| ==Phrack Classic== |
|
|
| Volume Three, Issue 32, File #10 of 12 |
|
|
|
|
| KL ^*^ KL ^*^ KL ^*^ KL ^*^ KL |
|
|
| K N I G H T L I N E |
|
|
| Issue 001 / Part I |
|
|
| 17th of November, 1990 |
|
|
| Written, compiled, |
|
|
| and edited by Doc Holiday |
|
|
| KL ^*^ KL ^*^ KL ^*^ KL ^*^ KL |
|
|
| --- |
|
|
| Welcome to the 5th year of Phrack and the first edition of KnightLine! |
|
|
| --- |
| SunDevil II: The witch-hunt continues.. |
|
|
| I hate to start out on such a sour note, but: Inside sources have reported an |
| enormous amount of Secret Service activity in major U.S. cities. |
| Furthermore, sources claim that new investigations are underway for the |
| prosecution of all Legion Of Doom members. |
|
|
| The investigations have "turned up" new evidence that could bring about |
| the sequel to SunDevil. |
|
|
| This information comes from reliable sources and I suggest that all precautions |
| should be taken to protect yourselves from a raid. |
|
|
| Some good advice to follow: |
|
|
| A> Refrain from using "codes", or other means to commit toll fraud. |
|
|
| B> Further yourselves from those who are overwhelmed with desire to tell |
| you their recent conquests of computer systems. |
|
|
| C> Refrain from downloading or storing stolen Unix source code. |
|
|
| D> Get rid of anything that might incriminate you or your peers. |
|
|
| E> Stay cool, calm, and collected. |
|
|
|
|
| The Conflict has submitted a file to KL about what to do IF YOU ARE raided. |
|
|
| - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - |
|
|
| Simple Guidelines To Follow If You Encounter |
| Law Enforcement Agents In An Unfriendly Situation |
|
|
| The current state of the Computer Underground is an extreme turmoil. |
| The recent threat of another series of witchhunt raids has put many |
| people into a state of paranoia, and rightfully so. Noone needs to |
| deal with all the bullshit associated with a bust. I am offering a |
| few guidelines to follow if you encounter a precarious situation |
| instigated by a law enforcement agent; of course, it is up to you to |
| decide what you want to do. Of the people whom I have spoken with, |
| these will be some of the best steps to follow if you receive an |
| unexpected visit. |
|
|
| Probably the first thing you would want to do if you receive an |
| unfriendly visit from Joe Fed is to READ the damn warrant. Find |
| out why you have been chosen, and what they are looking for. Also, |
| remember that if they have only a search and seizure warrant, they |
| are warranted only to confiscate items on your premises; however, if |
| they are serving a subpoena, they may take what they need, on or off |
| your premises. So, in essence, the clean-house preventive measure |
| may or may not be useful to you. |
|
|
| An important thing to do when Agent Foley (or one of his lesser |
| evil counterparts) comes knocking on your door is to cooperate fully. |
| Drop a lot of "Yes sir"/"No sir" answers; respond politely. You're |
| in no position to be a smart ass, and being friendly surely can not |
| hurt you. |
|
|
| Another important thing to remember, although it is almost |
| opposite of the aforementioned, has to do with what to say. In |
| essence, do not say a fucking thing if you are questioned! Remember, |
| anything you say or do can and WILL be used AGAINST you in a court of |
| law. Simply reply, "I can not answer any questions without counsel", |
| or "I first must contact my attorney." You need not answer a damn |
| thing they ask of you without an attorney present, and it would most |
| probably be very detrimental to do so. |
|
|
| This hint parallels the previous one. No matter what you do, |
| do not reply to any question with "I don't know anything", or any |
| simple derivation of that phrase. If you do, and you are indicted, |
| you will be reamed in court. The presence of that statement could |
| greatly damage your defense, unless you are conditionally mental or |
| something. |
|
|
| In essence, those are all you should need. What I have outlined |
| is very simple, but logical. You need to keep a level head at least |
| while they are on site with you; get pissed off/psycho later, after |
| they leave. If you are currently an active member of the Computer |
| Underground, you may wish to lose anything that is important to you, |
| at least temporarily. Why? Well, the analogy I was given follows |
| that: if you were suspected of racketeering, the feds could execute |
| a search and seizure on your property. If they can prove by 51% that |
| ANY of the confiscated material COULD have been used in your suspected |
| racketeering, it is forfeited (i.e. you lost it, for good). The |
| forfeiture stands whether or not you are indicted or convicted! So, |
| you would be entirely screwed. |
|
|
| All of the aforementioned steps are important. Those are all I really |
| have to offer. I suggest that you get clean before the sweep occurs, |
| and that you stay clean until after the sweep clears. Exercise |
| extreme caution. Keep your head high, and keep your back to the wall |
| (otherwise, it would be quite possible to find a knife lodged in it). |
| Stay safe, and good luck! |
|
|
| The Conflict |
| 11-13-1990 |
|
|
| - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - |
| ***UPDATE.11/16/90: 3 Hackers are DOOMED to prison |
|
|
| Frank Darden (Leftist), Adam Grant (Urvile), and Robert Riggs (Prophet) |
| were sentenced Friday. Robert, who was currently on probation before the |
| incident was sentenced to 21 months in a federal prison. Frank and Adam were |
| received sentences of 14 months. All three were ordered to pay $233,000 in |
| restitution. |
|
|
| Kent Alexander, an assistant U.S. attorney who prosecuted the case, was |
| not available for comment. |
|
|
| --- |
