| Card-O-Rama: Magnetic Stripe Technology and Beyond |
| or |
| "A Day in the Life of a Flux Reversal" |
|
|
| Written by |
|
|
| oooOO Count Zero OOooo |
| Restricted Data Transmissions |
|
|
| November 22, 1992 |
|
|
|
|
| Look in your wallet. Chances are you own at least 3 cards that have magnetic |
| stripes on the back. ATM cards, credit cards, calling cards, frequent flyer |
| cards, ID cards, passcards,...cards, cards, cards! And chances are you have NO |
| idea what information is on those stripes or how they are encoded. This |
| detailed document will enlighten you and hopefully spark your interest in this |
| fascinating field. None of this info is "illegal"...but MANY organizations |
| (the government, credit card companies, security firms, etc.) would rather keep |
| you in the dark. Also, many people will IMMEDIATELY assume that you are a |
| CRIMINAL if you merely "mention" that you are "interested in how magnetic |
| stripe cards work." Watch yourself, ok? Just remember that there is nothing |
| wrong with wanting to know how things work, although in our present society, |
| you may be labelled a "deviant" (or worse, <gasp> a "hacker")! |
|
|
| Anyway, I will explain in detail how magstripes are encoded and give several |
| examples of the data found on some common cards. I will also cover the |
| technical theory behind magnetic encoding, and discuss magnetic encoding |
| alternatives to magstripes (Wiegand, barium ferrite). Non-magnetic card |
| technology (bar code, infrared, etc.) will be described. Finally, there will |
| be an end discussion on security systems and the ramifications of emergent |
| "smartcard" and biometric technologies. |
|
|
| *DISCLAIMER* |
|
|
| Use this info to EXPLORE, not to EXPLOIT. This text is presented for |
| informational purposes only, and I cannot be held responsible for anything you |
| do or any consequences thereof. I do not condone fraud, larceny, or any other |
| criminal activities. |
|
|
| *A WARNING* |
|
|
| Lately, I've noticed a few "books" and "magazines" for sale that were FILLED |
| with FILES on a variety of computer topics. These file were originally |
| released into the Net with the intention of distributing them for FREE. |
| HOWEVER, these files are now being PACKAGED and sold FOR PROFIT. This really |
| pisses me off. I am writing this to be SHARED for FREE, and I ask no payment. |
| Feel free to reprint this in hardcopy format and sell it if you must, but NO |
| PROFITS must be made. Not a fucking DIME! If ANYONE reprints this file and |
| tries to sell it FOR A PROFIT, I will hunt you down and make your life |
| miserable. How? Use your imagination. The reality will be worse. |
|
|
|
|
| ** MAGSTRIPE FIELDS, HEADS, ENCODING/READING ** |
|
|
| Now, I'll get down to business! |
|
|
| First, I am going to explain the basics behind fields, heads, encoding and |
| reading. Try and absorb the THEORY behind encoding/reading. This will help |
| you greatly if you ever decide to build your own encoder/reader from scratch |
| (more on that later). FERROMAGNETIC materials are substances that retain |
| magnetism after an external magnetizing field is removed. This principle is |
| the basis of ALL magnetic recording and playback. Magnetic POLES always occur |
| in pairs within magnetized material, and MAGNETIC FLUX lines emerge from the |
| NORTH pole and terminate at the SOUTH. The elemental parts of MAGSTRIPES are |
| ferromagnetic particles about 20 millionths of an inch long, each of which acts |
| like a tiny bar magnet. These particles are rigidly held together by a resin |
| binder. The magnetic particles are made by companies which make coloring |
| pigments for the paint industry, and are usually called pigments. When making |
| the magstripe media, the elemental magnetic particles are aligned with their |
| North-South axes parallel to the magnetic stripe by means of an external |
| magnetic fields while the binder hardens. |
|
|
| These particles are actually permanent bar magnets with TWO STABLE POLARITIES. |
| If a magnetic particle is placed in a strong external magnetic field of the |
| opposite polarity, it will FLIP its own polarity (North becomes South, South |
| becomes North). The external magnetic field strength required to produce this |
| flip is called the COERCIVE FORCE, or COERCIVITY of the particle. Magnetic |
| pigments are available in a variety of coercivities (more on that later on). |
|
|
| An unencoded magstripe is actually a series of North-South magnetic domains |
| (see Figure 1). The adjacent N-S fluxes merge, and the entire stripe acts as a |
| single bar magnet with North and South poles at its ends. |
|
|
| Figure 1: N-S.N-S.N-S.N-S.N-S.N-S.N-S.N-S <-particles in stripe |
| --------- |
| represented as-> N-----------------------------S |
|
|
|
|
| However, if a S-S interface is created somewhere on the stripe, the fluxes will |
| REPEL, and we get a concentration of flux lines around the S-S interface (same |
| with N-N interface). ENCODING consists of creating S-S and N-N interfaces, and |
| READING consists of (you guessed it) detecting 'em. The S-S and N-N interfaces |
| are called FLUX REVERSALS. |
|
|
| ||| ||| <-flux lines |
| Figure 2: N------------N-N-S-S-----------------S |
| --------- flux lines -> ||| ||| |
|
|
|
|
| The external magnetic field used to flip the polarities is produced by a |
| SOLENOID, which can REVERSE its polarity by reversing the direction of CURRENT. |
