project string | commit_id string | target int64 | func string | cwe string | big_vul_idx string | idx int64 | hash string | size float64 | message string | dataset string |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Chrome | fb83de09f2c986ee91741f3a2776feea0e18e3f6 | 1 | void OverlayWindowViews::OnGestureEvent(ui::GestureEvent* event) {
if (event->type() != ui::ET_GESTURE_TAP)
return;
hide_controls_timer_.Reset();
if (!GetControlsScrimLayer()->visible()) {
UpdateControlsVisibility(true);
return;
}
if (GetCloseControlsBounds().Contains(event->location())) {
... | 186551 | 7,290 | 303506592678362065050884877503185093458 | null | null | null | |
Chrome | 610f904d8215075c4681be4eb413f4348860bf9f | 0 | CallbackList& callbacks() { return callbacks_; }
| 101065 | 90,816 | 6378649268612680894492270454042834907 | null | null | null | |
tensorflow | 92dba16749fae36c246bec3f9ba474d9ddeb7662 | 1 | bool DependencyOptimizer::SafeToRemoveIdentity(const NodeDef& node) const {
if (!IsIdentity(node) && !IsIdentityN(node)) {
return true;
}
if (nodes_to_preserve_.find(node.name()) != nodes_to_preserve_.end()) {
return false;
}
if (!fetch_nodes_known_) {
// The output values of this node may be nee... | null | null | 195,059 | 280470408197015060590448712190364740247 | 40 | Prevent a null-pointer dereference / `CHECK`-fail in grappler.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 409187354
Change-Id: I369c249cca32e6c56ec193f0ebbf2f2768fc7d43 | other |
tensorflow | 8a513cec4bec15961fbfdedcaa5376522980455c | 1 | StatusOr<FullTypeDef> SpecializeType(const AttrSlice& attrs,
const OpDef& op_def) {
FullTypeDef ft;
ft.set_type_id(TFT_PRODUCT);
for (int i = 0; i < op_def.output_arg_size(); i++) {
auto* t = ft.add_args();
*t = op_def.output_arg(i).experimental_full_type();
// ... | null | null | 195,067 | 127871006948263872569838116397374697164 | 48 | Prevent null dereference read in `SpecializeType()`
For some adversarial protos, the attribute for a key might not exist.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 408382090
Change-Id: Ie7eabe532c9ff280fce5dce1f6cdb93c76c2e040 | other |
gpac | a69b567b8c95c72f9560c873c5ab348be058f340 | 1 | GF_AV1Config *gf_odf_av1_cfg_read_bs_size(GF_BitStream *bs, u32 size)
{
#ifndef GPAC_DISABLE_AV_PARSERS
AV1State state;
u8 reserved;
GF_AV1Config *cfg;
if (!size) size = (u32) gf_bs_available(bs);
if (!size) return NULL;
cfg = gf_odf_av1_cfg_new();
gf_av1_init_state(&state);
state.config = cfg;
cfg->marker ... | null | null | 195,074 | 94331888032186617444846251549702110835 | 83 | fixed #1895 | other |
tensorflow | 5b491cd5e41ad63735161cec9c2a568172c8b6a3 | 1 | bool Tensor::FromProto(Allocator* a, const TensorProto& proto) {
CHECK_NOTNULL(a);
TensorBuffer* p = nullptr;
if (!TensorShape::IsValid(proto.tensor_shape())) return false;
if (proto.dtype() == DT_INVALID) return false;
TensorShape shape(proto.tensor_shape());
const int64_t N = shape.num_elements();
if (N... | null | null | 195,083 | 293865285807198215508518477303207322028 | 31 | Validate `proto.dtype()` before calling `set_dtype()`.
This prevents a `DCHECK`-fail when the proto contains an invalid dtype for a tensor shape with 0 elements or for an incomplete tensor shape.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 408369083
Change-Id: Ia21a3e3d62a90d642a4561f08f3b543e5ad00c46 | other |
ImageMagick | f221ea0fa3171f0f4fdf74ac9d81b203b9534c23 | 1 | static Image *ReadPCLImage(const ImageInfo *image_info,ExceptionInfo *exception)
{
#define CropBox "CropBox"
#define DeviceCMYK "DeviceCMYK"
#define MediaBox "MediaBox"
#define RenderPCLText " Rendering PCL... "
char
command[MagickPathExtent],
*density,
filename[MagickPathExtent],
geometry[Magi... | null | null | 195,237 | 64211844764718959430074467543645938607 | 257 | Fixes #4985: 4e+26 is outside the range of representable values of type 'unsigned long' at coders/pcl.c:299 (#4986)
* fix Division by zero in XMenuWidget() of MagickCore/widget.c
* Fix memory leak in AnimateImageCommand() of MagickWand/animate.c and DisplayImageCommand() of MagickWand/display.c
* fix Division by... | other |
tensorflow | 1b54cadd19391b60b6fcccd8d076426f7221d5e8 | 1 | void Compute(OpKernelContext *ctx) override {
const Tensor *indices_t, *values_t, *shape_t, *dense_t;
OP_REQUIRES_OK(ctx, ctx->input("sp_indices", &indices_t));
OP_REQUIRES_OK(ctx, ctx->input("sp_values", &values_t));
OP_REQUIRES_OK(ctx, ctx->input("sp_shape", &shape_t));
OP_REQUIRES_OK(ctx, ctx->... | null | null | 195,242 | 149037414387774871757110019685380440226 | 116 | Add missing validation to sparse dense cwise ops.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 415543133
Change-Id: I5baf3284e919338afb96178c468ad3d3cb0d956c | other |
radare2 | 37897226a1a31f982bfefdc4aeefc2e50355c73c | 1 | R_API bool r_io_bank_map_add_top(RIO *io, const ut32 bankid, const ut32 mapid) {
RIOBank *bank = r_io_bank_get (io, bankid);
RIOMap *map = r_io_map_get (io, mapid);
r_return_val_if_fail (io && bank && map, false);
RIOMapRef *mapref = _mapref_from_map (map);
if (!mapref) {
return false;
}
RIOSubMap *sm = r_io_s... | null | null | 195,302 | 166117759561842192488491492863600381325 | 89 | Fix use-after-free in iobank rbtree usage ##io
* See havoc4 bin for reproducer
* Reported via huntr.dev by 'Cen Zhang' | other |
flatpak | 65cbfac982cb1c83993a9e19aa424daee8e9f042 | 1 | flatpak_dir_ensure_bundle_remote (FlatpakDir *self,
GFile *file,
GBytes *extra_gpg_data,
FlatpakDecomposed **out_ref,
char **out_checksum,... | null | null | 195,385 | 228799429357940261115009589207592722070 | 89 | Ensure that bundles have metadata on install
If we have a bundle without metadata we wouldn't properly present
the permissions in the transaction. | other |
v4l2loopback | e4cd225557486c420f6a34411f98c575effd43dd | 1 | static int vidioc_querycap(struct file *file, void *priv,
struct v4l2_capability *cap)
{
struct v4l2_loopback_device *dev = v4l2loopback_getdevice(file);
int labellen = (sizeof(cap->card) < sizeof(dev->card_label)) ?
sizeof(cap->card) :
sizeof(dev->card_label);
int device_nr =
((struct v4l... | null | null | 195,398 | 315173664575668559594492834827107741837 | 49 | add explicit format specifier to printf() invocations
CWE-134 | other |
tensorflow | a1e1511dde36b3f8aa27a6ec630838e7ea40e091 | 1 | int TfLiteIntArrayGetSizeInBytes(int size) {
static TfLiteIntArray dummy;
int computed_size = sizeof(dummy) + sizeof(dummy.data[0]) * size;
#if defined(_MSC_VER)
// Context for why this is needed is in http://b/189926408#comment21
computed_size -= sizeof(dummy.data[0]);
#endif
return computed_size;
} | null | null | 195,402 | 57995846542337948463298638540979134332 | 10 | [lite] Update TfLiteIntArrayCreate to return size_t
PiperOrigin-RevId: 416439896
Change-Id: I847f69b68d1ddaff4b1e925a09b8b69c1756653b | other |
hhvm | dabd48caf74995e605f1700344f1ff4a5d83441d | 1 | bool JSON_parser(Variant &z, const char *p, int length, bool const assoc,
int depth, int64_t options) {
// No GC safepoints during JSON parsing, please. Code is not re-entrant.
NoHandleSurpriseScope no_surprise(SafepointFlags);
json_parser *json = s_json_parser.get(); /* the parser state */
//... | null | null | 195,549 | 230969768529717165037239975546250419627 | 499 | Fix a json_decode crash when depth==0
Summary:
Setting depth=0 is an error, and should result in NULL, but we weren't
checking for it, so in the case of a single, top-level string, we
would reading the -1th element of the stack.
