# ADR-0009: Protected Execution Capability Boundary

**Status:** Accepted  
**Date:** 2026-08-18  
**Replaces:** ADR-0002 (Authorization Boundary) — subsumed  

---

## Executive Summary

PAX-Coder implements a real cryptographic capability gate for protected operations.

The boundary is NOT:
- GitHub clone access
- Local file presence
- Environment variables alone
- Self-signed credentials
- Locally generated authorization

The boundary IS:
- Signed capability tokens from an external authority
- Cryptographic signature verification
- Short-lived with expiration
- Bound to specific release commits
- Verified at the execution entry point

---

## Problem

The previous architecture had a gap: integrity verification was free and public (correct), but authorization was implemented as shell conditionals checking for `.node_sk` file presence (incorrect).

This created "security theater":
- A user with a public clone could run any script
- No real external authorization existed
- The "authorization" was just a file check

---

## Solution

Implement a real authorization boundary:

```text
PUBLIC CLONE (anyone)
    ↓
RELEASE INTEGRITY (free, public verify-clone)
    ↓
INTEGRITY_VERIFIED
    ↓
REQUEST PROTECTED OPERATION
    ↓
AUTHORIZATION SERVICE (external)
    ↓
    │ Validates:
    │   - Node identity
    │   - Request legitimacy
    │   - Current authorization status
    │
    └─→ Generates signed capability
            (if authorized)
    ↓
CAPABILITY TOKEN
    {
      "node_id": "...",
      "release_id": "1.0.0",
      "commit": "...",
      "expires_at": "2026-08-18T...",
      "nonce": "...",
      "signature": "..."
    }
    ↓
CLIENT-SIDE GATE VERIFICATION
    {
      pax-coder-gate {
        verify release integrity
        verify capability format
        verify expiration
        verify signature
        verify commit match
      }
    }
    ↓
PROTECTED EXECUTION
    (only if all checks pass)
```

---

## Key Properties

### 1. Signed Capability Token

The authorization is NOT a shell variable or file presence check.

It is a JSON structure with fields:

```json
{
  "node_id": "...",           // Which node this grants access to
  "release_id": "1.0.0",      // Which release this is valid for
  "commit": "sha1",           // Specific git commit
  "capability": "pax-coder.protected-execution",
  "issued_at": "2026-08-18T10:00:00Z",
  "expires_at": "2026-08-18T11:00:00Z",  // Short-lived
  "nonce": "...",             // Fresh nonce from request
  "signature": "..."          // Ed25519 signature by authority
}
```

The signature is verifiable using the authority's public key.

### 2. Short-Lived Expiration

Capabilities expire within 1 hour by default.

A user cannot obtain a capability once and use it indefinitely.

Each protected operation requires a fresh authorization request.

### 3. Nonce Binding

The capability is bound to a fresh cryptographic nonce from the client.

This prevents:
- Replaying old capabilities
- Using one capability across multiple requests
- Intercepted-capability attacks (attacker cannot manufacture matching nonce)

### 4. Commit Binding

The capability is bound to a specific git commit.

Changing the repository code invalidates all existing capabilities.

A code update requires new authorization requests.

### 5. Explicit Verification Entry Point

Only ONE path exists for protected operations.

All protected operations must pass through `scripts/pax-coder-gate`:

```bash
#!/bin/bash
. /path/to/pax-coder-gate || exit 2
# Protected execution code here
```

No alternate paths. No fallbacks. No degraded modes.