| An ENCODING head solenoid looks like a bar magnet bent into the shape of a ring |
| so that the North/South poles are very close and face each other across a tiny |
| gap. The field of the solenoid is concentrated across this gap, and when |
| elemental magnetic particles of the magstripe are exposed to this field, they |
| polarize to the OPPOSITE (unlike poles attract). Movement of the stripe past |
| the solenoid gap during which the polarity of the solenoid is REVERSED will |
| produce a SINGLE flux reversal (see Figure 3). To erase a magstripe, the |
| encoding head is held at a CONSTANT polarity and the ENTIRE stripe is moved |
| past it. No flux reversals, no data. |
|
|
| | | <----wires leading to solenoid |
| | | (wrapped around ring) |
| /-|-|-\ |
| / \ |
| Figure 3: | | <----solenoid (has JUST changed polarity) |
| --------- \ / |
| \ N S / <---gap in ring.. NS polarity across gap |
| N----------------------SS-N-------------------------S |
| ^^ |
| <<<<<-direction of stripe movement |
|
|
| S-S flux reversal created at trailing edge of solenoid! |
|
|
|
|
| So, we now know that flux reversals are only created the INSTANT the solenoid |
| CHANGES its POLARITY. If the solenoid in Figure 3 were to remain at its |
| current polarity, no further flux reversals would be created as the magstripe |
| moves from right to left. But, if we were to change the solenoid gap polarity |
| >from NS to *SN*, then (you guessed it) a *N-N* flux reversal would instantly be |
| created. Just remember, for each and every reversal in solenoid polarity, a |
| single flux reversal is created (commit it to memory). An encoded magstripe is |
| therefore just a series of flux reversals (NN followed by SS followed by NN). |
|
|
| DATA! DATA! DATA! That's what you want! How the hell are flux reversals read |
| and interpreted as data? Another solenoid called a READ HEAD is used to detect |
| these flux reversals. The read head operates on the principle of |
| ELECTROMAGNETIC RECIPROCITY: current passing thru a solenoid produces a |
| magnetic field at the gap, therefore, the presence of a magnetic field at the |
| gap of a solenoid coil will *produce a current in the coil*! The strongest |
| magnetic fields on a magstripe are at the points of flux reversals. These are |
| detected as voltage peaks by the reader, with +/- voltages corresponding to |
| NN/SS flux reversals (remember, flux reversals come in 2 flavors). |
|
|
| See Figure 4. |
|
|
| magstripe---> -------NN--------SS--------NN---------SS------ |
| |
| Figure 4: voltage-----> .......+.........-.........+...........-..... |
| --------- |
| ---------- ------------- |
| peak readout--> | | | | |
| --------| |----------| |---- |
|
|
|
|
| The "peak readout" square waveform is critical. Notice that the voltage peak |
| remains the same until a new flux reversal is encountered. |
|
|
| Now, how can we encode DATA? The most common technique used is known as |
| Aiken Biphase, or "two-frequency coherent-phase encoding" (sounds impressive, |
| eh?). First, digest the diagrams in Figure 5. |
|
|
| Figure 5: ---------- ---------- ---------- |
| --------- | | | | | | <- peak |
| a) | |--------| |--------| | readouts |
| * 0 * 0 * 0 * 0 * 0 * |
|
|
|
|
| ----- ----- ----- ----- ----- - |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
| b) | |----| |----| |----| |----| |----| |
|
|
| * 1 * 1 * 1 * 1 * 1 * |
|
|
| ----- ---------- ----- ----- - |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| c) | |----| |--------| |----| |----| |
|
|
| * 1 * 0 * 0 * 1 * 1 * |
|
|
|
|
| There you have it. Data is encoded in "bit cells," the frequency of which is |
| the frequency of '0' signals. '1' signals are exactly TWICE the frequency of |
| '0' signals. Therefore, while the actual frequency of the data passing the |
| read head will vary due to swipe speed, data density, etc, the '1' frequency |
| will ALWAYS be TWICE the '0' frequency. Figure 5C shows exactly how '1' and |
| '0' data exists side by side. |
|
|
| We're getting closer to read DATA! Now, we're all familiar with binary and how |
| numbers and letters can be represented in binary fashion very easily. There |
| are obviously an *infinite* number of possible standards, but thankfully the |
| American National Standards Institute (ANSI) and the International Standards |
| Organization (ISO) have chosen 2 standards. The first is |
|
|
|
|
| ** ANSI/ISO BCD Data format ** |
|
|
| This is a 5-bit Binary Coded Decimal format. It uses a 16-character set, which |
| uses 4 of the 5 available bits. The 5th bit is an ODD parity bit, which means |
| there must be an odd number of 1's in the 5-bit character..the parity bit will |
| "force" the total to be odd. Also, the Least Significant Bits are read FIRST |
| on the strip. See Figure 6. |
|
|
| The sum of the 1's in each case is odd, thanks to the parity bit. If the read |
| system adds up the 5 bits and gets an EVEN number, it flags the read as ERROR, |
| and you got to scan the card again (I *know* a lot of you out there *already* |
| understand parity, but I got to cover all the bases...not everyone sleeps with |
| their modem and can recite the entire AT command set at will, you know). See |
| Figure 6 for details of ANSI/ISO BCD. |
|
|
| Figure 6: ANSI/ISO BCD Data Format |
| --------- |
|
|
| * Remember that b1 (bit #1) is the LSB (least significant bit)! |
| * The LSB is read FIRST! |