Differential Revision: D19609959
fbshipit-source-id: 04ca1e0965e04b44df2d5c806a73c3da99f... | other |
hhvm | 1888810e77b446a79a7674784d5f139fcfa605e2 | 1 | bool WddxPacket::recursiveAddVar(const String& varName,
const Variant& varVariant,
bool hasVarTag) {
bool isArray = varVariant.isArray();
bool isObject = varVariant.isObject();
if (isArray || isObject) {
if (hasVarTag) {
m_packetString.... | null | null | 195,551 | 257002953542231292524849386209084454732 | 82 | Fix infinite recursion in wddx
Summary:
It wasn't checking for infinite recursion due to references or self-referential
objects. As it turns out closures always return themselves when converted to an
array. Raising a warning and returning is how PHP-src deals with this problem,
nothing special is done for closures.
R... | other |
pjproject | 856f87c2e97a27b256482dbe0d748b1194355a21 | 1 | static pj_xml_node *xml_parse_node( pj_pool_t *pool, pj_scanner *scanner)
{
pj_xml_node *node;
pj_str_t end_name;
PJ_CHECK_STACK();
if (*scanner->curptr != '<')
on_syntax_error(scanner);
/* Handle Processing Instructino (PI) construct (i.e. "<?") */
if (*scanner->curptr == '<' && *(scanner->... | null | null | 195,670 | 137312951595763938703339557990324963725 | 121 | Merge pull request from GHSA-5x45-qp78-g4p4
* Prevent infinite loop in scanning xml content
* Simplify scanning method
* Optimization | other |
glibc | 23e0e8f5f1fb5ed150253d986ecccdc90c2dcd5e | 1 | __getcwd_generic (char *buf, size_t size)
{
/* Lengths of big file name components and entire file names, and a
deep level of file name nesting. These numbers are not upper
bounds; they are merely large values suitable for initial
allocations, designed to be large enough for most real-world
uses.... | null | null | 195,716 | 204737856749159993041789176797064964819 | 333 | getcwd: Set errno to ERANGE for size == 1 (CVE-2021-3999)
No valid path returned by getcwd would fit into 1 byte, so reject the
size early and return NULL with errno set to ERANGE. This change is
prompted by CVE-2021-3999, which describes a single byte buffer
underflow and overflow when all of the following condition... | other |
mvfst | a67083ff4b8dcbb7ee2839da6338032030d712b0 | 1 | void updateHandshakeState(QuicServerConnectionState& conn) {
// Zero RTT read cipher is available after chlo is processed with the
// condition that early data attempt is accepted.
auto handshakeLayer = conn.serverHandshakeLayer;
auto zeroRttReadCipher = handshakeLayer->getZeroRttReadCipher();
auto zeroRttHea... | null | null | 195,720 | 181509801354210897629105034468408496700 | 80 | Close connection if we derive an extra 1-rtt write cipher
Summary: Fixes CVE-2021-24029
Reviewed By: mjoras, lnicco
Differential Revision: D26613890
fbshipit-source-id: 19bb2be2c731808144e1a074ece313fba11f1945 | other |
tensorflow | 02cc160e29d20631de3859c6653184e3f876b9d7 | 1 | void MakeDataset(OpKernelContext* ctx, DatasetBase** output) override {
// Create a new SparseTensorSliceDatasetOp::Dataset, insert it in
// the step container, and return it as the output.
const Tensor* indices;
OP_REQUIRES_OK(ctx, ctx->input("indices", &indices));
const Tensor* values;
OP_RE... | null | null | 195,752 | 171363723210961322415209119251133937799 | 47 | Prevent nullptr deref in SparseTensorSliceDataset
The arguments must determine a valid sparse tensor. This means that when indices are empty then the values must be empty too (and the reverse).
Also added test, by modifying existing test with empty sparse tensor to now run with an invalid sparse tensor input.
PiperO... | other |
php-src | 0c8a2a2cd1056b7dc403eacb5d2c0eec6ce47c6f | 1 | */
static void php_wddx_pop_element(void *user_data, const XML_Char *name)
{
st_entry *ent1, *ent2;
wddx_stack *stack = (wddx_stack *)user_data;
HashTable *target_hash;
zend_class_entry *pce;
zval obj;
/* OBJECTS_FIXME */
if (stack->top == 0) {
return;
}
if (!strcmp((char *)name, EL_STRING) ||... | null | null | 195,801 | 281179289723329197214540489283702639538 | 125 | Fix for bug #72790 and bug #72799
(cherry picked from commit a14fdb9746262549bbbb96abb87338bacd147e1b)
Conflicts:
ext/wddx/wddx.c | other |
mongo | 6518b22420c5bbd92c42caf907671c3a2b140bb6 | 1 | DocumentSource::GetNextResult DocumentSourceUnionWith::doGetNext() {
if (!_pipeline) {
// We must have already been disposed, so we're finished.
return GetNextResult::makeEOF();
}
if (_executionState == ExecutionProgress::kIteratingSource) {
auto nextInput = pSource->getNext();
... | null | null | 195,804 | 77189124809087292115725641020447994671 | 60 | SERVER-58203 factor out logging statements into helper functions | other |
lsquic | a74702c630e108125e71898398737baec8f02238 | 1 | lsquic_qeh_settings (struct qpack_enc_hdl *qeh, unsigned max_table_size,
unsigned dyn_table_size, unsigned max_risked_streams, int server)
{
enum lsqpack_enc_opts enc_opts;
assert(qeh->qeh_flags & QEH_INITIALIZED);
if (qeh->qeh_flags & QEH_HAVE_SETTINGS)
{
LSQ_WARN("settings alrea... | null | null | 196,276 | 288925027585735265622903529553530375426 | 33 | Release 3.1.0 | other |
minetest | da71e86633d0b27cd02d7aac9fdac625d141ca13 | 1 | static inline int checkSettingSecurity(lua_State* L, const std::string &name)
{
if (ScriptApiSecurity::isSecure(L) && name.compare(0, 7, "secure.") == 0)
throw LuaError("Attempt to set secure setting.");
bool is_mainmenu = false;
#ifndef SERVER
is_mainmenu = ModApiBase::getGuiEngine(L) != nullptr;
#endif
if (!is... | null | null | 196,670 | 14542184638408056621499358845757545617 | 18 | Protect a few more settings from being set from mods
Of those settings main_menu_script has concrete security impact, the rest are added out of abundance of caution. | other |
njs | 81af26364c21c196dd21fb5e14c7fa9ce7debd17 | 1 | njs_array_convert_to_slow_array(njs_vm_t *vm, njs_array_t *array)
{
uint32_t i, length;
njs_value_t index, value;
njs_object_prop_t *prop;
njs_set_array(&value, array);
array->object.fast_array = 0;
length = array->length;
for (i = 0; i < length; i++) {
if (njs_i... | null | null | 196,817 | 15778839275107817850632511934182345441 | 30 | Fixed Object.defineProperty() when a recursive descriptor is provided.
This closes #481 issue on Github. | other |
furnace | 0eb02422d5161767e9983bdaa5c429762d3477ce | 1 | inline void FurnaceGUI::patternRow(int i, bool isPlaying, float lineHeight, int chans, int ord, const DivPattern** patCache) {
static char id[32];
bool selectedRow=(i>=sel1.y && i<=sel2.y);
ImGui::TableNextRow(0,lineHeight);
ImGui::TableNextColumn();
float cursorPosY=ImGui::GetCursorPos().y-ImGui::GetScrollY(... | null | null | 196,841 | 136686899264564982027774933242322169613 | 275 | fix possible pattern crash
issue #325 | other |
libjxl | 7dfa400ded53919d986c5d3d23446a09e0cf481b | 1 | Status DecodeImageAPNG(Span<const uint8_t> bytes, ThreadPool* pool,
CodecInOut* io) {
Reader r;
unsigned int id, i, j, w, h, w0, h0, x0, y0;
unsigned int delay_num, delay_den, dop, bop, rowbytes, imagesize;
unsigned char sig[8];
png_structp png_ptr;
png_infop info_ptr;
CHUNK chunk;
... | null | null | 196,993 | 123816616739143632951179511270786230002 | 212 | Fix handling of APNG with 0 delay_den (#313) | other |
drogon | 3c785326c63a34aa1799a639ae185bc9453cb447 | 1 | int HttpFileImpl::save(const std::string &path) const
{
assert(!path.empty());
if (fileName_.empty())
return -1;
filesystem::path fsPath(utils::toNativePath(path));
if (!fsPath.is_absolute() &&
(!fsPath.has_parent_path() ||
(fsPath.begin()->string() != "." && fsPath.begin()->str... | null | null | 197,057 | 300389952786254526295960796960160809202 | 28 | Prevent malformed upload path causing arbitrary write (#1174) | other |
tensorflow | bc9c546ce7015c57c2f15c168b3d9201de679a1d | 1 | void Compute(OpKernelContext* c) override {
core::RefCountPtr<Var> v;
OP_REQUIRES_OK(c, LookupResource(c, HandleFromInput(c, 0), &v));
OP_REQUIRES_OK(c, EnsureSparseVariableAccess<Device, T>(c, v.get()));
// NOTE: We hold the lock for the whole gather operation instead
// of increasing the referen... | null | null | 197,110 | 294361236653337986849576392701719119932 | 86 | Prevent heap oob access in `resource_variable_ops.cc`
PiperOrigin-RevId: 387936433
Change-Id: I9e71ddaa8dbd51ec6afbf163a6b3b591f193b4f6 | other |
tinyexr | a685e3332f61cd4e59324bf3f669d36973d64270 | 1 | static int DecodeChunk(EXRImage *exr_image, const EXRHeader *exr_header,
const std::vector<tinyexr::tinyexr_uint64> &offsets,
const unsigned char *head, const size_t size,
std::string *err) {
int num_channels = exr_header->num_channels;
int num_s... | null | null | 197,111 | 270881477601119047421793150845336761803 | 277 | Make line_no with too large value(2**20) invalid. Fixes #124 | other |
mongo | 07b8851825836911265e909d6842d4586832f9bb | 1 | DocumentSource::GetNextResult DocumentSourceGroup::initialize() {
const size_t numAccumulators = _accumulatedFields.size();
// Barring any pausing, this loop exhausts 'pSource' and populates '_groups'.