| This is not good for the Underground at all. I'm sure the government will |
| use the outcome of this to their advantage in speeding up the momentum of |
| prosecuting hackers. In their eyes, everyone is in LOD. |
|
|
| Dale Boll, a special agent of the Secret Service in Washington, said |
| "Telephone companies are preparing for a retaliation from the hacking |
| underworld and are beefing up security at all ends of the wire." |
|
|
| I can't verify or validate these rumors of retaliation. But I can say if |
| you are going to do some sort of retaliation, I would think twice-- It could |
| make things worse. This is not a "game" we are playing. No, it's reality. |
| And I'm sured Frank, Adam, and Rob are feeling it right now. |
| --- |
| A few words from Erik Bloodaxe on the sentences: |
|
|
| "I'm not surprised in the least at the sentencing. However, I'm sure the three |
| of them are. I wish I could ask them if all the singing was worth-while in the |
| long-run. How can anyone hope to make a deal with federal officals, who with |
| in the past year, resorted to such lies and deceit. Everyday I think all this |
| will be over and I can get on with my life and possibly use my own computer to |
| write a term paper without fear of it's confiscation due to who or what I know |
| or have seen or done in the past. Perhaps this will end eventually, but until |
| then Mr. Cook will play on the peoples inherient fear of technology and |
| exploit everyone in his past on his personal crusade for his own twisted view |
| of justus. Are you or have you ever been a member of the Legion of Doom? Tell |
| me, do you believe in reincarnation Senator McCarthy?" |
|
|
| - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - |
|
|
| "The weirdest part of my dream was... when I woke up." |
|
|
| And now.... .. ANNOUNCING: |
|
|
| The first annual, |
|
|
| X M A S C O N '90 |
|
|
| Where: Houston, TX |
| When: December 28th-30th 1990 |
| Who: All Hackers, Journalists, and Federal Agents |
|
|
| Well, it's getting closer.. XmasCon is next month and we plan on having |
| the biggest gathering of Hackers & Feds since SummerCon '88! |
|
|
| This event was going to be private until word got out. A journalist |
| (unnamed) found out about the private event and decided to make it public news |
| in the magazine for which he writes. Well, after seeing the words: "XMASCON" |
| in a magazine with less readers than Phrack, we decided to announce it |
| ourselves. So, here it is-- Your OFFICIAL invitation to the gathering that |
| should replace the painful memories of SummerCon'90 (SCon'90? What do you mean? |
| there was a SummerCon this year? HA. It surprised me too). |
|
|
| Hotel Information: |
| La Quinta Inn |
| 6 North Belt East |
| (713) 447-6888 |
| (Located next to Intercontinental Airport) |
|
|
| Fees: $44.00+TAX a night (single) |
| $56.00+TAX a night (double) |
|
|
| Government Discount (With ID) |
| $49.00+TAX a night (single) |
| $37.00+TAX a night (double) |
|
|
| 1-800-531-5900 |
|
|
|
|
| Call for reservations in advance. Please tell the registar that you are with |
| XmasCon'90. Everyone is welcome to attend, and I do mean EVERYONE. |
|
|
|
|
| Take care & see you at HoHoCon! |
|
|
| --DH |
|
|
| _______________________________________________________________________________ |
|
|
| F R O M T H E W I R E |
|
|
|
|
| HEADLINE Thirteen Arrested For Breaking Into University Computer |
| Byline: PAT MILTON |
| DATE 08/16/90 |
| SOURCE The Associated Press (ASP) |
| Origin: FARMINGDALE, N.Y. |
| (Copyright 1990. The Associated Press. All Rights Reserved.) |
|
|
|
|
| * FARMINGDALE, N.Y. (AP) _ Thirteen computer hackers ranging in age from 14 to |
| 32 were charged Thursday with breaking into the mainframe computer at a |
| university in Washington state and causing costly damage to the files. One of |
| the suspects is a 14-year-old high school student from New York City who is |
| also a suspect in last November's break-in of an Air Force computer in the |
| Pentagon, according to Senior Investigator Donald Delaney of the New York State |
| Police. The student, who used the name "Zod" when he signed onto the computer, |
| is charged with breaking into the computer at the City University of Bellevue |
| in Washington in May by figuring out the toll-free telephone number that gave |
| students and faculty legitimate access to the system. |
|
|
| "Zod," who was not identified because he is a minor, maintained control over |
| the system by setting up his own program where others could illegally enter the |
| system by answering 11 questions he set up. |
|
|
| More than 40 hackers across the country are believed to have gained illegal |
| access to the system since May, Delaney said. As a result of the break-in, |
| university files were altered and deleted, and consultants must be hired to |
| reprogram the system, Delaney said. In addition to the arrests, search |
| warrants were executed at 17 locations on Thursday where officers confiscated |
| $50,000 worth of computers and related equipment. Three more arrests were |
| expected. Two of the 13 arrested were from Long Island and the rest were from |
| the New York boroughs of Brooklyn, Queens, Manhattan and the Bronx. |
| Farmingdale is on Long Island. The 13 were charged with computer tampering, |
| computer trespass, unauthorized use of a computer and theft of services. The |
| juveniles will be charged with juvenile delinquency. |
|
|
| The investigation began two months ago after a technician at the university |
| noticed "error message" flashing on the computer screen, indicating someone had |
| entered the system illegally. The suspects were traced through subpoenaed |
| telephone records. * Many hackers break into private computer systems for the |