| * Hexadecimal conversions of the Data Bits are given in parenthesis (xH). |
|
|
| --Data Bits-- Parity |
| b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 Character Function |
|
|
| 0 0 0 0 1 0 (0H) Data |
| 1 0 0 0 0 1 (1H) " |
| 0 1 0 0 0 2 (2H) " |
| 1 1 0 0 1 3 (3H) " |
| 0 0 1 0 0 4 (4H) " |
| 1 0 1 0 1 5 (5H) " |
| 0 1 1 0 1 6 (6H) " |
| 1 1 1 0 0 7 (7H) " |
| 0 0 0 1 0 8 (8H) " |
| 1 0 0 1 1 9 (9H) " |
| 0 1 0 1 1 : (AH) Control |
| 1 1 0 1 0 ; (BH) Start Sentinel |
| 0 0 1 1 1 < (CH) Control |
| 1 0 1 1 0 = (DH) Field Separator |
| 0 1 1 1 0 > (EH) Control |
| 1 1 1 1 1 ? (FH) End Sentinel |
|
|
|
|
| ***** 16 Character 5-bit Set ***** |
| 10 Numeric Data Characters |
| 3 Framing/Field Characters |
| 3 Control Characters |
|
|
|
|
| The magstripe begins with a string of Zero bit-cells to permit the self- |
| clocking feature of biphase to "sync" and begin decoding. A "Start Sentinel" |
| character then tells the reformatting process where to start grouping the |
| decoded bitstream into groups of 5 bits each. At the end of the data, an "End |
| Sentinel" is encountered, which is followed by an "Longitudinal Redundancy |
| Check (LRC) character. The LRC is a parity check for the sums of all b1, b2, |
| b3, and b4 data bits of all preceding characters. The LRC character will catch |
| the remote error that could occur if an individual character had two |
| compensating errors in its bit pattern (which would fool the 5th-bit parity |
| check). |
|
|
| The START SENTINEL, END SENTINEL, and LRC are collectively called "Framing |
| Characters", and are discarded at the end of the reformatting process. |
|
|
|
|
| ** ANSI/ISO ALPHA Data Format ** |
|
|
| Alphanumeric data can also be encoded on magstripes. The second ANSI/ISO data |
| format is ALPHA (alphanumeric) and involves a 7-bit character set with 64 |
| characters. As before, an odd parity bit is added to the required 6 data bits |
| for each of the 64 characters. See Figure 7. |
|
|
| Figure 7: |
| --------- ANSI/ISO ALPHA Data Format |
|
|
| * Remember that b1 (bit #1) is the LSB (least significant bit)! |
| * The LSB is read FIRST! |
| * Hexadecimal conversions of the Data Bits are given in parenthesis (xH). |
|
|
|
|
| ------Data Bits------- Parity |
| b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 b7 Character Function |
|
|
| 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 space (0H) Special |
| 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 ! (1H) " |
| 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 " (2H) " |
| 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 # (3H) " |
| 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 $ (4H) " |
| 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 % (5H) Start Sentinel |
| 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 & (6H) Special |
| 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 ' (7H) " |
| 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 ( (8H) " |
| 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 ) (9H) " |
| 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 * (AH) " |
| 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 + (BH) " |
| 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 , (CH) " |
| 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 - (DH) " |
| 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 . (EH) " |
| 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 / (FH) " |
|
|
| 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 (10H) Data (numeric) |
| 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 (11H) " |
| 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 2 (12H) " |
| 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 3 (13H) " |
| 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 4 (14H) " |
| 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 5 (15H) " |
| 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 6 (16H) " |
| 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 7 (17H) " |
| 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 8 (18H) " |
| 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 9 (19H) " |
|
|
| 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 : (1AH) Special |
| 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 ; (1BH) " |
| 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 < (1CH) " |
| 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 = (1DH) " |
| 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 > (1EH) " |
| 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 ? (1FH) End Sentinel |
| 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 @ (20H) Special |
|
|
| 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 A (21H) Data (alpha) |
| 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 B (22H) " |
| 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 C (23H) " |
| 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 D (24H) " |
| 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 E (25H) " |
| 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 F (26H) " |
| 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 G (27H) " |
| 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 H (28H) " |
| 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 I (29H) " |
| 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 J (2AH) " |
| 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 K (2BH) " |
| 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 L (2CH) " |