GetNextResult input = pSource->getNext();
for (; input.isAdvanced(); input = pSource->getNext()) {
... | null | null | 197,179 | 299639630867010953869050856327872645652 | 110 | SERVER-60218-44: SERVER-60218 add initialize helper function for document_source_group (cherry picked from commit 867f52afbb79bc00e35c70f8e0681b7d602f97b2) | other |
gpac | dc7de8d3d604426c7a6e628d90cb9fb88e7b4c2c | 1 | GF_Err BD_DecMFFieldVec(GF_BifsDecoder * codec, GF_BitStream *bs, GF_Node *node, GF_FieldInfo *field, Bool is_mem_com)
{
GF_Err e;
u32 NbBits, nbFields;
u32 i;
GF_ChildNodeItem *last;
u8 qp_local, qp_on, initial_qp;
GF_FieldInfo sffield;
memset(&sffield, 0, sizeof(GF_FieldInfo));
sffield.fieldIndex = field->fi... | null | null | 197,499 | 299257728605197431750731122978204720459 | 96 | fixed #2212 | other |
radare2 | fc285cecb8469f0262db0170bf6dd7c01d9b8ed5 | 1 | static RList *oneshotall_buffer(RBin *bin, RBuffer *b) {
RList *list = r_list_newf (free);
RBinXtrData *meta = get_the_meta (bin, b);
r_list_append (list, meta);
return list;
} | null | null | 197,579 | 140388220319988183510409398909926632593 | 6 | Fix #20354 | other |
tensorflow | be7a4de6adfbd303ce08be4332554dff70362612 | 1 | void Compute(OpKernelContext* context) override {
// Read ragged_splits inputs.
OpInputList ragged_nested_splits_in;
OP_REQUIRES_OK(context, context->input_list("rt_nested_splits",
&ragged_nested_splits_in));
const int ragged_nested_splits_len = ragged_n... | null | null | 197,719 | 209500931068648342443345704454092620756 | 45 | Ensure non-empty rt_nested_splits in tf.raw_ops.RaggedTensorToVariant
PiperOrigin-RevId: 387664237
Change-Id: Ia1700c34b5610873d63561abc86e23b46ead93b3 | other |
tensorflow | c79ba87153ee343401dbe9d1954d7f79e521eb14 | 1 | Status TransposeShapeFn(InferenceContext* c) {
ShapeHandle input = c->input(0);
ShapeHandle perm_shape = c->input(1);
const Tensor* perm = c->input_tensor(1);
DimensionHandle perm_elems = c->NumElements(perm_shape);
// If we don't have rank information on the input or value information on
// perm we can't r... | null | null | 197,748 | 34055993943311259251029225987542874775 | 65 | Make Transpose's shape inference function validate that negative `perm` values are within the tensor's rank.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 403252853
Change-Id: Ia6b31b45b237312668bb31c2c3b3c7bbce2d2610 | other |
tensorflow | bb6a0383ed553c286f87ca88c207f6774d5c4a8f | 1 | TfLiteStatus EvalGatherNd(TfLiteContext* context, const TfLiteTensor* params,
const TfLiteTensor* indices, TfLiteTensor* output) {
switch (params->type) {
case kTfLiteFloat32:
return GatherNd<float, IndicesT>(params, indices, output);
case kTfLiteUInt8:
return GatherNd<ui... | null | null | 197,760 | 79501722422646953902317860019376579160 | 24 | Prevent heap OOB read in TFLite's `gather_nd.cc`.
Passing negative indices is illegal but there was a missing check so that resulted in OOB accesses.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 387208551
Change-Id: I6b7a8a62d3e7c13a16d81619e5bc23ae2cdbc7fd | other |
curl | 8dfc93e573ca740544a2d79ebb0ed786592c65c3 | 1 | Curl_cookie_add(struct Curl_easy *data,
/*
* The 'data' pointer here may be NULL at times, and thus
* must only be used very carefully for things that can deal
* with data being NULL. Such as infof() and similar
*/
struc... | null | null | 197,805 | 340011739869148140831706810976304098697 | 717 | cookie: reject cookies with "control bytes"
Rejects 0x01 - 0x1f (except 0x09) plus 0x7f
Reported-by: Axel Chong
Bug: https://curl.se/docs/CVE-2022-35252.html
CVE-2022-35252
Closes #9381 | other |
jerryscript | f3a420b672927037beb4508d7bdd68fb25d2caf6 | 1 | lexer_expect_object_literal_id (parser_context_t *context_p, /**< context */
uint32_t ident_opts) /**< lexer_obj_ident_opts_t option bits */
{
lexer_skip_spaces (context_p);
if (context_p->source_p >= context_p->source_end_p)
{
parser_raise_error (context_p, PARSER_ERR_PROPERT... | null | null | 197,825 | 18090551596235490242321914030640150439 | 221 | Fix class static block opening brace parsing (#4942)
The next character should not be consumed after finding the static block opening brace.
This patch fixes #4916.