| pure satisfaction of cracking the code, and also to obtain sometimes costly |
| computer programs, Delaney said. |
| - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| _______________________________________________________________________________ |
|
|
|
|
| HEADLINE US Sprint helps business customers battle PBX fraud |
| DATE 09/25/90 |
| SOURCE BUSINESS WIRE (BWR) |
|
|
|
|
| KANSAS CITY, Mo.--(BUSINESS WIRE)--US Sprint Wednesday announced its corporate |
| security department will help the company's business customers battle PBX |
| fraud. After producing significant results in fighting code abuse US Sprint is |
| directing their efforts to help their business customers in identifying and |
| preventing computer hackers from infiltrating their business customer's owned |
| or leased telephone switching equipment. ``Unauthorized use of our |
| long-distance service has been greatly reduced through increased detection, |
| prevention, investigation and prosecution efforts,'' said Bob Fox, US Sprint |
| vice president corporate security. |
|
|
| ``Now rather than attacking a long-distance carrier's network in * an attempt |
| to steal authorization codes, computer hackers are attacking private companies' |
| and governmental agencies' Private Branch Exchanges (PBX's). Computer |
| hackers break into private telephone switches in an attempt to reoriginate |
| long-distance calls, which are then billed to the businesses. Fox says a |
| business may not discover its telephone system has been ``hacked'' until their |
| long-distance bill is received and then it may be too late. Help is on the way |
| however. US Sprint has started a customer support program to help the |
| company's business customers to combat the situation. Del Wnorowski, US Sprint |
| senior vice president-general counsel said, ``The new program is customers |
| about the potential for telecommunications fraud committed through their owned |
| or leasesd switching equipment and to assist them in preventing this type of |
| illegal activity.'' US Sprint is a unit of United Telecommunications Inc., a |
| diversified telecommunications company headquartered in Kansas City. |
|
|
| CONTACT: |
| US Sprint, Kansas City. |
| Phil Hermanson, 816/276-6268 |
| _______________________________________________________________________________ |
|
|
|
|
| HEADLINE Fax pirates find it easy to intercept documents |
| DATE 09/10/90 |
| SOURCE Toronto Star (TOR) |
| Edition: METRO |
| Section: BUSINESS TODAY |
| Page: B4 |
| (Copyright The Toronto Star) |
|
|
|
|
| --- Fax pirates find it easy to intercept documents --- |
|
|
| TOKYO (Special) - Considering that several years ago enthusiastic hackers began |
| breaking into computer systems worldwide to steal valuable information, it |
| could only have been a matter of time before the same problem surfaced for |
| facsimile machines. Now, officials of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public |
| Corp. report evidence that this has been happening, not only in their own |
| country but around the globe. Apparently, anyone with just a little knowledge |
| of electronics can tap fax messages being sent from one of these relatively |
| unsophisticated machines to another, with the duplication printed out on the |
| pirate's facsimile machine. Both the sender and the receiver of the faxed |
| document remain completely unaware that they have been bugged. "I shudder to |
| think of some of the business documents which only recently moved over my |
| company's fax machines being examined by our competitors," one Tokyo executive |
| nervously admits when informed that there has been a proliferation of tapping. |
| "You don't think the tax people are doing it too?" he then asks in mock terror. |
|
|
| It is certainly a frightening thought. The technique involves making a |
| secret connection with the telephone line of the party whose fax messages are |
| to be intercepted. That is all too easy to accomplish, according to officials |
| of Nippon Telegraph and Telephone. Apart from a few special cases, very little |
| has been done to guard against outside tapping. As a result, one of the most |
| vulnerable areas - and one most businessmen and women now should begin to feel |
| unsure of - is the privacy or security of the facsimile machine. Technical |
| attention to this problem is in order. |
|
|
| "The idea that somewhere out there is 'Conan the Hacker' who is reading my |
| fax correspondence as readily as I do sends chills up my spine," says one |
| American businesswoman here. "There could be a lot of trouble for me and up to |
| now I didn't even realize it was possible." It is not only possible, but easy. |
| Ordinary components available at any electronics store can be used. With these |
| in hand, tappers can rig up a connection that sets off a warning signal, |
| without the sender or receiver realizing it, whenever a fax message passes |
| along the telephone line. Considering the growing volume of highly |
| confidential material being sent and received via fax equipment, the resulting |
| leaks can be considered highly dangerous to the security of corporate |
| information. |
|
|
| In Japan alone it is estimated that there are 3.7 million |
| machines in operation. Given the nature of these tapping operations, it would |
| appear to be extremely difficult for companies to determine whether they are |
| suffering serious damage from this process. In addition, it is clear that a |
| great many corporations have yet to realize the extent of the threat to their |
| privacy. "If more business executives recognized what is going on," suggests |
| one Japanese security specialist, "they would move now to halt the opportunity |
| for leaks and thus protect their corporations from this type of violation." He |