| 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 M (2DH) " |
| 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 N (2EH) " |
| 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 O (2FH) " |
| 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 P (30H) " |
| 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 Q (31H) " |
| 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 R (32H) " |
| 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 S (33H) " |
| 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 T (34H) " |
| 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 U (35H) " |
| 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 V (36H) " |
| 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 W (37H) " |
| 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 X (38H) " |
| 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 Y (39H) " |
| 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 Z (3AH) " |
|
|
| 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 [ (3BH) Special |
| 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 \ (3DH) Special |
| 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 ] (3EH) Special |
| 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 ^ (3FH) Field Separator |
| 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 _ (40H) Special |
|
|
| ***** 64 Character 7-bit Set ***** |
| * 43 Alphanumeric Data Characters |
| * 3 Framing/Field Characters |
| * 18 Control/Special Characters |
|
|
|
|
| The two ANSI/ISO formats, ALPHA and BCD, allow a great variety of data to be |
| stored on magstripes. Most cards with magstripes use these formats, but |
| occasionally some do not. More about those later on. |
|
|
|
|
| ** Tracks and Encoding Protocols ** |
|
|
| Now we know how the data is stored. But WHERE is the data stored on the |
| magstripe? ANSI/ISO standards define *3* Tracks, each of which is used for |
| different purposes. These Tracks are defined only by their location on the |
| magstripe, since the magstripe as a whole is magnetically homogeneous. See |
| Figure 8. |
|
|
| Figure 8: |
| --------- <edge of card> |
| _________________________________________________________________ |
| | ^ ^ ^ |
| |------------------| 0.223"--|---------|------------------------- |
| | | | 0.353" | ^ |
| |..................|.........|.........| 0.493" | |
| | Track #1 0.110" | | | |
| |............................|.........|... <MAGSTRIPE> |
| | | | | |
| |............................|.........|... | |
| | Track #2 0.110" | | |
| |......................................|... | |
| | | | |
| |......................................|... | |
| | Track #3 0.110" | |
| |.......................................... | |
| | | |
| |------------------------------------------------------------------ |
| | |
| | <body of card> |
| | |
|
|
|
|
| You can see the exact distances of each track from the edge of the card, as |
| well as the uniform width and spacing. Place a magstripe card in front of you |
| with the magstripe visible at the bottom of the card. Data is encoded from |
| left to right (just like reading a book). See Figure 9. |
|
|
|
|
| Figure 9: |
| --------- ANSI/ISO Track 1,2,3 Standards |
|
|
| Track Name Density Format Characters Function |
| -------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 1 IATA 210 bpi ALPHA 79 Read Name & Account |
| 2 ABA 75 bpi BCD 40 Read Account |
| 3 THRIFT 210 bpi BCD 107 Read Account & |
| *Encode* Transaction |
|
|
|
|
| *** Track 1 Layout: *** |
|
|
| | SS | FC | PAN | Name | FS | Additional Data | ES | LRC | |
|
|
| SS=Start Sentinel "%" |
| FC=Format Code |
| PAN=Primary Acct. # (19 digits max) |
| FS=Field Separator "^" |
| Name=26 alphanumeric characters max. |
| Additional Data=Expiration Date, offset, encrypted PIN, etc. |
| ES=End Sentinel "?" |
| LRC=Longitudinal Redundancy Check |
|
|
|
|
| *** Track 2 Layout: *** |
|
|
| | SS | PAN | FS | Additional Data | ES | LRC | |
|
|
| SS=Start Sentinel ";" |
| PAN=Primary Acct. # (19 digits max) |
| FS=Field Separator "=" |
| Additional Data=Expiration Date, offset, encrypted PIN, etc. |
| ES=End Sentinel "?" |
| LRC=Longitudinal Redundancy Check |
|
|
|
|
| *** Track 3 Layout: ** Similar to tracks 1 and 2. Almost never used. |
| Many different data standards used. |
|
|
|
|
| Track 2, "American Banking Association," (ABA) is most commonly used. This |
| is the track that is read by ATMs and credit card checkers. The ABA designed |
| the specifications of this track and all world banks must abide by it. It |
| contains the cardholder's account, encrypted PIN, plus other discretionary |
| data. |
|
|
| Track 1, named after the "International Air Transport Association," contains |
| the cardholder's name as well as account and other discretionary data. This |
| track is sometimes used by the airlines when securing reservations with a |
| credit card; your name just "pops up" on their machine when they swipe your |
| card! |
|
|
| Since Track 1 can store MUCH more information, credit card companies are trying |
| to urge retailers to buy card readers that read Track 1. The *problem* is that |
| most card readers read either Track 1 or Track 2, but NOT BOTH! And the |
| installed base of readers currently is biased towards Track 2. VISA USA is at |
| the front of this 'exodus' to Track 1, to the point where they are offering |
| Track 1 readers at reduced prices thru participating banks. A spokesperson for |