JerryScript-DCO-1.0-Signed-off-by: Martin Negyokru negyokru@inf.u-szeged.hu | other |
tensorflow | 7731e8dfbe4a56773be5dc94d631611211156659 | 1 | bool IsConstantFoldable(
const Node* n,
const std::unordered_map<string, std::vector<PartialTensorShape>>*
shape_map,
const std::function<bool(const Node*)>& consider,
int64_t max_constant_size_in_bytes,
std::unordered_map<const Node*, std::vector<Tensor>>*
shape_replacement_map) {
... | null | null | 197,826 | 172373573712419656450812250984956481158 | 70 | Don't constant-fold DT_RESOURCE constants.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 391803952
Change-Id: I0ea3ec31d3e7dfda0f03b4027a237f08d00a3091 | other |
samba | d92dfb0dabf9cfccb86f2b1146d6c353af2e1435 | 1 | static NTSTATUS ldapsrv_SearchRequest(struct ldapsrv_call *call)
{
struct ldap_SearchRequest *req = &call->request->r.SearchRequest;
struct ldap_Result *done;
struct ldapsrv_reply *done_r;
TALLOC_CTX *local_ctx;
struct ldapsrv_context *callback_ctx = NULL;
struct ldb_context *samdb = talloc_get_type(call->conn->l... | null | null | 197,830 | 314918662591421001470003516678988238334 | 238 | CVE-2021-3670 ldap_server: Remove duplicate print of LDAP search details
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=14694
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Douglas Bagnall <douglas.bagnall@catalyst.net.nz>
(cherry picked from commit 2b3af3b560c9617a233c131376c870fce146c002) | other |
openscad | b81369dffc3f385257a9b1f5c271118a88671d6d | 1 | static std::string getComment(const std::string &fulltext, int line)
{
if (line < 1) return "";
// Locate line
unsigned int start = 0;
for (; start<fulltext.length() ; ++start) {
if (line <= 1) break;
if (fulltext[start] == '\n') line--;
}
int end = start + 1;
while (fulltext[end] != '\n') end++;
std::st... | null | null | 197,891 | 313568077470000783177680974177297728787 | 38 | Add file bounds check to comment parser | other |
crun | 1aeeed2e4fdeffb4875c0d0b439915894594c8c6 | 1 | crun_command_exec (struct crun_global_arguments *global_args, int argc, char **argv, libcrun_error_t *err)
{
int first_arg = 0, ret = 0;
libcrun_context_t crun_context = {
0,
};
cleanup_process_schema runtime_spec_schema_config_schema_process *process = NULL;
struct libcrun_container_exec_options_s exec_o... | null | null | 197,973 | 67555112620788823184421673030526843273 | 93 | exec: --cap do not set inheritable capabilities
Closes: CVE-2022-27650
Signed-off-by: Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@redhat.com> | other |
jerryscript | 3ad76f932c8d2e3b9ba2d95e64848698ec7d7290 | 1 | vm_loop (vm_frame_ctx_t *frame_ctx_p) /**< frame context */
{
const ecma_compiled_code_t *bytecode_header_p = frame_ctx_p->shared_p->bytecode_header_p;
const uint8_t *byte_code_p = frame_ctx_p->byte_code_p;
ecma_value_t *literal_start_p = frame_ctx_p->literal_start_p;
ecma_value_t *stack_top_p;
uint16_t enco... | null | null | 197,989 | 117248586394637887953246786581777711038 | 3,977 | Fix for-in collection cleanup on abrupt 'has' result (#4807)
This patch fixes #4747
JerryScript-DCO-1.0-Signed-off-by: Robert Fancsik robert.fancsik@h-lab.eu | other |
tensorflow | e86605c0a336c088b638da02135ea6f9f6753618 | 1 | void Compute(OpKernelContext* ctx) override {
auto x = ctx->input(0);
auto i = ctx->input(1);
auto v = ctx->input(2);
OP_REQUIRES(ctx, TensorShapeUtils::IsVector(i.shape()),
errors::InvalidArgument("i must be a vector. ",
i.shape().DebugString()... | null | null | 198,003 | 93663684494140260682969182544172664356 | 31 | Fix FPE in inpace update ops.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 388303197
Change-Id: Ib48309b6213ffe53eba81004b00e889d653e4b83 | other |
gpac | d7daa8aeb6df4b6c3ec102622e1599279310a19e | 1 | GF_Err gf_isom_get_sample_for_movie_time(GF_ISOFile *the_file, u32 trackNumber, u64 movieTime, u32 *StreamDescriptionIndex, GF_ISOSearchMode SearchMode, GF_ISOSample **sample, u32 *sampleNumber, u64 *data_offset)
{
Double tsscale;
GF_Err e;
GF_TrackBox *trak;
u64 mediaTime, nextMediaTime;
s64 segStartTime, mediaOf... | null | null | 198,178 | 148501486251921845480245286379253106973 | 108 | fixed #2108 | other |
mruby | 00acae117da1b45b318dc36531a7b0021b8097ae | 1 | mrb_vm_exec(mrb_state *mrb, const struct RProc *proc, const mrb_code *pc)
{
/* mrb_assert(MRB_PROC_CFUNC_P(proc)) */
const mrb_irep *irep = proc->body.irep;
const mrb_pool_value *pool = irep->pool;
const mrb_sym *syms = irep->syms;
mrb_code insn;
int ai = mrb_gc_arena_save(mrb);
struct mrb_jmpbuf *prev_jm... | null | null | 198,512 | 251133800800873458523255728173671147403 | 1,828 | vm.c: target class may be NULL. | other |
tensorflow | 5ecec9c6fbdbc6be03295685190a45e7eee726ab | 1 | void Compute(OpKernelContext* context) override {
// Get the stamp token.
const Tensor* stamp_token_t;
OP_REQUIRES_OK(context, context->input("stamp_token", &stamp_token_t));
int64_t stamp_token = stamp_token_t->scalar<int64>()();
// Get the tree ensemble proto.
const Tensor* tree_ensemble_se... | null | null | 198,523 | 201044185104134614142321846533666874996 | 28 | Prevent use after free.
A very old version of the code used `result` as a simple pointer to a resource. Two years later, the pointer got changed to a `unique_ptr` but author forgot to remove the call to `Unref`. Three years after that, we finally uncover the UAF.
PiperOrigin-RevId: 387924872
Change-Id: I70fb6f199164d... | other |
engine | 7df766124f87768b43b9e8947c5a01e17545772c | 1 | static int pkey_GOST_ECcp_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx, unsigned char *out,
size_t *out_len, const unsigned char *key,
size_t key_len)
{
GOST_KEY_TRANSPORT *gkt = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *pubk = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pctx);
struct gost_pmeth_data *data = EVP_PKEY_... | null | null | 198,552 | 119311370633297214893271826756266062107 | 111 | Fix buffer overrun in creating key transport blob according to RFC 9189, 4.2.4.2
Resolves: CVE-2022-29242 | other |
Bento4 | 33331ce2d35d45d855af7441db6116b4a9e2b70f | 1 | main(int argc, char** argv)
{
if (argc < 2) {
PrintUsageAndExit();
}
// default options
Options.input = NULL;
Options.verbose = false;
Options.hls_version = 0;
Options.pmt_pid = 0x100;
... | null | null | 198,555 | 309905552433608479525781569947809221165 | 725 | fix #691 | other |
libmobi | eafc415bc6067e72577f70d6dd5acbf057ce6e6f | 1 | MOBI_RET mobi_decode_infl(unsigned char *decoded, int *decoded_size, const unsigned char *rule) {
int pos = *decoded_size;
char mod = 'i';
char dir = '<';
char olddir;
unsigned char c;
while ((c = *rule++)) {
if (c <= 4) {
mod = (c <= 2) ? 'i' : 'd'; /* insert, delete */
... | null | null | 198,566 | 211795113703656920067010021209431193626 | 59 | Fix wrong boundary checks in inflections parser resulting in stack buffer over-read with corrupt input | other |
MilkyTracker | fd607a3439fcdd0992e5efded3c16fc79c804e34 | 1 | mp_sint32 LoaderS3M::load(XMFileBase& f, XModule* module)
{
module->cleanUp();
// this will make code much easier to read
TXMHeader* header = &module->header;
TXMInstrument* instr = module->instr;
TXMSample* smp = module->smp;
TXMPattern* phead = module->phead;
// we're already out of memory here
if... | null | null | 198,695 | 232151339946137971220513489493449251730 | 415 | Fix #184: Heap overflow in S3M loader | other |
LuaJIT | 53f82e6e2e858a0a62fd1a2ff47e9866693382e6 | 1 | static ptrdiff_t finderrfunc(lua_State *L)
{
cTValue *frame = L->base-1, *bot = tvref(L->stack);
void *cf = L->cframe;
while (frame > bot && cf) {
while (cframe_nres(cframe_raw(cf)) < 0) { /* cframe without frame? */
if (frame >= restorestack(L, -cframe_nres(cf)))
break;
if (cframe_errfunc(cf) >... | null | null | 198,743 | 103249297125021918182204154082572508861 | 50 | Fix frame traversal for __gc handler frames.
Reported by Changochen. | other |
pjproject | 077b465c33f0aec05a49cd2ca456f9a1b112e896 | 1 | PJ_DEF(int) pj_scan_get_char( pj_scanner *scanner )
{
int chr = *scanner->curptr;
if (!chr) {
pj_scan_syntax_err(scanner);
return 0;
}
++scanner->curptr;
if (PJ_SCAN_IS_PROBABLY_SPACE(*scanner->curptr) && scanner->skip_ws) {
pj_scan_skip_whitespace(scanner);
}
return chr;
} | null | null | 199,836 | 250257059547301458667731790844822819454 | 16 | Merge pull request from GHSA-7fw8-54cv-r7pm | other |
vim | 2813f38e021c6e6581c0c88fcf107e41788bc835 | 1 | spell_move_to(
win_T *wp,
int dir, // FORWARD or BACKWARD
int allwords, // TRUE for "[s"/"]s", FALSE for "[S"/"]S"
int curline,
hlf_T *attrp) // return: attributes of bad word or NULL
// (only when "dir" is FORWARD)
{
linenr_T lnum;
pos_T found_pos;
int found_len = 0;
char_... | null | null | 199,918 | 24431311156552293265437974373971430432 | 236 | patch 8.2.5072: using uninitialized value and freed memory in spell command
Problem: Using uninitialized value and freed memory in spell command.
Solution: Initialize "attr". Check for empty line early. | other |
samba | eb50fb8f3bf670bd7d1cf8fd4368ef4a73083696 | 1 | static NTSTATUS vfswrap_fsctl(struct vfs_handle_struct *handle,
struct files_struct *fsp,
TALLOC_CTX *ctx,
uint32_t function,
uint16_t req_flags, /* Needed for UNICODE ... */
const uint8_t *_in_data,
uint32_t in_len,
uint8_t **_out_data,
uint32_t m... | null | null | 200,320 | 36864430679636639714404842179779335208 | 330 | FSCTL_GET_SHADOW_COPY_DATA: Don't return 4 extra bytes at end
labels_data_count already accounts for the unicode null character at the
end of the array. There is no need in adding space for it again.