| went on to note that third parties mentioned in fax messages also can be badly |
| hurt by these interceptions. Fortunately, manufacturers are producing machines |
| capable of preventing hackers from tapping into the system. In some cases, |
| newly developed fax machines use code systems to defend information |
| transmitted. But these tap-proof facsimile machines are not yet in general |
| use. Makers of the new "protected" facsimile machines predict that once the |
| business communities around the globe become aware of the threat they will |
| promptly place orders for replacements and junk their old equipment as a simple |
| matter of damage control. The market could prove extremely large. Those few |
| leak-proof fax machines now in operation depend upon scrambling messages, so |
| that even if a pirate taps into the telephone line leading to the unit, the |
| intercepted message is impossible to read. |
|
|
| Nippon Telegraph and Telephone, for example, claims that it would require |
| a hacker using a large computer more than 200,000 years to crack the codes used |
| in its own pirate-proof fax. This ultimately may prove to be something of an |
| exaggeration. Although in Japan and many other countries this kind of tapping |
| clearly is illegal, it remains nearly impossible to track down electronic |
| eavesdroppers. As far as is known, none of these snoopers have been identified |
| and dragged into court. Security specialists in Japan claim that there may be |
| thousands of fax hackers who get their kicks out of intercepting and reading |
| other people's business mail, with few using the information for illegal |
| purposes or actively conveying it to third parties. |
| _______________________________________________________________________________ |
|
|
|
|
| HEADLINE Inmate behind scams |
| Byline: JOHN SEMIEN |
| DATE 09/11/90 |
| SOURCE THE BATON ROUGE SUNDAY ADVOCATE (BATR) |
| Section: NEWS |
| Page: 1-B |
| (Copyright 1989 by Capitol City Press) |
|
|
|
|
| There wasn't much inmate Lawrence "Danny" Faires couldn't buy, sell or |
| steal with a telephone call from his jail cell in Miami when his million-dollar |
| fraud ring ran afoul of the U.S. Secret Service in 1989. That was the year |
| Faires used a portable computer with an automatic dialing program to "hack out" |
| access codes to the long-distance lines of Telco Communications Inc., a Baton |
| Rouge-based phone company. Telco officials were alarmed when they spotted |
| 1,500 attempts at gaining unauthorized access to the company's long-distance |
| service in a single 12-hour period in January 1989. |
|
|
| Convinced that an organized fraud scheme was at work, Telco called |
| Resident Agent Phil Robertson, who heads the service's Baton Rouge office. |
|
|
| "They told me they felt they were being attacked by hackers who had discovered |
| their long-distance access lines and who were hacking out personal |
| identification numbers belonging to their customers," Robertson said Monday. |
|
|
| "You are billed based on your pin (access) number. The computer hacker had |
| located several of their 800 numbers and had entered digits hoping it would be |
| a valid pin number." Using computer records, Robertson said agents were able to |
| isolate 6,000 fraudulent Telco calls that were made during a three-week period |
| of January. More than a third of those calls were traced to a cell block in |
| the Dade County Interim Detention Center that has been home for Faires for the |
| past four years. Faires is awaiting trial in Miami on first-degree murder |
| charges. "As it turned out, all of the inmates in this cell block are awaiting |
| trial," Robertson said. "One of the inmates, Danny Faires, had a computer in |
| his cell attached to a modem, and he turned out to be the hacker." |
|
|
| "All he had to do was plug his modem in, let it make the calls and check his |
| printout for the numbers that came back good," the agent said. In checking out |
| the other bogus Telco calls, agents uncovered a massive credit card scam. A |
| federal grand jury in Milwaukee, Wis., linked both scams to Faires and alleged |
| associates of the inmate across the country in a Feb. 27 indictment of six |
| people on federal wire and access device fraud. Fairies, an unindicted |
| co-conspirator in the case, last week said he has spent the past three years |
| applying his previous experience as a computer systems analyst and programmer |
| to a lap-top, portable computer provided by one of the prison guards. He |
| describes the results as "doing business with America" at the expense of large |
| credit card and telecommunications companies. Faires said he attacked Telco's |
| system by chance after receiving one of the company's access numbers in a group |
| of assorted access codes acquired by his associates. "It was just their |
| misfortune that we became aware that they had a system there that was easily |
| accessible," Faires said in a telephone interview. |
|
|
| "I was given their access number, along with Sprint and MCI, I guess |
| virtually every company in America we got." Faires said he used the stolen, |
| long distance phone time and other stolen credit card numbers to access |
| networks with credit information from major department stores and mail order |
| businesses. "You come up to the door and the door is locked," he said. "You |
| have to buy access. Well, I bought access with credit cards from another |
| system. I had access codes that we had hacked. "I could pull your entire |
| credit profile up and just pick the credit card numbers that you still had some |
| credit in them and how many dollars you had left in your account and I would |
| spend that," Faires said. "My justification was, I don't know the creditor and |
| he had no knowledge of it so he won't have to pay it." However, Faires said he |