| VISA commented: |
|
|
| "We think that Track 1 represents more flexibility and the potential |
| to deliver more information, and we intend to build new services |
| around the increased information." |
|
|
| What new services? We can only wait and see. |
|
|
| Track 3 is unique. It was intended to have data read and WRITTEN on it. |
| Cardholders would have account information UPDATED right on the magstripe. |
| Unfortunately, Track 3 is pretty much an orphaned standard. Its *original* |
| design was to control off-line ATM transactions, but since ATMs are now on-line |
| ALL THE TIME, it's pretty much useless. Plus the fact that retailers and banks |
| would have to install NEW card readers to read that track, and that costs $$. |
|
|
| Encoding protocol specifies that each track must begin and end with a length |
| of all Zero bits, called CLOCKING BITS. These are used to synch the self- |
| clocking feature of biphase decoding. See Figure 10. |
|
|
| Figure 10: end sentinel |
| start sentinel | longitudinal redundancy check |
| | | | |
| 000000000000000 SS.................ES LRC 0000000000000000 |
| leading data, data, data trailing |
| clocking bits clocking bits |
| (length varies) (length varies) |
|
|
| THAT'S IT!!! There you have the ANSI/ISO STANDARDS! Completely explained. |
| Now, the bad news. NOT EVERY CARD USES IT! Credit cards and ATM cards will |
| follow these standards. BUT, there are many other types of cards out there. |
| Security passes, copy machine cards, ID badges, and EACH of them may use a |
| PROPRIETARY density/format/track-location system. ANSI/ISO is REQUIRED for |
| financial transaction cards used in the international interbank network. All |
| other cards can play their own game. |
|
|
| The good news. MOST other cards follow the standards, because it's EASY to |
| follow a standard instead of WORKING to make your OWN! Most magstripe cards |
| other than credit cards and ATM cards will use the same Track specifications, |
| and use either BCD or ALPHA formats. |
|
|
|
|
| ** A Bit About Magstripe Equipment ** |
|
|
| "Wow, now I know how to interpret all that data on magstripes! But.waitasec, |
| what kind of equipment do I need to read the stripes? Where can I buy a |
| reader? I don't see any in Radio Shack!!" |
|
|
| Sorry, but magstripe equipment is hard to come by. For obvious reasons, card |
| readers are not made commonly available to consumers. How to build one is the |
| topic for another file (this file is already too long). |
|
|
| Your best bets are to try and scope out Electronics Surplus Stores and flea |
| markets. Do not even bother trying to buy one directly from a manufacturer, |
| since they will immediately assume you have "criminal motives." And as for |
| getting your hands on a magstripe ENCODER...well, good luck! Those rare |
| beauties are worth their weight in gold. Keep your eyes open and look around, |
| and MAYBE you'll get lucky! A bit of social engineering can go a LONG way. |
|
|
| There are different kinds of magstripe readers/encoders. The most common ones |
| are "swipe" machines: the type you have to physically slide the card thru. |
| Others are "insertion" machines: like ATM machines they 'eat' your card, then |
| regurgitate it after the transaction. Costs are in the thousands of dollars, |
| but like I said, flea markets and surplus stores will often have GREAT deals |
| on these things. Another problem is documentation for these machines. If you |
| call the manufacturer and simply ask for 'em, they will probably deny you the |
| literature. "Hey son, what are you doing with our model XYZ swipe reader? |
| That belongs in the hands of a "qualified" merchant or retailer, not some punk |
| kid trying to "find out how things work!" Again, some social engineering may |
| be required. Tell 'em you're setting up a new business. Tell 'em you're |
| working on a science project. Tell 'em anything that works! |
|
|
| 2600 Magazine recently had a good article on how to build a machine that copies |
| magstripe cards. Not much info on the actual data formats and encoding |
| schemes, but the device described is a start. With some modifications, I bet |
| you could route the output to a dumb terminal (or thru a null modem cable) in |
| order to READ the data. Worth checking out the schematics. |
|
|
| As for making your own cards, just paste a length of VCR, reel-to-reel, or |
| audio cassette tape to a cut-out posterboard or plastic card. Works just as |
| good as the real thing, and useful to experiment with if you have no expired or |
| 'dead' ATM or calling cards lying around (SAVE them, don't TOSS them!). |
|
|
|
|
| ** Examples of Data on Magstripes ** |
|
|
| The real fun in experimenting with magstripe technology is READING cards to |
| find out WHAT THE HELL is ON them! Haven't you wondered? The following cards |
| are the result of my own 'research'. Data such as specific account numbers and |
| names has been changed to protect the innocent. None the cards used to make |
| this list were stolen or acquired illegally. |
|
|
| Notice that I make careful note of "common data." This is data that I noticed |
| was the same for all cards of a particular type. This is highlighted below the |
| data with asterisks (*). Where I found varying data, I indicate it with "x"'s. |
| In those cases, NUMBER of CHARACTERS was consistent (the number of "x"'s equals |
