Clean up nested duplicate: v2/v2/tools/guard.py

v2/v2/tools/guard.py

@@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
-"""SecurityMonitor for the tool harness (Kintsugi §5c).
-
-Every subprocess the tool layer spawns goes through run_checked().
-The check is code, not model judgment — it cannot be reasoned away.
-Commands are argv lists (never shell=True), checked against blocked
-patterns, allowlisted binaries, and a path jail before execution.
-"""
-
-import re
-import subprocess
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from pathlib import Path
-
-# Kintsugi SecurityMonitor patterns + Rivet additions.
-SUSPICIOUS_PATTERNS = [
-    r"base64\s+--decode",
-    r"curl.*\|.*sh",
-    r"\benv\b", r"\bprintenv\b",
-    r">\s*/dev/tcp",
-    r"nc\s+-e",
-    r"chmod\s+777",
-    r"\.ssh/authorized_keys",
-    r"rm\s+-rf\s+/",
-    r"\bsudo\b",
-    r"DROP\s+DATABASE",
-]
-
-# Binaries the tool harness is allowed to spawn. Nothing else runs.
-ALLOWED_BINARIES = {
-    "git", "npm", "npx", "tsc", "node", "pg_dump", "psql",
-}
-
-
-class ToolSecurityError(Exception):
-    pass
-
-
-@dataclass
-class ToolResult:
-    ok: bool
-    stdout: str = ""
-    stderr: str = ""
-    returncode: int = -1
-    blocked_reason: str = ""
-
-
-def check_command(argv: list) -> str:
-    """Return a block reason, or '' if the command is clean."""
-    if not argv:
-        return "empty command"
-    binary = Path(argv[0]).name
-    if binary not in ALLOWED_BINARIES:
-        return f"binary '{binary}' not in tool allowlist"
-    joined = " ".join(str(a) for a in argv)
-    for pattern in SUSPICIOUS_PATTERNS:
-        if re.search(pattern, joined, re.IGNORECASE):
-            return f"matches blocked pattern: {pattern}"
-    return ""
-
-
-def check_path(path: Path, roots: list) -> str:
-    """Return a block reason unless path resolves inside an allowed root."""
-    resolved = Path(path).resolve()
-    for root in roots:
-        try:
-            resolved.relative_to(Path(root).resolve())
-            return ""
-        except ValueError:
-            continue
-    return f"path {resolved} escapes allowed roots {roots}"
-
-
-def run_checked(argv: list, cwd: str | None = None,
-                timeout: int = 60) -> ToolResult:
-    reason = check_command(argv)
-    if reason:
-        return ToolResult(ok=False, blocked_reason=reason)
-    try:
-        proc = subprocess.run(
-            argv, cwd=cwd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout,
-        )
-    except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
-        return ToolResult(ok=False, stderr=f"timed out after {timeout}s")
-    except FileNotFoundError as exc:
-        return ToolResult(ok=False, stderr=str(exc))
-    except OSError as exc:
-        return ToolResult(ok=False, stderr=str(exc))
-    return ToolResult(
-        ok=proc.returncode == 0,
-        stdout=proc.stdout,
-        stderr=proc.stderr,
-        returncode=proc.returncode,
-    )