| now thinks of the trouble the illegal use of the credit cards has caused his |
| victims in their efforts to straighten out damaged credit records. "I remember |
| I took a course once that was called computer morality about the moral ethics |
| to which we're morally bound," he said. "It's like a locksmith. Even though |
| he can open a lock, he's morally bound not to if it's not his lock. I violated |
| that." |
|
|
| The vulnerability of credit card companies to hackers is the subject of an |
| unpublished book that Faires said he has written. Faires said his book |
| includes tips on how businesses and others can safeguard access to their |
| credit, but added that there may be no way to be completely safe from |
| hackers. "It's untitled as yet," he said about the book. "We're leaving that |
| open. I'm waiting to see if they electrocute me here, then I'm going to put |
| something about "I could buy it all but couldn't pay the electric bill.' " |
| [This guy is a real toon -DH] |
|
|
| While Faires has not been formally charged in connection with the scheme, |
| last week he said he was sure charges will be forthcoming because "there is no |
| question about my involvement." The other six alleged conspirators are John |
| Carl Berger and George A. Hart Jr. of Milwaukee, Wis.; Charles Robert McFall |
| and Victor Reyes of San Antonio, Texas; Steven Michael Skender Jr. of West |
| Allis, Wis.; and Angelo Bruno Bregantini of Marshville, N.C. All six men are |
| charged with conspiracy to commit access device and wire fraud. Berger, |
| Skender, Reyes and Bregantini also are charged separately with multiple counts |
| of wire fraud. |
|
|
| The indictments are the first criminal charges generated by Operation |
| Mongoose, an ongoing Secret Service probe of credit card and long-distance |
| telephone access fraud. The charges allege that Faires has had access to a |
| telephone since his arrest and imprisonment in Miami in 1986, an allegation |
| that has prompted a separate probe by Miami authorities. That phone was used |
| to make frequent calls to a building on Brookfield Road in Brookfield, Wis., |
| where another alleged unindicted co-conspirator, Fred Bregantini, operates |
| various businesses, according to the indictment. The indictment said Faires |
| and Fred Bregantini were "at the hub" of the telephone and credit card scam. |
| The two men are accused of collecting credit card numbers and telephone access |
| codes from other defendants in the case and using the numbers to purchase |
| merchandise, services and "other things of value." Robertson said agents |
| believe the members of the ring copied many of these stolen numbers from credit |
| card receipts retrieved from the trash cans of various businesses. He said the |
| practice, commonly called "dumpster diving," is a widely used method in credit |
| card fraud. [`dumpster diving' eh? -DH] |
|
|
| While some of the defendants helped make purchases on the stolen cards, |
| the indictment alleges that others provided addresses used for the shipment of |
| the stolen goods. The goods included gold coins, plane tickets, computer |
| equipment, tools and stereo equipment. Robertson said agents are still |
| tallying the cost of the scam to Telco and other companies but that the damage |
| has already climbed past $1 million. Herbert Howard, president of Telco, on |
| Friday said the company lost from $35,000 to $40,000 in revenues from illegal |
| calls and in additional expenses for researching Faires' use of access codes. |
| "It was really a learning experience for us because this is the first time this |
| has happened," Howard said about his 2-year-old company. "I think it's a fear |
| of all long-distance companies. It's very fortunate that we caught it as |
| quickly as we did." |
| _______________________________________________________________________________ |
|
|
| HEADLINE No, I'm not paranoid, but who is No. 1? |
| Byline: DENISE CARUSO |
| Column: INSIDE SILICON VALLEY |
| DATE 08/21/90 |
| SOURCE SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER (SFEX) |
| Edition: FIFTH |
| Section: BUSINESS |
| Page: D-16 |
| (Copyright 1989) |
|
|
|
|
| THOUGH I didn't plan it that way, this week proved to be a perfect time to |
| start renting old episodes of "The Prisoner" - that very dark, very paranoid |
| British spy series from the early '60s which foresaw a bleak future in which |
| "een-formation" was of paramount importance, no matter whose "side" you were |
| on. Every well-paid company representative from every telephone service |
| provider in North America earned his or her keep this week, fielding calls from |
| blood-thirsty members of the press corps who also wanted "een-formation" about |
| whether or not the huge long-distance snafu with AT&T was a "hack" (an illegal |
| break-in) or some form of computerized germ warfare. |
|
|
| I'm happy that the answer was "no," but of course the event opens a rather |
| nasty can of worms: has AT&T's problem tipped off the hacker community that |
| the phone network is vulnerable? "That's a very good question," said one |
| network engineer I spoke with last week. But, he assured me, his network was |
| totally secure and had all kinds of safeguards built in to prevent either |
| outside penetration or the introduction of a software virus to the system. I |
| hope he's right, but I must admit, I've heard that song before. |
|
|
| Here, for example, is an excerpt from an anonymous piece of electronic |
| mail I received last week, slightly edited to correct grammatical |
| imperfections: "It may be of interest to you to know, if I wanted to have |
| "fun," "evil" deeds could be done by remote control, up to and including |
| shutting down every ESS (electronic switching station) office in North America. |