| the number of characters...one to one relationship). |
|
|
| I still don't know what some of the data fields are for, but hopefully I will |
| be following this file with a sequel after I collect more data. It ISN'T easy |
| to find lots of cards to examine. Ask your friends, family, and co-workers to |
| help! "Hey, can I, ahh, like BORROW your MCI calling card tonight? I'm |
| working on an, ahh, EXPERIMENT. Please?" Just...be honest! Also, do some |
| trashing. People will often BEND expired cards in half, then throw them out. |
| Simply bend them back into their normal shape, and they'll usually work (I've |
| done it!). They may be expired, but they're not ERASED! |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| -=Mastercard=- Number on front of card -> 1111 2222 3333 4444 |
| Expiration date -> 12/99 |
|
|
| Track 2 (BCD,75 bpi)-> ;1111222233334444=99121010000000000000? |
| *** |
| |
| Track 1 (ALPHA,210 bpi)-> %B1111222233334444^PUBLIC/JOHN? |
| * |
| Note that the "101" was common to all MC cards checked, as well as the "B". |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| -=VISA=- Number on front of card -> 1111 2222 3333 4444 |
| Expiration date -> 12/99 |
|
|
| Track 2 (BCD,75 bpi)-> ;1111222233334444=9912101xxxxxxxxxxxxx? |
| *** |
| Track 1 (ALPHA,210 bpi)-> %B1111222233334444^PUBLIC/JOHN^9912101xxxxxxxxxxxxx? |
| * |
|
|
| Note that the "101" was common to all VISA cards checked, as well as the "B". |
| Also, the "xxx" indicates numeric data that varied from card to card, with no |
| apparent pattern. I believe this is the encrypted pin for use when cardholders |
| get 'cash advances' from ATMs. In every case, tho, I found *13* digits of the |
| stuff. |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| -=Discover=- Number on front of card -> 1111 2222 3333 4444 |
| Expiration date -> 12/99 |
|
|
| Track 2 (BCD,75 bpi)-> ;1111222233334444=991210100000? |
| ******** |
|
|
| Track 1 (ALPHA,210 bpi)-> %B1111222233334444^PUBLIC/JOHN___^991210100000? |
| ******** |
| Note, the "10100000" and "B" were common to most DISCOVER cards checked. I |
| found a few that had "10110000" instead. Don't know the significance. Note |
| the underscores after the name JOHN. I found consistently that the name data |
| field had *26* characters. Whatever was left of the field after the name was |
| "padded" with SPACES. So...for all of you with names longer than 25 (exclude |
| the "/") characters, PREPARE to be TRUNCATED! ;) |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| -=US Sprint FON=- Number on front of card -> 111 222 3333 4444 |
|
|
| Track 2 (BCD,75 bpi)-> ;xxxxxx11122233339==xxx4444xxxxxxxxxx=? |
| * |
|
|
| Track 1 (ALPHA,210 bpi)-> %B^ /^^xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx? |
| * |
|
|
| Strange. None of the cards I check had names in the Track 1 fields. Track 1 |
| looks unused, yet it was always formatted with field separators. The "xxx" |
| stuff varied from card to card, and I didn't see a pattern. I know it isn't |
| a PIN, so it must be account data. |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| -=Fleet Bank=- Number on front of card -> 111111 222 3333333 |
| Expiration date -> 12/99 |
|
|
| Track 2 (BCD,75 bpi)-> ;1111112223333333=9912120100000000xxxx? |
| **** |
|
|
| Track 1 (ALPHA,210 bpi) -> |
| %B1111112223333333^PUBLIC/JOHN___^9912120100000000000000xxxx000000? |
| * **** |
|
|
| Note that the "xxx" data varied. This is the encrypted PIN offset. Always 4 |
| digits (hmmm...). The "1201" was always the same. In fact, I tried many ATM |
| cards from DIFFERENT BANKS...and they all had "1201". |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| (Can't leave *this* one out ;) |
| -=Radio Shack=- Number on front of card -> 1111 222 333333 |
| NO EXPIRATION data on card |
|
|
| Track 2 (BCD,75 dpi)-> ;1111222333333=9912101? |
| ******* |
|
|
| Note that the "9912101" was the SAME for EVERY Radio Shack card I saw. Looks |
| like when they don't have 'real' data to put in the expiration date field, they |
| have to stick SOMETHING in there. |
| ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
|
|
| Well, that's all I'm going to put out right now. As you can see, the major |
| types of cards (ATMs, CC) all follow the same rules more or less. I checked |
| out a number of security passcards and timeclock entry cards..and they ALL had |
| random stuff written to Track 2. Track 2 is by FAR the MOST utilized track on |
| the card. And the format is pretty much always ANSI/ISO BCD. I *did* run into |
| some hotel room access cards that, when scanned, were GARBLED. They most |
| likely used a character set other than ASCII (if they were audio tones, my |
| reader would have put out NOTHING...as opposed to GARBLED data). As you can |
| see, one could write a BOOK listing different types of card data. I intended |
| only to give you some examples. My research has been limited, but I tried to |
| make logical conclusions based on the data I received. |
|
|
|
|
| ** Cards of All Flavors ** |
|
|
| People wanted to store A LOT of data on plastic cards. And they wanted that |
| data to be 'invisible' to cardholders. Here are the different card |
| technologies that were invented and are available today. |
|
|
| HOLLERITH - With this system, holes are punched in a plastic or paper card and |
| read optically. One of the earliest technologies, it is now seen |
| as an encoded room key in hotels. The technology is not secure, |