Signed-off-by: Christof Schmitt <christof.schmitt@us.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Reviewed-by:... | other |
pjproject | 560a1346f87aabe126509bb24930106dea292b00 | 1 | static int print_media_desc(const pjmedia_sdp_media *m, char *buf, pj_size_t len)
{
char *p = buf;
char *end = buf+len;
unsigned i;
int printed;
/* check length for the "m=" line. */
if (len < (pj_size_t)m->desc.media.slen+m->desc.transport.slen+12+24) {
return -1;
}
*p++ = 'm'; /*... | null | null | 201,007 | 133454390800145611389529375903489549180 | 63 | Merge pull request from GHSA-f5qg-pqcg-765m | other |
linux | a3727a8bac0a9e77c70820655fd8715523ba3db7 | 1 | static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
{
return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
task_sid_subj(parent), task_sid_obj(current),
SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
} | null | null | 201,343 | 63175626254905822917570001000286668928 | 6 | selinux,smack: fix subjective/objective credential use mixups
Jann Horn reported a problem with commit eb1231f73c4d ("selinux:
clarify task subjective and objective credentials") where some LSM
hooks were attempting to access the subjective credentials of a task
other than the current task. Generally speaking, it is ... | other |
linux | e6a21a14106d9718aa4f8e115b1e474888eeba44 | 1 | *vidtv_s302m_encoder_init(struct vidtv_s302m_encoder_init_args args)
{
u32 priv_sz = sizeof(struct vidtv_s302m_ctx);
struct vidtv_s302m_ctx *ctx;
struct vidtv_encoder *e;
e = kzalloc(sizeof(*e), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!e)
return NULL;
e->id = S302M;
if (args.name)
e->name = kstrdup(args.name, GFP_KERNEL);
e->... | null | null | 201,925 | 220376165242545767374971532665904547126 | 60 | media: vidtv: Check for null return of vzalloc
As the possible failure of the vzalloc(), e->encoder_buf might be NULL.
Therefore, it should be better to check it in order
to guarantee the success of the initialization.
If fails, we need to free not only 'e' but also 'e->name'.
Also, if the allocation for ctx fails, we... | other |
spice | ca5bbc5692e052159bce1a75f55dc60b36078749 | 1 | static int reds_init_ssl(RedsState *reds)
{
const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method;
int return_code;
/* Limit connection to TLSv1.1 or newer.
* When some other SSL/TLS version becomes obsolete, add it to this
* variable. */
long ssl_options = SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 | SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 | SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION | S... | null | null | 202,678 | 122101275279986190714681083473068742276 | 74 | With OpenSSL 1.1: Disable client-initiated renegotiation.
Fixes issue #49
Fixes BZ#1904459
Signed-off-by: Julien Ropé <jrope@redhat.com>
Reported-by: BlackKD
Acked-by: Frediano Ziglio <fziglio@redhat.com> | other |
binaryen | 6f599272c66f65472f5e4c8d759d5bca77e47da6 | 1 | void WasmBinaryBuilder::visitRethrow(Rethrow* curr) {
BYN_TRACE("zz node: Rethrow\n");
curr->target = getExceptionTargetName(getU32LEB());
// This special target is valid only for delegates
assert(curr->target != DELEGATE_CALLER_TARGET);
curr->finalize();
} | null | null | 202,734 | 209177550826884079893421252076067255380 | 7 | Turn an assertion on not colliding with an internal name into an error (#4422)
Without this, the result in a build without assertions might be quite
confusing. See #4410
Also make the internal names more obviously internal names. | other |
ghostpdl | 5d499272b95a6b890a1397e11d20937de000d31b | 1 | search_impl(i_ctx_t *i_ctx_p, bool forward)
{
os_ptr op = osp;
os_ptr op1 = op - 1;
uint size = r_size(op);
uint count;
byte *pat;
byte *ptr;
byte ch;
int incr = forward ? 1 : -1;
check_read_type(*op1, t_string);
check_read_type(*op, t_string);
if (size > r_size(op1)) { /* c... | null | null | 202,822 | 249132726675055919779887509398809507782 | 46 | Bug 702582, CVE 2020-15900 Memory Corruption in Ghostscript 9.52
Fix the 'rsearch' calculation for the 'post' size to give the correct
size. Previous calculation would result in a size that was too large,
and could underflow to max uint32_t. Also fix 'rsearch' to return the
correct 'pre' string with empty string matc... | other |
tty | 15b3cd8ef46ad1b100e0d3c7e38774f330726820 | 1 | con_insert_unipair(struct uni_pagedir *p, u_short unicode, u_short fontpos)
{
int i, n;
u16 **p1, *p2;
p1 = p->uni_pgdir[n = unicode >> 11];
if (!p1) {
p1 = p->uni_pgdir[n] = kmalloc_array(32, sizeof(u16 *),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!p1) return -ENOMEM;
for (i = 0; i < 32; i++)
p1[i] = NULL;
}
p2 = ... | null | null | 203,622 | 61670946817080732094550256808909248342 | 31 | Revert "consolemap: Fix a memory leaking bug in drivers/tty/vt/consolemap.c"
This reverts commit 84ecc2f6eb1cb12e6d44818f94fa49b50f06e6ac.
con_insert_unipair() is working with a sparse 3-dimensional array:
- p->uni_pgdir[] is the top layer
- p1 points to a middle layer
- p2 points to a bottom layer
If it needs to a... | other |
squashfs-tools | e0485802ec72996c20026da320650d8362f555bd | 1 | static struct dir *squashfs_opendir(unsigned int block_start, unsigned int offset,
struct inode **i)
{
squashfs_dir_header_3 dirh;
char buffer[sizeof(squashfs_dir_entry_3) + SQUASHFS_NAME_LEN + 1]
__attribute__((aligned));
squashfs_dir_entry_3 *dire = (squashfs_dir_entry_3 *) buffer;
long long start;
int bytes ... | null | null | 204,017 | 65180591611652100911872766047415284947 | 132 | Unsquashfs: additional write outside destination directory exploit fix
An issue on github (https://github.com/plougher/squashfs-tools/issues/72)
showed how some specially crafted Squashfs filesystems containing
invalid file names (with '/' and '..') can cause Unsquashfs to write
files outside of the destination direct... | other |
vim | 28d032cc688ccfda18c5bbcab8b50aba6e18cde5 | 1 | do_window(
int nchar,
long Prenum,
int xchar) // extra char from ":wincmd gx" or NUL
{
long Prenum1;
win_T *wp;
#if defined(FEAT_SEARCHPATH) || defined(FEAT_FIND_ID)
char_u *ptr;
linenr_T lnum = -1;
#endif
#ifdef FEAT_FIND_ID
int type = FIND_DEFINE;
int len;
#endif
cha... | null | null | 204,069 | 40601062791344847116382130508151483298 | 537 | patch 8.2.4979: accessing freed memory when line is flushed
Problem: Accessing freed memory when line is flushed.
Solution: Make a copy of the pattern to search for. | other |
openldap | 3539fc33212b528c56b716584f2c2994af7c30b0 | 1 | issuerAndThisUpdateCheck(
struct berval *in,
struct berval *is,
struct berval *tu,
void *ctx )
{
int numdquotes = 0;
struct berval x = *in;
struct berval ni = BER_BVNULL;
/* Parse GSER format */
enum {
HAVE_NONE = 0x0,
HAVE_ISSUER = 0x1,
HAVE_THISUPDATE = 0x2,
HAVE_ALL = ( HAVE_ISSUER | HAVE_THISUPDAT... | null | null | 204,115 | 296580747977289517542159030414767300564 | 161 | ITS#9454 fix issuerAndThisUpdateCheck | other |
pjproject | 8b621f192cae14456ee0b0ade52ce6c6f258af1e | 1 | static void parse_rtcp_bye(pjmedia_rtcp_session *sess,
const void *pkt,
pj_size_t size)
{
pj_str_t reason = {"-", 1};
/* Check and get BYE reason */
if (size > 8) {
reason.slen = PJ_MIN(sizeof(sess->stat.peer_sdes_buf_),
*((pj_uint8_t*)pkt+8));
pj_memcpy(sess->sta... | null | null | 204,195 | 116381620827139969116334270652816885980 | 19 | Merge pull request from GHSA-3qx3-cg72-wrh9 | other |
lldpd | 73d42680fce8598324364dbb31b9bc3b8320adf7 | 1 | sonmp_decode(struct lldpd *cfg, char *frame, int s,
struct lldpd_hardware *hardware,
struct lldpd_chassis **newchassis, struct lldpd_port **newport)
{
const u_int8_t mcastaddr[] = SONMP_MULTICAST_ADDR;
struct lldpd_chassis *chassis;
struct lldpd_port *port;
struct lldpd_mgmt *mgmt;
int length, i;
u_int8_t... | null | null | 204,378 | 433540116442967903483329906084914417 | 132 | sonmp: fix heap overflow when reading SONMP packets
By sending short SONMP packets, an attacker can make the decoder crash
by reading too much data on the heap. SONMP packets are fixed in size,
just ensure we get the enough bytes to contain a SONMP packet.