|
|
| "Less evil and more fun might be to shut down the stock market for a day, |
| scramble all transactions, or even send it down in a tail spin! Banks aren't |
| immune either. This may sound very darkside, but people must have what is |
| needed to fight back if things go bad!" Not disturbing enough? Try this one on |
| for size: Back in July of '89, I wrote of a story in the premier issue of the |
| magazine Mondo 2000 that detailed how one might set about hacking automatic |
| teller machines (ATMs). That story contained everything but the blueprints for |
| the device, which the magazine's editors didn't print because they thought it |
| would be irresponsible to do so. But now, a student-owned Cornell University |
| publication called "Visions Magazine" - for which Carl Sagan is creative |
| adviser - has asked the article's author, Morgan Russell, for rights to reprint |
| the article in its entirety, including device blueprints. |
|
|
| These kinds of stories are disturbing, yet somehow I've always expected |
| they would happen, a reaction that's similar to the way I feel when I watch |
| "The Prisoner." No. 6, as he's called, cries out at the beginning of every |
| episode, "I am not a number! I am a free man!" His will to resist is |
| sufficient to fend off the authorities who believe their need for the |
| "een-formation" in No. 6's head gives them the right to try to control his |
| movements and thoughts, using - of course - only the most impressive |
| technology. |
|
|
| Of course, the science-fiction fantasy of impressive technology in the |
| '60s, when "The Prisoner" was created, was as authoritarian and centralized as |
| the governments using it. Not many faceless authorities back then were |
| predicting a near-future where all classes of people had access to, could |
| afford and knew how to use powerful technology. (I'm sure it would have ruined |
| their supper if they had.) Neither did they envision today's growing class of |
| technological sophisticates - whether self-taught PC hackers or trained |
| computer scientists - who, by virtue of their knowledge, could cripple, |
| disable, or otherwise confound the system which spawned them. Have any opinion |
| you'd like about the right or wrong of it. Fact is, whether it's the phone |
| network or a bank teller machine, the more we rely on technology, the less we |
| can rely on technology. |
|
|
| Though this fact can make life unpleasant for those of us who are |
| victimized by either the machines we trust or the people who know how to fidget |
| with them, there is something strangely comforting about knowing that, after |
| all, a computer is still only as trustworthy as the humans who run it. Write |
|
|
| CONTACT: |
| Denise Caruso, Spectra, San Francisco Examiner |
| P.O Box 7260 |
| San Francisco, CA 94120. (Denise |
|
|
| MCI Mail (Denise Caruso) - CompuServe (73037,52) - CONNECT (Caruso) |
| _______________________________________________________________________________ |
|
|
| HEADLINE US Sprint to Supply Soviet Venture With Switches |
| DATE 09/17/90 |
| SOURCE WALL STREET JOURNAL (WJ) |
|
|
|
|
| WASHINGTON -- US Sprint Communications Corp. said it obtained U.S. government |
| approval to supply a Soviet joint venture with packet switches that can greatly |
| improve telecommunications services between the Soviet Union and other |
| countries. The imminent shipment of these switches was announced by William |
| Esrey, chairman and chief executive officer of United Telecommunications Inc., |
| shortly after completing a visit to the Soviet Union with Commerce Secretary |
| Robert Mosbacher and the chief executives of other U.S. companies. United |
| Telecommunications is the parent of US Sprint. |
|
|
| The export license that US Sprint expects to obtain as early as this week |
| will be the first license for telecommunications equipment granted by the U.S. |
| under the new, relaxed regulations for shipping technology to the Soviet Union, |
| Esrey said. * The Soviet venture, Telenet USSR, will be owned by a US Sprint |
| subsidiary, Sprint International, and the Soviet Ministry of Post and |
| Telecommunications and the Larvian Academy of Sciences, a Soviet research |
| group. The Commerce Department doesn't discuss details of individual license |
| applications, but Mosbacher has publicly supported technology tie-ups between |
| the U.S. companies represented in his traveling group and potential Soviet |
| partners. US Sprint appears to be leading the race among American |
| telecommunications companies to establish solid ties in the Soviet Union. An |
| earlier proposal by U S West Inc. to lay down part of an international |
| fiber-optic line across the Soviet Union was rejected by U.S. authorities |
| because of the advanced nature of the technology. |
|
|
| US Sprint's packet switches, however, appear to be within the new |
| standards for permissible exports to the Soviet Union. The switches are used |
| to route telephone calls and control traffic in voice, facsimile and |
| digitalized data transmission. These eight-bit switches are one or two |
| generations behind the comparable systems in use in Western countries, but are |
| still good enough to sharply improve the ability of Sprint's Soviet customers |
| to communicate with other countries, Esrey's aides said. The company declined |
| to discuss the value of its investment or to disclose how many switches will be |
| sold. US Sprint said its venture will operate through new, dedicated satellite |
| lines that will augment the often-congested 32 international lines that |
| currently exist for Moscow-based businesses. Esrey said he expects the venture |
| to be in operation before the end of this year. |