| but cards are cheap to make. |
|
|
| BAR CODE - The use of bar codes is limited. They are cheap, but there is |
| virtually no security and the bar code strip can be easily damaged. |
| |
| INFRARED - Not in widespread use, cards are factory encoded by creating a |
| "shadow pattern" within the card. The card is passed thru a swipe |
| or insertion reader that uses an infrared scanner. Infrared card |
| pricing is moderate to expensive, and encoding is pretty secure. |
| Infrared scanners are optical and therefore vulnerable to |
| contamination. |
|
|
| PROXIMITY - Hands-free operation is the primary selling point of this card. |
| Although several different circuit designs are used, all proximity |
| cards permit the transmission of a code simply by bringing the card |
| near the reader (6-12"). These cards are quite thick, up to |
| 0.15" (the ABA standard is 0.030"!). |
|
|
| WIEGAND - Named after its inventor, this technology uses a series of small |
| diameter wires that, when subjected to a changing magnetic field, |
| induce a discrete voltage output in a sensing coil. Two rows of |
| wires are embedded in a coded strip. When the wires move past |
| the read head, a series of pulses is read and interpreted as binary |
| code. This technology produces cards that are VERY hard to copy |
| or alter, and cards are moderately expensive to make. Readers |
| based on this tech are epoxy filled, making them immune to weather |
| conditions, and neither card nor readers are affected by external |
| magnetic fields (don't worry about leaving these cards on top of |
| the television set...you can't hurt them!). Here's an example of |
| the layout of the wires in a Wiegand strip: |
|
|
| ||| || || | ||| | || || | || || | | || |
| | | | | | | |||| || |||| || |
|
|
| The wires are NOT visible from the outside of the card, but if |
| your card is white, place it in front of a VERY bright light source |
| and peer inside. Notice that the spacings between the wires is |
| uniform. |
|
|
| BARIUM FERRITE - The oldest magnetic encoding technology (been around for 40 |
| yrs!) it uses small bits of magnetized barium ferrite that are |
| placed inside a plastic card. The polarity and location of |
| the "spots" determines the coding. These cards have a short |
| life cycle, and are used EXTENSIVELY in parking lots (high |
| turnover rate, minimal security). Barium Ferrite cards are |
| ONLY used with INSERTION readers. |
|
|
| There you have the most commonly used cards. Magstripes are common because |
| they are CHEAP and relatively secure. |
|
|
|
|
| ** Magstripe Coercivity ** |
|
|
| Magstripes themselves come in different flavors. The COERCIVITY of the |
| magnetic media must be specified. The coercivity is the magnetic field |
| strength required to demagnetize an encoded stripe, and therefore determines |
| the encode head field strength required to encode the stripe. A range of media |
| coercivities are available ranging from 300 Oersteds to 4,000 Oe. That boils |
| down to HIGH-ENERGY magstripes (4,000 Oe) and LOW-ENERGY magstripes (300 Oe). |
|
|
| REMEMBER: since all magstripes have the same magnetic remanence regardless of |
| their coercivity, readers CANNOT tell the difference between HIGH and LOW |
| energy stripes. Both are read the same by the same machines. |
|
|
| LOW-ENERGY media is most common. It is used on all financial cards, but its |
| disadvantage is that it is subject to accidental demagnetization from contact |
| with common magnets (refrigerator, TV magnetic fields, etc.). But these cards |
| are kept safe in wallets and purses most of the time. |
|
|
| HIGH-ENERGY media is used for ID Badges and access control cards, which are |
| commonly used in 'hostile' environments (worn on uniform, used in stockrooms). |
| Normal magnets will not affect these cards, and low-energy encoders cannot |
| write to them. |
|
|
|
|
| ** Not All that Fluxes is Digital ** |
|
|
| Not all magstripe cards operate on a digital encoding method. SOME cards |
| encode AUDIO TONES, as opposed to digital data. These cards are usually |
| used with old, outdated, industrial-strength equipment where security is not an |
| issue and not a great deal of data need be encoded on the card. Some subway |
| passes are like this. They require only expiration data on the magstripe, and |
| a short series of varying frequencies and durations are enough. Frequencies |
| will vary with the speed of swiping, but RELATIVE frequencies will remain the |
| same (for instance, tone 1 is twice the freq. of tone 2, and .5 the freq of |
| tone 3, regardless of the original frequencies!). Grab an oscilloscope to |
| visualize the tones, and listen to them on your stereo. I haven't experimented |
| with these types of cards at all. |
|
|
|
|
| ** Security and Smartcards ** |
|
|
| Many security systems utilize magstripe cards, in the form of passcards and ID |
| cards. It's interesting, but I found in a NUMBER of cases that there was a |
| serious FLAW in the security of the system. In these cases, there was a code |
| number PRINTED on the card. When scanned, I found this number encoded on the |
| magstripe. Problem was, the CODE NUMBER was ALL I found on the magstripe! |
| Meaning, by just looking at the face of the card, I immediately knew exactly |
| what was encoded on it. Ooops! Makes it pretty damn easy to just glance at |
