|
|