| _______________________________________________________________________________ |
|
|
| HEADLINE BT Tymnet Introduces Additional XLINK Services |
| DATE 09/09/90 |
| SOURCE DOW JONES NEWS WIRE |
|
|
| SAN JOSE, Calif. -DJ- BT Tymnet Inc. said XLINK Express, a family of new, |
| bundled, port-based, synchronous X.25 (XLINKs) services, is available. The |
| XLINK service offers customers lower cost X.25 host access to its TYMNET |
| network, the company said in a news release. XLINKs are leased-line private |
| access port services for X.25 interfaces at speeds up to 19.2 bits per second |
| and supporting up to 64 virtual circuits. |
|
|
| XLINK Express includes port access, leased line, modems, software, and free |
| data transmission. Prior to XLINK Express, customers requiring a |
| 9.6-bit-per-second leased line for standard X.25 host connectivity would |
| typically pay about $1,500 monthly for their leased line, modems and interface. |
| With XLINK, customers can now be charged a monthly rate of $900, the company |
| said. |
|
|
| BT Tymnet Inc. is a unit of British Telecom plc. |
| _______________________________________________________________________________ |
|
|
| HEADLINE Hacker may be taunting the FBI; Whiz suspected of invading U.S. army |
| computer |
| Credit: PENINSULA TIMES TRIBUNE |
| DATE 04/10/90 |
| SOURCE Montreal Gazette (GAZ) |
| Edition: FINAL |
| Section: NEWS |
| Page: F16 |
| Origin: PALO ALTO, Calif. |
| (Copyright The Gazette) |
|
|
| --- Hacker may be taunting the FBI; Whiz suspected of invading |
| U.S. army computer --- |
|
|
| PALO ALTO, Calif. - The computer prodigy wanted on suspicion of invading a |
| U.S. army computer may be taunting FBI agents by defiantly talking to his |
| hacker buddies on electronic bulletin boards while he eludes a manhunt, |
| authorities said. The mysterious Kevin Poulsen, a former Menlo Park, Calif., |
| resident described by many as a computer genius, is outsmarting the FBI and |
| apparently has the savvy to make this game of hide-and-seek a long contest. |
|
|
| No, investigators are not getting frustrated, FBI official Duke Diedrich |
| said. "It's just a matter of time. We've got our traps and hopefully one day |
| we'll be able to get the mouse." Authorities have issued an arrest warrant for |
| the former SRI International computer expert. He has been at large since at |
| least Jan. 18, when federal officials revealed allegations of a sensational |
| computer conspiracy. The FBI says Poulsen, 24, is the mastermind of a complex |
| computer and telephone-system invasion that included breaking into an |
| unclassified army computer network, snooping on the FBI and eavesdropping on |
| the calls of a former girlfriend. FBI agents believe he may be in southern |
| California, but because he is apparently still hooked up to a national network |
| of hackers, he could be using his friends to hide just about anywhere, Diedrich |
| said. Poulsen is adept at manufacturing false identification and knows how to |
| use the phone system to cover traces of his calls. |
|
|
| Agents believe his hacker talk on electronic bulletin boards is perhaps "a |
| way of taunting law enforcement officials," Diedrich said. Poulsen may be back |
| to his old tricks, but "he's not hiding with the usual bunch of hackers," said |
| John Maxfield, a computer security consultant and former FBI informant. |
|
|
| Maxfield, known nationally as a "narc" among young hackers, said he had |
| underground sources who said Poulsen was rumored to be living alone in a |
| southern California apartment. Poulsen's computer chatter could lead to his |
| downfall, Maxfield said. Many hackers are electronic anarchists who would be |
| happy to turn in a high-ranking hacker, thereby pushing themselves up the |
| status ladder, he said. But Poulsen probably has access to a steady flow of |
| cash, so he doesn't have to get a job that might lead to his arrest, Maxfield |
| said. |
|
|
| With his expertise, Poulsen could easily crack the bank computers that |
| validate cash transactions and then credit his own accounts, Maxfield said. |
| The FBI isn't desperate, but agents have contacted America's Most Wanted, a |
| television show that asks viewers to help authorities find fugitives. |
|
|
| Poulsen's mother, Bernadine, said her son called home just after police |
| announced there was a warrant for his arrest, but he had not called since. |
| During the brief call, "He just apologized for all the stress he was causing |
| us." The fugitive's motivation baffles Maxfield. |
|
|
| The self-described "hacker tracker" has conducted investigations that have |
| led to dozens of arrests, but the Poulsen-contrived conspiracy as alleged by |
| the FBI is strange, he said. Most teen-age hackers are thrill seekers, he |
| explained. The more dangerous the scam, the bigger the high. But Poulsen is |
| 24. "Why is he still doing it?" Maxfield asked. |
|
|
| Poulsen, alias "Dark Dante" and "Master of Impact," was a member of an |
| elite hacker gang called Legion of Doom. [Poulsen was never a member of the |
| group -DH] |
|
|
| The 25 or so mischievous members are now being arrested one by one, Maxfield |
| said. They consider themselves misfits, but smart misfits who are superior to |
| the masses of average people who have so labelled them, he said. [Baha, |
| Maxfield really cracks me up -DH] |
|
|
| - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - |
|
|
| Kevin recently had a 15 minute television debut on NBC's "Unsolved |
| Mystries". The program showed renactments of Kevin breaking into CO's and |
| walking around his apartment filled with computers and other 'listening' |
| devices (as the show called them). |
|
|
| I personally got a kick out of the photographs he took of himself holding |
| switching equipment after a break-in at a CO. |