CVE-2021-43612 | other |
php-src | 259057b2a484747a6c73ce54c4fa0f5acbd56179 | 1 | SPL_METHOD(SplDoublyLinkedList, unserialize)
{
spl_dllist_object *intern = (spl_dllist_object*)zend_object_store_get_object(getThis() TSRMLS_CC);
zval *flags, *elem;
char *buf;
int buf_len;
const unsigned char *p, *s;
php_unserialize_data_t var_hash;
if (zend_parse_parameters(ZEND_NUM_ARG... | null | null | 204,545 | 175570379904229409444093217226892836618 | 56 | Fix bug #70366 - use-after-free vulnerability in unserialize() with SplDoublyLinkedList | other |
samba | 34383981a0c40860f71a4451ff8fd752e1b67666 | 1 | static int ldb_wildcard_compare(struct ldb_context *ldb,
const struct ldb_parse_tree *tree,
const struct ldb_val value, bool *matched)
{
const struct ldb_schema_attribute *a;
struct ldb_val val;
struct ldb_val cnk;
struct ldb_val *chunk;
uint8_t *save_p = NULL;
unsigned int c = 0;
a = ldb_schema_attribu... | null | null | 204,711 | 264293216438188529998910258908439139604 | 126 | CVE-2019-3824 ldb: wildcard_match check tree operation
Check the operation type of the passed parse tree, and return
LDB_INAPPROPRIATE_MATCH if the operation is not LDB_OP_SUBSTRING.
A query of "attribute=*" gets parsed as LDB_OP_PRESENT, checking the
operation and failing ldb_wildcard_match should help prevent confu... | other |
vim | adce965162dd89bf29ee0e5baf53652e7515762c | 1 | do_tag(
char_u *tag, // tag (pattern) to jump to
int type,
int count,
int forceit, // :ta with !
int verbose) // print "tag not found" message
{
taggy_T *tagstack = curwin->w_tagstack;
int tagstackidx = curwin->w_tagstackidx;
int tagstacklen = curwin->w_tagstacklen;
int cur_m... | null | null | 204,751 | 126478621754533124439278167196869287849 | 679 | patch 9.0.0246: using freed memory when 'tagfunc' deletes the buffer
Problem: Using freed memory when 'tagfunc' deletes the buffer.
Solution: Make a copy of the tag name. | other |
evolution-data-server | 5d8b92c622f6927b253762ff9310479dd3ac627d | 1 | gpg_ctx_add_recipient (struct _GpgCtx *gpg,
const gchar *keyid)
{
if (gpg->mode != GPG_CTX_MODE_ENCRYPT && gpg->mode != GPG_CTX_MODE_EXPORT)
return;
if (!gpg->recipients)
gpg->recipients = g_ptr_array_new ();
g_ptr_array_add (gpg->recipients, g_strdup (keyid));
} | null | null | 206,025 | 141933283002790613862782726205564754266 | 11 | CamelGpgContext: Enclose email addresses in brackets.
The recipient list for encrypting can be specified by either key ID or
email address. Enclose email addresses in brackets to ensure an exact
match, as per the gpg man page:
HOW TO SPECIFY A USER ID
...
By exact match on an email address.
... | other |
vim | c6fdb15d423df22e1776844811d082322475e48a | 1 | parse_command_modifiers(
exarg_T *eap,
char **errormsg,
cmdmod_T *cmod,
int skip_only)
{
char_u *orig_cmd = eap->cmd;
char_u *cmd_start = NULL;
int use_plus_cmd = FALSE;
int starts_with_colon = FALSE;
int vim9script = in_vim9script();
int has_visual_range = F... | null | null | 206,262 | 23783941848142444822455321328938674747 | 362 | patch 9.0.0025: accessing beyond allocated memory with the cmdline window
Problem: Accessing beyond allocated memory when using the cmdline window in
Ex mode.
Solution: Use "*" instead of "'<,'>" for Visual mode. | other |
vim | 6456fae9ba8e72c74b2c0c499eaf09974604ff30 | 1 | regmatch(
char_u *scan, // Current node.
proftime_T *tm UNUSED, // timeout limit or NULL
int *timed_out UNUSED) // flag set on timeout or NULL
{
char_u *next; // Next node.
int op;
int c;
regitem_T *rp;
int no;
int status; // one of the RA_ values:
#ifdef FEAT_RELTIME
int tm_... | null | null | 206,921 | 14507096832468276355973161027739212088 | 1,481 | patch 8.2.4440: crash with specific regexp pattern and string
Problem: Crash with specific regexp pattern and string.
Solution: Stop at the start of the string. | other |
flatpak | fb473cad801c6b61706353256cab32330557374a | 1 | apply_extra_data (FlatpakDir *self,
GFile *checkoutdir,
GCancellable *cancellable,
GError **error)
{
g_autoptr(GFile) metadata = NULL;
g_autofree char *metadata_contents = NULL;
gsize metadata_size;
g_autoptr(GKeyFile) metakey = NULL;
g_autof... | null | null | 206,989 | 62902606532827421827792118702945647615 | 172 | dir: Pass environment via bwrap --setenv when running apply_extra
This means we can systematically pass the environment variables
through bwrap(1), even if it is setuid and thus is filtering out
security-sensitive environment variables. bwrap ends up being
run with an empty environment instead.
As with the previous c... | other |
linux | 054aa8d439b9185d4f5eb9a90282d1ce74772969 | 1 | static struct file *__fget_files(struct files_struct *files, unsigned int fd,
fmode_t mask, unsigned int refs)
{
struct file *file;
rcu_read_lock();
loop:
file = files_lookup_fd_rcu(files, fd);
if (file) {
/* File object ref couldn't be taken.
* dup2() atomicity guarantee is the reason
* we loop to ca... | null | null | 208,085 | 236448832030969755251234701523533614254 | 22 | fget: check that the fd still exists after getting a ref to it
Jann Horn points out that there is another possible race wrt Unix domain
socket garbage collection, somewhat reminiscent of the one fixed in
commit cbcf01128d0a ("af_unix: fix garbage collect vs MSG_PEEK").
See the extended comment about the garbage colle... | other |
vim | 27efc62f5d86afcb2ecb7565587fe8dea4b036fe | 1 | check_termcode(
int max_offset,
char_u *buf,
int bufsize,
int *buflen)
{
char_u *tp;
char_u *p;
int slen = 0; // init for GCC
int modslen;
int len;
int retval = 0;
int offset;
char_u key_name[2];
int modifiers;
char_u *modifiers_start = NULL;
int key... | null | null | 208,411 | 141177609605865586721920240131748064761 | 604 | patch 9.0.0018: going over the end of the typahead
Problem: Going over the end of the typahead.
Solution: Put a NUL after the typeahead. | other |
linux | 717adfdaf14704fd3ec7fa2c04520c0723247eac | 1 | static ssize_t hid_debug_events_read(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct hid_debug_list *list = file->private_data;
int ret = 0, len;
DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current);
mutex_lock(&list->read_mutex);
while (ret == 0) {
if (list->head == list->tail) {
add_wait_queue(&... | null | null | 208,430 | 155206844330449950846334904452225854896 | 73 | HID: debug: check length before copy_to_user()
If our length is greater than the size of the buffer, we
overflow the buffer
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Daniel Rosenberg <drosen@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz> | other |
tor | 57e35ad3d91724882c345ac709666a551a977f0f | 1 | networkstatus_parse_vote_from_string(const char *s, const char **eos_out,
networkstatus_type_t ns_type)
{
smartlist_t *tokens = smartlist_create();
smartlist_t *rs_tokens = NULL, *footer_tokens = NULL;
networkstatus_voter_info_t *voter = NULL;
networkstatus_t *ns = NULL;
d... | null | null | 208,505 | 320303562647980943317783282141447596021 | 536 | Avoid possible segfault when handling networkstatus vote with bad flavor
Fix for 6530; fix on 0.2.2.6-alpha. | other |
heimdal | 04171147948d0a3636bc6374181926f0fb2ec83a | 1 | tgs_build_reply(astgs_request_t priv,
hdb_entry_ex *krbtgt,
krb5_enctype krbtgt_etype,
const krb5_keyblock *replykey,
int rk_is_subkey,
krb5_ticket *ticket,
const char **e_text,
AuthorizationData **auth_data,
const struct sockaddr *from_addr)
{
krb5_context context = priv->context;
krb5_kdc_conf... | null | null | 208,506 | 172674879650950329667725116403393224452 | 1,038 | kdc: validate sname in TGS-REQ
In tgs_build_reply(), validate the server name in the TGS-REQ is present before
dereferencing. | other |
libxml2 | b1d34de46a11323fccffa9fadeb33be670d602f5 | 1 | xmlStringLenDecodeEntities(xmlParserCtxtPtr ctxt, const xmlChar *str, int len,
int what, xmlChar end, xmlChar end2, xmlChar end3) {
xmlChar *buffer = NULL;
size_t buffer_size = 0;
size_t nbchars = 0;
xmlChar *current = NULL;
xmlChar *rep = NULL;
const xmlChar *last;
xmlEntityPtr en... | null | null | 208,533 | 301710766906450297101615067146831788109 | 164 | Fix inappropriate fetch of entities content
For https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=761430
libfuzzer regression testing exposed another case where the parser would
fetch content of an external entity while not in validating mode.