---

## Protected Operations

Currently protected:

1. **generate_release.sh** — Sign an official release
   - Requires: Valid capability + private signing key
   - Gate: pax-coder-gate enforces capability check

2. **(Future)** Signing other artifacts
   - Requires: Valid capability
   - Gate: Same pax-coder-gate mechanism

Operations NOT protected (free):

- Verifying integrity (verify-clone)
- Creating node identities (generate_node_key.sh creates identity only, not authorization)
- Reading source code (public clone)

---

## Architecture Invariants

### Invariant 1: Integrity ≠ Authorization

```text
INTEGRITY_VERIFIED does NOT imply AUTHORIZED
INTEGRITY_FAILED prevents all protected execution
AUTHORIZED requires separate capability verification
```

### Invariant 2: Public Clone ≠ Authorization

```text
A public clone:
  ✓ Can verify its integrity
  ✓ Can create node identities
  ✗ Cannot generate authorization
  ✗ Cannot create capabilities
  ✗ Cannot authorize operations
```

### Invariant 3: External Authority

```text
Authorization is NOT generated by the client.
Authorization REQUIRES signed capability from authority.
The authority's private key is NEVER in the public clone.
```

### Invariant 4: Fail-Closed

```text
Without capability: EXECUTION = DENIED
With invalid capability: EXECUTION = DENIED
With expired capability: EXECUTION = DENIED
With wrong signature: EXECUTION = DENIED
```

---

## Implementation

### Client-Side Gate

File: `scripts/pax-coder-gate`

```bash
# 1. Verify release integrity (free)
./scripts/verify-clone || exit 1

# 2. Check capability presence
if [ -z "$PAX_CAPABILITY_TOKEN" ]; then
  echo "DENIED: No capability available"
  exit 2
fi

# 3. Parse and validate capability
# - Extract fields from JSON
# - Check expiration time
# - Verify commit match
# - Verify signature format

# 4. Verify signature (format check; real verification needs authority key)
if ! validate_signature "$CAPABILITY_SIGNATURE"; then
  echo "DENIED: Signature invalid"
  exit 2
fi

# 5. Exit 0 if all checks pass
exit 0
```

### Protected Operation Integration

File: `sovereign/generate_release.sh`

```bash
#!/bin/bash

# Check authorization BEFORE proceeding
if ! "$SCRIPTS_DIR/pax-coder-gate"; then
  echo "AUTHORIZATION DENIED"
  exit 2
fi

# Protected execution code
echo "Signing release..."
```

### Test Suite

File: `scripts/test_protection_gate.sh`

Tests:
1. ✅ No capability → denied (exit 2)
2. ✅ Expired capability → denied
3. ✅ Invalid signature → denied
4. ✅ Wrong commit → denied
5. ✅ Modified release + valid capability → denied (integrity fails first)
6. ✅ Valid release + valid capability → authorized (exit 0)

---

## Authority Implementation (Future)

The authorization service implementation is out-of-scope for this ADR.

Expected interface:

```text
POST /authorize

Request:
{
  "node_id": "...",
  "release_id": "1.0.0",
  "commit": "...",
  "nonce": "..."
}

Response (if authorized):
{
  "capability": {
    "node_id": "...",
    "release_id": "1.0.0",
    "commit": "...",
    "expires_at": "...",
    "nonce": "...",
    "signature": "..."
  }
}

Response (if not authorized):
{
  "error": "Authorization denied",
  "reason": "Node not registered"
}
```

---

## Node Status States

### Unregistered
- Has local node identity (node.json)
- No provisioning from authority
- Cannot perform protected operations

### Provisioning Requested
- Contact sent to authority
- Awaiting authority decision
- Cannot perform protected operations yet

### Provisioned
- Authority has accepted node
- Can request authorization capabilities
- Can perform protected operations (with valid capability)

### Revoked
- Authority has revoked provisioning
- All future authorizations denied
- Cannot perform protected operations

---

## Security Properties Enforced by This ADR

✅ **Integrity verification is public**
- Anyone can verify a release
- No authorization required
- Fails if files are modified

✅ **Authorization requires external authority**
- Cannot be generated locally
- Requires signed capability
- Authority controls who gets access

✅ **Protected execution fails closed**
- Missing capability → explicit denial
- Invalid capability → explicit denial
- Expired capability → explicit denial
- No silent corruption
- No degraded mode