| _______________________________________________________________________________ |
|
|
| HEADLINE Amtrak Gets Aboard SDN |
| Byline: BETH SCHULTZ |
| DATE 10/25/90 |
| SOURCE COMMUNICATIONS WEEK |
| Issue: 267 |
| Section: PN |
| Page: 58 |
| (Copyright 1989 CMP Publications, Inc. All rights reserved.) |
|
|
| WASHINGTON - Amtrak, always looking for ways to reduce the amount of government |
| funding it takes to keep it on track, has switched its long distance traffic |
| onto a virtual private network-taking advantage of an AT&T promotion that saved |
| the railroad $250,000. Though Amtrak realized the cost-savings potential of |
| AT&T's Software Defined Network (SDN) as early as May 1987, it took until last |
| spring for the company to move full-speed ahead with implementation of that |
| virtual private network service. "We had led the horse to water, but we |
| couldn't make it drink," said Jim West, an AT&T national systems consultant. |
|
|
| But in April of this year, AT&T removed the last obstacle in the |
| railroad's way, said Amtrak's chief network engineer Matt Brunk. At that time, |
| AT&T began running a special promotion that waived the installation fee for |
| connecting sites to the SDN. Until then, Amtrak, based here, could only afford |
| adding locations piecemeal. |
|
|
| Plagued by network abuse, Amtrak began tracking the potential of SDN as a |
| means of solving that problem as soon as AT&T announced its SDN rates in |
| December 1986. Describing the severity of its toll-fraud problem, Brunk told |
| of a seven-day stint in 1985 during which hackers tallied $185,000 in |
| unauthorized charges. By the end of that year, toll fraud on Amtrak's network |
| reached in excess of $1 million. |
|
|
| Before the days of the virtual private network, the only way to clean up |
| this abuse was through a toll-free "800" service configuration and PBX remote |
| access, which Amtrak implemented at the end of 1985. "We changed the policy |
| and procedures for all users, limiting the capabilities of remotaccess," Brunk |
| said. |
|
|
| But Amtrak needed to further patrol its network, and after studying AT&T's |
| SDN, as well as competitive offerings, the railroad ordered in May 1987 the |
| first portion of what would this year become a 300-site SDN. The initial order |
| included AT&T Accunet T1.5 circuits for just two stations, one in Chicago and |
| one here. Used to replace the 800 service, these 1.544-megabit-per-second |
| direct connections were used to "provide secure remote access to on-net numbers |
| for numerous users," Brunk said. |
|
|
| Equally important, Amtrak also signed up for the Network Remote Access |
| Fraud Control feature, which gives it a single point of control over the |
| network. "What Amtrak ordered then was not really a network, because it was |
| feature-specific," said AT&T national account manager Sharon Juergens. |
|
|
| The company has not billed back or dropped any toll fraud since it began |
| using the SDN remote access feature, Brunk said. "Anyone with PBX |
| remote-access capability and :heavy! volume not using SDN as a vehicle is |
| doing their company a disservice." |
|
|
| Originally a beta-test site for the SDN's security-report feature, Amtrak |
| has since come to rely heavily on that option, too. With the exception of some |
| group codes, a warning is sent if spending on any user code exceeds $60 per |
| month. "We begin investigating immediately," Brunk said. "We are now |
| proactive, instead of reactive." |
|
|
| Today, 40 Amtrak locations have switched-access connections to the SDN; |
| 260 sites are linked through dedicated means, whether through voice-grade |
| analog circuits or high-speed T1s. "The users' traffic is discounted, on a |
| single billing statement, and in effect, :the SDN! links them to the company. |
| This is our corporate communications glue," Brunk said. "But this is only the |
| beginning. Not only have we provided a service, but also we have provided a |
| bright future. We have set ourselves up for competitive gain." Spending |
| Stabilized And the company has stabilized telecommunications expenditures. In |
| 1985, Amtrak spent $26 million on telecom equipment and services. Four years |
| later, Brunk estimated the railroad will spend just $1 million more. He said |
| contributing factors to this will be the SDN, upgrading from outdated analog |
| PBXs to digital PBXs and replacing some PBX installations with local |
| Bell-provided centrex service. Network savings resulting from reduced |
| call-setup time alone, Brunk added, will reach $74,000 this year. |
|
|
| "In a nutshell, we have improved transmission quality, network management |
| and maintenance, and reduced costs," Brunk said. "The users have gained a |
| single authorization code accessing multiple applications, improved quality and |
| support." |
|
|
| Cost savings aside, Amtrak also took into consideration applications |
| available off the SDN. "At the time, of what was available, we really liked |
| everything about SDN," Brunk said. |
|
|
| The Amtrak network is supported by the dedicated access trunk testing |
| system. This system lets Amtrak test access lines, thus aiding the company in |
| activating and deactivating authorization codes. And Amtrak is testing the |
| AT&T Alliance dedicated teleconferencing service. |
|
|
| With the teleconferencing service, Amtrak can reduce internal travel |
| expenditures: Users can access the system remotely via an 800 number, or on |
| demand. Amtrak operators can connect teleconferencing calls at any time. "The |
| quality is fantastic, but the cost is even better because it's all connected to |
| the SDN," said Brunk. |
|
|
| _______________________________________________________________________________ |
|
|