Plug that hole | other |
dpdk | af74f7db384ed149fe42b21dbd7975f8a54ef227 | 1 | vhost_user_get_inflight_fd(struct virtio_net **pdev,
struct vhu_msg_context *ctx,
int main_fd __rte_unused)
{
struct rte_vhost_inflight_info_packed *inflight_packed;
uint64_t pervq_inflight_size, mmap_size;
uint16_t num_queues, queue_size;
struct virtio_net *dev = *pdev;
int fd, i, j;
int numa_node = ... | null | null | 210,284 | 33623247974536318315256615866397928606 | 94 | vhost: fix FD leak with inflight messages
Even if unlikely, a buggy vhost-user master might attach fds to inflight
messages. Add checks like for other types of vhost-user messages.
Fixes: d87f1a1cb7b6 ("vhost: support inflight info sharing")
Cc: stable@dpdk.org
Signed-off-by: David Marchand <david.marchand@redhat.co... | other |
linux | 89c2b3b74918200e46699338d7bcc19b1ea12110 | 1 | static int io_read(struct io_kiocb *req, unsigned int issue_flags)
{
struct iovec inline_vecs[UIO_FASTIOV], *iovec = inline_vecs;
struct kiocb *kiocb = &req->rw.kiocb;
struct iov_iter __iter, *iter = &__iter;
struct io_async_rw *rw = req->async_data;
ssize_t io_size, ret, ret2;
bool force_nonblock = issue_flags &... | null | null | 210,484 | 9767670992332379490534176378394297980 | 97 | io_uring: reexpand under-reexpanded iters
[ 74.211232] BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in iov_iter_revert+0x809/0x900
[ 74.212778] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888025dc78b8 by task
syz-executor.0/828
[ 74.214756] CPU: 0 PID: 828 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted
5.14.0-rc3-next-20210730 #1
[ 74.216525] Hardware n... | other |
squashfs-tools | 79b5a555058eef4e1e7ff220c344d39f8cd09646 | 1 | static struct dir *squashfs_opendir(unsigned int block_start, unsigned int offset,
struct inode **i)
{
squashfs_dir_header_3 dirh;
char buffer[sizeof(squashfs_dir_entry_3) + SQUASHFS_NAME_LEN + 1]
__attribute__((aligned));
squashfs_dir_entry_3 *dire = (squashfs_dir_entry_3 *) buffer;
long long start;
int bytes;... | null | null | 210,701 | 84788405315542553885310338439631637350 | 117 | Unsquashfs: fix write outside destination directory exploit
An issue on Github (https://github.com/plougher/squashfs-tools/issues/72)
shows how some specially crafted Squashfs filesystems containing
invalid file names (with '/' and ..) can cause Unsquashfs to write
files outside of the destination directory.
This com... | other |
file-roller | b147281293a8307808475e102a14857055f81631 | 1 | extract_archive_thread (GSimpleAsyncResult *result,
GObject *object,
GCancellable *cancellable)
{
ExtractData *extract_data;
LoadData *load_data;
GHashTable *checked_folders;
struct archive *a;
struct archive_entry *entry;
int r;
extr... | null | null | 211,102 | 146521485464683242231569868140802651647 | 242 | libarchive: sanitize filenames before extracting | other |
linux | 7fd25e6fc035f4b04b75bca6d7e8daa069603a76 | 1 | static void atusb_disconnect(struct usb_interface *interface)
{
struct atusb *atusb = usb_get_intfdata(interface);
dev_dbg(&atusb->usb_dev->dev, "%s\n", __func__);
atusb->shutdown = 1;
cancel_delayed_work_sync(&atusb->work);
usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&atusb->rx_urbs);
atusb_free_urbs(atusb);
usb_kill_urb(atusb->... | null | null | 211,113 | 267064650077885177982562711259078440803 | 23 | ieee802154: atusb: fix use-after-free at disconnect
The disconnect callback was accessing the hardware-descriptor private
data after having having freed it.
Fixes: 7490b008d123 ("ieee802154: add support for atusb transceiver")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.2
Cc: Alexander Aring <alex.aring@gmail.com>
Re... | other |
gdk-pixbuf | 4f0f465f991cd454d03189497f923eb40c170c22 | 1 | read_bitmap_file_data (FILE *fstream,
guint *width,
guint *height,
guchar **data,
int *x_hot,
int *y_hot)
{
guchar *bits = NULL; /* working variable */
char line[MAX_SIZE]; /* input line from file */
int size; /* number of bytes of data */
char name_... | null | null | 211,473 | 70165411011067571586761169769193194588 | 126 | Avoid an integer overflow in the xbm loader
At the same time, reject some silly input, such as negative
width or height.
https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=672811 | other |
linux | 89f3594d0de58e8a57d92d497dea9fee3d4b9cda | 1 | dev_config (struct file *fd, const char __user *buf, size_t len, loff_t *ptr)
{
struct dev_data *dev = fd->private_data;
ssize_t value, length = len;
unsigned total;
u32 tag;
char *kbuf;
spin_lock_irq(&dev->lock);
if (dev->state > STATE_DEV_OPENED) {
value = ep0_write(fd, buf, len, ptr);
spin_unlock... | null | null | 211,650 | 182318114915089365572042937695601411290 | 107 | usb: gadget: don't release an existing dev->buf
dev->buf does not need to be released if it already exists before
executing dev_config.
Acked-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Signed-off-by: Hangyu Hua <hbh25y@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20211231172138.7993-2-hbh25y@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Gr... | other |
jasper | 4cd52b5daac62b00a0a328451544807ddecf775f | 1 | static jpc_enc_cp_t *cp_create(const char *optstr, jas_image_t *image)
{
jpc_enc_cp_t *cp;
jas_tvparser_t *tvp;
int ret;
int numilyrrates;
double *ilyrrates;
int i;
int tagid;
jpc_enc_tcp_t *tcp;
jpc_enc_tccp_t *tccp;
jpc_enc_ccp_t *ccp;
uint_fast16_t rlvlno;
uint_fast16_t prcwidthexpn;
uint_fast16_t prche... | null | null | 211,785 | 181232699919937488567474720086554483482 | 431 | Avoid maxrlvls more than upper bound to cause heap-buffer-overflow | other |
vim | e3537aec2f8d6470010547af28dcbd83d41461b8 | 1 | do_buffer_ext(
int action,
int start,
int dir, // FORWARD or BACKWARD
int count, // buffer number or number of buffers
int flags) // DOBUF_FORCEIT etc.
{
buf_T *buf;
buf_T *bp;
int unload = (action == DOBUF_UNLOAD || action == DOBUF_DEL
|| action == DOBUF_WIPE || action == DO... | null | null | 211,839 | 216423663569045638499778463707888891660 | 337 | patch 8.2.4327: may end up with no current buffer
Problem: May end up with no current buffer.
Solution: When deleting the current buffer to not pick a quickfix buffer as
the new current buffer. | other |
linux | 690b2549b19563ec5ad53e5c82f6a944d910086e | 1 | static int ismt_access(struct i2c_adapter *adap, u16 addr,
unsigned short flags, char read_write, u8 command,
int size, union i2c_smbus_data *data)
{
int ret;
unsigned long time_left;
dma_addr_t dma_addr = 0; /* address of the data buffer */
u8 dma_size = 0;
enum dma_data_direction dma_direction ... | null | null | 212,083 | 218082028726825778448502302966621907044 | 241 | i2c: ismt: prevent memory corruption in ismt_access()
The "data->block[0]" variable comes from the user and is a number
between 0-255. It needs to be capped to prevent writing beyond the end
of dma_buffer[].