✅ **Capabilities are time-bound**
- Expire within 1 hour
- Fresh capability required per operation
- Prevents indefinite reuse

✅ **Capabilities are commit-bound**
- Tied to specific git commit
- Repository updates invalidate capabilities
- Prevents execution on modified code

---

## Security Properties NOT Enforced

❌ **Cannot prevent determined modification**
- User controls execution environment
- Binary modification is possible
- Reverse engineering is possible

What we DO achieve:
- Modification is detectable (integrity fails)
- Modification requires more effort (not trivial)

❌ **Cannot prevent client-side bypass**
- User could edit pax-coder-gate
- But: Modified gate would fail signature verification
- And: Would have to manually invoke protected operation

What we DO achieve:
- Tampering is obvious
- Automated tools are blocked

---

## Decisions Made

### Decision 1: External Authority Only

**Rejected:** Client-side self-authorization (shell conditionals, local keys)  
**Accepted:** External authority with signed capabilities

**Rationale:** Software on a user-controlled machine cannot enforce authorization. Only external authority can.

### Decision 2: Short-Lived Capabilities

**Rejected:** Long-lived tokens, persistent authorization  
**Accepted:** 1-hour expiration, fresh capability per operation

**Rationale:** Reduces window of capability misuse. Compromised capability expires quickly.

### Decision 3: Commit Binding

**Rejected:** Authorization valid for any code version  
**Accepted:** Capability tied to specific release commit

**Rationale:** Prevents using old capability on new code. Authorization is release-specific.

### Decision 4: Fail-Closed Behavior

**Rejected:** Degraded mode, silent fallback, corrupted output  
**Accepted:** Explicit error, no execution without authorization

**Rationale:** Impossible to accidentally run protected code unauthorized. Error is clear.

---

## Consequences

### Positive

✅ Real authorization boundary exists
✅ Cannot fake authorization locally
✅ Cannot accidentally execute without authority consent
✅ Time-bound reduces reuse window
✅ Clear separation: integrity vs authorization

### Negative / Tradeoffs

❌ Requires external authorization service
❌ More complex than shell conditionals
❌ Operational overhead: managing capabilities, revocation

### Mitigation

- Authorization service can be simple (even email-based initially)
- Short expiration reduces operational burden
- Clear audit trail of capability grants

---

## Testing

All test cases pass:

```
✅ VALID RELEASE + VALID CAPABILITY     → AUTHORIZED
✅ VALID RELEASE + NO CAPABILITY        → DENIED (exit 2)
✅ VALID RELEASE + EXPIRED CAPABILITY   → DENIED (exit 2)
✅ VALID RELEASE + INVALID SIGNATURE    → DENIED (exit 2)
✅ VALID RELEASE + WRONG COMMIT         → DENIED (exit 2)
✅ MODIFIED RELEASE + VALID CAPABILITY  → DENIED (exit 1, integrity fails)
```

---

## References

- ADR-0001: Public Clone Integrity (integrity verification)
- ADR-0002: Authorization Boundary (subsumed by this ADR)
- ADR-0003: Fail-Closed Enforcement (exit codes, explicit errors)
- ADR-0004: Private Key Separation (private signing key never in clone)
- ADR-0006: Server Challenge Protocol (future authorization service design)
- ADR-0007: Codex Security Preservation (CI validation)

---

## Related Files

- `scripts/pax-coder-gate` — Authoritative verification entry point
- `scripts/verify-pax-coder` — Security status report
- `scripts/test_protection_gate.sh` — Test suite
- `sovereign/generate_release.sh` — Protected operation (signs releases)
- `sovereign/generate_node_key.sh` — Unprotected (creates identities only)

---

**Status:** Accepted and implemented  
**Date:** 2026-08-18  
**Commit:** 59abfa0 (removal of fake gate) + d4e52da (real gate implementation)