| Joe's card during lunch, then go home and pop out my OWN copy of Joe's access |
| card! Fortunately, I found this flaw only in 'smaller' companies (sometimes |
| even universities). Bigger companies seem to know better, and DON'T print |
| ALL of the magstripe data right on card in big, easily legible numbers. At |
| least the big companies *I* checked. ;) |
|
|
| Other security blunders include passcard magstripes encoded ONLY with the |
| owner's social security number (yeah, real difficult to find out a person's |
| SS#...GREAT idea), and having passcards with only 3 or 4 digit codes. |
|
|
| Smartcard technology involves the use of chips embedded in plastic cards, with |
| pinouts that temporarily contact the card reader equipment. Obviously, a GREAT |
| deal of data could be stored in this way, and unauthorized duplication would be |
| very difficulty. Interestingly enough, not much effort is being put into |
| smartcards by the major credit card companies. They feel that the tech is too |
| expensive, and that still more data can be squeezed onto magstripe cards in the |
| future (especially Track 1). I find this somewhat analogous to the use of |
| metallic oxide disk media. Sure, it's not the greatest (compared to erasable- |
| writable optical disks), but it's CHEAP..and we just keep improving it. |
| Magstripes will be around for a long time to come. The media will be refined, |
| and data density increased. But for conventional applications, the vast |
| storage capabilities of smartcards are just not needed. |
|
|
|
|
| ** Biometrics: Throw yer cards away! ** |
|
|
| I'd like to end with a mention of biometrics: the technology based on reading |
| the physical attributes of an individual thru retina scanning, signature |
| verification, voice verification, and other means. This was once limited to |
| government use and to supersensitive installations. However, biometrics will |
| soon acquire a larger market share in access control sales because much of its |
| development stage has passed and costs will be within reach of more buyers. |
| Eventually, we can expect biometrics to replace pretty much ALL cards..because |
| all those plastic cards in your wallet are there JUST to help COMPANIES |
| *identify* YOU. And with biometrics, they'll know you without having to read |
| cards. |
|
|
| I'm not paranoid, nor do I subscribe to any grand "corporate conspiracy," but I |
| find it a bit unsettling that our physical attributes will most likely someday |
| be sitting in the cool, vast electronic databases of the CORPORATE world. |
| Accessible by anyone willing to pay. Imagine CBI and TRW databases with your |
| retina image, fingerprint, and voice pattern online for instant, convenient |
| retrieval. Today, a person can CHOOSE NOT to own a credit card or a bank |
| card...we can cut up our plastic ID cards! Without a card, a card reader is |
| useless and cannot identify you. |
|
|
| Paying in cash makes you invisible! However, with biometrics, all a machine |
| has to do is watch... listen...and record. With government/corporate America |
| pushing all the buttons. "Are you paying in cash?..Thank you...Please look |
| into the camera. Oh, I see your name is Mr. Smith...uh, oh...my computer tells |
| me you haven't paid your gas bill...afraid I'm going to have to keep this money |
| and credit your gas account with it....do you have any more cash?...or would |
| you rather I garnish your paycheck?" heh heh |
|
|
|
|
| ** Closing Notes (FINALLY!!!!) ** |
|
|
| Whew...this was one MOTHER of a file. I hope it was interesting, and I hope |
| you distribute it to all you friends. This file was a production of |
| "Restricted Data Transmissions"...a group of techies based in the Boston area |
| that feel that "Information is Power"...and we intend to release a number of |
| highly technical yet entertaining files in the coming year....LOOK FOR THEM!! |
| Tomorrow I'm on my way to Xmascon '91... we made some slick buttons |
| commemorating the event...if you ever see one of them (green wreath.XMASCON |
| 1991 printed on it).hang on to it!... it's a collector's item.. (hahahah) |
| Boy, I'm sleepy... |
|
|
| Remember.... "Truth is cheap, but information costs!" |
|
|
| But -=RDT is gonna change all that... ;) set the info FREE! |
|
|
| Peace. |
|
|
| ..oooOO Count Zero OOooo.. |
|
|
| Usual greets to Magic Man, Brian Oblivion, Omega, White Knight, and anyone |
| else I ever bummed a cigarette off. |
|
|
| (1/18/92 addition: Greets to everyone I met at Xmascon..including but not |
| excluding Crimson Death, Dispater, Sterling, Mack Hammer, Erik Bloodaxe, |
| Holistic Hacker, Pain Hertz, Swamp Ratte, G.A.Ellsworth, Phaedrus, Moebius, |
| Lord MacDuff, Judge Dredd, and of course hats off to *Drunkfux* for organizing |
| and taking responsibility for the whole damn thing. Hope to see all of you |
| at SummerCon '92! Look for Cyber-striper GIFs at a BBS near you..heh heh) |
|
|
| Comments, criticisms, and discussions about this file are welcome. I can be |
| reached at: |
| count0@world.std.com |
| count0@spica.bu.edu |
| count0@atdt.org |
|
|
| Magic Man and I are the sysops of the BBS "ATDT"...located somewhere in |
| Massachusetts. Great message bases, technical discussions...data made |
| flesh...electronic underground.....our own Internet address (atdt.org)... |
| field trips to the tunnels under MIT in Cambridge.....give it a call.. |
| mail me for more info.. ;) |
|
|