Fixes: 5e9a97b1f449 ("i2c: ismt: Adding support for I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_PROC_CALL")
Reported-and-tested-by: Zheyu... | other |
varnish-cache | c5fd097e5cce8b461c6443af02b3448baef2491d | 1 | http_isfiltered(const struct http *fm, unsigned u, unsigned how)
{
const char *e;
const struct http_hdrflg *f;
if (fm->hdf[u] & HDF_FILTER)
return (1);
e = strchr(fm->hd[u].b, ':');
if (e == NULL)
return (0);
f = http_hdr_flags(fm->hd[u].b, e);
return (f != NULL && f->flag & how);
} | null | null | 212,407 | 122529399994073188542433561825721278627 | 13 | Do not call http_hdr_flags() on pseudo-headers
In http_EstimateWS(), all headers are passed to the http_isfiltered()
function to calculate how many bytes is needed to serialize the entire
struct http. http_isfiltered() will check the headers for whether they are
going to be filtered out later and if so skip them.
How... | other |
atril | f4291fd62f7dfe6460d2406a979ccfac0c68dd59 | 1 | extract_argv (EvDocument *document, gint page)
{
ComicsDocument *comics_document = COMICS_DOCUMENT (document);
char **argv;
char *command_line, *quoted_archive, *quoted_filename;
GError *err = NULL;
if (page >= comics_document->page_names->len)
return NULL;
if (comics_document->regex_arg)... | null | null | 212,917 | 5221502165965543150113388489824773188 | 37 | comics: make the files containing "--checkpoint-action=" unsupported
Fixes #257 | other |
qemu | 8c92060d3c0248bd4d515719a35922cd2391b9b4 | 1 | static void sungem_send_packet(SunGEMState *s, const uint8_t *buf,
int size)
{
NetClientState *nc = qemu_get_queue(s->nic);
if (s->macregs[MAC_XIFCFG >> 2] & MAC_XIFCFG_LBCK) {
nc->info->receive(nc, buf, size);
} else {
qemu_send_packet(nc, buf, size);
}
} | null | null | 212,927 | 22164789416916763534513212272225664326 | 11 | sungem: switch to use qemu_receive_packet() for loopback
This patch switches to use qemu_receive_packet() which can detect
reentrancy and return early.
This is intended to address CVE-2021-3416.
Cc: Prasad J Pandit <ppandit@redhat.com>
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
Reviewed-by: Mark Cave-Ayland <mark.cave-ayland@ilande... | other |
w3m | 67be73b03a5ad581e331ec97cb275cd8a52719ed | 1 | process_button(struct parsed_tag *tag)
{
Str tmp = NULL;
char *p, *q, *r, *qq = "";
int qlen, v;
if (cur_form_id < 0) {
char *s = "<form_int method=internal action=none>";
tmp = process_form(parse_tag(&s, TRUE));
}
if (tmp == NULL)
tmp = Strnew();
p = "submit";
par... | null | null | 213,589 | 325224422713155790624329814808410593768 | 47 | Prevent segfault with incorrect button type
Bug-Debian: https://github.com/tats/w3m/issues/17 | other |
libtpms | ea62fd9679f8c6fc5e79471b33cfbd8227bfed72 | 1 | FindEmptyObjectSlot(
TPMI_DH_OBJECT *handle // OUT: (optional)
)
{
UINT32 i;
OBJECT *object;
for(i = 0; i < MAX_LOADED_OBJECTS; i++)
{
object = &s_objects[i];
if(object->attributes.occupied == CLEAR)
{
if(handle)
*handle = i + TRANSIENT_F... | null | null | 213,998 | 277852716912471259753395033097358636489 | 20 | tpm2: Initialize a whole OBJECT before using it
Initialize a whole OBJECT before using it. This is necessary since
an OBJECT may also be used as a HASH_OBJECT via the ANY_OBJECT
union and that HASH_OBJECT can leave bad size inidicators in TPM2B
buffer in the OBJECT. To get rid of this problem we reset the whole
OBJECT... | other |
liblouis | 2e4772befb2b1c37cb4b9d6572945115ee28630a | 1 | compileRule(FileInfo *file, TranslationTableHeader **table,
DisplayTableHeader **displayTable, const MacroList **inScopeMacros) {
CharsString token;
TranslationTableOpcode opcode;
CharsString ruleChars;
CharsString ruleDots;
CharsString cells;
CharsString scratchPad;
CharsString emphClass;
TranslationTableCha... | null | null | 214,997 | 50388777807644470054179765540034197016 | 1,462 | Prevent an invalid memory writes in compileRule
Thanks to Han Zheng for reporting it
Fixes #1214 | other |
linux-2.6 | efc7ffcb4237f8cb9938909041c4ed38f6e1bf40 | 1 | int hfsplus_find_cat(struct super_block *sb, u32 cnid,
struct hfs_find_data *fd)
{
hfsplus_cat_entry tmp;
int err;
u16 type;
hfsplus_cat_build_key(sb, fd->search_key, cnid, NULL);
err = hfs_brec_read(fd, &tmp, sizeof(hfsplus_cat_entry));
if (err)
return err;
type = be16_to_cpu(tmp.type);
if (type != ... | CWE-119 | null | 215,399 | 256655408888579656518249099852758355696 | 22 | hfsplus: fix Buffer overflow with a corrupted image
When an hfsplus image gets corrupted it might happen that the catalog
namelength field gets b0rked. If we mount such an image the memcpy() in
hfsplus_cat_build_key_uni() writes more than the 255 that fit in the name
field. Depending on the size of the overwritten d... | other |
linux-2.6 | 649f1ee6c705aab644035a7998d7b574193a598a | 1 | int hfsplus_block_allocate(struct super_block *sb, u32 size, u32 offset, u32 *max)
{
struct page *page;
struct address_space *mapping;
__be32 *pptr, *curr, *end;
u32 mask, start, len, n;
__be32 val;
int i;
len = *max;
if (!len)
return size;
dprint(DBG_BITMAP, "block_allocate: %u,%u,%u\n", size, offset, len... | CWE-20 | null | 215,400 | 162883961593441362505774058247214968119 | 130 | hfsplus: check read_mapping_page() return value
While testing more corrupted images with hfsplus, i came across
one which triggered the following bug:
[15840.675016] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at fffffffb
[15840.675016] IP: [<c0116a4f>] kmap+0x15/0x56
[15840.675016] *pde = 00008067 *pte = 00000000
[1... | other |
nettle | c71d2c9d20eeebb985e3872e4550137209e3ce4d | 1 | ecc_256_modp (const struct ecc_modulo *p, mp_limb_t *rp)
{
mp_limb_t u1, u0;
mp_size_t n;
n = 2*p->size;
u1 = rp[--n];
u0 = rp[n-1];
/* This is not particularly fast, but should work well with assembly implementation. */
for (; n >= p->size; n--)
{
mp_limb_t q2, q1, q0, t, cy;
/* <q2, q... | CWE-310 | null | 215,948 | 177459790284134415640388177650830838743 | 60 | Fixed miscomputation bugs in secp-256r1 modulo functions. | other |
openssl | cca1cd9a3447dd067503e4a85ebd1679ee78a48e | 1 | kssl_keytab_is_available(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx)
{
krb5_context krb5context = NULL;
krb5_keytab krb5keytab = NULL;
krb5_keytab_entry entry;
krb5_principal princ = NULL;
krb5_error_code krb5rc = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
int rc = 0;
if ((krb5rc = krb5_init_context(&kr... | CWE-20 | null | 216,126 | 270879083228272962991952045442860437006 | 53 | Submitted by: Tomas Hoger <thoger@redhat.com>
Fix for CVE-2010-0433 where some kerberos enabled versions of OpenSSL
could be crashed if the relevant tables were not present (e.g. chrooted). | other |
libssh | 4d8420f3282ed07fc99fc5e930c17df27ef1e9b2 | 1 | int sftp_mkdir(sftp_session sftp, const char *directory, mode_t mode) {
sftp_status_message status = NULL;
sftp_message msg = NULL;
sftp_attributes errno_attr = NULL;
struct sftp_attributes_struct attr;
ssh_buffer buffer;
ssh_string path;
uint32_t id;
buffer = ssh_buffer_new();
if (buffer == NULL) {
... | null | 216,202 | 59555850448704507002572255109645975811 | 89 | sftp: Fix bug in sftp_mkdir not returning on error.
resolves: #84
(cherry picked from commit a92c97b2e17715c1b3cdd693d14af6c3311d8e44) | other | |
server | 9e2c26b0f6d91b3b6b0deaf9bc82f6e6ebf9a90b | 1 | int maria_create(const char *name, enum data_file_type datafile_type,
uint keys,MARIA_KEYDEF *keydefs,
uint columns, MARIA_COLUMNDEF *columndef,
uint uniques, MARIA_UNIQUEDEF *uniquedefs,
MARIA_CREATE_INFO *ci,uint flags)
{
register uint i,j;
File ... | null | 216,901 | 108363512210404851146521651556770149401 | 1,212 | MDEV-26351 segfault - (MARIA_HA *) 0x0 in ha_maria::extra
don't let Aria create a table that it cannot open | other |
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